Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse

Mauro Conti; Marin Duroyon; Gabriele Orazi; Gene Tsudik

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_3

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse

Mauro Conti, Marin Duroyon, Gabriele Orazi^*, Gene Tsudik

^*Corresponding author for this work

Cyber Security

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar attacks targeting other human-interface peripherals, such as computer mice, are under-explored. To this end, this paper considers security leakage via acoustic signals emanating from normal mouse usage. We first confirm feasibility of such attacks by showing a proof-of-concept attack that classifies four mouse movements with 97% accuracy in a controlled environment. We then evolve the attack towards discerning twelve unique mouse movements using a smartphone to record the experiment. Using Machine Learning (ML) techniques, the model is trained on an experiment with six participants to be generalizable and discern among twelve movements with 94% accuracy. In addition, we experiment with an attack that detects a user action of closing a full-screen window on a laptop. Achieving an accuracy of 91%, this experiment highlights exploiting audio leakage from computer mouse movements in a realistic scenario.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 21st International Conference, DIMVA 2024, Proceedings
Editors	Federico Maggi, Manuel Egele, Mathias Payer, Michele Carminati
Publisher	Springer
Pages	44-63
Number of pages	20
ISBN (Print)	9783031641701
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_3
Publication status	Published - 2024
Event	21st International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA 2024 - Lausanne, Switzerland Duration: 17 Jul 2024 → 19 Jul 2024

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	14828 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	21st International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA 2024
Country/Territory	Switzerland
City	Lausanne
Period	17/07/24 → 19/07/24

Bibliographical note

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care
Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

Keywords

Acoustic Side-channel
Acoustic Signals
Audio Leakage
Computer Mouse
Cybersecurity
Human Interface Devices
Input Devices
Machine Learning
Mouse Movement

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_3

Cite this

Conti, M., Duroyon, M., Orazi, G., & Tsudik, G. (2024). Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse. In F. Maggi, M. Egele, M. Payer, & M. Carminati (Eds.), Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 21st International Conference, DIMVA 2024, Proceedings (pp. 44-63). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 14828 LNCS). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_3

Conti, Mauro ; Duroyon, Marin ; Orazi, Gabriele et al. / Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse. Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 21st International Conference, DIMVA 2024, Proceedings. editor / Federico Maggi ; Manuel Egele ; Mathias Payer ; Michele Carminati. Springer, 2024. pp. 44-63 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse",

abstract = "Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar attacks targeting other human-interface peripherals, such as computer mice, are under-explored. To this end, this paper considers security leakage via acoustic signals emanating from normal mouse usage. We first confirm feasibility of such attacks by showing a proof-of-concept attack that classifies four mouse movements with 97% accuracy in a controlled environment. We then evolve the attack towards discerning twelve unique mouse movements using a smartphone to record the experiment. Using Machine Learning (ML) techniques, the model is trained on an experiment with six participants to be generalizable and discern among twelve movements with 94% accuracy. In addition, we experiment with an attack that detects a user action of closing a full-screen window on a laptop. Achieving an accuracy of 91%, this experiment highlights exploiting audio leakage from computer mouse movements in a realistic scenario.",

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note = "Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository {\textquoteleft}You share, we take care!{\textquoteright} – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public. ; 21st International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA 2024 ; Conference date: 17-07-2024 Through 19-07-2024",

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Conti, M, Duroyon, M, Orazi, G & Tsudik, G 2024, Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse. in F Maggi, M Egele, M Payer & M Carminati (eds), Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 21st International Conference, DIMVA 2024, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 14828 LNCS, Springer, pp. 44-63, 21st International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, DIMVA 2024, Lausanne, Switzerland, 17/07/24. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_3

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse. / Conti, Mauro; Duroyon, Marin; Orazi, Gabriele et al.
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 21st International Conference, DIMVA 2024, Proceedings. ed. / Federico Maggi; Manuel Egele; Mathias Payer; Michele Carminati. Springer, 2024. p. 44-63 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 14828 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

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AU - Tsudik, Gene

N1 - Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

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Conti M, Duroyon M, Orazi G, Tsudik G. Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on a Computer Mouse. In Maggi F, Egele M, Payer M, Carminati M, editors, Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment - 21st International Conference, DIMVA 2024, Proceedings. Springer. 2024. p. 44-63. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_3