Abstract
We present a proof of Arrow's theorem from social choice theory that uses a fixpoint argument. Specifically, we use Banach's result on the existence of a fixpoint of a contractive map defined on a complete metric space. Conceptually, our approach shows that dictatorships can be seen as fixpoints of a certain process.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings TARK 2019 |
Publisher | Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science |
Pages | 175-188 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Volume | 297 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Event | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge - Toulouse, France Duration: 17 Jul 2019 → 19 Jul 2019 Conference number: 17 |
Publication series
Name | Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS |
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Publisher | Open Publishing Association |
ISSN (Print) | 2075-2180 |
Conference
Conference | Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge |
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Abbreviated title | TARK |
Country/Territory | France |
City | Toulouse |
Period | 17/07/19 → 19/07/19 |
Keywords
- Social choice theory
- voting
- Arrow’s impossibility theorem
- Banach’s fixpoint theorem
- dictatorship
- force
- fixpoint
- metric