Boolean Negotiation Games

Nils Bulling, Koen V. Hindriks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review


We propose Boolean Negotiation Games, a computationally grounded model to investigate strategic aspects of negotiations. Our model is inspired by the popular Boolean Game framework and Rubinstein’s bargaining model of alternating offers. We analyse restrictions on negotiation protocols and investigate properties of agreements. We propose and investigate protocols that do not allow repeating offers. In the context of Boolean Games we then naturally obtain finite games, which arise in many practical negotiation contexts. We show that Boolean negotiation games (BNGs) can yield agreements which are more beneficial than the stable solutions (i.e. Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game, and propose an algorithm to compute stable negotiation strategies.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConflict Resolution in Decision Making
Subtitle of host publicationSecond International Workshop, COREDEMA 2016
EditorsReyhan Aydoğan, Tim Baarslag, Enrico Gerding, Catholijn M. Jonker, Vicente Julian, Victor Sanchez-Ang
Place of PublicationCham
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-57285-7
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-57284-0
Publication statusPublished - 2017
EventCOREDEMA 2016: 2nd International Workshop on Conflict Resolution in Decision Making - The Hague, Netherlands
Duration: 29 Aug 201630 Aug 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print)0302-9743


ConferenceCOREDEMA 2016
CityThe Hague


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