Competition Between Cooperative Projects

Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs De Weerdt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

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A paper needs to be good enough to be published; a grant proposal needs to be sufficiently convincing compared to the other proposals, in order to get funded. Papers and proposals are examples of cooperative projects that compete with each other and require effort from the involved agents, while often these agents need to divide their efforts across several such projects. We aim to provide advice how an agent can act optimally and how the designer of such a competition (e.g., the program chairs) can create the conditions under which a socially optimal outcome can be obtained. We therefore extend a model for dividing effort across projects with two types of competition: a quota or a success threshold. In the quota competition type, only a given number of the best projects survive, while in the second competition type, only the projects that are better than a predefined success threshold survive. For these two types of games we prove conditions for equilibrium existence and efficiency. Additionally we find that competitions using a success threshold can more often have an efficient equilibrium than those using a quota. We also show that often a socially optimal Nash equilibrium exists, but there exist inefficient equilibria as well, requiring regulation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationArtificial Intelligence
Subtitle of host publication29th Benelux Conference, BNAIC 2017, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsB. Verheij, M. Wiering
Place of PublicationCham
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-76892-2
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-76891-5
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Event29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Groningen, Netherlands
Duration: 8 Nov 20179 Nov 2017
Conference number: 29

Publication series

NameCommunications in Computer and Information Science
ISSN (Print)1865-0929


Conference29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Abbreviated titleBNAIC 2017
Internet address

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