Coordination games in cancer

Péter Bayer*, Robert A. Gatenby, Patricia H. McDonald, Derek R. Duckett, Kateřina Staňková, Joel S. Brown

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.
Original languageEnglish
Article numbere0261578
JournalPLoS ONE
Volume17
Issue number1 January
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

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