Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial

Q.B. Lone; Alisa Frik; Matthew Luckie; MacIej Korczyński; M.J.G. van Eeten; C. Hernandez Ganan

doi:10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833701

Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial

Q.B. Lone, Alisa Frik, Matthew Luckie, MacIej Korczyński, M.J.G. van Eeten, C. Hernandez Ganan

Organisation & Governance

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

127 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

IP spoofing, sending IP packets with a false source IP address, continues to be a primary attack vector for large-scale Denial of Service attacks. To combat spoofing, various interventions have been tried to increase the adoption of source address validation (SAV) among network operators. How can SAV deployment be increased? In this work, we conduct the first randomized control trial to measure the effectiveness of various notification mechanisms on SAV deployment. We include new treatments using nudges and channels, previously untested in notification experiments. Our design reveals a painful reality that contrasts with earlier observational studies: none of the notification treatments significantly improved SAV deployment compared to the control group. We explore the reasons for these findings and report on a survey among operators to identify ways forward. A portion of the operators indicate that they do plan to deploy SAV and ask for better notification mechanisms, training, and support materials for SAV implementation.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings - 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2022
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	2361-2378
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Electronic)	9781665413169
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833701
Publication status	Published - 2022
Event	43rd EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) - San Francisco, United States Duration: 22 May 2022 → 26 May 2022 Conference number: 43 https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2022/

Conference

Conference	43rd EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Country/Territory	United States
City	San Francisco
Period	22/05/22 → 26/05/22
Internet address	https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2022/

Bibliographical note

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care
Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

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10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833701

Deployment_of_Source_Address_Validation_by_Network_Operators_A_Randomized_Control_TrialFinal published version, 1.94 MB

Cite this

@inproceedings{d228a44165c1461abb5c6d411aa3eef9,

title = "Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial",

abstract = "IP spoofing, sending IP packets with a false source IP address, continues to be a primary attack vector for large-scale Denial of Service attacks. To combat spoofing, various interventions have been tried to increase the adoption of source address validation (SAV) among network operators. How can SAV deployment be increased? In this work, we conduct the first randomized control trial to measure the effectiveness of various notification mechanisms on SAV deployment. We include new treatments using nudges and channels, previously untested in notification experiments. Our design reveals a painful reality that contrasts with earlier observational studies: none of the notification treatments significantly improved SAV deployment compared to the control group. We explore the reasons for these findings and report on a survey among operators to identify ways forward. A portion of the operators indicate that they do plan to deploy SAV and ask for better notification mechanisms, training, and support materials for SAV implementation.",

author = "Q.B. Lone and Alisa Frik and Matthew Luckie and MacIej Korczy{\'n}ski and {van Eeten}, M.J.G. and {Hernandez Ganan}, C.",

note = "Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.; 43rd EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) ; Conference date: 22-05-2022 Through 26-05-2022",

year = "2022",

doi = "10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833701",

language = "English",

pages = "2361--2378",

booktitle = "Proceedings - 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2022",

publisher = "IEEE",

address = "United States",

url = "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2022/",

}

Lone, QB, Frik, A, Luckie, M, Korczyński, M, van Eeten, MJG & Hernandez Ganan, C 2022, Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial. in Proceedings - 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2022. IEEE, pp. 2361-2378, 43rd EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Francisco, United States, 22/05/22. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833701

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T1 - Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators

T2 - 43rd EEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

AU - Lone, Q.B.

AU - Frik, Alisa

AU - Luckie, Matthew

AU - Korczyński, MacIej

AU - van Eeten, M.J.G.

AU - Hernandez Ganan, C.

N1 - Conference code: 43

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - IP spoofing, sending IP packets with a false source IP address, continues to be a primary attack vector for large-scale Denial of Service attacks. To combat spoofing, various interventions have been tried to increase the adoption of source address validation (SAV) among network operators. How can SAV deployment be increased? In this work, we conduct the first randomized control trial to measure the effectiveness of various notification mechanisms on SAV deployment. We include new treatments using nudges and channels, previously untested in notification experiments. Our design reveals a painful reality that contrasts with earlier observational studies: none of the notification treatments significantly improved SAV deployment compared to the control group. We explore the reasons for these findings and report on a survey among operators to identify ways forward. A portion of the operators indicate that they do plan to deploy SAV and ask for better notification mechanisms, training, and support materials for SAV implementation.

AB - IP spoofing, sending IP packets with a false source IP address, continues to be a primary attack vector for large-scale Denial of Service attacks. To combat spoofing, various interventions have been tried to increase the adoption of source address validation (SAV) among network operators. How can SAV deployment be increased? In this work, we conduct the first randomized control trial to measure the effectiveness of various notification mechanisms on SAV deployment. We include new treatments using nudges and channels, previously untested in notification experiments. Our design reveals a painful reality that contrasts with earlier observational studies: none of the notification treatments significantly improved SAV deployment compared to the control group. We explore the reasons for these findings and report on a survey among operators to identify ways forward. A portion of the operators indicate that they do plan to deploy SAV and ask for better notification mechanisms, training, and support materials for SAV implementation.

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DO - 10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833701

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 2361

EP - 2378

BT - Proceedings - 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2022

PB - IEEE

Y2 - 22 May 2022 through 26 May 2022

ER -

Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial

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Cybersecurity (TPM)

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Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial

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Bibliographical note

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Cybersecurity (TPM)

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