Device independence for two-party cryptography and position verification with memoryless devices

Jérémy Ribeiro, Thinh Lê, Jȩdrzej Kaniewski, Jonas Helsen, Stephanie Wehner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)
15 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Quantum communication has demonstrated its usefulness for quantum cryptography far beyond quantum key distribution. One domain is two-party cryptography, whose goal is to allow two parties who may not trust each other to solve joint tasks. Another interesting application is position-based cryptography whose goal is to use the geographical location of an entity as its only identifying credential. Unfortunately, security of these protocols is not possible against an all powerful adversary. However, if we impose some realistic physical constraints on the adversary, there exist protocols for which security can be proven, but these so far relied on the knowledge of the quantum operations performed during the protocols. In this work we improve the device-independent security proofs of Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)NJOPFM1367-263010.1088/1367-2630/18/5/055004] for two-party cryptography (with memoryless devices) and we add a security proof for device-independent position verification (also memoryless devices) under different physical constraints on the adversary. We assess the quality of the devices by observing a Bell violation, and, as for Kaniewski and Wehner [New J. Phys. 18, 055004 (2016)NJOPFM1367-263010.1088/1367-2630/18/5/055004], security can be attained for any violation of the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne inequality.

Original languageEnglish
Article number062307
JournalPhysical Review A
Volume97
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 5 Jun 2018

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Device independence for two-party cryptography and position verification with memoryless devices'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this