TY - GEN
T1 - Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders
AU - Robu, Valentin
AU - Parkes, David C.
AU - Ito, Takayuki
AU - Jennings, Nicholas R.
PY - 2013/12/1
Y1 - 2013/12/1
N2 - We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in which submitted bids are linear combinations of bids received from others. We extend the existing state of the art, by identifying constraints on the interesting bundles and contingency weights reported by the agents which allow the efficient second priced, fixed point bids auction to be implemented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for domains in which the required single crossing condition fails (which characterizes when efficient, IC auctions are possible), we design a two-stage mechanism in which a subset of agents ("experts" ) are allocated first, using their reports to allocate the remaining items to the other agents.
AB - We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in which submitted bids are linear combinations of bids received from others. We extend the existing state of the art, by identifying constraints on the interesting bundles and contingency weights reported by the agents which allow the efficient second priced, fixed point bids auction to be implemented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for domains in which the required single crossing condition fails (which characterizes when efficient, IC auctions are possible), we design a two-stage mechanism in which a subset of agents ("experts" ) are allocated first, using their reports to allocate the remaining items to the other agents.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84896062802&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84896062802
SN - 9781577356332
T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 339
EP - 345
BT - IJCAI 2013 - Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
T2 - 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2013
Y2 - 3 August 2013 through 9 August 2013
ER -