Efficient interdependent value combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders

Valentin Robu, David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito, Nicholas R. Jennings

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


We study the problem of designing efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values; i.e., values that depend on the signals of other agents. We consider a contingent bid model in which agents can explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. In particular, we adopt a linear contingent bidding model for single minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), in which submitted bids are linear combinations of bids received from others. We extend the existing state of the art, by identifying constraints on the interesting bundles and contingency weights reported by the agents which allow the efficient second priced, fixed point bids auction to be implemented in single minded CAs. Moreover, for domains in which the required single crossing condition fails (which characterizes when efficient, IC auctions are possible), we design a two-stage mechanism in which a subset of agents ("experts" ) are allocated first, using their reports to allocate the remaining items to the other agents.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2013 - Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number of pages7
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2013 - Beijing, China
Duration: 3 Aug 20139 Aug 2013

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823


Conference23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2013

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