Emotion-enriched moral perception

This article provides a new account of how moral beliefs can be epistemically justified. I argue that we should take seriously the hypothesis that the human mind contains emotion-enriched moral perceptions, i.e. perceptual experiences as of moral properties, arising from cognitive penetration by emotions. Further, I argue that if this hypothesis is true, then such perceptual experiences can provide regress-stopping justification for moral beliefs. Emotion-enriched moral perceptions do exhibit a kind of epistemic dependence: they can only justify moral beliefs if the emotions from which they arise are themselves justified. However, to have a justified emotion, one only needs (1) to possess some non-moral information and (2) to respond fittingly to this information. Neither (1) nor (2) requires one to possess any justification for moral beliefs antecedently, so emotion-enriched moral perceptions can halt the regress of moral justification.