Abstract
The adoption of new market mechanisms - vital to the better integration of flexible assets - depends on the fairness and nondiscrimination of the pricing rules. We consider a market setting with time-flexible unit energy buyers and sellers, that additionally submit their availability in time. The time-flexibility of the agents allows for different schedules to be equivalent with regard to social welfare, which can lead to arbitrary price differences, i.e. price discrimination. In this work, we demonstrate that non-discriminatory prices are not trivially defined in time-flexible settings, provide a definition of non-discrimination as consistent over equivalent outcomes, show that this concept does not conflict with individual rationality and, finally, compare our work to broader concepts of fairness from economic psychology.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2703-2705 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
| Volume | 2023-May |
| Publication status | Published - 2023 |
| Event | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom Duration: 29 May 2023 → 2 Jun 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository ‘You share, we take care!’ – Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-careOtherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.
Keywords
- Auctions
- Discrimination
- Energy Markets
- Mechanism Design