Fundamental finite key limits for information reconciliation in quantum key distribution

Marco Tomamichel, Jesus Martinez-Mateo, Christoph Pacher, David Elkouss

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The security of quantum key distribution protocols is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a precise analysis of the security properties requires tools from both classical cryptography and information theory. Here, we employ recent results in non-asymptotic classical information theory to show that information reconciliation imposes fundamental limitations on the amount of secret key that can be extracted in the finite key regime. In particular, we find that an often used approximation for the information leakage during one-way information reconciliation is flawed and we propose an improved estimate.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Pages1469-1473
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)9781479951864
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2014 - Honolulu, HI, United States
Duration: 29 Jun 20144 Jul 2014

Conference

Conference2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2014
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu, HI
Period29/06/144/07/14

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