TY - GEN
T1 - Game-theoretic modeling of transmission line reinforcements with distributed generation
AU - Andoni, Merlinda
AU - Robu, Valentin
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - Favourable sites for renewable generation are often remote locations (such as islands) where installed capacity, e.g. from wind turbines, exceeds local aggregate demand. We study the effect that curtailment mechanisms - applied when there is excess generation - have on the incentives to build additional capacity and the profitability of the generators. Next, for a two-location setting, we study the combined effect that curtailment schemes and line access rules have on the decision to invest in transmission expansion. In particular, for "common access" rules, this leads to a Stackelberg game between transmission and local generation capacity investors, and we characterise the equilibrium of this game. Finally, we apply and exemplify our model to a concrete problem of a grid reinforcement project, between Hunterston and the Kintyre peninsula, in western Scotland, and we determine a mechanism for setting transmission charges that assures both the profitability of the line and local renewable investors.
AB - Favourable sites for renewable generation are often remote locations (such as islands) where installed capacity, e.g. from wind turbines, exceeds local aggregate demand. We study the effect that curtailment mechanisms - applied when there is excess generation - have on the incentives to build additional capacity and the profitability of the generators. Next, for a two-location setting, we study the combined effect that curtailment schemes and line access rules have on the decision to invest in transmission expansion. In particular, for "common access" rules, this leads to a Stackelberg game between transmission and local generation capacity investors, and we characterise the equilibrium of this game. Finally, we apply and exemplify our model to a concrete problem of a grid reinforcement project, between Hunterston and the Kintyre peninsula, in western Scotland, and we determine a mechanism for setting transmission charges that assures both the profitability of the line and local renewable investors.
KW - Generation incentives
KW - Renewable energy
KW - Stackelberg game
KW - Transmission investment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85014251964&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85014251964
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 1291
EP - 1292
BT - AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Y2 - 9 May 2016 through 13 May 2016
ER -