Game-theoretic modeling of transmission line reinforcements with distributed generation

Merlinda Andoni, Valentin Robu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Favourable sites for renewable generation are often remote locations (such as islands) where installed capacity, e.g. from wind turbines, exceeds local aggregate demand. We study the effect that curtailment mechanisms - applied when there is excess generation - have on the incentives to build additional capacity and the profitability of the generators. Next, for a two-location setting, we study the combined effect that curtailment schemes and line access rules have on the decision to invest in transmission expansion. In particular, for "common access" rules, this leads to a Stackelberg game between transmission and local generation capacity investors, and we characterise the equilibrium of this game. Finally, we apply and exemplify our model to a concrete problem of a grid reinforcement project, between Hunterston and the Kintyre peninsula, in western Scotland, and we determine a mechanism for setting transmission charges that assures both the profitability of the line and local renewable investors.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1291-1292
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 9 May 201613 May 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period9/05/1613/05/16

Keywords

  • Generation incentives
  • Renewable energy
  • Stackelberg game
  • Transmission investment

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