Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers

MacIej Korczyński; Yevheniya Nosyk; Qasim Lone; Marcin Skwarek; Baptiste Jonglez; Andrzej Duda

doi:10.1145/3404868.3406668

Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers

MacIej Korczyński, Yevheniya Nosyk, Qasim Lone, Marcin Skwarek, Baptiste Jonglez, Andrzej Duda

Organisation & Governance

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper reports on the first Internet-wide active measurement study to enumerate networks not filtering incoming packets based on their source address. Our method identifies closed and open DNS resolvers handling requests from the outside of the network with the source address in the prefix of the tested network. The study gives the most complete picture of the inbound Source Address Validation deployment at network providers: 32,673 IPv4 ASes and 197,641 IPv4 BGP prefixes are vulnerable to spoofing of inbound traffic.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Pages	9-11
Number of pages	3
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450380393
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3404868.3406668
Publication status	Published - 2020
Event	2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop, ANRW 2020 - Meetecho, Online, Spain Duration: 27 Jul 2020 → 30 Jul 2020

Publication series

Name	ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop

Conference

Conference	2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop, ANRW 2020
Country/Territory	Spain
City	Meetecho, Online
Period	27/07/20 → 30/07/20

Access to Document

10.1145/3404868.3406668

Cite this

Korczyński, M., Nosyk, Y., Lone, Q., Skwarek, M., Jonglez, B., & Duda, A. (2020). Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers. In ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop (pp. 9-11). (ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop). Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). https://doi.org/10.1145/3404868.3406668

Korczyński, MacIej ; Nosyk, Yevheniya ; Lone, Qasim ; Skwarek, Marcin ; Jonglez, Baptiste ; Duda, Andrzej. / Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers. ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2020. pp. 9-11 (ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop).

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title = "Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers",

abstract = "This paper reports on the first Internet-wide active measurement study to enumerate networks not filtering incoming packets based on their source address. Our method identifies closed and open DNS resolvers handling requests from the outside of the network with the source address in the prefix of the tested network. The study gives the most complete picture of the inbound Source Address Validation deployment at network providers: 32,673 IPv4 ASes and 197,641 IPv4 BGP prefixes are vulnerable to spoofing of inbound traffic.",

author = "MacIej Korczy{\'n}ski and Yevheniya Nosyk and Qasim Lone and Marcin Skwarek and Baptiste Jonglez and Andrzej Duda",

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series = "ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop",

publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)",

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booktitle = "ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop",

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note = "2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop, ANRW 2020 ; Conference date: 27-07-2020 Through 30-07-2020",

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Korczyński, M, Nosyk, Y, Lone, Q, Skwarek, M, Jonglez, B & Duda, A 2020, Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers. in ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop. ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), pp. 9-11, 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop, ANRW 2020, Meetecho, Online, Spain, 27/07/20. https://doi.org/10.1145/3404868.3406668

Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers. / Korczyński, MacIej; Nosyk, Yevheniya; Lone, Qasim; Skwarek, Marcin; Jonglez, Baptiste; Duda, Andrzej.

ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), 2020. p. 9-11 (ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

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AU - Jonglez, Baptiste

AU - Duda, Andrzej

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Korczyński M, Nosyk Y, Lone Q, Skwarek M, Jonglez B, Duda A. Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers. In ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop. Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 2020. p. 9-11. (ANRW 2020 - Proceedings of the 2020 Applied Networking Research Workshop). https://doi.org/10.1145/3404868.3406668

Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers

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Cybersecurity (TPM)

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Inferring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address Validation Using DNS Resolvers

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

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Projects

Cybersecurity (TPM)

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