TY - GEN
T1 - LightRoAD
T2 - 2021 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)
AU - Taouil, Mottaqiallah
AU - Reinbrecht, Cezar
AU - Hamdioui, Said
AU - Sepulveda, Johanna
N1 - Accepted author manuscript
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)-based systems are widely used in mobile and portable applications where low-cost and high-storage memory capability are required. However, such systems are prone to attacks. A latent threat to DRAM-based system security is the so-called Rowhammer attacks. By repeatedly accessing memory, an attacker is able to perform unauthorized data modifications into physically adjacent memory locations. As a consequence, powerful privilege-escalation attacks can be achieved. Although most of the known countermeasures are based on refresh strategies or intensive address monitoring, their efficient and low-cost realization is still a challenge. In this work, we present LightRoad, a lightweight and flexible hardware detector for Rowhammer attacks. Additionally, we propose two variants that further extend the LightRoad security, namely LightRoAD+Sec and LightRoAD+PARA. Our experiments show that LightRoad and its variants are very efficient and effective to detect attacks while having an affordable cost that varies according to the desired security level.
AB - Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)-based systems are widely used in mobile and portable applications where low-cost and high-storage memory capability are required. However, such systems are prone to attacks. A latent threat to DRAM-based system security is the so-called Rowhammer attacks. By repeatedly accessing memory, an attacker is able to perform unauthorized data modifications into physically adjacent memory locations. As a consequence, powerful privilege-escalation attacks can be achieved. Although most of the known countermeasures are based on refresh strategies or intensive address monitoring, their efficient and low-cost realization is still a challenge. In this work, we present LightRoad, a lightweight and flexible hardware detector for Rowhammer attacks. Additionally, we propose two variants that further extend the LightRoad security, namely LightRoAD+Sec and LightRoAD+PARA. Our experiments show that LightRoad and its variants are very efficient and effective to detect attacks while having an affordable cost that varies according to the desired security level.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85114962056
U2 - 10.1109/ISVLSI51109.2021.00072
DO - 10.1109/ISVLSI51109.2021.00072
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 978-1-6654-3947-3
T3 - Proceedings of IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI
SP - 362
EP - 367
BT - Proceedings - 2021 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2021
A2 - Ceballos, Cristina
PB - IEEE
CY - Piscataway
Y2 - 7 July 2021 through 9 July 2021
ER -