Localised Reputation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

M. Toman; N. Yorke-Smith

Localised Reputation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

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Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

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Abstract

Under what conditions can cooperation emerge and be sustained? Previous studies abstract cooperation and defection using the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. We study a local reputation mechanism in which agents can remember defectors, abstain from interacting with them, and warn nearby agents. Simulations find that local reputation is effective in sustaining cooperation and punishing defection. Further, we find that the size of agent memory and amount of gossip are not significant factors, provided that the locality range of gossip is greater than the agent movement speed.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021
Subtitle of host publication	33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning
Editors	Edit Luis A. Leiva, Cédric Pruski, Réka Markovich, Amro Najjar, Christoph Schommer
Pages	761-763
Publication status	Published - 2021
Event	33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning - Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg Duration: 10 Nov 2021 → 12 Nov 2021

Conference

Conference	33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning
Abbreviated title	BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021
Country/Territory	Luxembourg
City	Esch-sur-Alzette
Period	10/11/21 → 12/11/21

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title = "Localised Reputation in the Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma",

abstract = "Under what conditions can cooperation emerge and be sustained? Previous studies abstract cooperation and defection using the spatial Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma (PD) game. We study a local reputation mechanism in which agents can remember defectors, abstain from interacting with them, and warn nearby agents. Simulations find that local reputation is effective in sustaining cooperation and punishing defection. Further, we find that the size of agent memory and amount of gossip are not significant factors, provided that the locality range of gossip is greater than the agent movement speed. ",

author = "M. Toman and N. Yorke-Smith",

year = "2021",

language = "English",

pages = "761--763",

editor = "Leiva, {Edit Luis A. } and Pruski, {C{\'e}dric } and Markovich, {R{\'e}ka } and Najjar, {Amro } and Schommer, {Christoph }",

booktitle = "BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021",

note = "33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and<br/>30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning, BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021 ; Conference date: 10-11-2021 Through 12-11-2021",

}

Toman, M & Yorke-Smith, N 2021, Localised Reputation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. in ELA Leiva, C Pruski, R Markovich, A Najjar & C Schommer (eds), BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021: 33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning. pp. 761-763, 33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and
30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg, 10/11/21.

Localised Reputation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. / Toman, M.; Yorke-Smith, N.
BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021: 33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning. ed. / Edit Luis A. Leiva; Cédric Pruski; Réka Markovich; Amro Najjar; Christoph Schommer. 2021. p. 761-763.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Localised Reputation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

AU - Toman, M.

AU - Yorke-Smith, N.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Under what conditions can cooperation emerge and be sustained? Previous studies abstract cooperation and defection using the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. We study a local reputation mechanism in which agents can remember defectors, abstain from interacting with them, and warn nearby agents. Simulations find that local reputation is effective in sustaining cooperation and punishing defection. Further, we find that the size of agent memory and amount of gossip are not significant factors, provided that the locality range of gossip is greater than the agent movement speed.

AB - Under what conditions can cooperation emerge and be sustained? Previous studies abstract cooperation and defection using the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. We study a local reputation mechanism in which agents can remember defectors, abstain from interacting with them, and warn nearby agents. Simulations find that local reputation is effective in sustaining cooperation and punishing defection. Further, we find that the size of agent memory and amount of gossip are not significant factors, provided that the locality range of gossip is greater than the agent movement speed.

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 761

EP - 763

BT - BNAIC/BeneLearn 2021

A2 - Leiva, Edit Luis A.

A2 - Pruski, Cédric

A2 - Markovich, Réka

A2 - Najjar, Amro

A2 - Schommer, Christoph

T2 - 33rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence and<br/>30th Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning

Y2 - 10 November 2021 through 12 November 2021

ER -

Localised Reputation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract

Conference

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