TY - JOUR
T1 - Moral foundations theory and the narrative self
T2 - towards an improved concept of moral selfhood for the empirical study of morality
AU - van den Berg, Tom Gerardus Constantijn
AU - Corrias, Luigi Dennis Alessandro
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Within the empirical study of moral decision making, people’s morality is often identified by measuring general moral values through a questionnaire, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the success of these moral values in predicting people’s behaviour has been disappointing. The general and context-free manner in which such approaches measure moral values and people’s moral identity seems crucial in this respect. Yet, little research has been done into the underlying notion of self. This article aims to fill this gap. Taking a phenomenological approach and focusing on MFT, we examine the concept of moral self that MFT assumes and present an improved concept of moral self for the empirical study of morality. First, we show that MFT adopts an essentialist concept of moral self, consisting of stable moral traits. Then, we argue that such a notion is unable to grasp the dynamical and context sensitive aspects of the moral self. We submit that Ricoeur’s narrative notion of identity, a self that reinterprets itself in every decision situation through self-narrative, is a viable alternative since it is able to incorporate context sensitivity and change, while maintaining a persisting moral identity. Finally, we argue that this narrative concept of moral self implies measuring people’s morality in a more exploratory fashion within a delineated context.
AB - Within the empirical study of moral decision making, people’s morality is often identified by measuring general moral values through a questionnaire, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the success of these moral values in predicting people’s behaviour has been disappointing. The general and context-free manner in which such approaches measure moral values and people’s moral identity seems crucial in this respect. Yet, little research has been done into the underlying notion of self. This article aims to fill this gap. Taking a phenomenological approach and focusing on MFT, we examine the concept of moral self that MFT assumes and present an improved concept of moral self for the empirical study of morality. First, we show that MFT adopts an essentialist concept of moral self, consisting of stable moral traits. Then, we argue that such a notion is unable to grasp the dynamical and context sensitive aspects of the moral self. We submit that Ricoeur’s narrative notion of identity, a self that reinterprets itself in every decision situation through self-narrative, is a viable alternative since it is able to incorporate context sensitivity and change, while maintaining a persisting moral identity. Finally, we argue that this narrative concept of moral self implies measuring people’s morality in a more exploratory fashion within a delineated context.
KW - Moral Foundation Theory
KW - Moral self
KW - Moral values
KW - Narrative self
KW - Ricoeur
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85161459652&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11097-023-09918-x
DO - 10.1007/s11097-023-09918-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85161459652
SN - 1568-7759
JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
ER -