Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games

Gleb Polevoy, Stojan Trajanovski, Mathijs M. de Weerdt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Shared effort games model people's contribution to projects and sharing the obtained profits.
Those games generalize both public projects like writing for Wikipedia, where everybody shares the resulting benefits, and all-pay auctions such as contests and political campaigns, where only the winner obtains a profit.
In $\theta$-equal sharing (effort) games, a threshold for effort defines which contributors win and then receive their (equal) share.
(For public projects $\theta = 0$ and for all-pay auctions $\theta = 1$.)
Thresholds between 0 and 1 can model games such as paper co-authorship and shared homework assignments.
First, we fully characterize the conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for two-player shared effort games
with close budgets and
project value functions that are linear on the received contribution and prove some efficiency results.
Second, since the theory does not work for more players, fictitious play simulations are used to show when such an equilibrium exists and what its efficiency is.
The results about existence and efficiency of these equilibria provide the likely strategy profiles and
the socially preferred strategies to use in real life situations of contribution to public projects.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems
Place of PublicationRichland, SC
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Pages861-868
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-2738-1
Publication statusPublished - 2014
EventAAMAS 2014: 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Paris, France
Duration: 5 May 20149 May 2014
Conference number: 13

Publication series

NameAAMAS '14
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Conference

ConferenceAAMAS 2014
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period5/05/149/05/14

Keywords

  • competition, equilibrium, market, models, shared effort games, simulation

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