Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games with double-integrator agents

Filippo Fabiani, Andrea Caiti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, we show the equivalence between a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game. Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a network of double-integrator agents, which can be represented as a graph. Virtual couplings, i.e., pairs of spring-damper, assigned to each edge of the graph, allow to synthesize a distributed, gradient-based control law that steers the network to an invariant set of stable configurations. We characterize the points belonging to such set as Nash equilibria of the associated potential game, relating the parameters of the virtual couplings with the equilibrium seeking problem, since they are crucial to shape the transient behavior (i.e., the convergence) and, ideally, the set of achievable equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-907144-00-8
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Event18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019 - Naples, Italy
Duration: 25 Jun 201928 Jun 2019


Conference18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019


Dive into the research topics of 'Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games with double-integrator agents'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this