We consider Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize the relation between several monotonicity and smoothness assumptions postulated in the literature. Furthermore, we prove convergence of a preconditioned proximal-point algorithm, under a restricted monotonicity property that allows for a non-Lipschitz, non-continuous game mapping.
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2022)|
|Publication status||Published - 2022|
|Event||IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2022) - Cancún, Mexico|
Duration: 6 Dec 2022 → 9 Dec 2022
|Conference||IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2022)|
|Period||6/12/22 → 9/12/22|
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- Nash equilibrium
- Cost function