On the approachability principle for distributed payoff allocation in coalitional games

Aitazaz Ali Raja, Sergio Grammatico

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articleScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
42 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In the context of coalitional games, we present a partial operator-theoretic characterization of the approachability principle and, based on this characterization, we interpret a particular distributed payoff allocation algorithm to be a sequence of time-varying paracontractions. Then, we also propose a distributed payoff allocation algorithm on time-varying communication networks. The state in the proposed algorithm converges to a consensus in the”CORE” set as desired. For the convergence analysis, we rely on an operator-theoretic property of paracontraction.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2690-2695
JournalIFAC-PapersOnline
Volume53 (2020)
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Event21st IFAC World Congress 2020 - Berlin, Germany
Duration: 12 Jul 202017 Jul 2020

Keywords

  • Approachability principle
  • Coalitional game theory
  • Paracontraction

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