Optimal nonlinear solutions for reverse Stackelberg games with incomplete information

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Abstract

The reverse Stackelberg game provides a suitable decision-making framework for hierarchical control problems like network pricing and toll design. We propose a novel numerical solution approach for systematic computation of optimal nonlinear leader functions, also known as incentives, for reverse Stackelberg games with incomplete information and general, nonconcave utility functions. In particular, we apply basis function approximation to the class of nonlinear leader functions, and treat the incentive design problem as a standard semi-infinite programming problem. A worked example is provided to illustrate the proposed solution approach and to demonstrate its efficiency.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
EditorsFrancesco Bullo, Christophe Prieur, Alessandro Giua
Place of PublicationPiscataway, NJ, USA
PublisherIEEE
Pages5304-5309
ISBN (Print)978-1-5090-1837-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States
Duration: 12 Dec 201614 Dec 2016

Conference

Conference55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Abbreviated titleCDC 2016
CountryUnited States
CityLas Vegas
Period12/12/1614/12/16

Keywords

  • Games
  • Programming
  • Optimization
  • Standards
  • Systematics
  • Indexes
  • Decision making

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