Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of ``robust core". Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely, distributed payoff allocation and distributed bargaining, that converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for ``robust coalitional games".

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Keywords

  • Control systems
  • Costs
  • Distributed Algorithms
  • Dynamic Games
  • Energy Systems
  • Game Theory
  • Games
  • Multi-agent systems
  • Network systems
  • Resource management
  • Stability criteria
  • Uncertainty

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