Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Aitazaz Ali Raja; Sergio Grammatico

doi:10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Aitazaz Ali Raja, Sergio Grammatico

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

32 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff allocation and 2) distributed bargaining, which converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for 'robust coalitional games.'

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	511-520
Journal	IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Volume	9
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269
Publication status	Published - 2022

Bibliographical note

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care
Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

Keywords

Control systems
Costs
Distributed Algorithms
Dynamic Games
Energy Systems
Game Theory
Games
Multi-agent systems
Network systems
Resource management
Stability criteria
Uncertainty

Access to Document

10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269

Payoff_Distribution_in_Robust_Coalitional_Games_on_Time_Varying_NetworksFinal published version, 1.14 MB

Cite this

@article{ed57b150d7fa445585a97a2e43fb0e8c,

title = "Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks",

abstract = "In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff allocation and 2) distributed bargaining, which converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for 'robust coalitional games.'",

keywords = "Control systems, Costs, Distributed Algorithms, Dynamic Games, Energy Systems, Game Theory, Games, Multi-agent systems, Network systems, Resource management, Stability criteria, Uncertainty",

author = "Raja, {Aitazaz Ali} and Sergio Grammatico",

note = "Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.",

year = "2022",

doi = "10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269",

language = "English",

volume = "9",

pages = "511--520",

journal = "IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems",

issn = "2325-5870",

publisher = "IEEE Control Systems Society",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

AU - Raja, Aitazaz Ali

AU - Grammatico, Sergio

N1 - Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff allocation and 2) distributed bargaining, which converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for 'robust coalitional games.'

AB - In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff allocation and 2) distributed bargaining, which converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for 'robust coalitional games.'

KW - Control systems

KW - Costs

KW - Distributed Algorithms

KW - Dynamic Games

KW - Energy Systems

KW - Game Theory

KW - Games

KW - Multi-agent systems

KW - Network systems

KW - Resource management

KW - Stability criteria

KW - Uncertainty

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115127316&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269

DO - 10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85115127316

SN - 2325-5870

VL - 9

SP - 511

EP - 520

JO - IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems

JF - IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems

IS - 1

ER -

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this