Population games with replicator dynamics under event-triggered payoff provider and a demand response application

Juan Martinez-Piazuelo, Wicak Ananduta, Carlos Ocampo-Martinez, Sergio Grammatico, Nicanor Quijano

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1 Citation (Scopus)
30 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We consider a large population of decision makers that choose their evolutionary strategies based on simple pairwise imitation rules. We describe such a dynamic process by the replicator dynamics. Differently from the available literature, where the payoffs signals are assumed to be updated continuously, we consider a more realistic scenario where they are updated occasionally. Our main technical contribution is to devise two event-triggered communication schemes with asymptotic convergence guarantees to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how our proposed approach is applicable as an efficient distributed demand response mechanism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3417-3422
Number of pages6
JournalIEEE Control Systems Letters
Volume7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023

Bibliographical note

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care
Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

Keywords

  • Asymptotic stability
  • Costs
  • Demand response
  • Event-triggered control
  • game theory
  • Games
  • optimization
  • Protocols
  • Sociology
  • Statistics

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