Abstract
We consider a large population of decision makers that choose their evolutionary strategies based on simple pairwise imitation rules. We describe such a dynamic process by the replicator dynamics. Differently from the available literature, where the payoffs signals are assumed to be updated continuously, we consider a more realistic scenario where they are updated occasionally. Our main technical contribution is to devise two event-triggered communication schemes with asymptotic convergence guarantees to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how our proposed approach is applicable as an efficient distributed demand response mechanism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 3417-3422 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | IEEE Control Systems Letters |
Volume | 7 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-careOtherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.
Keywords
- Asymptotic stability
- Costs
- Demand response
- Event-triggered control
- game theory
- Games
- optimization
- Protocols
- Sociology
- Statistics