Post-quantum WireGuard

Andreas Hulsing; Kai Chun Ning; Peter Schwabe; Florian Weber; Philip R. Zimmermann

doi:10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030

Post-quantum WireGuard

Andreas Hulsing, Kai Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber, Philip R. Zimmermann

Cyber Security

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

52 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Subtitle of host publication	Proceedings
Editors	L. O'Conner
Place of Publication	Piscataway
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	304-321
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-7281-8934-5
ISBN (Print)	978-1-7281-8935-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030
Publication status	Published - 2021
Event	42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021 - Virtual, San Francisco, United States Duration: 24 May 2021 → 27 May 2021

Conference

Conference	42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021
Country/Territory	United States
City	Virtual, San Francisco
Period	24/05/21 → 27/05/21

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10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030

Cite this

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title = "Post-quantum WireGuard",

abstract = "In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.",

author = "Andreas Hulsing and Ning, \{Kai Chun\} and Peter Schwabe and Florian Weber and Zimmermann, \{Philip R.\}",

year = "2021",

doi = "10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-1-7281-8935-2",

pages = "304--321",

editor = "L. O'Conner",

booktitle = "2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)",

publisher = "IEEE",

address = "United States",

note = "42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021 ; Conference date: 24-05-2021 Through 27-05-2021",

}

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T1 - Post-quantum WireGuard

AU - Hulsing, Andreas

AU - Ning, Kai Chun

AU - Schwabe, Peter

AU - Weber, Florian

AU - Zimmermann, Philip R.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.

AB - In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85113214330

U2 - 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030

DO - 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85113214330

SN - 978-1-7281-8935-2

SP - 304

EP - 321

BT - 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

A2 - O'Conner, L.

PB - IEEE

CY - Piscataway

T2 - 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021

Y2 - 24 May 2021 through 27 May 2021

ER -

Post-quantum WireGuard

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