Reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks: Analysis and synthesis tools

Carlos Murguia; Nathan van de Wouw; Justin Ruths

doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.528

Reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks: Analysis and synthesis tools

Carlos Murguia, Nathan van de Wouw, Justin Ruths

Team Bart De Schutter

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

74 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

For given system dynamics, control structure, and fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools–in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)–for characterizing and minimizing the set of states that sensor attacks can induce in the system while keeping the alarm rate of the fault detector sufficiently close to its false alarm rate in the attack-free case. This quantifies the attack's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	IFAC-PapersOnLine
Subtitle of host publication	Proceedings 20th IFAC World Congress
Editors	Denis Dochain, Didier Henrion, Dimitri Peaucelle
Place of Publication	Laxenburg, Austria
Publisher	Elsevier
Pages	2088-2094
Volume	50-1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.528
Publication status	Published - 2017
Event	20th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), 2017 - Toulouse, France Duration: 9 Jul 2017 → 14 Jul 2017 Conference number: 20 https://www.ifac2017.org

Publication series

Name	IFAC-PapersOnLine
Number	1
Volume	50

Conference

Conference	20th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), 2017
Abbreviated title	IFAC 2017
Country/Territory	France
City	Toulouse
Period	9/07/17 → 14/07/17
Internet address	https://www.ifac2017.org

Keywords

cyber physical systems
model-based fault detectors
reachable sets
security
stochastic systems

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10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.528

1-s2.0-S2405896317308960-mainFinal published version, 796 KB

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abstract = "For given system dynamics, control structure, and fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools–in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)–for characterizing and minimizing the set of states that sensor attacks can induce in the system while keeping the alarm rate of the fault detector sufficiently close to its false alarm rate in the attack-free case. This quantifies the attack's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.",

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author = "Carlos Murguia and Wouw, {Nathan van de} and Justin Ruths",

year = "2017",

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editor = "Dochain, {Denis } and Henrion, {Didier } and Peaucelle, {Dimitri }",

booktitle = "IFAC-PapersOnLine",

note = "20th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), 2017, IFAC 2017 ; Conference date: 09-07-2017 Through 14-07-2017",

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Murguia, C, Wouw, NVD & Ruths, J 2017, Reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks: Analysis and synthesis tools. in D Dochain, D Henrion & D Peaucelle (eds), IFAC-PapersOnLine: Proceedings 20th IFAC World Congress. vol. 50-1, IFAC-PapersOnLine, no. 1, vol. 50, Elsevier, Laxenburg, Austria, pp. 2088-2094, 20th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), 2017, Toulouse, France, 9/07/17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.528

Reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks: Analysis and synthesis tools. / Murguia, Carlos; Wouw, Nathan van de; Ruths, Justin.
IFAC-PapersOnLine: Proceedings 20th IFAC World Congress. ed. / Denis Dochain; Didier Henrion; Dimitri Peaucelle. Vol. 50-1 Laxenburg, Austria: Elsevier, 2017. p. 2088-2094 (IFAC-PapersOnLine; Vol. 50, No. 1).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

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AB - For given system dynamics, control structure, and fault/attack detection procedure, we provide mathematical tools–in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs)–for characterizing and minimizing the set of states that sensor attacks can induce in the system while keeping the alarm rate of the fault detector sufficiently close to its false alarm rate in the attack-free case. This quantifies the attack's potential impact when it is constrained to stay hidden from the detector. Simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.

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KW - stochastic systems

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CY - Laxenburg, Austria

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ER -

Reachable sets of hidden CPS sensor attacks: Analysis and synthesis tools

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Keywords

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