Reciprocation Effort Games

Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs De Weerdt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

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Consider people dividing their time and effort between friends, interest clubs, and reading seminars. These are all reciprocal interactions, and the reciprocal processes determine the utilities of the agents from these interactions. To advise on efficient effort division, we determine the existence and efficiency of the Nash equilibria of the game of allocating effort to such projects. When no minimum effort is required to receive reciprocation, an equilibrium always exists, and if acting is either easy to everyone, or hard to everyone, then every equilibrium is socially optimal. If a minimal effort is needed to participate, we prove that not contributing at all is an equilibrium, and for two agents, also a socially optimal equilibrium can be found. Next, we extend the model, assuming that the need to react requires more than the agents can contribute to acting, rendering the reciprocation imperfect. We prove that even then, each interaction converges and the corresponding game has an equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationArtificial Intelligence
Subtitle of host publication29th Benelux Conference, BNAIC 2017, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsB. Verheij, M. Wiering
Place of PublicationCham
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-76892-2
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-76891-5
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Event29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence: 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Groningen, Netherlands
Duration: 8 Nov 20179 Nov 2017
Conference number: 29

Publication series

NameCommunications in Computer and Information Science
ISSN (Print)1865-0929
ISSN (Electronic)1865-0937


Conference29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Abbreviated titleBNAIC 2017
Internet address

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