Scheduling electric vehicles to chargers through iterative double auction mechanism

Jie Gao; Jia Yuan Yu; Chun Wang; Terrence Wong

doi:10.1109/ISC246665.2019.9071651

Scheduling electric vehicles to chargers through iterative double auction mechanism

Jie Gao, Jia Yuan Yu, Chun Wang, Terrence Wong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

Consider a decentralized electric vehicle (EV) charging scheduling problem where the chargers and vehicles are modeled as utility maximizing agents. To schedule chargers to vehicles in a day-ahead market, we propose a double auction mechanism, where chargers report their time availabilities and charging costs and vehicles report their preferences on different chargers. This auction is conducted in an iterative manner which enables the computation of effective schedules through multilateral negotiation between agents. We evaluate the efficiency performance of the mechanism through a computational study. The result generated from the iterative double auction mechanism is on average 35% better than the first come first serve (FCFS) allocation policy.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	342-348
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728108469
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISC246665.2019.9071651
Publication status	Published - 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019 - Casablanca, Morocco Duration: 14 Oct 2019 → 17 Oct 2019

Conference

Conference	5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019
Country/Territory	Morocco
City	Casablanca
Period	14/10/19 → 17/10/19

Keywords

auction
electric vehicles
optimization
scheduling
two-sided mechanism

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10.1109/ISC246665.2019.9071651

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@inproceedings{ecdf8668bade43f7a293b03bc8a7de4e,

title = "Scheduling electric vehicles to chargers through iterative double auction mechanism",

abstract = "Consider a decentralized electric vehicle (EV) charging scheduling problem where the chargers and vehicles are modeled as utility maximizing agents. To schedule chargers to vehicles in a day-ahead market, we propose a double auction mechanism, where chargers report their time availabilities and charging costs and vehicles report their preferences on different chargers. This auction is conducted in an iterative manner which enables the computation of effective schedules through multilateral negotiation between agents. We evaluate the efficiency performance of the mechanism through a computational study. The result generated from the iterative double auction mechanism is on average 35% better than the first come first serve (FCFS) allocation policy.",

keywords = "auction, electric vehicles, optimization, scheduling, two-sided mechanism",

author = "Jie Gao and Yu, {Jia Yuan} and Chun Wang and Terrence Wong",

year = "2019",

doi = "10.1109/ISC246665.2019.9071651",

language = "English",

pages = "342--348",

booktitle = "5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019",

publisher = "IEEE",

address = "United States",

note = "5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019 ; Conference date: 14-10-2019 Through 17-10-2019",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Scheduling electric vehicles to chargers through iterative double auction mechanism

AU - Gao, Jie

AU - Yu, Jia Yuan

AU - Wang, Chun

AU - Wong, Terrence

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Consider a decentralized electric vehicle (EV) charging scheduling problem where the chargers and vehicles are modeled as utility maximizing agents. To schedule chargers to vehicles in a day-ahead market, we propose a double auction mechanism, where chargers report their time availabilities and charging costs and vehicles report their preferences on different chargers. This auction is conducted in an iterative manner which enables the computation of effective schedules through multilateral negotiation between agents. We evaluate the efficiency performance of the mechanism through a computational study. The result generated from the iterative double auction mechanism is on average 35% better than the first come first serve (FCFS) allocation policy.

AB - Consider a decentralized electric vehicle (EV) charging scheduling problem where the chargers and vehicles are modeled as utility maximizing agents. To schedule chargers to vehicles in a day-ahead market, we propose a double auction mechanism, where chargers report their time availabilities and charging costs and vehicles report their preferences on different chargers. This auction is conducted in an iterative manner which enables the computation of effective schedules through multilateral negotiation between agents. We evaluate the efficiency performance of the mechanism through a computational study. The result generated from the iterative double auction mechanism is on average 35% better than the first come first serve (FCFS) allocation policy.

KW - auction

KW - electric vehicles

KW - optimization

KW - scheduling

KW - two-sided mechanism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85084631850&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ISC246665.2019.9071651

DO - 10.1109/ISC246665.2019.9071651

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85084631850

SP - 342

EP - 348

BT - 5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019

PB - IEEE

T2 - 5th IEEE International Smart Cities Conference, ISC2 2019

Y2 - 14 October 2019 through 17 October 2019

ER -

Scheduling electric vehicles to chargers through iterative double auction mechanism

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