TY - JOUR
T1 - The effectiveness of capacity markets in the presence of a high portfolio share of renewable energy sources
AU - Bhagwat, Pradyumna C.
AU - Iychettira, Kaveri K.
AU - Richstein, Jörn C.
AU - Chappin, Emile J.L.
AU - De Vries, Laurens J.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - The effectiveness of a capacity market is analyzed by simulating three conditions that may cause suboptimal investment in the electricity generation: imperfect information and uncertainty; declining demand shocks resulting in load loss; and a growing share of renewable energy sources in the generation portfolio. Implementation of a capacity market can improve supply adequacy and reduce consumer costs. It mainly leads to more investment in low-cost peak generation units. If the administratively determined reserve margin is high enough, the security of supply is not significantly affected by uncertainties or demand shocks. A capacity market is found to be more effective than a strategic reserve for ensuring reliability.
AB - The effectiveness of a capacity market is analyzed by simulating three conditions that may cause suboptimal investment in the electricity generation: imperfect information and uncertainty; declining demand shocks resulting in load loss; and a growing share of renewable energy sources in the generation portfolio. Implementation of a capacity market can improve supply adequacy and reduce consumer costs. It mainly leads to more investment in low-cost peak generation units. If the administratively determined reserve margin is high enough, the security of supply is not significantly affected by uncertainties or demand shocks. A capacity market is found to be more effective than a strategic reserve for ensuring reliability.
KW - Adequacy policy
KW - Capacity markets
KW - Security of supply
UR - http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:ce980fec-0c06-406a-8e57-8cb34c9eb1a3
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85029547640&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jup.2017.09.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jup.2017.09.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85029547640
SN - 0957-1787
JO - Utilities Policy: strategy, performance, regulation
JF - Utilities Policy: strategy, performance, regulation
ER -