The search value of a set

Robbert Fokkink; Ken Kikuta; David Ramsey

doi:10.1007/s10479-016-2252-y

The search value of a set

Robbert Fokkink^*, Ken Kikuta, David Ramsey

^*Corresponding author for this work

Applied Probability

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

44 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study search games in which the hider may hide in a finite number of locations. We assume that the cost of searching these locations does not depend on the order in which the locations are searched. From these assumptions we derive that the cost function is submodular, thus placing search games with an immobile hider in the context of coalitional games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	63-73
Number of pages	11
Journal	Annals of Operations Research
Volume	256
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2252-y
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2017

Keywords

Coalitional game
Search game
Submodular function
Zero-sum game

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10.1007/s10479-016-2252-y

10.1007_s10479-016-2252-yFinal published version, 367 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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The search value of a set

Abstract

Keywords

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