The search value of a set

Robbert Fokkink, Ken Kikuta, David Ramsey

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
20 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study search games in which the hider may hide in a finite number of locations. We assume that the cost of searching these locations does not depend on the order in which the locations are searched. From these assumptions we derive that the cost function is submodular, thus placing search games with an immobile hider in the context of coalitional games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)63-73
Number of pages11
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
Volume256
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2017

Keywords

  • Coalitional game
  • Search game
  • Submodular function
  • Zero-sum game

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