TY - GEN
T1 - UAVs Path Deviation Attacks
T2 - 17th IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication and Networking, SECON Workshops 2020
AU - Sorbelli, Francesco Betti
AU - Conti, Mauro
AU - Pinotti, Cristina M.
AU - Rigoni, Giulio
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Recently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are employed for a plethora of civilian applications. Such flying vehicles can accomplish tasks under the pilot's eyesight within the range of a remote controller, or autonomously according to a certain pre-loaded path configuration. Different path deviation attacks can be performed by malicious users against UAVs. We classify such attacks and the relative defenses based on the UAV's flight mode, i.e., (i) First Person View (FPV), (ii) civilian Global Navigation Satellite System based (GNSS), and (iii) GNSS "plus"auxiliary technologies (GNSS+), and on the multiplicity, i.e., (i) Single UAV, and (ii) Multiple UAVs. We found that very little has been done to secure the FPV flight mode against path deviation. In GNSS mode, spoofing is the most worrisome attack. The best defense against spoofing seems to be redundancy, such as adding vision chips to single UAV or using multiple arranged UAVs. No specific attacks and defenses have been found in literature for GNSS+ or for UAVs moving in group without a pre-ordered arrangement. These aspects require further investigation.
AB - Recently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are employed for a plethora of civilian applications. Such flying vehicles can accomplish tasks under the pilot's eyesight within the range of a remote controller, or autonomously according to a certain pre-loaded path configuration. Different path deviation attacks can be performed by malicious users against UAVs. We classify such attacks and the relative defenses based on the UAV's flight mode, i.e., (i) First Person View (FPV), (ii) civilian Global Navigation Satellite System based (GNSS), and (iii) GNSS "plus"auxiliary technologies (GNSS+), and on the multiplicity, i.e., (i) Single UAV, and (ii) Multiple UAVs. We found that very little has been done to secure the FPV flight mode against path deviation. In GNSS mode, spoofing is the most worrisome attack. The best defense against spoofing seems to be redundancy, such as adding vision chips to single UAV or using multiple arranged UAVs. No specific attacks and defenses have been found in literature for GNSS+ or for UAVs moving in group without a pre-ordered arrangement. These aspects require further investigation.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091998246&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SECONWorkshops50264.2020.9149780
DO - 10.1109/SECONWorkshops50264.2020.9149780
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091998246
T3 - Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks workshops
BT - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication and Networking, SECON Workshops 2020
PB - IEEE
Y2 - 22 June 2020
ER -