Using Stackelberg games to model electric power grid investments in renewable energy settings

Merlinda Andoni*, Valentin Robu

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Often renewable generators cluster in remote regions (such as windy islands) located away from demand centres. Suitability of these locations in terms of renewable resources, is often coupled with insufficient grid capacity, which leads to the application of generation curtailment, when power generated exceeds local aggregate demand. This work studies the effect of curtailments schemes on the strategic interaction of different investors. Our work uses a game-theoretic approach to study the profitability and decision making on future renewable investment, for a variety of different schemes. Next, we study the effect of curtailment and line access rules in power grid expansion.We model the interplay between a private line investor and local generators as a Stackelberg game and determine the generation capacity and profits at equilibrium. Finally, we examine a UK-based network upgrade case-study and show how results can be utilised to set a grid access payment mechanism, ensuring both the implementation of transmission and local generation investments.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAutonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, IFAAMAS 2016 Workshops, Best Papers, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsNardine Osman, Carles Sierra
PublisherSpringer
Pages127-146
Number of pages20
ISBN (Print)9783319468815
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, IFAAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 9 May 201610 May 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume10002 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, IFAAMAS 2016
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period9/05/1610/05/16

Keywords

  • Generation incentives
  • Renewable energy
  • Stackelberg game
  • Transmission investment

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Using Stackelberg games to model electric power grid investments in renewable energy settings'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this