Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-252
JournalEthics, Policy & Environment
Volume25
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Externally publishedYes

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