Zone poisoning: The how and where of non-secure DNS dynamic updates

Maciej Korczynski, Michał Król, Michel Van Eeten

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)


This paper illuminates the problem of non-secure DNS dynamic updates, which allow a miscreant to manipulate DNS entries in the zone files of authoritative name servers. We refer to this type of attack as to zone poisoning. This paper presents the first measurement study of the vulnerability. We analyze a random sample of 2.9 million domains and the Alexa top 1 million domains and find that at least 1,877 (0.065%) and 587 (0.062%) of domains are vulnerable, respectively. Among the vulnerable domains are governments, health care providers and banks, demonstrating that the threat impacts important services. Via this study and subsequent notifications to affected parties, we aim to improve the security of the DNS ecosystem.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIMC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Internet Measurement Conference
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781450345262
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event2016 ACM Internet Measurement Conference, IMC 2016 - Santa Monica, United States
Duration: 14 Nov 201616 Nov 2016


Conference2016 ACM Internet Measurement Conference, IMC 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Monica


  • Domain Name System
  • Dynamic updates
  • Measurement
  • Security
  • Zone poisoning


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