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The birth of ethics from the spirit of tectonics

Koller, S

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
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THE
BIRTH OF ETHICS
FROM THE
SPIRIT OF TECTONICS

BY

STEFAN KOLLER

PROMOVENDUS OF CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE
TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF DELFT | DEN HAAG, 2014

DIE
GEBURT DER ETHIK
AUS DEM
GEISTE DER TEKTONIK

VON
STEFAN KOLLER,

PROMOVENDUS DER CLASSISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE AN DER
TECHNISCHEN UNIVERSITÄT DELFT



DEN HAAG. 2014

DIE HEUTE NOCH HERRSCHENDE ETHIK IST IHRER METHODE NACH EINE STATISCHE MIT DEM FESTEN ALS GRUNDBEGRIFF.

~ ROBERT MUSIL (†1942) ~

ES SCHIEN MIR DAMALS, ALS OB SIE BISWEILEN JANUSGESICHTER TRÜGEN: EIN BESTÄNDIGER BLICK, EIN FAST GRAMVOLLES GESICHT ZURÜCK IN DAS GESTRIGE, IN EIN VERSUNKENES, ZERSTÖRTEES, ENTSTELLTES, ABER DOCH – IN EBEN DEM RÜCK-BLICK – IN EIN GROSSES BEWAHRTEES; UND DA WAR EIN ANDERES, EIN MUTIGES, FAST FREUDIGES GESICHT ZUR ZUKUNFT. ES WAR ALSO EINE MENGE VERGANGENHEIT, DIE DA DIE GROSSE FLUCHT IN DIE ZUKUNFT UNTERNAHM; ABER AUCH EINE MENGE ZUKUNFT, DIE DA IHRE VERGANGENHEIT RETTETE; UND EINE MENGE, DAS VERLOREN GEHEN MUSSTE, ABER WENIGSTENS DEM GEDANKEN NACH IN DEN FOLGENDEN KAPITELN WIEDERAUFGERUFEN IST.

~ ADOLF K. PLACZEK (†2000) ~

COVER IMAGE: GOTTFRIED SEMPER, DRESDEN FORUM

THE TODAY STILL DOMINANT ETHICS IS METHODOLOGICALLY SPEAKING A STATIC ONE – FIRMNESS IS ITS MOST FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT.

~ ROBERT MUSIL (†1942) ~

AT THE TIME IT APPEARED TO ME AS IF THEY WORE JANUS FACED Demeanours. A STEADY GAZE, NEARLY MOURNFUL, FACING BACK YESTERDAY, FACING SOMETHING SUNK, DESTROYED, DISFIGURED – AND YET, IN FACING BACK, SOMETHING GREAT WAS PRESERVED. AND THERE WAS ALSO ANOTHER OUTLOOK, A COURAGEOUS, NEARLY JOYOUS FACING THE FUTURE. SO THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF PAST SETTING OUT ON ITS GRAND RESCUE INTO THE FUTURE, BUT ALSO A GREAT DEAL OF FUTURE THAT RESCUED ITS PAST – AND A GREAT DEAL THAT COULD NOT BUT BE LOST, AND WHAT THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS WILL COMMEMORATE, AT LEAST IN SPIRIT.

~ ADOLF K. PLACZEK (†2000) ~

SOURCES: MUSIL (1918/2000, 127), PLACZEK (1995, 7 AND 9). COVER IMAGE: RECONSTRUCTION OF SEMPER'S 1842 DESIGN FOR THE DRESDEN FORUM IN FRÖHLICH (2000, 74). TWO LINES IN 'ABOUT THIS BOOK' ARE LARGELY OWED TO GRAYLING (1994, V-VI).

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ABOUT THIS BOOK

This book is about the morality of architecture. It is more precisely about moralizing buildings. People talk about architecture morally all the time – but it is not clear how and if architecture is moral. Nor is it clear what people mean most of the time when they talk about ‘the ethics’ or ‘the morality’ of architecture. As the PREFACE and INTRODUCTION will show, such talk is incredibly diverse. Sometimes such talk is about a building, sometimes about the architect – and at other times it is about something else yet. If the subject matter is incredibly diverse here, so is the role of such talk. Moral talk about building commissions decides their fate, sometimes significant amounts of public expenditure. Moral talk decides the public favour of architects, as it scandalizes some and glorifies others. Moral talk writes history. And most of all, moral talk *sticks*. We do not quite know how to parse it, or how to get rid of it. And we certainly do not know when it is valid. In fact, we have no idea if any of it ever is.

We therefore need ways to test such talk more systematically. We need to understand what such statements are really about, when they are meaningful, what is behind them, and what the conditions for their truth are. We need to understand how to disarm such statements, when necessary – and how to back them up, when required. What we need, in short, is an ethics of architecture, and this book provides one. It tells us how to systematically test moral statements about architecture. And it explains how architecture can be moral, when it is. For otherwise we would not even know what to test for.

Spanning the works of Vitruvius, Cicero, Kant, Semper, Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier and others, the following chapters argue for the continuity of a moral outlook across twenty centuries of architectural production in the West. Moreover, by drawing on state of the art research in contemporary ethics and the philosophy of language, the book argues for a radical revision of where philosophy and architecture meet – and how they can do so in a profitable and inviting manner that operates across disciplinary and institutional divides, while remaining sensitive to the genuine difficulties this engenders.

Hence, quite apart from specific goals of content, the work wishes to introduce philosophers and architects to contemporary philosophy of architecture more generally. As such, it aims to equip readers from both audiences with an unflinching examination of some of the field’s core questions. Architects and philosophers stand much to gain from exposure to rigorous work in the respective other discipline, and the field as such can only mature if it draws on such efforts more widely – and in a concerted manner. Indeed, the current work hopes to attract a greater number of researchers in either discipline to the philosophy of architecture – and hopes they find the questions raised by the philosophy of architecture sufficiently intriguing to bestow on the field efforts of their own. Thus every effort has been made to introduce these questions in as sharp and variegated a manner as possible.

While the following chapters serve this introductory manner then, they cannot simplify what is not an elementary subject. The level at which the book is pitched is that of a discussion which regards its readers not only as capable of tackling philosophy and architecture seriously, but as wishing to do so. The end result places high demands on readers unseasoned in either one of the two disciplines, but hopes the rewards are worth the effort of their pursuit. The author has strenuously aimed for clear exposition, but is under no illusion that the result makes many concessions to ease of access.

This is a long work, and some readers may wish to skip some of its more discursive parts. Very likely, different parts of the work’s intended audience bring different types of expectations, interests, and abilities to the table. In that vein, readers pressed for time should minimally read the entirety of the PREFACE and INTRODUCTION, and are advised to then follow one of two shortcuts. Readers primarily interested in the architectural material should familiarize themselves with §1.1-§1.2, §2.1-§2.2, §3.3-§3.4, and §4.1-§4.2, and then delve into the material in CHAPTERS 6 and 8-10, chapters that can be read in any order of personal interest, to conclude with the CODA.

Readers primarily interested in the philosophical core argument should carefully peruse the following:

Part 1 Theoretical Foundation: §1.1-§1.4, §1.7.1, §2.1-§2.5.

Part 2 Philosophical Context: §3.1-§3.4, §3.6.7, §3.7.1, §3.8, §4.1-§4.2.

Part 3 Specific Thinkers: §5.1-§5.2, §5.4, §6.1, §6.2.1, §6.5-§6.7, §7.1, §7.5, §8.1, §9.3-§9.4, §9.6, §10.3.3, §10.5.

Part 4 Conclusion: §11.1-§11.3, §C.6.

Parts 1, 2, and 4 may be read in single sittings. The longer material in Part 3 offers a natural break between CHAPTERS 7 and 8, thus allowing its being read in two sittings. Further, §I.3 provides a synoptic overview to all chapters, and may aid some readers in deciding which parts perhaps interest them most.

Those even less patient to get ahead to the central bits are instructed to jump into §3.3-§3.4 and §4.1-§4.2. While not all statements therein will be instantly accessible when read in isolation, these sections unequivocally contain the philosophical and historical key theses of the present work. The third, equally central, goal of the present work is entirely methodological. While that goal pervades the work as a whole, it can be summarized briefly: to help philosophers of architecture and aesthetics enrich their work, and increase the intellectual level, value and relevance of their work to others, especially architects.

In their endeavor to establish a contemporary philosophy of architecture, authors typically focus on a set of thinkers and texts they deem canonical and relevant. That set, this book will argue, can be considerably expanded, and deserves to be. Le Corbusier's work provides a case in point, explored in CHAPTER 6. Philosophers and their readers have much to gain once thinkers – especially architects – beyond the current canon are treated with the amount of care philosophers already bestow on work by their own peers, past and present. Similarly, aesthetic philosophers have scrupulously worked on their own recent and distant past, but can gain immeasurably more by seeing the authors and texts they engage with as relating to a set of authors and texts beyond those standardly considered philosophical – where, as before, it is architects' own texts that open up the relevance and possibility for further dialogue. The methodology this book employs to open up those architects' texts will be familiar to any reader or practitioner of contemporary analysis of ancient philosophy. Relentless, scrupulous attention to often a few lines only of Greek text typically precedes the most modest of attempts to pontificate on the philosophical content or merit of the passage in question. The architectural tradition in the West has so far not received enough of this type of attention, be it classical or modernist sources. Commentators from within the architectural tradition on the other hand have excelled in bestowing minute attention to such canonical texts. Their work, too, can reach new levels once it is informed by a level of exegetical discernment and logical rigor that scholarship on Plato and Aristotle has now attained, if only fairly recently. The present work demonstrates that the entire Western canon of architecture – from Vitruvius to Semper and Le Corbusier – is replete with authors whose views deserve to be analysed with an eye to their philosophical content, systematicity, and cogency. For it demonstrates how much philosophy and architecture stand to gain from analysing these authors' works in this manner – and how relevant and indispensable such efforts are, if we are to at all arrive at answers to the present work's core questions that merit and to some degree withstand the sustained critical attention of a wider audience.

It is doubtful most readers will unreservedly endorse the philosophical core results of the present work – that moralizations of buildings are indeed possible, and that architecture can be (indeed, is inescapably) moral. Perhaps fewer readers will agree with every detail of its exegetical work on the aforementioned key thinkers. But the book's broader appeal, that the exegetical standards in philosophical work on architecture today can and deserve to be raised, will hopefully be heard and welcomed more widely.

PREFACE

MORALIZING BUILDINGS

This book is about getting a philosophical handle on the moralization of buildings – on what happens when people appraise buildings morally. Before we delve into a philosophical treatment of that phenomenon, however, we need to get a better handle on the phenomenon itself. We need to take a closer look at how moral talk about architecture looks, at who utters it, and at what roles it plays in our lives. That is what this PREFACE is all about, in §P1. §P.2 then looks at aesthetic philosophy’s forays into a closely related matter – the moral appraisal of artworks.

§P.1 MORAL TALK ABOUT ARCHITECTURE

We are certainly accustomed to aesthetically appraising buildings, but sometimes our endorsements or criticisms of buildings appear to verge beyond such appraisals and we appear inclined to reject or praise a building beyond simply liking how it looks or is designed. Certainly we could try and moralize our aesthetic judgements as well, about buildings no less. But what perhaps intrigues us most about moralizing buildings is when it is done directly. Consider the following examples:

- (1) ‘This building is insane (or sick).’
- (2) ‘This building mutilates the city.’
- (3) ‘This building is the most civilized one of that era.’
- (4) ‘This building obscures prerequisites of an open society.’
- (5) ‘This building expresses family life and its values.’
- (6) ‘This building embodies values of rationality and calm character.’
- (7) ‘Fascist buildings convey a sense of authoritarian attitude.’
- (8) ‘This building is politically friendly.’
- (9) ‘This building is a built realization of a concept – to find a balance between security and wellbeing.’
- (10) ‘This building raises the quality of life for its tenants.’
- (11) ‘This building is evil.’

Some of these statements are more overtly moral than others, and some are more directly about the building than others. Such statements are made fairly frequently and, as we will see, the group of people ready to evince them is fairly diverse too. Nor is their status in question on grounds of infelicity. It appears these statements are not only well formed but taken seriously by their utterers as well as audiences. This is true even when the audience disagrees with the respective utterer. For those disagreeing do not typically object to the statement as such but deny the specific point it purports to make. When people contest whether a building raises the quality of life for its tenants or not, for instance, they typically dispute the building’s merits and not whether something wider is off the mark.

Yet it behooves us to ask if such statements can ever be literally true, and whether we should take them seriously even where we feel inclined to disagree with them rather strongly. This book will argue that at least some of these statements can and should be taken seriously, depending on their circumstance of utterance of course. In arguing for this, the thesis resists influential reservations that reject such statements on more general grounds than their being occasionally false. Such reservations have to be taken seriously as well and addressed accordingly. Because if and when such reservations are on track, disagreeing with any one of (1)-(11) should be expressed in stronger terms than expressed previously – for instance, on grounds of infelicity. Then one should reject such statements out of hand and not even consider whether the occasion warrants asserting or arguing with them. Thus, in rejecting for instance (1), one would not simply argue that the building is actually fairly healthy and thus, ‘not sick’. One would rather reject the

statement in its entirety: it is just not the case that this building is sick. This philosophical distinction – between narrow and wide scope negation – is one of many that are tracked poorly by ordinary language and that elude many speakers otherwise perfectly competent in arguing over (1). Yet such distinctions make a great difference to our understanding of what is going on when buildings are moralized, who is saying what, and who is actually right.

As a result, the above class of statements repays a sort of sustained philosophical attention it has so far never received. Philosophers either themselves rely on such statements fairly uncritically or dismiss them without closer examination. What we need instead is a philosophical inquiry into moralizations of architecture. We need to examine both the positive case for taking them literally and the negative case of contesting their status as being genuinely truth-purporting. We need to understand and evaluate the philosophical reasons of those mounting such cases. This is what the present work is all about. It is about getting a philosophical grip on the moralization of architecture.

Before we get into the thick of that, however, we need a better understanding of the contexts in which statements like (1)-(11) arise in the first place. For such statements belie their own complexity if we consider them in isolation of context. Moreover if, as we will see, these statements originate from a diverse set of speakers – architects, journalists, philosophers, critics, the public – that already indicates that they merit closer scrutiny. We cannot dismiss them as an idiolect or a fringe part of discourse most rational people circumvent.

Here then is the first example **(1)**, fleshed out a bit more. It is from a website serving a public protest of a new arts forum in The Hague (Netherlands), the *SpuiForum*, and says, ‘*SpuiForum?* Insane.’¹ (Fig. P.1) The Dutch adjective ‘*krankjorum*’ means ‘insane’. Like its cognate ‘*krankhoofdig*’, it means a deficiency or ailment of the mind. The implied lack of sanity (cf. *sanus* meaning ‘healthy’) connotes a specific variety of sickness, implying the first order predication ‘this building is insane’ or, ‘this building is sick’ (lacking in health, cf. the German ‘*krank*’). Indeed, the slogan itself, juxtaposing as it does ‘*Spuiforum*’ to ‘*krankjorum*’, appears to take advantage of a rhyme, so as to bring out the proximity of ‘*krankjorum*’ to ‘*krankforum*’: ‘sick forum’.² The image accompanying the slogan literally crosses out the proposed building, in a manner reminiscent of no-smoking signs. This added visual cue clarifies, if the slogan left it open, that the target of the moralization is indeed the building itself.

The website itself is organized by a Dutch architect, Peter Drijver, who has collected on- and offline sources of further protesting voices that strongly object to the project, particularly its envisaged rebuilding of a public area. Drijver’s site links to newspaper articles which reports a wide array of people engaging statements like, **(2)** ‘The building mutilates the city’.³ That statement originates from previous office holders in the country responsible for public building more widely,⁴ and other architects from Rem Koolhaas to Herman Hertzberger are quoted with equally critical, if not always outright moralizing, remarks. Other journalists are equally ready to indulge, and not simply report, similar statements of a directly moral nature.⁵ The debate surrounding that particular project for nearly three years now is frequently conducted on overtly moral grounds, even if the factors touched on are fairly diverse.

¹ See Drijver (2014).

² Thanks to Maarten Franssen for saving me from linguistic errors here.

³ See Telegraaf (2014) and Den Haag FM (2014).

⁴ Even an active holder of the office in question (‘*rijkswaarde*’) would not be formally involved in the *Spuiforum* decision, however, as it pertains to a municipal rather than national matter.

⁵ See Rosenberg (2012) and Dirks (2012).

SPUIFORUM? KRANKJORUM!

Een cultureel centrum, een mooier Spuiplein, een impuls voor de stad?
Ja, natuurlijk! Maar daarvoor hoeft niet alles gesloopt te worden. Het kan anders en beter.
U kunt het Spuiforum nog stoppen. Stem op 19 maart met uw hart!



Fig. P.1. Online protest over the *SpuiForum* by NeutelingsRiedijk architects, The Hague, Netherlands.



Fig. P.2. NeutelingsRiedijk, *SpuiForum*. Rendering from first competition phase. (Source: NR architects)

The building in question, displayed in the bottom left corner of fig. P.1 (cf. also fig. P.2), would require the eradication of extant architecture on the site, including the *Dance Theatre* by Rem Koolhaas (1987). As before, discussion of such facets of the project are couched in morally inflammatory language, where one building is said to ‘kill’ another. Contrary voices seem to insist that such sentiments are ‘unjustified’ as they are based in either anachronistic ‘tastes’ (which are always debatable) or ‘bad stereotypes’ of what the building ought to be or do.⁶ In short, the actual merits of such moralizations are themselves part of the debate, with no resolution in sight. Plainly neither camp (for or against the project) knows how to parse, justify, or disarm such moralizations. Yet, just a fortnight before this book went to print, the controversy over the project sufficed to see it cancelled for good.

The same impression emerges from architectural critics engaging one another on fairly iconic building projects, which brings us to statements **(3)** and **(4)**. Mies van der Rohe, one of the spearheads of modernist architecture, designed a housing complex in Detroit in 1961-1965 called *Lafayette Park* (figs. P.3 and P.4). While enthusiastic supporters of the project were ready to call it ‘certainly the most civilized dwelling-quarter of this century’, others (quoting this very line), contest the statement by groping after the other end of the moral spectrum. Thus we learn:

Mies van der Rohe’s buildings at *Lafayette Park* are hollow glass shells, which exist alone in the Platonic world of Mies’s imagination and have no relation to site, climate, insulation, function, or internal activity. As a society becomes more ‘open’ (Popper), it requires visible discriminations among building types obscured by the neutralizing facades of Mies’s buildings.⁷

These lines seek to at once contest the *positive* moralization of *Lafayette Park*, and replace it by one of its own, if of a rather different valence. That is, the original moralization is not regarded as nonsensical *tout court*, but rather as ill-founded in fact. The passage also indicates the readiness of some architecture critics to underwrite such sentiments by a generous, if cryptic, dipping from moral philosophy. Here, we get an allusion to Plato’s moral philosophy, as well as its criticism at the hands of Karl Popper – the clear implication being that *just such criticism* can be enlisted to re-moralize Mies’s architecture.

Nor are architecture critics and historians alone in their readiness to draw on moralizations of buildings, which brings us to statements authored by philosophers, **(5)**-**(8)**. Christian Illies and Anthonie Meijers, for instance, have this to say about Frank Lloyd Wright’s architecture (cf. Fig. P.5) – statement **(5)**.

Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, designed most of his so called Prairie Houses around a fireplace or hearth to express family life and its values, especially unity, harmony with nature, and the simple life.⁸

Robert Stecker raises a similar point for a neo-classicist building he encountered during a walk in the countryside. He writes,

Figs. P.3 – P.4 (facing page). Mies van der Rohe, *Lafayette Park*, Detroit, Michigan. (Source: Photos courtesy of Carolyn A. Fahey, July 2013)

⁶ ‘Danstheater, orkest, conservatorium en huidige theaters vinden de kritiek onterecht. ‘Over smaak valt natuurlijk te twisten, maar hoe ging het ook alweer bij de aanvankelijke verfoeide Eiffeltoren en, dichterbij huis, het Haagse stadhuis van Meier?’, schrijven de directeuren aan de gemeenteraad. [...] ‘Tegenstanders uiten het kwalijke vooroordeel dat de kunst er straks nog slechts is voor de elite. Het Spuiforum is juist een manier om dat te weerleggen.’ (apud Dirks *ibid.*, 2012).

⁷ This statement is based on Jencks (1973/1980, 95-96). I look at the original statement, uncondensed, in CHAPTER 10, where I also discuss *Lafayette Park* more fully.

⁸ Illies and Meijers (2014, 179n38).



A house this huge is bound to use large amounts of energy no matter how energy efficient the appliances are. This apparent fact might create a further dissonance with its pretty country setting, this time with ethical overtones, at least if one thinks that unnecessarily large expenditures of energy indicate an indifference to the environment. Could one go even further, and say that this house in particular [...] is expressive of a wasteful, high consumption lifestyle and the contemporary American society that encourages such a way of life? [...] couldn't one also see the house as expressive of more acceptable ethical ideals: a commitment to family, the rewards of hard work, the honest pursuit of happiness and the good life?⁹

It is not clear how sincere (as opposed to rhetorical) Stecker's questions are, but clearly enough, a relation of architecture to ethics is assumed to be in place, as is the idea that that relation is primarily one of symbolism. Similar points emerge from other philosophers. Christoph Baumberger, for one, invites us not only to take moralizations of buildings seriously, but gives us a reason for doing so – their being wide spread in critical practice, professional and lay:

The practice of architectural criticism is laden with ethical evaluations. [...] a closer look at our critical practices reveals that we can and do morally evaluate buildings with respect to their symbolic meaning and to their impacts upon individuals, society and the environment.¹⁰



Fig.P.5. Frank Lloyd Wright, *Zimmerman House*, Manchester, New Hampshire. (Source: photo by John W. Hession, *New Hampshire Home*, May/June 2013, online at <http://www.nhhomemagazine.com>)

Or again, when aesthetic philosopher María José Alcaraz León develops her claim that ‘aesthetic properties can play the role of reasons in attributions of cognitive or moral value to works of art’,¹¹ one of her examples is the church of *Santa Maria Novella* in Florence (completed by Leon Battista Alberti in 1470) which, owing to its rational and sober composition or atmospheric properties, contributes to the

⁹ Stecker (2010, 280)

¹⁰ Baumberger (2014).

¹¹ Alcaraz (2013).

building's moralization as itself 'rational' and 'sober' (6).¹² In personal communication, she added statements (7) and (8),

I referred to the beauty of *Santa Maria Novella* as contributing to the values of rationality and calm character that the building seems to embody. I guess, it could also be illustrated with a negative quality, such as the way in which certain fascist buildings convey a sense of authoritarian attitude towards the possible users by possessing certain aesthetic features, such as grandeur, or systematicity, and by relating to the environment they are located in a particular way. I remember I once saw a building in Berlin which really struck me in this sense and later someone confirmed that the building had been designed during the Third Reich. [...] I guess other values could also be implemented in this manner. Maybe when descriptions such as 'this building is politically friendly' apply to a particular building, one could also find aesthetic properties underlying them.¹³

Such examples are used to similar effect by other philosophers of aesthetics, too. Robert Stecker writes,

There is another wrinkle in the evaluation of buildings as expressions of ways of life or of social, political, or religious ideals. Whether or not we place positive value on the way of life or ideal expressed, we value the achievement of expressing it. An individual may reject the Christian worldview expressed in gothic cathedrals, but be full of admiration for the cathedrals themselves, in part because for their expressive qualities associated with this very worldview.¹⁴

The exception, Stecker adds (*ibid.*), is when the building expresses 'ideals widely agreed to be odious', as when a building 'expresses well the totalitarian ideal of intimidating state [government]'.¹⁵

I will look at such statements, coming from philosophers, in great detail in CHAPTER 1. I would not say they are all uncritical. Certainly Illies and Meijers, Baumberger, and Alcaraz (not to mention others) all have reasons and particular frameworks that license these statements for their authors. But we shall also see that where such attempts at licensing are made, they often fail to engage their target clearly enough.

Architects themselves, of course, have not always been shy to avoid moralizing their projects either, which brings us to the final group of statements, (9)-(11). Explaining the ambition behind a forensic psychiatric clinic (Figs. P.6 and P.7) its architects write how,

The goal of the built realization of the overall concept was [...] to find a balance between the high security demands and the quality of life of the inmates. [...] Our redesign for this forensic clinic raises the quality of life for its inmates.¹⁵

At other times, architects answer the moralizations of their buildings with a moral defense of themselves. Thus, when Zaha Hadid's *Al Wakrah* stadium in Qatar, projected for completion in 2022, hit news headline over 800 worker casualties at the site's construction, she disavowed any complicity or responsibility with that fact on the grounds that,

It's not my duty as an architect to look at it. I cannot do anything about it because I have no power to do anything about it. I think it's a problem anywhere in the world. But, as I said, I think there are discrepancies all over the world. [...] I have nothing to do with the workers. I think that's an issue the government - if there's a problem - should pick up. Hopefully, these things will be resolved.¹⁶

Some commentators disagreed, writing

¹² Alcaraz (2014).

¹³ Alcaraz (p.c., 4 June 2014).

¹⁴ Stecker (2010, 280).

¹⁵ Nickl-Weiler and Nickl (2009, 161 and 121); my translation. The English translation provided in the book itself renders 'bauliche Umsetzung des Gesamtkonzeptes' as 'architectural master plan'.

¹⁶ Quoted in Riach (2014).

[T]his is a truly appalling attitude. Good safety starts with good design. If architects are not thinking about constructability and safety in implementation [then] they are simply poor architects.¹⁷

As such voices attest, the moralization of the architect's practice seems to either affect (that of) her work, or even 'come across' in or during that work's built realization.

Given, then, that there is no shortage of architects moralizing their own work or finding it moralized by others, we have to wonder what to make of such statements. Are they true? Are they even meaningful? If they are either, how could they be? If they are not, why not? Some architects find the moralizations of their buildings so detestable that they outright protest the exercise itself. But it is also fair to say that they do not tell us why we should reject such statements (or indeed, how widely we should reject them). When a German newspaper went live with a photo of Rem Koolhaas' *CCTV tower* in China juxtaposed to the headline **(11)** 'Buildings of evil',¹⁸ Koolhaas was so incensed that his next presentation featured a lecture slide with the newspaper article crossed out, in big capitals, by the word 'NONSENSE'. But that defensive response terminates before reasons are given for its cogency. Instead, such charged responses only heighten an extant intrigue that attaches to outright, unabashed moralizations of buildings, whether drawing on so-called thin ('evil') or thick moral terms ('sick').

Similarly, Hadid's partner in her firm Patrick Schumacher similarly called for a full stop on seeing the profession and its products moralized:

Stop political correctness in architecture. But also: stop confusing architecture and art. Architects are in charge of the form of the built environment, not its content [...] We need to grasp this and run with this despite all the (ultimately conservative) moralizing political correctness that is trying to paralyse us with bad conscience and arrest our explorations if we cannot instantly demonstrate a manifest tangible benefit for the poor - as if the delivery of social justice is the architect's competency.¹⁹

This are strong words – but can they be sustained? Should they?

The next pages will attempt a preliminary response to these questions. A fully considered response has to wait until subsequent chapters have done their work, and will only be given in the CODA.

§P.2 THE 'INTERACTION' OF ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

It is no coincidence, perhaps, that architects resist moralizations when moralizations do not suit those architects or even risk harming their public standing. It is easier to shake off aesthetic misgivings as these (or at least so received wisdom has it) are mostly attributable to taste or the lack thereof. An architect can always take refuge in the consolation that her supreme aesthetic understanding is beyond the public's comprehension. No such response seems available in the moral case, because an architect professing to moral authority would make a laughing stock of himself. There is nothing an architect can fall back on to trump a moral dissonance with an architecturally unenlightened audience. For such and other reasons, moral assaults on architecture have a longer staying power than aesthetic ones. They seem to stick.

They also seem better poised, not just to rile up opposition from architects, but to elicit strong emotional reactions from the public. The *SpuiForum*, for instance, is not only 'sick': in deciding the project's fate (preferably, its demise) at the voting booth, visitors at Drijver's website are asked to 'vote with their heart' (Fig. P.1). That phrase hints both at the weight of the affair and the envisaged response it merits. (And it did not stop at online appeals either, but led to active picketing in the project's nearby plaza around October 2012.) No such stake or response seems to be elicited from aesthetic disputes over buildings. Or,

¹⁷ The comment is available at De Zeen (2014a).

¹⁸ Hosch (2010).

¹⁹ The statement was originally made on Schumacher's Facebook page, and subsequently reported in De Zeen (2014b).

when one comes across stylistic ‘battles’ in architecture (or, for that matter, elsewhere), chances are a moral argument is just around the corner. Instinctively, we accord moralizations a greater weight even where, or especially where, we contest them.



Fig.P.6. and P.7. Nickl und Partner Architekten AG, *Forensische Psychiatrie*, County Hospital Gabersee, Germany (2006).
(Source: Nickl-Weiler and Nickl 2009, 120-121)



What is peculiar about such cases is the juxtaposition of what (on the face of it) look to be *aesthetic* properties with *moral* values. That is, it seems that buildings earn their alleged moralizations purely on their own grounds. Certainly the very characterization of *Lafayette Park* as ‘hollow glass shells’ hints as much at a particular understanding of the buildings’ salient features as it lays the ground for their condemnation. The hearths in Frank Lloyd Wright’s house and not just any hearth are taken to represent family values, at the hands of moral philosophers no less – presumably because Wright’s hearths are composed and arranged in a manner that other hearths lack. And, finally, the forensic clinic is claimed to have benign effects on its tenants precisely because it is claimed to be the ‘built realization’ of a concept. It is that realization, not what it is a realization of, to which the morally praiseworthy features are attached. We are thus invited to consider the allocation of public and private spaces, the dimensioning of rooms, the colour selection on floors, curtains, and walls, and much else. For that surely is the ‘built realization’ of the underlying concept if anything is.

The issue, then, seems to arise over an interaction between the very *features* that differentiate buildings from one another (and from a wide range of other artifacts) and the moral *statements* such features seem to occasion if not always license. What is puzzling, however, is how such a juxtaposition (or ‘interaction’) of factors has been discussed in the literature across various scholarly communities, to which I turn next.

Aesthetic philosophers have not been shy to reflect on the broader issue here, specifically as regards ‘the relation between moral and aesthetic values in art’, where roughly speaking *moralism* (or *ethicism*)

is the theory that the intrinsic moral merits and defects of an artwork also count as aesthetic merits and defects, respectively; whereas *autonomism* is the theory that such moral values are irrelevant to an artwork’s aesthetic value.²⁰

But debates surrounding such positions have certainly not stormed to bestow prolonged attention on buildings. Instead, the preferred examples and illustrations are drawn from literature, painting, and photography.²¹ Indeed, Dominic Lopes sees fit to put it thus:

The ethicism and autonomism debate [in philosophical aesthetics] has centred on two narrative arts, literature and movies, and it can be recast without loss in terms of literary and cinematic value.²²

While I cannot speak for Lopes’s reasons for making such a strong statement (‘without loss’), I can certainly volunteer reasons of my own. Aesthetic philosophers interested in the moral appraisal of artworks typically focus on their *representational* content – where that means, for instance, how a moral code or an immoral action or an immoral viewpoint gets *portrayed* in an artwork, such as a figurative painting or a novel. And even where the artwork does not literally *express* or intend to express moral viewpoints, the idea still is that we can critique art morally if an artwork *requires* (‘prescribes’) us to engage with its content in such a way as to assume or condone morally problematic points of view or responses. The classic examples are misogynist or racist novels, or propaganda movies that motivate in their viewer a sort of ‘going along’ with politically problematic messages to at all enjoy them aesthetically, as (it is alleged) in Leni Riefenstahl’s *Triumph of the Will* (1935). And if these examples are taken to exhaustively delineate ‘morally relevant features of artworks’, architecture appears to drop out of the picture rather quickly. That is, it is not clear that buildings really evoke a political message in the way Riefenstahl’s movie does. Nor do they have the kind of representational content that novels do, or points of view that tangibly come across when we visit individual buildings (though this is the type of position that Alcaraz was trying to motivate).

²⁰ Jacobson (2005, 342). Jacobson himself defends a view that falls on neither side of this spectrum, as it holds that moral defects of artworks can on occasion be among their aesthetic merits.

²¹ For a representative sampling of this tendency in the literature, see the papers in Levinson (1998) and Hagbert (2008), Gaut (2007), and many papers by Noël Carroll and Robert Stecker in the *British Journal of Aesthetics* over the past fifteen years. Carroll (2014) is the first to significantly break the mold, but appeared too late for consideration here.

²² Lopes (2014, 102).

As a result, when aesthetic philosophers employ such notions as ‘aesthetic merit (or flaw)’ and talk of its *interaction* with ‘moral merit (or demerit)’, the quoted terms’ generality is apparent rather than real, just as Lopes suggests. A related worry is that, limited applicability apart, the terms are too ill-defined to begin with.²³ If so, that is one more reason for philosophers of architecture to resist the importation of frameworks employing such terms to address if and how architecture is morally appraisable.

Philosophers of architecture, on the other hand, have been slow to accord greater attention to moral questions about architecture, as most prefer to remain firmly within the paradigm of aesthetics. (CHAPTER 1 will show several examples.) The net effect of these two tendencies has been that (1) the ethics of art criticism has focused its efforts on aesthetic properties that most buildings appear to lack, and that (2) the aesthetic properties philosophers of architecture focus on are not deemed to license ‘ethical criticism’. Paintings are rarely if ever moralized by philosophers unless their figurative content, like the descriptive content of novels, cries out for such attention. There is no question, for instance, to moralize the choice of colour schemes or the dimensions of a painting. Yet if buildings have any aesthetic properties in common with paintings, colour and physical dimensioning certainly seem to be the more salient ones. To be sure, philosophers of architecture have readily focused on such properties to explain, or at least debate, which of these account for aesthetic value. But when these philosophers attempt to moralize buildings (on the few occasions they have done so) they focus on the type of properties that philosophers elsewhere use to moralize artworks. Baumberger’s reference to building’s ‘symbolic content’ is no exception in this regard. As similar statements by Illies, Stecker, and Alcaraz indicated, an ethics of symbolism is part of a wider trend to imbue buildings with moral content of the very variety one encounters when aesthetic philosophers discuss other art forms. As a result, buildings’ aesthetically more salient properties (like coloration and dimensioning) are marginalized in this line of inquiry, as brought out in this striking passage from Berys Gaut’s vastly influential work:

St Paul’s [cathedral by Christopher Wren] is not just a magnificent example of religious architecture; its survival during the Blitz was taken by Londoners as a great sign of hope that goodness would prevail against evil. The symbolism here is clear[.]²⁴

Contrary to appearances, Gaut does not engage a building here so much as its featuring in a short story by Graham Greene. It is the story, or rather the characters in it, that accord the building that symbolic significance. Hence what is under discussion here is not the moral quality of Wren’s artwork but Greene’s. The only other architectural example in Gaut’s monograph likewise treats architecture in the context of another art, painting: ‘details such as the arch or architectural feature in the upper right of the picture’.²⁵ To the extent architecture merits attention at all, it literally figures in other art forms – those with clear(er) representational content. Certainly an inquiry into the symbolic power of architecture is merited, but it seems also odd to claim symbolic power as the main or sole entry point for architecture’s moralization, when that leaves out architecture’s most salient aesthetic features. (Certainly Wren could not foresee, much less intend, for *St. Paul’s* to have the alleged symbolic role Greene reports. One also wonders how wide the range of aesthetically divergent buildings could have been to occupy that symbolic role.)

Finally, philosophical writers in the architecture community keen to moralize buildings have sought to widen the range of aesthetic properties typically associated with them. This serves them with a double foil in a single stroke – one, it allows them to readily connect with an exciting branch of aesthetic inquiry (that of the interaction of ethics and aesthetics), and two, it allows them to take to task the rest of the field

²³ Schellekens (2009). Jacobson (2005, 2008) also offers criticism of the ‘ethicism versus autonomism’ debate as regards its conceptual foundations. – I return to the foundational question of what makes aesthetic value *value* in §7.5.1. As regards moral value, my CHAPTER 2 framework deliberately eschews general answers, without subscribing to ethical particularism either. See specifically §2.4.2 and §9.4.1 on what (in that framework) is denoted by the *M*-variable (for ‘*M*’ = ‘moral’).

²⁴ Gaut (2007, 193). The example also appears in other aesthetic philosophers discussing the moral status of artworks, such as Matthew Kieran.

²⁵ Gaut (2007, 23).

(architecture, that is) for *too narrow a delineation of which properties of buildings are*, not simply morally but *aesthetically salient*. Thus Andrew Ballantyne suggests that buildings earn their place in our moral lives because they host and shape them; a point he takes (albeit subtly) to sufficiently dislodge the visually fixed, ‘stand-off-ish’ attitude we too typically draw on when appraising buildings aesthetically.²⁶ David Leatherbarrow and Nathaniel Coleman have offered similar points that, while drawing on a different philosophical background, end up with familiar looking conclusions – our understandings of which properties buildings have is to be expanded, if we are to understand the full significance of buildings, moral and otherwise.²⁷

These trends seem to hold a lesson in accumulation. And that is, as long as we are beholden to a fairly standard delineation of which non-moral properties buildings actually have, we have no chance to open buildings to moral appraisal. One architectural writer goes so far as to make that point into a moral one itself. Those sticking to a narrow delineation of architecture’s aesthetic properties, and still attempting to moralize architecture, succumb to a ‘phony ethics’. The idea is that only the morally depraved, or mistaken, could succumb to a narrow understanding of architecture (one on which it risks losing genuine moral significance). Instead, we are invited to opt for a ‘spatial empowering’ architecture, the actual explanation of which is conveniently cut short by the book’s physical termination.²⁸

This charge of immoralism loses its bite upon reflection, however. Certainly, once we include moral properties among the properties buildings are said to have, the moralization of buildings can sail through. But if that is a truism, it is also a philosophically shallow one. The question never was whether buildings, once (or if) they are moral, can be moral. The question was how buildings *can* be moral. Including the properties buildings have so as to include moral properties, without telling us how, does not provide but rather presuppose an answer to that question. This type of impasse is familiar from moral philosophy elsewhere. At times, the challenge to confront the moral skeptic is met, not by answering the skeptic’s concerns, but by either telling him to ‘get lost’, or querying the skeptic’s moral integrity in the first place. Thus Bernard Williams suggests that ‘the more interesting thing’ is not what one says *to* the skeptic, but what can be said *about* him.²⁹ This repeats the aforementioned moralization of the moral skeptic, and exchanges a perfectly legitimate philosophical concern (‘What reason is there to be moral for someone who is not moral already?’) for an *ad hominem*, one conducted under the mantle of moral concern no less.

It thus seems that the moralization of architecture is at an impasse. It seems that the very sentiments we have found to be so frequent and diverse in public debate (1-11) do not survive philosophical scrutiny. And where they do, the reasons for that – if we think of the aforementioned writers – seem remote from their apparent grounds outside the philosophy room. Suppose that asked to give a reason for declaring the *SpiuForum* a ‘sick building’ and the *CCTV Tower* a pinnacle of ‘evil’ architecture, one would try to say these buildings are morally despicable (if they are) because they either *symbolize* evil, *embody* narratives with reprehensible undertones, or *shape* lives of morally despicable people. That seems far fetched, and looks like an explanation in need of an explanation itself. If anything, the *CCTV Tower* seems to be somehow complicit with an undemocratic *form* of society, but it is unclear it really furthers or expresses its goals. If it does so at all, it certainly does not seem to be very good at it. Hence the impasse. If we limit our attention to the compositional properties these buildings *have* prior to their moralization, it then looks as if moralizing these buildings cannot really get off ground. We have to look elsewhere for its justification.

It is for perhaps this reason that a currently influential trend (scrutinized in CHAPTER 1) in the philosophy of architecture is to shift the moral burden away from buildings. It is claimed, rather, that statements which *on the face of them* appear to moralize buildings do nothing of the sort. Instead we are invited to

²⁶ Ballantyne (2011).

²⁷ Leatherbarrow (2014), Coleman (2014).

²⁸ Till (2009, 174-178). On my view (of which more presently), the core argument of Till’s book simply begs the question. I elaborate on this critique in Koller (2013, 60-61 with 73n.7).

²⁹ Williams (1985, 24-25).

‘redescribe’ these statements so that they are either no longer about buildings or (when they are) do not ultimately moralize them, really.

The current thesis seeks to give these trends and default responses a run for their money. It seems simply less than credible that statements of the form (1) to (11) should either be explained in ways that appear incredibly strained and remote from what they purport to tell us – or be explained in a way that removes any moral interest such statements ever held in the first place. Instead, I shall suggest that these statements – at least some of them – can be perfectly taken at face value. We can take them literally and so, against the second stance, need not efface their semantic intent. And what is more, we can show how – at least sometimes – these statements are really true because of buildings’ actual properties prior to already seeing them as moralized, which undercuts the first of the aforementioned trends. The majority of the thesis, then, is dedicated to showing how all this is possible. But a good portion is also dedicated to demonstrating just how dissatisfactory contemporary models are in morally appraising architecture. For it is only by fully realizing their shortcomings that one can develop a superior alternative, one that answers the whole array of genuine theoretic needs this PREFACE has begun to outline – something that informs the present work’s composition, which moves from unsuccessful to (more) successful attempts at moralizing buildings as we go along.

If, then, one goal of this thesis is to open up architecture to the considerable clarificatory power developed by contemporary analytic philosophy, and in turn alert aesthetic philosophers to ways of engaging architecture more effectively, another of the thesis’ overarching goals returns us to the opening remarks in this PREFACE. As we saw, public disputes on architecture are frequently enough conducted in morally charged language, with architects finding themselves unfairly placed at its receiving end or propagating its usage when the occasion suits their ends. And as we saw as well, no principled method for approaching such disputes is currently in sight. As a result, decisions on public expenditure are sometimes steered by moral considerations where no one quite knows how to parse them, let alone how much weight one should actually accord them. To help this situation, the present work provides a sober look under the hood of what is going in moralizations that arguably polarize such exchanges, and scrutinizes what defensibility if any they have. The thesis develops a framework to test moralizations of architecture for their meaningfulness, truth value, and justification. And this is aimed at, not just to clear up a relatively niche area in a philosophical sub-discipline, but to rein in what is potentially a confusing and even hampering element in public decision making.

Admittedly painters and novelists will find their work scandalized on moral grounds every now and then, if we think of Édouard Manet’s *Olympia* or Henry Miller’s *Tropic of Capricorn*. But not only are such cases few and far between, and belong to eras more ready to jump at scandals than our own: such scandals rarely decide the public standing of a novelist or painter in the long run. Or, at any rate, they have largely ceased to do so. By contrast, moral critiques of architects’ work still make it to the headlines fairly regularly, as the examples from Zaha Hadid to Koolhaas demonstrated. The reason for this is easy enough to surmise – buildings, especially large ones in public places, enjoy a prominence that novels read in closets or paintings hung in galleries simply do not enjoy. As part of the culture and everyday life we all inhabit and cannot escape, buildings are accountable for what they do and are to us in a sense that other artistic artifacts are simply not. At the same time, even highly educated people would be hard pressed to give an articulate, fine-grained explanation of which of two buildings they would prefer to see built on a public spot. Idioms like, ‘It is an eyesore’, ‘I just can’t stand the sight of it’, and ‘It looks wrong’ speak eloquently to their lack of articulation, if little else besides.³⁰ A public insistent on propagating inflammatory or panegyric

³⁰ For a contrary assessments of such sentiments, see Fox (2007, 121-122) and Roeser (2013, 95), both of whom take the observed phenomenon of aesthetic ‘eye sores’ as the sole (and unanalysed) starting point of their moral inquiries into architecture. This appears to marginalize the very possibility of buildings as objects of moral appraisal in other (and more direct) ways. Fox’s later work explicitly argues that *any other* route of moral inquiry about architecture sooner or later defaults to extant models and questions of ethical inquiry on affairs pertaining to the human and natural world: see Fox (2009).

appraisals of architecture owes stronger reasons to those whose work stands on the line. *Pari passu*, the public itself deserves a better idea of what it gets exposed to when architects come bearing the gifts of future wellbeing. Philosophers have certainly not done enough to bring sobriety to the debate, and sometimes only added fuel to bonfire.

‘Architecture is inevitable’, as Le Corbusier once put it – but its moralization certainly is not. By the end of this book, readers will have a firm grip on just what its chances of survival are, and what moralizing architecture requires to earn its rightful place in a contemporary understanding and debating of architecture.

INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS AN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE?

Most of us take moral appraisal pretty much for granted. To the extent that we worry, we simply worry about getting it right. Philosophers too worry about getting the answers to moral questions right. However, traditionally, they have also been worried about the whole business of moral appraisal itself. – Michael Smith³¹

§1.1 MORALLY DECORATED SHEDS

This thesis seeks to develop an ethics of architecture, that is, of built structures canonically recognized as architecture.

Such an ethics, to be *of architecture*, has to address the *specifics* that pertain to this type of artifact at the exclusion of, or at least in marked contrast to, architecture's more or less distant cousins. Thus, the current thesis does not aim to develop an ethics of the built environment in full generality, one applicable to all types of built constructions, including motor ways or customary railway bridges. What sets architecture apart from such types of construction?

As proposed in this thesis, architecture is characterized by having to meet three core demands: *being functional*, *being aesthetically pleasing*, and *being solidly constructed*. I do not deny that buildings have to satisfy a whole swath of *further* constraints, specifically contextual and site-specific ones. (For reasons to transpire shortly, I defer attention to such 'further constraints' to §9.3). But the three 'demands' I have selected have not only enjoyed canonical status in architecture since Vitruvius brought them to prominence in the first century BC (see CHAPTER 3) – they also suffice to set architecture apart from other types of construction, provided of course the demands are *individuated* properly.³² For, many items in our built environment, and more generally in the world of artifacts surrounding us, are not explicitly designed with a view to *being aesthetically pleasing*. A customary motor way, for instance, is there to facilitate transportation. But beyond providing a smooth ride it has no aspirations that would classify as aesthetic. A lot of artifacts surrounding us arguably aspire to meet aesthetic aspirations, but do not serve functional needs beyond them, let alone, requirements of *being solidly constructed*. We call them art works, and typically engage with them in institutional settings specifically set apart for their contemplation. Some of these settings, like galleries and museums, qualify as architecture precisely because they aspire to be more than art works.³³

Architecture, then, differs from functional artifacts and art objects alike by having to meet a range of requirements these other objects can legitimately escape. That is, these other objects can respectively be aesthetically neutral and ignore pedestrian utilitarian concerns, without losing their status within the category of objects they belong to. It is for the contrasting type of artifact, the architectural artifact, that the current thesis aims to develop an ethics.

What, however, do we mean by speaking of an ethics in this context?

³¹ Smith (1993/2007, 72).

³² On a broader understanding, many designed objects from coffee machines to smartphones could be said to be, not just functional and aesthetically pleasing, but also 'solidly constructed'. The present work assumes a narrower understanding, preserving specifically architectural constraints on *being solidly constructed*. See §3.4.1 and *passim*. Even on that narrower definition of the term, however, artifacts like suspension bridges by Ben van Berkel or Santiago Calatrava would qualify as architectural. But that, I take it, is an extensionally acceptable result of the definition.

³³ Certain objects institutionally qualify as artworks, like Duchamp's or Rauschenberg's, but do not seemingly aspire to be, or stand in for, anything other than pedestrian functional objects. Even if such objects would lack a separate set of aesthetic *features* they could still contain aesthetic *ambition*, perhaps even inescapably so as suggested by Arthur Danto (1964, 1981).

In general, by ‘an ethics’ philosophers intend a body of thought enabling the rigorous *evaluation of moral statements* for their meaningfulness, cogency, and truth value. A statement is *moral* if the proposition it expresses attaches an evaluative term of a particular category to an object.³⁴ That term can be either directly evaluative and overtly moralistic, such as ‘evil’ or ‘vile’, or it can be implicitly moralistic, such as ‘unhealthy’ and ‘violent’. In contemporary ethics such terms are taken to respectively connote ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ moral concepts, in that the latter contain a *flatly descriptive component* that governs the term’s felicitous and truthful ascription, a component the former term’s application is assumed to lack. For instance, for an agent’s behaviour to classify as violent it has to exhibit aggression and lead to ostensive harm.

An ethics of architecture, then is a philosophical framework that allows us to test statements that apply moral terms to buildings so as to make moral statements about them – that is, make evaluative statements that openly or implicitly *praise* or *condemn* buildings on decidedly moral grounds.³⁵ For such statements to fall within the purview of an ethics *of architecture*, they have to be *about* the building itself, and not something else. Otherwise the juxtaposition of a building with moral vocabulary fails to amount to a statement of moral appraisal *about* the building. Call this the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, which will be developed in §1.2.1, and which affords us a first approximation of the extensional adequacy of the ethics of architecture. An ethics of architecture *failing* to address such statements specifically would seem to miss its intended target. Whether an ethics of architecture ought to address types of statements *other* than those demarcated by the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT – and if so, which ones – remains to be seen. We can readily allow for a broad field of ‘architecture ethics’ to encompass philosophical treatment of *any and all* ethical issues arising in and from the practice and reception of architecture, without unnecessarily muddying the waters of the ‘ethics of architecture’. See further CHAPTER 1.

To satisfy the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, the aforementioned ‘evaluative term’ needs to *attach* to the (built) object of moral appraisal in the right sort of way. CHAPTER 1 discusses how to satisfy the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, and argues we need to home in on built object’s *intrinsic compositional features* for their moral appraisal.³⁶ By contrast, a mere conjunction like ‘Billy is vile and Reims Cathedral is beautiful’ does not suffice to yield statements of moral appraisal *about a building*, nor does the *mere juxtaposition* of buildings with moral labels attached to them extraneously. If few instances will feature *mere juxtaposition* as literally as what is displayed in figs. I.1-I.2, non-literal examples differ in degree, not kind, from literal instances. For, in *mere juxtaposition* the moral evaluative or label attaches, as it were, like a caption to an image, a caption that does not visibly *pick out* anything in the image.³⁷ Whenever that caption attaches to a photograph of the building, or quite literally to the building itself as in Figs. I.1-I.2, we are dealing with morally decorated sheds. Hence, when agents keen to promote or derogate specific buildings decorate them in the garb of (seemingly) moral talk, we should question whether they are making a meaningful

³⁴ See Platts (1980, 70) and, for larger issues, Platts (1981/1997). This neither presupposes nor rules out that we take moral statements *at face value* (cf. Blackburn 1980, chapter 6)

³⁵ Apart from evaluative statements, moral statements also include statements of obligation (or recommendation) but these fall out once we restrict our attention to *buildings*. Trivially, buildings can feature *in* statements of obligation, such as ‘The architect should bill his services in designing building *b* in a proportionate way’. But such statements seem to tell us little of moral import *about buildings* in particular, as ethical frameworks seeking to assess such statements confirm. Such frameworks (for instance, those of Priemus et al. 2008) are readily *applicable* to big building projects, but hardly pick out features in such projects *peculiar* to architecture. Hennig (2004) levels a related complaint at recent attempts to create a *distinct* subdiscipline of ‘the ethics of sports’ in that (doping apart) there seems precious little here not already covered by professional ethics in general. This matter apart, since it is not clear statements of obligation can be leveled *at* buildings, I have bracketed statements of obligation when developing the overall argument in this thesis, while acknowledging that they hold important concerns that *surround* the core ambitions of an ethics of architecture.

³⁶ This fixation on intrinsic property attribution (relaxed only in §9.3 to encompass relational properties) is meant to evade the harder question on what *in general* makes a statement (moral or otherwise) genuinely *about* something. We still lack a proper theoretic account (on necessary and sufficient conditions) to answer this question: see §1.2.1.

³⁷ One can artificially include the title or caption as part of the artwork (here: building) to be appraised morally, but the ensuing category of artworks is no longer architecture pure and simple. For discussion, Levinson (1985, 31-33).

statement at all, let alone one about buildings. We thus need a philosophical *framework* that allows us to test statements that apply moral terms to buildings. In short, we need an *ethics* of architecture.

As I show in CHAPTER 1, current research in architecture ethics has largely sidelined the development of such a framework, because it widely regards the *statements* such a framework is designed to assess as infelicitous or irrelevant. That is, where contemporary architecture ethics does not outright ignore statements attaching moral terms to buildings, it typically regards such statements to be either (a) purely *metaphorical*, and so as ‘stand in-s’ for non-moral statements about architecture, or (b) thinly veiled attempts at morally appraising the *architect* responsible for the building. In either case, we are not supposed to take the statements at semantic face value, but either (a) to re-describe them in a (non-metaphorical) way that *eliminates* moral vocabulary attached to buildings, or (b) to view such statements as pragmatic ‘moves in a language game’ the ostensive purpose of which is, not to moralize buildings but their architects. In (b), listeners understand precisely the *point* of such statements as saying, by way of conversational implicature, something considerably divergent from the *literal content* of such statements.³⁸



Fig.I.1 (left) A building in Athens’s Metaxourgio district, the label speaking of ‘the think tank of Platonic contemplation’ (*Prótupo theôrêtikó phrontistério Platôn*); the word ‘think tank’ was Aristophanes’ satiric label for Plato’s Academy.

Fig.I.2 (right) A bank in Dresden close to Pöppelman’s Zwinger. The inscription reads, ‘Courage is the beginning of action, fortune its end’ (*Mut steht am Anfang des Handelns, Glück am Ende.*), a saying attributed to the Greek philosopher Democritus. (Photos by author, April and October 2013.)

As a consequence of such tendencies the lion’s share of contemporary research in architecture ethics has unsurprisingly focused on the ethics of architects – in particular, on their professional conduct and,

³⁸ Suppose just a minute after you park your car in the wrong spot a policeman walks up to you and says, ‘You do not want to park here.’ You are not supposed to take him to literally (and quite falsely) inform you about your *actual* wants. Rather, his utterance is there to instruct you about what you *should be doing*. The *point* of his utterance contradicts its literal meaning, though the literal meaning is *instrumental* in getting that point across. Just so, the current line of thought runs, moral statements about buildings are not to be *taken at literal face value* as they serve a purely instrumental role of ‘getting other points across’, by way of conversational implicature. It is unclear whether that is meant to be a descriptive or normative claim, and how widely the claim is intended to generalize across the class of statements in question. I briefly return to conversational implicatures in §1.2.1.

specifically, on questions of accountability and propriety in relation to clients, patrons, tenants, the wider public. The resulting ethics escapes the uncomfortable juxtaposition of moral terms with architectural artifacts, because it situates moral terms in an area moral philosophers and lay public are alike comfortable (because familiar) with – in the dealings of humans in their treatment of each other.

Consequently, even in contemporary architecture ethics the building (where it is not ignored entirely) is seen, at best, *as an instrument* through which a client suffers harm (physical or otherwise) at the architect's hand – and, at worst, *as the spatial context* in which such harm is transacted, and an exchangeable one at that (like a site incidental to a crime). In neither case, as before, do moral categories such as the infliction of harm attach to buildings directly, or *per se*, but only parasitically so. For, the building only serves as instrument or context to agents of which moral terms hold actually, directly, and literally.³⁹

Now, personally I have considerable sympathy with such redescriptive tendencies.⁴⁰ That is, a large number of scenarios where moral talk attaches to buildings can be arguably disarmed, and subsequently analysed, in the manners just described – that is, as metaphorical, or in pragmatic terms on an instrumental or context-driven elaboration. Moreover, in such cases these strategies of restatement genuinely clarify what otherwise seem philosophically, not to mention morally, problematic statements. (An examination of such strategies' merits, and the extent of their application, is given in CHAPTERS 1 and 11.)

But it seems doubtful that these strategies apply across the board, and do not gloss over what frequently appear to be genuine, sincere attempts at statements of moral import *about buildings* – attempts of the variety the PREFACE exposed. Moreover, I quietly suspect that philosophers of architecture have shied away from moral talk about buildings because they regard themselves (and rightly so) to be ill equipped to deal with such talk straight on.⁴¹ That, of course, is a self made predicament. Philosophers' refusal to actively develop the very framework that *would* equip them to deal with such talk is reinforcing in more than one way. First, it reinforces the aforementioned feeling of *not needing* such a framework. But secondly it also reinforces an anxiety of *not being able to* handle the questions the framework would address, if only it were already available. And that anxiety is self-perpetuating.

I have written this thesis to break out of this vicious cycle. In particular, I want to suggest that, complementary to a philosophical need to have robust systems of analysis and evaluation for the moral conduct of architects, there is an equally genuine need for a philosophical system that (1) tell us what would be required to *take* moral statements about buildings *at face value* and (2) enables us to decide which of these statements *once interpreted thus* we can justifiably endorse. For only then can the broader project of developing an *ethics* of architecture get underway, requiring as it does a properly worked out *semantics* and *epistemology* for the statements in its target area. In short, to moralize architecture responsibly we require a theory that explains such questions of content and justification – and CHAPTER 2 is here to provide just that.

Moral statements about architecture are not avoided to an equally strong degree all fields of philosophical inquiry, once we consider for instance work done in philosophical aesthetics. However, that field's major problem, we saw in §P.2, is that first order moralizations of architecture are stated but not explained. But willingness to *evince* a statement should not be taken as equivalent to the speaker's *commitment* to the statement's literal truth conditions, even if there are arguably weak evidential relations between the two. The present work precisely queries how we get from utterance to content. So, as before, to moralize

³⁹ A striking instance of this is the exploitation of classicist architecture in fascist and (later) communist rallies in twentieth century Germany. The buildings got literally 'dressed up' for such occasions in party banners, yielding *mere juxtaposition*. See further Schoonman (2014).

⁴⁰ The label 'redescriptivist' is not intended to imply an explicit ambition to *describe* something adequately, if in revisionist terms. Other labels like 'periphrastic' or perhaps even 'paraphrastic' might have served just as well to designate the position in question. What matters in any case is not the label but the position it stands for.

⁴¹ CHAPTER 1 also touches on similar tendencies in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of technology, but an application of later chapters' findings to these sub-disciplines is beyond the confines of the present work.

architecture responsibly we need to move beyond the state of current debate, be it in the philosophy of architecture or aesthetics. As stated, we need a theory that explains questions of content and justification.

As we will see in CHAPTERS 2-3 (and following), developing such a theory to test moral statements about architecture systematically requires that as philosophers we pay a great deal more attention to the specifics of buildings, in particular how they look and are constructed, than is customary in contemporary work under the mantle of ‘the philosophy of architecture’. Contemporary philosophers prefer to operate on a broad, typically entirely general, understanding of ‘architecture’ as a mass term, one that does not allow or even welcome fine-grained sub-distinctions on stylistic and constructional grounds. Such is the type of detail one typically only acquires from site visits and the consultation of historical and contemporary analyses at the hand of experts – but these are equally inaccessible from the comfortable arm chair most philosophers prefer.

Indeed, it is frequently taken to be a *trade mark* of philosophical work on architecture, especially of an analytic bent, that attending to such distinctions and details is detrimental to the fully generic or universalist ambitions of philosophical work.⁴²

A moment’s reflection, however, should reveal how difficult it is to ever appraise buildings morally on such skimpy grounds. Indeed, to see how feeble the notion is, it suffices to realize that no ethics *of humans* could ever get off ground either without attention to the specifics of human conduct – in particular, the detailed features of individual agents, their motives, and the physical and intellectual means at the disposal of such agents to realize their goals. (It would be as if philosophical ethics had exchanged its standard questions for a single one – as to the inherent goodness or evil, not of this man or that, but of *mankind* as such. We are familiar with that question, perhaps, but more in the area of theology than philosophical ethics.)

In just this manner of *homing in on detail*, I suggest, we need to move contemporary philosophy of architecture to a level that discriminates buildings at a sufficient level, and analyses them with regard to how they are constructed, how they look, and which functionalities they ostensibly (aim to) meet beyond such generic descriptors as ‘housing’ or ‘medicare’. Buildings come with *floor plans* discussing such subsidiary functionalities (collectively referred to as ‘program’), have a construction revealed in *section*, and feature façade designs that only emerge in *elevation*. It is high time contemporary philosophers treat architecture more seriously in all of its three dimensions – and that includes paying greater attention to all three forms of its canonical self-representation: floor plan, section, elevation.

This returns us to §I.1’s opening remarks, on what sets architecture apart from other built constructions, and other ‘remote cousins’ like art works hung in galleries, or purely instrumental artifacts. If, as this thesis argues, *being functional*, *being aesthetically pleasing*, and *being solidly constructed*, are all requirements that architecture has to meet to qualify as architectural, philosophers interested in assessing the moral qualities of buildings (whether alleged or real) have to pay attention to how individual buildings meet such requirements – and, indeed, how they rank these requirements, how seriously they take them at all, and where they set the ‘bench mark’ of how much attention the requirements respectively demand.⁴³

The resulting ethic, I concede, will look very little like our familiar ethics of human agents. Avoidance of harm as in utilitarianism, or respect for human dignity as in deontology, or arctic integrity as in virtue

⁴² Historically, this has been bequeathed by the work of Roger Scruton in the 1970s and has had an enduring influence on subsequent work on the field – including Christoph Baumberger, Rafael de Clercq, Christian Illies, and Andrea Sauchelli, to mention the authors whose works form the core of contemporary *analytic* philosophy of architecture (as of 2014). I return to some of these authors in CHAPTER 1. On Scruton see below, 106n.231 (§3.3).

⁴³ The present work issues in no recommendations for how to morally appraise artifacts that only need to meet one or two of these three requirements. If there are applications to philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of technology, this would require to disentangle my work from some of its commitments – such as, that when speaking of architecture, beauty and functionality cannot be disentangled from one another, and neither from firmness. Given this, it is an open question how much of my work (in its present form) speaks to the notions of beauty and functionality operative in philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of technology today.

theory, are not moral considerations that attach to buildings in their standard fashion. Nor should we expect an ethics of buildings to simply be an ethics of humans, that is, ‘more of the same’ – at least, not unless we are happy to indulge in all sorts of anthropomorphisms that cannot be sustained once standards of philosophical rigor enter.⁴⁴

Rather, I shall suggest, an ethics of architecture attaches, as here proposed, to a specific type of normativity that attaches to the three core requirements - *being functional*, *being aesthetically pleasing*, and *being solidly constructed*. The difficulty, I suggest, is in categorizing that normativity correctly, and not all readers will concede that ‘ethical’ clearly fits the bill. However, to assimilate the normativity in question to either norms of aesthetics (how things look, or whether we should regard something *as art*) or to norms of construction or functionality is demonstrably false. It is false because it seeks to assimilate, at least categorically, the norms underlying the three requirements to one of them – when, as CHAPTER 3 shall argue, the three requirements operate in close mutual dependence (reciprocity), but are genuinely distinct variables, not reducible to one another. It is also false because, even if there were not three but only one ‘core requirement’, the proposal mistakes the *content* of a norm for its *normative* grounding when, as we are all familiar with, certain norms, especially aesthetic ones, are frequently argued over on non-aesthetic grounds, including moral ones. Consider parents objecting to teenage girls entering nightlife in skimpy outfits. The objection attaches to an *aesthetic choice* made by the child, but the *grounds* of objecting to it is hardly aesthetic (or at least, not aesthetic alone, even if the parents were to solely object on grounds of impropriety).⁴⁵ The same consideration runs the other way, when companies declaring their product (not just their practice) ‘ethical’, and rationalize their grounds for opting for ethical practices on entirely prudential (self-regarding) grounds. As before, what it says on the tin is not necessarily what lies beneath, and the very transformation of moral talk into a market asset is as superficial as sticking a morally sounding label on a building we encountered earlier in §I.1 as *mere juxtaposition* (cf. fig. I.3).⁴⁶

A remaining difficulty is to classify the resulting normativity adequately. In lieu of more substantive lines of inquiry on this point in CHAPTER 2, I want to pre-empt one easy way out. For, on any way forward, we should not *reduce* the normativity that emerges here to aesthetic normativity. For doing so appears to commit the mistake of (once again) confusing the *content* of a norm with the *ground of its ascription*.

More precisely, since the present work tries to conceive of *architectural normativity*, which goes into a suitably qualified understanding of the norms operative in our demands towards good architecture, in terms of three ‘further types’ of normativity – namely, aesthetic, functional, and constructional – we would then have to ask how those further types of normativity relate to one another, and how they relate to *architectural normativity*. For instance, we could say that *architectural normativity* is not simply a conglomerate, commensuration, or ‘summation’ of the further types (creating a hybrid norm of sorts), but instead is either (a) created by a very specific *interplay* between the further types, or (b) serves itself as a regulative constraint on *how to properly align and rank* norms at play in the further types. In case (b), architectural

⁴⁴ In this regard, what follows departs from attempts to expand ethics in ways that *still* feature the morality of humans as their major *determinant* and *locus* of moral appraisal, and thus remains an ethics of humans. See further §3.5.

⁴⁵ As Gerry Gerstein’s illustrations (in Greenburg 1964) bring out, a daughter’s aesthetic choices might easily trigger a moral reaction in her mother, a reaction Gerstein then translates into *aesthetic terms*. Thus, the mother’s perception of her daughter’s (entirely tempered) outfit as untoward results in the hyperbolic representation of the daughter dressed for attention like a prostitute. To communicate the latter, Gerstein relies on the usual visual cues that his readership will readily identify as ‘prostitute-like’. I return to this point in CHAPTER 3, in that the Vitruvian concept of a building’s being *aesthetically pleasing* is related to a moralized understanding of dress.

⁴⁶ ‘[H]ere is the thing: because of social media and the fact that there is such transparency, the consumer today knows everything. And they [sc. consumers] are making decisions based not only on what companies sell – the features and benefits – but your values and sense of purpose. And if you do not do the right thing [as a company] they [sc. consumers] are going to reject you – and that’s why I think more [companies] will do the right thing.’ Thus Chairman and CEO of Starbucks, Howard Schultz, in Stewart (2014). On brand equity cf. Schultz (2012) where he likewise argues that ‘unsustainable’ business practice will increasingly draw ‘customer’s rejection’, and should thus be rejected on grounds of unprofitability. That decisions rationalized on squarely prudential grounds fail to qualify as moral is argued for in Pritchard (1949).

normativity would not be *entirely independent* of the further types, but would still qualify as somehow *sui generis* in that we cannot reduce it (*architectural normativity*) to any one of the further types or even their (imagined) commensuration and conglomeration, so that once a building satisfies (minimal standards on) aesthetic, functional, and constructional normativity *independently* (as if ticking boxes on a check list), we could already conclude that it qualifies as ‘good architecture’.⁴⁷

Beginning with CHAPTERS 2 and 3, I pursue a variant of (a) that I shall call the RECIPROcity THESIS, but I do not construe that as a thesis on how *three domains of values* are related to one another (to wit, functional, aesthetic, and constructional) so as to somehow give rise to ‘ethical values’, but as a thesis on how three *types of compositional properties* (that buildings have) ‘interact’ or relate to one another, where the *rationale* for a building to have particular instances of such types can itself be argued over on moral grounds.⁴⁸ For, analogously to how agents defend their actions, motives, and impacts thereof on others, by giving *moral grounds* for them that others can appraise ethically for their moral adequacy (or lack thereof; the grounds could either not even be said to apply or, even if they did apply, found wanting in principle), we should treat the construction and detailing that inform the specifics of building as if they were similarly open to normative and, more specifically, moral appraisal.



Fig. I.3. Department store, The Hague, Netherlands (Photo by author, June 2014)

That is, how a buildings looks, is constructed, and how it accommodates functional requirements, can be appraised on grounds that venture beyond the respective ‘home’ domain of norms from which such considerations or factors respectively arise. That is, we can appraise such factors on grounds venturing beyond respectively aesthetic, constructional, and functional reasons. One, we can appraise them in how far they cohere with one another – a core assessment I shall push for CHAPTERS 2 and 3. And second, we can appraise such choices on grounds that are occasionally moral. To develop this second point, I turn to the work of philosophers and architects who have appraised architectural designs on moral grounds, and may (with varying degrees of justification) be construed as developing a set of norms that pertain to

⁴⁷ This entire paragraph is owed to Christian Illies (p.c., 3 April 2014), who further adds (I translate), ‘perhaps G.E. Moore’s suggestion of organic units may help, a notion he uses to describe the complex relation of individual to more complete moral appraisals. But in his case he is only talking about moral appraisals, whereas in the present case we seem to be talking about trying to mediate among different types of [appraisals or values].’ As I now go on to say, I depart from Illies’ suggestion to construe the matter as a view on three domains of *values*.

⁴⁸ If, for instance in the title to CHAPTER 3, I elsewhere stick to talk of ‘values’, that is to accord respect to how these compositional requirements have been discussed canonically. That is, talk of ‘triad values’ is short hand for such *requirements* or *normative constraints* on composition, and not meant to incur substantive axiological commitments.

architecture, and help explain what we could classify as contributing to ‘*architectural normativity*’ without having to coin a separate category for it. (I pursue this throughout CHAPTERS 2 and 3, specifically in §2.6.)

In the end, however, arguing for a positive *set of norms* attaching to architecture is at best a secondary goal of this thesis. For, doing so would mean to argue for a specific *morality* of buildings when, as I said at the outset, the thesis’s primary goal is an *ethics* of architecture – that is, a philosophically satisfactory body of thought that helps us assess, for cogency, meaningfulness, and truth value, *moral statements* about architecture, about buildings, not such a set of moral statements itself. At the same time, that ethics cannot operate out of thin air and requires the introduction of *standards* aiding the assessment of such statements, and accordingly, first and second order standards for the *correctness condition* of moral appraisal of architecture, since that is what an ethics of architecture *does*.⁴⁹ Again, how this is precisely accomplished has to await the detailed work of CHAPTER 2.

§I.1.1 SIX HARD QUESTIONS FOR AN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE

Let us take stock. If my remarks so far apply at least in outline, future ethicists of architecture have quite a bit of work cut out for them. Among the most salient and pressing questions that emerge so far we have the following.

First, how can we reliably tell genuine from deviant instances of moral statements about buildings? Second, what are adequate methods of dealing with deviant instances? Do diagnoses of metaphorical talk and ‘language games’ exhaust our options here, or are there further (perhaps superior) options of handling moral statements about buildings that should not be taken at face value? If, for instance, we generally prefer to redescribe deviant moral statements about buildings into non-moral statements, how should the redescrptions look like? Should they even talk of buildings, and can they still employ moral vocabulary, on the understanding that no such vocabulary is employed literally and/or directly attaches to buildings? Thirdly, how can we sharpen our understanding of architecture’s role as *instrument* and *context* to the moral action of humans, individual or collective? Fourthly, where are the limits, in such cases, of architecture’s complicity with morally appraisable human action? And what does such complicity mean, for architecture’s own moral appraisal (if any)? Fifth, how do we categorize the norms that go into the normative assessment of how buildings are constructed and look? Sixth, which norms, quite generally, should we apply to architecture, and which should we withhold from them? If some norms do not apply, not even in principle, what consequences (if any) does this have for our answers to the previous questions?

The lion’s share of this thesis’ attention falls on the first question, specifically on the working out of the various conditions required for instances of moral statements to be ‘genuine’ or valid. In that very regard, and as already indicated, the present work is as much about the *preconditions* of architecture ethics more widely as it is about the development of a full blown ethical system itself. Without a firm understanding of the preconditions, oriented (as I claimed they must be) on the three demands of *being functional*, *being aesthetically pleasing*, and *being solidly constructed*, we lack a firm foundation from which to ask these other questions. Accordingly, I dedicate large portions of my thesis to establishing this foundation, from which (I argue) these other questions can be put more cogently, and answers to them can be developed with greater accuracy once we set out to do so. For instance, I argue in CHAPTER 2 that with a framework in place to verify (a) when moral statements about buildings have literal truth content, what that content is,

⁴⁹ For this distinction, cf. again the chapter motto. Applied to the domain of buildings (or a subset thereof dignified by the term ‘architecture’), Smith’s remarks set the agenda of the present work, if in reverse order. Smith further claims that moral *objectivism* (‘presuppos[ing] that there are correct answers to moral questions to be had’) presupposes moral *factualism* (72) of a *non-naturalist* variety (73), which is too tendentious. Further, taking statements of moral appraisal (whether about buildings or humans) at face value does not presuppose (a) objectivism or universalism, let alone (b) non-naturalist factualist accounts of these statements. As to (b), see Hartry Field’s work on the compatibility of disquotational truth schemas for ‘evaluative discourse’ (‘*b* is evil’ is true iff *b* is evil) with ‘factual defectiveness’ (Field 1994/2001, 242-251). I briefly return to (b) in §1.2.2.

and to verify (b) when that content can be justifiably endorsed, we *ipso facto* have a framework that reveals statements failing that verification as ‘deviant’ in a weak sense – as meriting an inquiry, if at all, on grounds other than their literal content. A ‘protocol’ for how to decompose, categorize and respond to such statements in all their variegated manner is beyond the present work, but knowing which part of tests for *non-deviance* such statements fail is already a main indicator for that. The present work will provide such a test in CHAPTER 2, to be employed and refined in every of the subsequent chapters; the CODA embarks on first efforts towards such a ‘protocol’ once these chapters are in place.

§I.2 ARCHITECTURE FIRST

As elsewhere, if we want to know how architecture relates to all sorts of things – for instance, to the natural and built environment more widely, to societal concerns of justice and sustainability, the future survival of our natural habitat, and, not to forget, the professional conduct of architects – we should first understand what we thus relate to these further things; meaning, architecture itself. As indicated above, philosophers largely lack the conceptual interface to ask questions *of* architecture, let alone satisfactorily *embed* architecture in such wider questions and their ramifications. This realization – we may call it ‘architecture first’ – explains several choices of content in this thesis.

For one, it explains why several of the six questions posed in §I.1.1 are either dealt with at the level of depth they require or are hardly dealt with at all. In the end, question one is perhaps the only one I address to an approximately satisfactory degree, whereas questions two to six are touched on in a considerably less systematic manner than I should like. But attempting comprehensiveness with regard to all six questions and answer them to everyone’s satisfaction, requires time and space beyond the confines of the present work. I hope much in it will help lay the foundation for more thorough work on those questions by others, and thus contribute to resolving the wider concerns of architecture ethics today.

Relatedly, to realize that architecture has to come first, before we can ask all sorts of question *of* and *with* it, explains why large portions of my work are dedicated to working through, in excruciating detail, issues concerning not architecture ethics but a *propaedeutic* to it. Let us see briefly how this pans out in practice. (Subsequent chapters abound in instances.)

As already indicated, the thesis’ ultimate goal is to develop a philosophically satisfactory body of thought that helps us assess, for cogency, meaningfulness, and truth value, *moral statements* about architecture, about buildings. But that ultimate goal must be arrived at in a series of carefully argued steps. While I lay no claim to comprehensiveness, part of my methodology to address this concern square on is to home in on moral statements already made in the literature about architecture.

As a more special way to address some of my wider concerns, I attend to authors who attended to the expressive limits of architecture. On the face of it, an inquiry into such limits pertains to an aesthetics rather than ethics of architecture. Frequently enough, that is precisely the label under which these writers *presented* their views.⁵⁰ However, given how the *content* of what a thing, animate or inanimate, expresses is frequently the primary locus for that thing’s *moral appraisal*, I suggest contemporary philosophy should re-appropriate (if not rather re-interpret altogether) such contributions from the past.

Relatedly, I will frequently attend to authors, recent and contemporary, who volunteer outright moral statements about architecture, not so much to *extract* from them *valid contributions* to an ethics of architecture, but to provide us with convenient targets for practice, in our goal to establish such an ethics. For too often, I allege, architecture has been moralized on grounds that cannot be sustained philosophically. To take such moralizations at face value would (as indicated earlier) mean to give in to metaphorical talk or to move in a (frequently, polemical) language game, when we should rather welcome such contributions as illustrating the boundaries of sense and nonsense of architectural morality. (That is, such authors illustrate the boundaries indirectly in their work, by transgressing them, where the earlier

⁵⁰ For instance, Hegel in his 1820s lectures on aesthetics (not an example to figure in the present work, however).

mentioned set of authors scrutinize the boundaries directly.) As always, such contributions have to be measured carefully against a more sustained, systematic inquiry into ‘architectural morality’. Indeed, I shall use such contributions as input, but not necessarily as the last word, on the road towards developing and refining such a more sustained inquiry.⁵¹

This concludes the explanation of the broader academic context of my work, its relation to existing research, the questions it hopes to raise, and those it aims to answer, including the limitations that of necessity inhere in a single undertaking like this one. I proceed to provide a brief synopsis of this thesis.

§I.3 THESIS SYNOPSIS

CHAPTER 1 looks at the current state of research pertaining to architecture ethics. It argues that the models currently on offer in the literature either bypass the development of an ethics of architecture, give bad reasons to bypass it, or contain inconclusive attempts at how to approach it. More specifically, I argue that none of the proposals currently on the table satisfy what §I.1 called the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, a constraint CHAPTER 1 develops in greater detail alongside other adequacy constraints. What we need instead is a model of moral appraisal that homes in on buildings themselves, specifically their intrinsic compositional features.

CHAPTER 2 then puts forward just such a model, a positive account of my own, called the ‘FACE VALUE TREATMENT’. On that model it is a *result*, and not simply declared by *fiat*, that at least some moral appraisals of architecture can be taken at face value. The model explains what it means to take such statements ‘at face value’, and how to account for their truth conditions. The model also features a linking conditional that connects buildings’ compositional properties Π to particular categories (or entire accounts) of moral appraisal \mathcal{M} , leaving the major task of properly delineating Π and \mathcal{M} , and their relation to one another, to later chapters. Since, on the account I offer, buildings earn moral appraisals by way of their own compositional properties, the account secures that buildings themselves are morally appraisable, and not (merely) that human agents causally linked to their design, construction, or utilization are morally appraisable. In contrast to redemptivist tendencies (on which the moral evaluative property attaches to *something other than the building*) and eliminativist tendencies (on which the moral property attaches to *nothing at all*), the FACE VALUE TREATMENT preserves the predicative structure (most) moral appraisals of buildings have at face value.

CHAPTER 3 presents a historically influential account for the normative appraisal of architecture, presented by a triad of normative constraints in Vitruvius’s work. Among the triad, I particularly focus on two notions, firmness (*being solidly constructed*) and beauty (*being aesthetically pleasing*). I argue for a specific understanding of these normative constraints (or ‘values’, loosely speaking), an understanding that (1) shows them rooted in further constraints, some of them explicitly moral, and that (2) on the whole explains how these constraints relate to architecture itself. In particular, I argue for a synchronic rather than diachronic reading of firmness or *firmitas*, in a way that points the way forward to what later writers will call ‘tectonic construction’ rather than temporal endurance, and I argue that we should understand beauty or *venustas*, not as surface appearance but as a moral choice how to clothe oneself. Many of these points are developed in CHAPTER 3 by looking at the Ciceronian subtext of Vitruvius’s *De Architectura*. I diverge from contemporary scholarship, not only in exploring that subtext at greater length (instead of viewing Vitruvius primarily through the lens of Renaissance commentary, as is currently standard), but also in treating Vitruvius’s text as a *treatise* on architecture, that is, a tractatus that presses (at least, in some

⁵¹ As always in such undertakings, one runs risks incorporating material of a dubious nature at all. Thus Williamson (2007, 245) notes, ‘One factor obscuring the descriptive inadequacy of standard accounts of reflective equilibrium is the already noted tendency to conceive evidence in philosophy as the mere having of ‘intuitions’ [...]. Even if we revise an ‘intuition’, our evidence may still include the fact that we had it. But the epistemic status of the original ‘intuition’, however much the model ignores it, must be relevant to the epistemic value of revising general theories in line with its content.’

moments) for a very specific *normative view* of what architecture should be, and not a (fairly) value neutral, comprehensive handbook of good practices that is largely non-committal or non-partisan.

CHAPTER 4 pushes forward historically, and explains how several of Vitruvius' core concerns with *firmitas* and *venustas* inform pre-modern debates on value in architecture, specifically the view I call the RECIPROCITY THESIS, on which beauty, firmness, and functionality should be reciprocally related. I outline the starting position for architects and philosophers in the wake of Kant's third *Critique*, a work that had compellingly argued that architecture can only ever address two values, beauty and functionality, and even then, only one of them fully. I argue how several subsequent writers identify the omission of firmness, as a third core value, as crucial to Kant's arguments, and instead argue for an understanding of architectural beauty and functionality that grounds both of them (in terms of content, and as a constraint on what legitimately goes into that content) by firmness. I outline the core tenets of what I call 'the tectonic tradition', with is united by re-establishing firmness or *firmitas* as a central value to architecture, a value that recuperates architecture's low standing as art, in the system of Kant, and its low standing in the wider moral concerns of humanity. CHAPTER 4 thus lays the ground for the remainder of the thesis.

CHAPTER 5 delves into the specifics of Kant's thought far more specifically. I detail his views, and provide an in depth analysis of his arguments – because, if his arguments are valid, several core concerns of this thesis, constructed around a (roughly) Vitruvian frame work, would no longer hold up to philosophical scrutiny. I argue that Kant's arguments fail to challenge my Vitruvian-informed reading of the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, specifically its emphasis inherited from (and by) the tectonic tradition on firmness as a core constraint on Π .

CHAPTER 6 provides an 'architectural echo' to Kant's philosophy in the work of the Swiss architect Le Corbusier. I argue that Le Corbusier implements (albeit unwittingly) several core tenets of Kant's understanding of architecture, what architecture can and should be, and where its complicity with human values and moral concerns specifically lies. I conclude that, in the last instance, neither Kant's arguments nor those unearthed from Le Corbusier's writings, can command a lasting challenge to the tectonic tradition. Kant's writings, in particular, however point towards the need for a more robust theory of experiencing architecture, and of the aesthetic and ethical values that transpire in such experiences. The chapter closes by scrutinizing and rejecting Kant's own criteria on such a theory.

CHAPTER 7 develops constraints on Π in line with CHAPTERS 2-4, hence, in line with *firmitas* exerting a normative constraint. I outline how Schopenhauer's philosophy lays the ground for the tectonic tradition and some of its core tenets, and moreover grounds those values in a moral system that sees architecture's role as delivering mankind from suffering. While I ultimately reject the derivation of many of Schopenhauer's views, in particular those surrounding what amounts to his take on \mathcal{M} , I argue that some of his views, particularly those on how to constrain Π , can be preserved independently. Moreover, I argue that reflection on Schopenhauer's rather than Kant's views furnishes us with substantive core constraints on an adequate account of experiencing architecture.

CHAPTERS 8 and 9 investigate the written and built work of Gottfried Semper. I argue that Semper aligns with neither an anti-tectonic (CHAPTERS 5-6) nor a proactively tectonic (CHAPTERS 4 and 7) individuation of Π , but rather shows us how to expand from the latter towards the former. I scrutinize his arguments that challenge, more successfully than Kant or Le Corbusier, the tectonic tradition's individuation of Π , and argue that this mandates a widening of \mathcal{M} as well.

In CHAPTER 9 I turn to Semper's urban designs for his own buildings, and suggest that Semper widens Π and \mathcal{M} in tandem, enhancing the applicability of my CHAPTER 2 model for the FACE VALUE TREATMENT. In particular, §§9.3-4 will revise CHAPTERS 1-2's response on how to meet the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT (§I.1). Instead of exclusively focusing on building's *intrinsic* compositional properties, we also need to include their *relational* compositional properties in our moral appraisal of (sets of) buildings.

Such properties include a building's axial orientation, sensitivity to siting, its comparative scale and massing, all of which all bear a strong link to a building's *intrinsic* compositional features, such as height, fineness of detailing on a façade, and non-comparative massing.

CHAPTER 10 concludes my substantiation, defense, and refinement of the FACE VALUE TREATMENT by deploying it to test moral appraisals, both negative and positive, of the architecture of Mies van der Rohe. I use my model to highlight that the compositional basis on which Mies's designs operate is too austere to license the type of grandiose moral value judgements critics and historians have seen fit to attach to his buildings.

CHAPTER 11 brings together several strands of arguments previously parked, including questions of a broadly philosophical nature on the aesthetics and meta-ethics of architecture. These areas clearly deserve inquiries in their own right and should draw on the results of the present work. The chapter also summarizes some of the major findings of the present work, for instance in its refinement of buildings' compositional properties and which of these are morally relevant (and how), and asks some parting questions of a particularly pressing nature that still remain when these findings are observed. How, for instance, can we justify divergent moral appraisals of compositionally indiscernible buildings? Should we even allow for their very possibility? If yes, how does this require revising and amplifying the theoretical framework introduced in earlier chapters? And so on. CHAPTER 11 also draws out, in some detail, avenues of further research with respect to areas of architecture and its history, and likewise queries how much revision and amplification we can still expect from such material at this point.

A CODA concludes the work by returning us to our opening questions in the PREFACE, its eleven sample moralizations of architecture and five sample buildings. Going through the sample buildings one by one reveals how the framework handles concrete cases, and shows how drawing on the framework in a competent and rational manner requires contextual sensitivity. As CHAPTER 11 will have pointed out, the present framework is relative to contextual parameters, but certainly not relativist in its morality. Accordingly, handling a non-relativist framework has to operate cautiously, and that is, in a manner free of mechanistic, dogmatic, or crudely universalist tendencies. The CODA closes by raising an agenda of future research on the ethics of architecture, and concludes that firm theoretic foundations are required for the questions on that agenda to have any shot at clarification and resolution. It is those theoretic foundations that are laid in the present work.

CHAPTER 1

ARCHITECTURE ETHICS WITHOUT AN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE

If [a philosopher] seemingly tells us that God exists, and then goes on to tell us that ‘God’ denotes the evolutionary-historical process that has brought us into being, and if we ourselves think that this evolutionary-historical process is far from deserving the name he gives it, then we should count him an atheist. We may report that he says the words ‘God exists’, but we would be wrong to say that he says that God exists. [...] Unless we can agree that a congeries of human and divine ideas could deserve the name ‘tree in the quad’, we ought not to report that Berkeley holds that the tree in the quad exists, no matter how much Berkeley himself may boast of his adherence to common opinion [on that point]. – David Lewis⁵²

§1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to provide a literature review of the current state of *philosophical* research on architecture ethics, and expand readers’ appreciation for the options on the menu, both as regards the width and depth of those positions. Accordingly, I shall introduce new varieties of redescriptionism and its close kin not hitherto mentioned. My review of options is highly selective in that I focus on what (after careful perusal of the entire field) strike me as the most promising representatives available represented today. I thus favour recent presentations of earlier views where they supersede the latter in argumentative cogency. I also ignore many valuable contributions when their direct relevance to the thesis’s larger goals was in doubt.⁵³ Finally, later chapters largely bypass contemporary philosophical contributions in favour of (attending to) material that has accumulated outside the current lens of what passes as ‘philosophy of architecture’, but will make continued use of several concepts unearthed from the literature review.

By ‘architecture ethics’ I mean to connote a field that encompasses the philosophical treatment of *any and all* ethical issues arising in and from the (professional) practice and (public) reception of architecture. By ‘an ethics of architecture’ – the thing I am after in the present work – I intend a much narrower field, characterized by the distinct goal to provide a philosophical body of thought that enables the systematic analysis of moral judgments made about buildings, a goal I outlined in the INTRODUCTION.⁵⁴

My overall goal with the current chapter is to show that, somewhat paradoxically, an ethics of architecture does not feature strongly in contemporary research on architecture ethics. Rather, philosophers prefer to treat moral statements about buildings, where they treat them at all, as meriting redescrptions of a variety that erases the moralization of buildings themselves.

Such ‘strategies of redescription’ (as I called them in the INTRODUCTION) are manifold, but they do not exhaust contemporary options of marginalizing the ethics of architecture. A different type of strategy is oriented on the idea that an ethics of architecture is best developed indirectly, by starting from elsewhere within architecture ethics, and then derive an ethics of architecture from there, as it were. While such a ‘strategy of derivation’ takes various shape in the literature, two popular variants have been to begin with either *ethical concerns surrounding architects* or *ethical concerns surrounding buildings users*, and to regard an ethics of

⁵² Lewis (1990, 23 and 23-24).

⁵³ Some of these are discussed in Koller (2013, §4.2); cf. §1.2.1 below. For similar reasons I ignore important recent contributions to the ethics of urbanism, discussed in Koller (2014).

⁵⁴ I understand this distinction may take time to get used to, but take heart in that philosophers have shown patience with comparable verbiage in the past. For instance, philosophy of language took a leap in the 1970s when philosophers started to distinguish *theories of meaning* from *meaning theories*. A *theory of meaning* comprises a set of axioms and derivation rules that jointly suffice to interpret the sentences of an object language (see §1.7). A *meaning theory* by contrast constitutes an attempt at philosophical inquiry into the correct formulation in principle of *theories of meaning*, irrespective of particular object languages. See McDowell (1977/1993).

architecture as derived from either one of them.⁵⁵ While neither variant (typically) employs strategies of redescription, they share with such strategies the idea that moral statements about buildings are to be approached (where we are to approach them at all) and interpreted *indirectly*, via an ethics of humans.

§1.2 will give readers an overview, not just on such positions, but where and why I depart from them, and what the work of CHAPTER 2 will put in their place. What helps divide the field – and subsequently sort the wheat from the chaff – is a set of *adequacy constraints* that operate on any satisfactory ethics of architecture. These are introduced in §1.2.1, as are various theories that evade some or all of these constraints at specific points in this chapter. Classifying such evasions sets the stage for discussion of more specific authors later on in the chapter, and gives us a firmer grasp on just what qualifies positions to be redescriptionist or derivationist.

Next up, §1.3 sketches the terrain of realist and antirealist positions in contemporary meta-ethics, as these come (we will see) with certain ‘domain neutral features’ that are relevant to better understand (and assess) our realist and antirealist options when developing an ethics of architecture. For such features are ‘neutral’ as to their domain of application, and so carry over to a hitherto unintended sphere of application – the moralization of buildings. What is more, seeing how some of the problems such features (or the positions they occur in) give rise to likewise aids us in coming up with a more robust understanding of just what is required of and what is possible in an ethics of architecture. Having said that, I do not claim that inspecting meta-ethics provides the be all and end all to all problems in the ethics of architecture – only that we can appreciate some of these problems in a clearer light. If awareness of the meta-ethical terrain surrounding the ethics of architecture is an indispensable preliminary, it is certainly only that – a preliminary to more substantive inquiries into first order ethics, inquiries that probe moral statements about architecture head on.

Hence, beginning with §1.4 I turn to concrete contributions to the ethics of architecture. In particular, I look at the work of Tom Spector (§1.5), Christian Illies and Nicholas Ray (§1.6), and Andrea Sauchelli (§1.7). Going through these works alerts us to specific issues that characterize the limitations of the ethics of architecture today, awareness of which is indispensable if one is to develop these authors’ work further towards (or by replacing them with) more satisfactory positions. More precisely, §1.4 looks at a premise all these authors have in common, what I will call *The Intentionalist Prejudice*. §1.5 then looks at a view that champions derivationism, and tackles the ethics of architecture via an ethics of architects. §1.6 harkens closer to derivationism, and will be scrutinized for its (unsuccessful) attempt to mount an ethics of architecture based on architecture’s alleged symbolism. The discussion here is valid for a much wider range of authors than indicated, if readers remember some of the philosophers heard in the PREFACE. §1.7 then closes with a staunch defender of redescriptionism, and unpacks just what this view involves and what can be said in its favour. Of all author-specific sections in this chapter, §1.7 is the one of greatest relevance to the project going forward (specifically §1.7.1 should not be skipped). For the failings of redescriptionism are instructive in more regard than one: they tell us, rather precisely, what is needed if we are to press forward, and develop a more satisfactory ethics of architecture. This returns us to the adequacy constraints that jump started the chapter, and provides a smooth transition to CHAPTER 2’s more constructive endeavour.

§1.2 STRATEGY OVERVIEW, ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS

The present section provides an overview of the overall strategic goals of CHAPTERS 1 and 2, to act as a ‘road map’ of sorts – to help readers discern the main line of argument across many points of details of an often technical nature.

⁵⁵ Sometimes the two are combined, but for now we can ignore that complication. I pursue it (fleetingly) in §1.7.

My ultimate strategic goal with CHAPTER 1 is to demonstrate that severe problems arise for either type of strategy mentioned in §1.1 – redescription or derivation. At the very least, it seems that regardless of how these strategies are developed in the current literature, and regardless of how one chooses to build on their foundation, some pretty strong problems remain in place. In particular, §§1.5-1.7 will argue that such strategies are *poorly motivated*, in that theories pursuing such strategies inadequately clarify the overall goal such theories are meant to address in the first place. And they are *poorly defended* in that arguments supporting such theories are frequently unsound or invalid, in that they contain premises that are demonstrably false or fail to establish (entail) their purported conclusions.

To help move the ethics of architecture beyond such dissatisfactory strategies, CHAPTER 2 puts forward an alternative that avoids the kind of commitments that incur those problems in the first place. The theory put forward will defend a (and hence, be called) FACE VALUE TREATMENT for statements of moral appraisal of buildings. To keep the surface grammar of such appraisals simple, I will treat these as all sharing the form ‘V(*b*)’ – statements that predicate morally evaluative predicates ‘V’ of buildings *b* (see further §2.3.1). A FACE VALUE TREATMENT entails disquotations for ‘V(*b*)’, where redescription never cancels semantic ascent for V(*b*). For some sentences (like, ‘He was rude to her’, or, ‘The present king of France is bald’),⁵⁶ a FACE VALUE TREATMENT would be out of place, and redescriptive efforts clearly warranted. But for ‘V(*b*)’, this is much less clear. Which, then, is the right position when it comes to ‘V(*b*)’? My argument proceeds in two stages, and is spread out over the next two chapters as follows.

§1.2.1 lays out ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS on an ethics of architecture, constraints that explain some of the previous paragraph’s material in greater detail. CHAPTER 2 will then argue that the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, supplemented by a two-step model explained in §2.2, best meets these ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS. But this argument for its optimally meeting these constraints does not proceed *a priori*, but rather constitutes an inference to the best explanation (or something very much like it).⁵⁷ That inference is accomplished by two premises in particular. First, CHAPTER 2 will show how the FACE VALUE TREATMENT meets all of the ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS (and very directly so). Second, CHAPTER 1 shows that redescriptionism and derivationism in several of their variants fail to satisfy the ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS (and appear to disagree with or even reject such constraints, rather than seek to comply them), and also fail on their own grounds (irrespective of the ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS). The conclusion to CHAPTER 1 is that redescriptionism and derivationism are either inherently defective (they cannot receive adequate justification, and so are flat out false), or that the current literature has failed to defend them adequately.⁵⁸ Now perhaps new ways of defending such strategies can be developed, ways that avoid the particular difficulties that, I argue, infect their current variants. But even then, I argue, two points remain.

First, even hard core proponents of such strategies may come to wonder whether their approach is complete enough to deal, across the board, with moral appraisals of buildings wherever they surface. Such proponents may take on board the FACE VALUE TREATMENT I accord such appraisals in CHAPTER 2, while subscribing to a significantly more austere understanding of how many instances that treatment is applicable to. That is, they would disagree with me on how many instances warrant the FACE VALUE

⁵⁶ Or even, ‘The cash machine ate my card’, to which we may add, ‘The cash machine was rude to me’.

⁵⁷ This is how Hornsby and Longworth (2006, 108) explain Donald Davidson’s argument for his hypothesis that Tarski-type theories of truth ‘best’ serve to provide a ‘theory of meaning’ for natural languages. Like my own account, Davidson launches this argument by first laying out adequacy constraints (in his case, for ‘theory of meaning’). More generally, it is notoriously hard to render the criteria for the *validity* of inference to the best explanation (abductive reasoning) formally precise, as it cannot be subsumed to deductive or inductive validity (Schurz 2008).

⁵⁸ Cf. Soames (2003, 309), quoted in §1.8, *a propos* Davidson’s claim mentioned in the previous footnote. I highlight these connections because they explain the origin of my methodology. Below I distance the theoretic ambitions I develop regarding an ‘ethics of architecture’ from truth conditional semantics, however. The point of such semantics, then, is not to provide the ethics of architecture with a *formal model* that can be appropriated for a specific language fragment (morally evaluative predicates applied to buildings), but to provide *methodological guidance*.

TREATMENT rather than treatment by redescription. If so, that is a further question, one that even later chapters will not answer in a principled manner but rather on a case-by-case basis. Further, §2.1 suggests how developments further down the road may blur the distinction between the FACE VALUE TREATMENT and its redescriptivist opposition, depending on *how much* content one deems necessary to preserve (to take at face value) in the target area of statements of the ethics of architecture. Again, while §1.2.1 touches on the matter, it does not demarcate the matter in a principled, systematic manner, as doing so would mandate, not just developing a FACE VALUE TREATMENT, but a host of myriad alternatives.

Second, even if more satisfactory variants of redescriptivism could be developed, and even if its proponents were to come round to accept (within strict limits) the use of the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, redescriptivist strategies would still run into one major difficulty. For, other than being infected by internal inconsistencies, I will argue such strategies do not clearly enough offer what they are most naturally taken to (purport to) do – and that is, offer us a satisfactory ethics of architecture. To be sure, it is not always clear whether proponents of such strategies really purport to offer such an ethics, as pronouncements in the literature are frustratingly ambiguous on that point, as we shall see. But that is precisely part of the problem, in that philosophers seem to lack a shared understanding of what an ethics of architecture could even *be*, and how *seriously* one should attempt to arrive at one. If, then, contemporary means are defective, a clearer understanding of the goal seems to be needed just as much.

The highly specific problems that emerge here – not that they have been recognized in the literature ever before – are by no means peculiar to the ethics of architecture. Indeed, a greater awareness how the same problems plague other areas in philosophy would already catapult contemporary research on the ethics of architecture leaps ahead. This is but one of many instances where work on (so-called) ‘applied ethics’ is able to make headway by paying greater attention to its meta-ethical assumptions.⁵⁹ For, once such assumptions are brought into the clear light of day, a host of issues and alternatives opens up. Progress in analytic philosophy, however, has only ever happened historically when debates were sharpened up, presuppositions made explicit, and alternatives scrutinized one by one. For that reason, §1.3.2 will look at such work before we address specific antirealist (that is, redescriptive and derivational) positions in the ethics of architecture itself.

§1.2.1 ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS

As I explained in §1.2, the position CHAPTER 2 will defend provides a FACE VALUE TREATMENT for statements of moral appraisal of buildings, statements of the surface grammatical form ‘V(b)’ that predicate morally evaluative predicates ‘V’ of buildings *b*. On the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, some instances of ‘V(b)’ are *literally true*.⁶⁰ For ‘V(b)’ to be literally true, two conditions have to be met. I call these the present project’s *adequacy constraints*, the first one of which will be familiar from the INTRODUCTION.

ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT (1):

[If ‘V(b)’ is literally true then] ‘V’ is true of *b* itself (and *not* only of *something other than b*).

⁵⁹ In this regard, consider Nagel (1979, xiii) on the need for theoretic depth in applied ethics. Much work on applied ethics (through no fault of its own) remains ineffective at the level of implementation. If so, if such work ‘is theoretically less deep than work that is irrelevant to the problems of society, it cannot claim superior importance merely by virtue of the publicity of its concerns.’

⁶⁰ A perhaps catchier label of the position would be LITERALISM, though its intended scope and theoretic ambition is more modest than what Francois Recanati intends by the term. Recanati (2010a, 172, 171) defines literalism as a(ny) position on which ‘sentences, qua grammatical entities, [...] possess a determinate (truth-evaluable) content’ in that ‘we may legitimately ascribe truth-conditional content to sentences, independently of the speech act which the sentence is used to perform.’ LITERALISM in my more restricted sense is the thesis that only certain sentences, namely ‘V(b)’-sentences, have literal content, leaving it open whether they earn that content as proscribed by Recanati’s strictures.

I insert corner brackets here because I will sometimes refer to the *consequents* alone when talking of the constraints. That is because the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT in that shortened version is employed to constrain not just literal truth but a properly working ethics of architecture as such. Context will disambiguate which use is intended.

Our first requirement literally requires ‘ $V(b)$ ’ to be a statement primarily about b . Getting clearer on the semantic primitive ‘about’ is notoriously hard, in that we still lack a proper theoretic account (on necessary and sufficient conditions) on what *in general* makes a statement (moral or otherwise) genuinely *about* something.⁶¹ The issue is somewhat mitigated once we amplify the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT with an additional constraint, where (as before) corner brackets are introduced to allow for two contextually ambiguated uses of referring to the constraint:

DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT (2):

[If ‘ $V(b)$ ’ is literally true then] V itself and *not (only) something other than V* is attributed to b .

The reason for my labeling the second constraint in terms of disquotation is straightforward. Together our two constraints imply a weakened disquotation schema for ‘ $V(b)$ ’, namely:

If ‘ $V(b)$ ’ is literally true then $V(b)$.

Since, by definition, a FACE VALUE TREATMENT treats at least some instances of ‘ $V(b)$ ’ as literally true, it thereby follows that the FACE VALUE TREATMENT entails disquotation for ‘ $V(b)$ ’. By contrast, any brand of a position I shall call ‘REDESCRIPTIVISM’ never cancels semantic ascent for $V(b)$, because it holds that either something other than ‘ V ’ is true of b and/or ‘ V ’ is true of something other than b – a REDESCRIPTIVIST will literally only ever mention but never use statements of the form ‘this building is morally good (or bad)’. A REDESCRIPTIVIST will only ever utter such statements with quote tags on hand. In short, we can characterize REDESCRIPTIVISM as the rejection of minimally one of the adequacy constraints. (As an aside, the qualifier ‘only’ figures in the formulation of both constraints to address the technical difficulty that ‘ $V(b)$ ’ may entail other predications, such as ‘ $W(b)$ ’ or ‘ $V(a)$ ’, *alongside* the literal truth of ‘ $V(b)$ ’. Such scenarios do not signal failure of preserving disquotation in the sense that matters here.)

Given the centrality of literal truth to demarcate the FACE VALUE TREATMENT from REDESCRIPTIVISM, we need an account of *how* ‘ $V(b)$ ’ can be *literally true*, and that means, how the above constraints can be met: flatly asserting that they can will not do. I give my answer in CHAPTER 2, but an informal statement can be given right away. The ascription of V to b has to be explained by b ’s intrinsic compositional properties Π , and anything that has Π is morally V . I call this last step the ‘Linking Conditional’ (LC) in my overall argument schema:

Step 1 Σ^* ‘ b is V ’ is true iff b has Π .

Step 2 LC For any building x , if x has Π then, *as per moral account \mathcal{M}* , x is V .

Conclusion b is V .

This type of reasoning clearly preserves disquotation. Since the reasoning ends up attributing moral properties to buildings, I will also treat any subscription to the disquotation constraint as moral realism about architecture. This still leaves it wide open which brand of moral property realism (if any) we subscribe to – for instance, a naturalist or non-naturalist (see §11.1). For now, the logical differences to competing theories matter more than their ensuing metaphysical differences.

On that note, we now have a clearer idea on how to be *one* brand of moral antirealist about architecture – just be a redescriptivist! But there are more options than that, as I will presently and in §1.3 (pertaining to areas also outside architecture) indicate. Let us begin with REDESCRIPTIVISM.

⁶¹ Compare Williamson (2007, 26) with Glock (2010, 342); cf. Yablo (2014), and Fine (2012, 13) on ‘subject matter’.

REVISIONARY SEMANTICS (REDESCRIPTIVISM): Statements of the form ‘V(*b*)’ have truth conditions, but these are (~1) not about *b* or (~2) do not predicate V of *b*.

This is the main target of my criticism in the current chapter and the next, especially §1.7 on Sauchelli. The position’s main attraction, it seems, has been earned by a wide-spread intuition that sentences of the form ‘V(*b*)’ commit a category mistake of sorts – that the juxtaposition of moral adjectives to noun phrases designating buildings yields semantic nonsense. Take a sentence like Noam Chomsky’s famous ‘Colourless green ideas sleep furiously’. A redescriptivist will happily offer substantive (‘realist’) semantic axioms for (a) each component word in that sentence (for instance, ‘Green...*x*... F...’ is true iff *x* is green and is F) and for (b) compositional principles to combine these with one another. But she will deny that the sentence construction *as a whole* is literally true, in the sense that the individual axioms generate a truth condition that *as a whole* (as such) makes sense. One reason is that ‘dreams’ violates the ‘thematic role’ of (that is, the type of *complements* allowed by) verbs like ‘sleep’, what Chomsky calls ‘theta-role’.⁶² Just so, the redescriptivist story goes, ‘this building is morally bad’ invokes semantic components that make sense individually, but fail to yield a coherent whole when taken literally. And the reason for that, we shall see in §1.4, is that a category mistake is in the offing. One could put the point in terms of functional type-theoretic semantics, such that the semantics for ‘V(*b*)’ fails to compute compositionally, since the denotation of ‘*b*’ (a building) is not of the correct *type* to be ‘in the domain of the function denoted by [‘V()’] and functional application fails in this case.’⁶³

This makes it sound as if only fairly technical writers in the field are ready to champion redescriptivism for an ethics of architecture. Nothing could be further from the truth. While understanding, and stating, the position’s underlying *assumptions* requires technical effort, writers have not been shy to plunge into it with only a modicum of understanding of such assumptions. One comparatively well established writer in the field can suffice here for illustrative purposes. In 1998 Karsten Harries published a book called *The Ethical Function of Architecture*. Despite what the book’s title may have suggested to readers otherwise, the author himself informs us that his work,

is not at all a book in what might be called ‘architectural ethics’.⁶⁴

His reason is that, on *his* use of the word ‘ethical’,

as I here understand it, has more to do with the Greek *ēthos* than what we usually mean by ‘ethics’, for example when we speak of ‘business ethics’ or ‘medical ethics’[.]’ (ibid.)

By ‘*ēthos*’ Harries however has less Greek discussions of morality in mind – say, Plato’s *Republic* or Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, both of which deal with fairly canonical moral matters, such as justice, virtuous character, and rightness of action – as the concerns of a ‘communal spirit’, as per Harries’ partly Hegelian, partly Heideggerian leanings. In other words, Harries substitutes perfectly moral instances of ‘V’ (in our scheme) for flatly non-moral talk (~2), and he is the first one to alert us of that.⁶⁵

⁶² See Culicover (1997).

⁶³ Magidor (2013, 49). On that proposal, a category mistaken sentence ‘suffers at worst from failure to express a proposition or to possess a truth-value, but is clearly nevertheless meaningful.’ (ibid., 53) This appears to rely on a technical understanding of ‘propositions’ as truth-evaluable *content* that ‘meaningful’ sentences may legitimately lack. By contrast, on REDESCRIPTIVISM as here understood ‘V(*b*)’ lacks determinate truth-evaluable content (see above on Recanati’s literalism) and is thereby deemed to be ‘meaningless’. Cf. Williamson (2009, 133-134), considering whether ‘the sentence ‘Mars was always either dry or not dry’ fails to express a proposition on its strict and literal reading, and the original question [‘Was Mars always dry or not dry?’] correspondingly lacks strict and literal content (in the relevant context).’

⁶⁴ Harries (1998, xii).

⁶⁵ For a contrary verdict, see Illies and Meijers (2006, 1226). They claim that Harries sees ‘the ethics of architecture [...] as closely connected to *ēthos*, that is the characteristic mode of being of individuals and communities. Thus an ethical architecture is not supposed to follow moral rules or principles but to enable a new way of living individually and as a community with others [...]. Although this Ethics of architecture claims to be different from (and not comparable with) more traditional approaches, it seems that this ideal of Ethics can be expressed in terms of what

That aside, Harries's work incurs problems of a methodological variety, including the resistance of its alleged results or proclamations – based as they are on etymological speculations, again owing to Heidegger – towards 'verification and objective evaluation' that the very communal context that Harries's account builds on appears to presuppose.⁶⁶ Harries's treatment conflates moral appraisal of buildings with moral appraisal of *cultural contexts* they are taken to be complicit with. Wagner and Semper, for instance, are showcased as what Hitler delighted in and Loos derided as 'Potemkin City' (1998, 39). The question of historical accuracy or relevance apart, this constitutes (~1) above.

In sum, Harries's work, especially in its analyses of concrete historical projects, features a highly interesting sample of redemptivism at work, in that it illustrates what can be done once we reject (1), (2), or even both at the same time – that we move the attention of our 'ethics' to non-moral talk, and to talk about things (in the broadest sense) other than buildings. Of course, some commentators have found fault with Harries's reading of architecture, or of ethics, but that is a further matter.⁶⁷ Arguably, on some demarcations of 'ethics', Harries' failure to closely enough adhere to a standard delineation of the moral domain is not as philosophically problematic as it appears, given how certain philosophers like Elisabeth Anscombe included have argued for rejecting that very delineation.⁶⁸ Whether or not an ethics of architecture complicit with the DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT (for moral vocabulary 'V') can be pursued on such grounds is an open question. I shall not pursue this possibility here since, at any rate, it is not pursued by Harries himself either.

Moving beyond redemptivism for now, the thesis largely leaves the viability of other versions of antirealism unaddressed, without denying that a more thorough discussion of each would have rendered the thesis more comprehensive and is certainly needed in the long run. To facilitate such research, we can at least explore those options that require greater (and hopefully repay) attention in the future.

REVISIONARY PRAGMATICS: As a matter of *conversational implicature*, a speaker's intent when evincing 'V(*b*)' is to convey (~2) a non-moral statement about *b* or (~1) a moral statement about something other than *b* (e.g. about *b*'s architect). The speaker is *not committed* to the literal truth-conditions of 'V(*b*)'.

Suppose a policeman walks up to you just after you have parked in the wrong spot, and says 'You do not want to park here' (cf. §1.2). That statement has literal truth-conditions, and the policeman (and you) perfectly understand these. What is more, both of you understand perfectly well that the policeman is not committed to the truth of that statement in uttering it (it is most likely *literally false* – why would you have parked your car here if you did not want to?), since its point (which he is very much committed to) is a different one – you should not park here, and he will write you a ticket if you do not move your car quickly. Just so, moralizations of architecture could well *have* literal truth conditions, but to *take* them literally in conversation would be to miss their actual point. Their 'actual point' is to either (~2) moralize something other than a building, or to (~1) make a non-moral (or, less than directly moral) statement about a building, just as REVISIONARY PRAGMATICS suggests. One way to make sense of the former (~2), touched on in the INTRODUCTION, is to take statements of the form 'V(*b*)' to imply things roughly like,

§1.6 (discussing Illies and Meijers) will identify as categories [5] and [6]. I remain uncertain that Harries' work can be brought into the fold of standard ethics so easily. More specifically, I am doubtful we can reduce his stance to (a) a rejection of principlism in ethics and (b) to the two categories [5]-[6]. Moreover, even if (a) and (b) were exegetically tenable, it remains uncertain (b) would meet present philosophical constraints. See again §1.6.

⁶⁶ This criticism is worked out in Spector (2001, 46, with 215n.21).

⁶⁷ Neal Leach, for instance, has argued that Harries's '*ethos*' glorifies the rural community, and so cannot 'engage substantively with social, economic, or political questions' that typically plague urban contexts (Leach 2005, 136). I discuss this argument in my (2013, §4.2). A related critique could point out how 'writers such as Hume, and ultimately Kant, recognized that it was unrealistic to look to politics to re-create the (at least supposed) feelings of community associated with the lost religiosity of earlier centuries, and indeed dangerous to do so' (Guyer 1993, 405n.28) It appears one could replace 'politics' with '*ethos*' here, and articulate an additional philosophical worry about Harries's larger project.

⁶⁸ Thanks to Ben Sweeting for raising this point.

Building *b* is the *instrument through which* or *spatial context in which* one human agent (*b*'s architect) exerts harm on another human agent (*b*'s end user).

where, as before, the moral appraisal attaches to a specific interhuman action, not to *b*. One would then need to tell a complicated story about how such statements acquire those complicated conversational implicatures. This could be done by enlisting technical work on non-standard forms of semantic compositionality: on such forms, the semantic values for '*b*' and '*V*' can *interact* in non-standard ways beyond (but including) simply shifting their standard values individually.⁶⁹

I shall not look into that further here. For, minimally, for the aforementioned 'actual point' of '*V(b)*'-statements to be either the instrumental or contextual role attributed to buildings (suppose we call these roles respectively '*I(b)*' or '*C(b)*'), one would need to show that either implication – if it is to be a conversational rather than a conventional one – would be 'cancellable without remainder', in Paul Grice's terms.⁷⁰ That is, utterances of the type '*V(b)* but not *I(b)*' or '*V(b)* but not *C(b)*' would have to be felicitous if REVISIONARY PRAGMATICS is to be correct. If however, these compound statements *are* felicitous, we are still owed an account of what the utterance's content, now shorn of its implied remainder, actually consists in – and that, now, is again '*V(b)*' pure and simple. And to understand *that*, we still need the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, even if the theoretic *role* allocated to the actual content of '*V(b)*' on REVISIONARY PRAGMATICS is a great deal less prominent than it is on the FACE VALUE TREATMENT itself, since the 'actual point' of uttering '*V(b)*' will rarely be to *convey* its literal truth. As elsewhere, antirealists need to *draw* on realist semantics, even if they do not accord realist content the central *role* realists accord it. This is a major lesson readers will hopefully take away from the present chapter.

This argument aside, revisionary pragmatics is not the only game in town either even if one already is committed to anti-realism. What is more, there *are* forms of anti-realism that escape the entanglement with 'remainders' of realist semantics we just highlighted. For on REVISIONARY SEMANTICS or PRAGMATICS, statements of the form '*V(b)*' still have (or at least may have) truth conditions, such that an account of these truth conditions is needed. But some forms of anti-realism about '*V(b)*' would precisely deny this:

ELIMINATIVISM: '*V(b)*' does not have truth conditions, it is empty noise.

EXPRESSIVISM: '*V(b)*' does not have truth conditions, its 'role' is to express dismay at, or a happy peppy feeling about, a building and/or its architect.

FICTIONALISM: '*V(b)*' does not really have truth conditions, we just pretend it does. (So, no realist commitments are incurred.)⁷¹

Finally, we have a position that is particularly tricky to classify in the confines of the current project, not least given my adequacy constraints.

BRUTE DISQUOTATIONALISM: '*V(b)*' is true iff *V* is true of *b*, but there is no further story (factualist or otherwise) of what it means for *b* to be *V* – it just is!

This position (sometimes propagated by Jody Azzouni or Hartry Field) defies easy categorization. Whatever else its virtues, explanatory power seem not to be among them. If buildings have moral features,

⁶⁹ See Recanati (2010b, 127-142), specifically on how we may parse the semantic value of 'lion' in 'There is a lion on the plaza' as a *marble statue* (2010b, 138), an instance of the more general phenomenon of *semantic flexibility* on which 'the meaning of a word may vary [...] as a function of the other words it combines with.' (2010b, 29) To broaden the relevance of such mechanisms to REDESCRIPTIVE PRAGMATICS, all one requires is that they are open to pragmatic (contextual, not word-driven) functional input.

⁷⁰ Grice (1989), Recanati (2003, 38-51). In contrast to conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are uncancellable. See Potts (2004).

⁷¹ Though as previously noted, fictionalism is sometimes claimed to differ from quasi-realism, at least the latter has been explored in the literature as to its tenability for aesthetic discourse. Accordingly, attempts to port a fictionalist or quasi-realist stance over to the ethics of architecture might build on such foundations. See Hopkins (2001) and Todd (2004).

we would very much like to know how. Since BRUTE DISQUOTATIONALISM evades any explanation on that point, I suppose we can safely ignore it for present purposes (even though we will have two more occasions to briefly revisit it later).

This concludes my brief ‘circus tour’ around key varieties of moral anti-realism about architecture. Let us now examine the merits of such views viewed on more general grounds. This turns us right into the thick of contemporary meta-ethics, and provides a much needed grounding before we head into the midst of antirealist positions in contemporary ethics of architecture, dealt with in §1.5 to §1.7.

§1.3 HOW TO *NOT* TAKE MORAL STATEMENTS AT FACE VALUE: SOME VARIETIES

The present subsection explains what it generally *requires* to take moral statements at face value quite generally (irrespective of subject domain), by looking at the *negation* thereof, as represented by various strands of moral antirealism. For contemporary meta-ethics features many contributors whose work qualifies as ‘antirealist’ because their theories do not take moral statements *at face value*. §1.3 thus looks at positions that are primarily developed and intended for the moral appraisal of human behaviour.

The only thing of direct relevance to the present work’s larger concerns are the basic theoretic features of such positions. Any claim that people committed to such a position in one area are *of necessity* committed to the same in another is ludicrous. It is perfectly conceivable to treat (some) moral appraisals of human behaviour at face value but withhold that treatment wholesale from the moral appraisal of inanimate objects. (Indeed, I would imagine many readers share that position as a default.) Nor do all arguments for (or against) the applications of certain of these positions in one domain automatically translate over into arguments for (or against) the applications of the same position in another – not unless, that is, the argument is based on attention to those positions’ ‘domain neutral’ features. And that is why my exposition and evaluation of these positions of necessity focuses on their domain neutral features, on features these positions have regardless of which domain they apply to. My reason for doing that is simply. We have no hope of making progress on the fundamentals of the ethics of architecture unless we begin to systematically pay attention to such features. An ethics of architecture without an inquiry into its metaethical foundation stands no chance to develop its core components: a moral semantics and a moral epistemology of architecture. Indeed, the field has *failed* to make substantive progress because contributors seem to agree all around that *no* metaethics *is needed*. What the field has not appreciated so far, it seems, is that these two factors are arguably correlated. §1.2.1 already introduced us to various stripes of moral antirealism for architecture – it is now time to look at such positions’ underlying domain neutral features in detail.

§1.3.1 MORAL ANTI-REALISM IN GENERAL

Contemporary meta-ethics features many contributors whose work qualify as ‘antirealist’ because their theories do not take moral statements *at face value*. What is meant by not taking statements ‘at face value’ here is the following. Antirealists deny that moral statements express genuine (truth-evaluable) propositions, let alone propositions that feature genuine (realist) properties expressed by moral terms (whether these properties are naturalistically reducible or not). Instead, the antirealist prefers to account for moral terms in ways that evade realist commitments, canonically by reducing them to statements about human intentional states. And they aim to reduce many (not all) purported semantic and ontological commitments the latter class of statements would engender *if taken at face value* to matters of ‘psychological fact’ which fit fairly easily into a naturalistic metaphysical framework.⁷²

Consider in this vein the question Plato raised in the *Euthyphro* (10a), as to whether the sacred is sacred because the gods deem it thus – that is the anti-realist option. Or whether, rather, the gods deem things sacred because things can already antecedently be established as sacred (on realist grounds).

⁷² For a particularly thorough example, see Gibbard (2003).

This, we will later see, is not how contemporary ethics of architecture divides up. Instead of a ‘divide’, received opinion currently favours one option only.⁷³ We are *not* to think that buildings are bearers of moral properties because they unequivocally *have* such properties, as on the realist option. Rather, it is only in buildings’ relation to human agents and (very specifically!) human *intentional states* that buildings can *at all* be mentioned in the same breath as moral properties.⁷⁴ That is the anti-realist option and (as §§1.5-1.7 will amply demonstrate) it is currently the only game in town. (Admittedly, there is no inherent necessity to couple anti-realism with respect to moral appraisals of buildings to such attachments of anthropocentrism when it comes to moral evaluation. However, for all authors across §§1.5-1.7 that is the combination they prefer, and readers to well to bear in mind the possibility of unelaborated positions, like non-anthropocentric varieties of moral antirealism with respect to the organic or inorganic realm.)

To understand the situation, let us consider the *Euthryphro*’s dilemma more formally. Here we have a bi-conditional,

For all x , x is sacred *iff* the gods think *that x is sacred*.

Realists and anti-realists disagree as to which of the statements flanked by the ‘iff’ is to be assigned explanatory priority.⁷⁵ The ‘dilemma’ arises because it is not clear from the bi-conditional alone how to assign that explanatory priority. For realists it is the left hand side, with a realist account to be provided to ascriptions of sanctity, by taking sanctity to be a *property* (possibly, an irreducible one). For the anti-realist it is the right hand side that enjoys explanatory priority, with a psychological account to be provided for propositional attitude statements invoking a *concept* of sanctity. As that concept need not feature outside propositional attitude contexts, and concepts do not in general require a realist property correlate,⁷⁶ any and all pretense of construing ascriptions of sanctity in a realist manner are explanatorily redundant.⁷⁷

But there is one advantage the realist enjoys here over the anti-realist – it is quite clear how he *understands* the left hand side, namely, as an attribution to things of sanctity. On the anti-realist account, this is not

⁷³ Some readers missed the emphasis on *systematic* philosophical reflection in the current context. Architects since Vitruvius have (following the Stoics) suggested to take as the recipient of normative appraisal an ordered *structure* like the universe or cosmos, to encompass (as a ‘trickle down effect’) buildings in the scope of moral evaluation. More recent proponents along similar lines allegedly include Warick Fox and Christopher Alexander. What, if anything, in these authors’ work qualifies as providing a systematic ‘ethics’ as required in the INTRODUCTION eludes me. In addition, there is also the old charge that varieties of this (Stoic) proposal are ultimately anthropocentric since they ‘humanize’ the universe by attributing to it features of sentient and intelligent agents, such as intellect and intent. I pursue this further in §3.5 below.

⁷⁴ §1.4 will call the crucial premise leading up to this view *The Intentionalist Prejudice*. But it is here, in the *Euthryphro* dilemma, that we first see the close connection of moral anti-realism to an explanatory fixation on *intentional attitudes*. By contrast, the realist position is very much fixated on denying that fixation: ‘Moral realism is the view that (i) moral judgments are beliefs that are meant to describe the way things really are; (ii) some of these beliefs are true, and (iii) moral judgments are made true in some way other than by virtue of the attitudes taken toward their content by any actual or idealized human agent.’ (Shafer-Landau 2007, 62) For an instance of (iii), we may marshal meta-ethical expressivism, that is, ‘a family of theories, all theories of the meaning of normative expressions, having in common that they attempt to explain the meaning of a normative predicate, P, not by saying what property it denotes, but indirectly, by saying what someone *does* by calling something P.’ (Dreier 1996, 29) The emphasis is on what does the *explanatory* work (see below).

⁷⁵ For this way of setting up the debate, see Blackburn (1993, 9-10), Platts (1980, 77-78), and Charles (1995). For a modern analytic take on the *Euthryphro* biconditional, see Irwin (2006).

⁷⁶ For propositional attitude statements not necessarily entailing ontological commitments (to properties *or* concepts in a Fregean sense), see Schiffer (2003, 11-48). Schiffer calls the very theory he rejects ‘The Face Value Theory’ because that theory (or family of theories) takes propositional attitude statements ‘at face value’ (2003, 11) in the sense indicated earlier.

⁷⁷ Realist properties (even of sanctity) need not be redundant *per se* (that is, claimed to be non-existent) for the anti-realist, as long as they do not play the *explanatory* role the realist accords them. The anti-realist’s disagreement with the realist, thus, need not surface at the level of ontological commitments. See Gibbard (2003, 9 and 19) and Dreier (2004, 32-33).

ever clear – that is, it is never quite clear how we are to construe the left hand side in the first place. I pursue this point at much greater length in §1.7. where I suggest it plays havoc with Sauchelli’s account.⁷⁸

Relatedly, as many realists have pointed out, the biconditional itself seems to fail for analogous contexts involving (non-omniscient) agents, in that there are many things one may rationally or irrationally regard as sacred that are nothing of the sort. That is, even if the realist grants that ‘the gods’ in the above biconditional are omniscient – such that nothing that is sacred, nor its being sacred, escapes the gods’ attention, and the ensuing biconditional holds – assuming moral omniscience for human agents is simply unfounded. It thus seems the two halves of the biconditional can come apart, on the very authority of the left hand side that, the realist claims, enjoys explanatory authority.⁷⁹ If so, the anti-realist is worse off, because the explanatory grounds he alleges to always obtain fail to so obtain. As James Shelley more recently put it, a realist could say that the biconditional is true for (our) discernment of (here) the sacred, not for the existence of the sacred as such.⁸⁰ That effectively redescribes the biconditional’s left hand side to ‘for all discerned x ’, thus invoking the very appearance/reality distinction the antirealist disavows.

In response, however, the anti-realist can always allege that this objection *presupposes*, and does not *establish*, the cogency of a realist reading of the left-hand side. For, on the anti-realist construal (so his response goes), that left-hand side is precisely *identified* by a set of attitudes and mental states that never fail to obtain in ascriptions of sanctity.⁸¹ The realist’s objection is thus circular. If, however, the objection is indeed circular, so is the anti-realist’s rejoinder. For it too presupposes what it means to establish – and that is, an *anti-realist* reading of the biconditional’s left hand side.⁸²

§1.3.2 VARIETIES OF MORAL ANTIREALISM

The impasse described just now characterises debates on moral and mental reality in philosophy pretty widely, then. As §§1.7-1.8 will argue, this type of impasse should also begin to better characterize debates on the foundations of the ethics of architecture as well. For instance, one lesson we can take away for our more local concerns is apparent already: anti-realist strategies of dealing with *statements attributing morally evaluative terms* are notoriously hard to pin down when it comes to the anti-realist’s self-understanding of those attributions. We never quite know if we are to take such attributions seriously. It is clear we are not to take them *at face value*, but how else to take them is left entirely unclear.

In particular, it is never quite clear whether such tendencies are best read in terms that we could classify as,

- (a) Eliminativist: do away with the (semantic content allegedly conveyed by the) target group of statements entirely,
- (b) Reductivist: reductively and correlatively identify what is *semantically worth salvaging* in these statements with something else entirely, or
- (c) Fictionalist: engage these statements’ meanings at the level of polite pretense, but do not take their meanings *really* seriously.

⁷⁸ Of course, the antirealist may respond that *wanting* to satisfy such explanatory demands is mistaken (and merely a trick to settle the case in favour of realism from the start). If so, he would need an argument that justifies this response, a response not already premised on the impugnation of massive error on behalf of those wanting the type of account the antirealist eschews. Certainly the antirealist cannot elevate his account to that of providing an explanation of the type required – at least, not without elevating his account to descriptive truth by *fiat* (cf. McGinn 1997, 10-13).

⁷⁹ See D’Arms and Jacobson (2000a, 2000b).

⁸⁰ Shelley (2011).

⁸¹ I owe this point to Cain Dodd.

⁸² See Shafer-Landau (2003, 33-37).

- (d) ??: We can treat moral statements about buildings as largely metaphorical or ‘moves’ in a language game.⁸³

§1.7 will explain in greater detail the points on which the first three of these stripes of antirealism diverge. (I will delegate the fourth option to the sidelines.) Here the true content of such statement is not to be gleaned from their semantic but their pragmatic ‘content’ such as their conversational implications.⁸⁴ This thesis does not scrutinize such options one-by-one – rather, it hopes to provoke future contributions along such lines, contributions provoked in part by dissatisfaction with the specific details and consequences of the realist alternative developed in this thesis’s subsequent chapters. Before moving on, however, I provide a ‘road map’ to chart options like the above three (a-c) on moral talk more generally (Fig. 1.1.).




Fig. 1.1. Realist and antirealist options for a target ‘area’ of statements and our being ‘committed’ to their content.
– Source: Blackburn (1986, 147 fig. 4), bracketed insertions mine.

While not literally intended as a Linnean tree on which entries further down the line inherit genus/species features from earlier ones, the structure certainly is meant to convey that we face consecutive ‘exit points’ in our move away from radical antirealism, depending on how much of realism we are willing to still salvage. The first juncture, for instance, foregoes truth-aptness, content, and justification wholesale – that is eliminativism. Next off is the possibility to shed at least *some* content we deem problematic, but in general still regard such content (that is, what remains), as truth apt – namely, the content that is safely reducible to something else. Thus reductivism, which raises uncomfortable issues (discussed in §1.7.1) on how to demarcate that division of content into ‘to be shed’ and ‘safely reducible’. Further down our diagram looms fictionalism, on which the *point* of the statement class in question is not so much to assert truth-apt content, but something either near enough or, as on expressivism, something not nearly truth-apt. But, so this (late in the day) concession still runs, these statements *have* a point, even though their point is not one of assertion in the sense that yields true, meaningful, and justifiable content. At the final juncture, we have retained the idea that the purported content of the statement class is salvageable *en toto*, so there is nothing that needs to be ‘shed’. Instead, the idea is to construe the content as mind-dependent in nature, which undercuts the possibility that characterizes metaphysical realism, on which content and justification can come apart.

The resulting positions – depending which (if any) exit point we have taken – differ with respect to *what* or *how* much content they take the target ‘area of commitments’ to comprise, and differ in which *attitude* to take towards that content, that is, what communicative role (if any) one takes such ‘content’ to serve. It is

⁸³ Telling such tendencies apart can be quite difficult in practice. Bearing in mind that ‘quasi-realism’ falls in line with the anti-realist treatment of the *Euthyphro* biconditional indicated earlier, cf. Blackburn (2005, 27): ‘we need to ask whether the error, to which both fictionalists and quasi-realists are supposed to react, lies in the practice itself [of uttering moral statements and committing oneself to their contents], or only in what some special theorists, misguided philosophers called realists, say about the practice, or yet again in some awkward amalgam or fusion of the two.’

⁸⁴ For an introduction to this tricky field, the reader could do worse than consult Recanati (2003) and the essays in Szabó (2005).

these choices that, irrespective of choice of target ‘area of commitments’, presents us with the aforementioned ‘domain neutral features’ that characterize the varieties of moral anti-realism. And it is exactly these choices one faces when the target area is statements of the form ‘ $\forall(b)$ ’, that is, outright moral appraisals of architecture.⁸⁵

Beyond that, positions (a) to (d) differ in kind, and warrant radically divergent *semantic frameworks* to underpin them. (For instance, an expressivist or fictionalist may eschew a straightforward truth conditional semantics, and might instead pursue what is for instance called an ‘assertion based’ or ‘speech act’ semantics.)

When it comes to the ethics of architecture, no one has tried to test any of these frameworks against moral statements about buildings in particular. Perhaps that is because buildings do not comprise an exception of sorts, not in the slightest regard. If so, that is a suspicion to be tested in reflection, not taken on board on good faith. In any case, it seems a rather half-baked effort to first offer an anti-realist attitude towards such statements, but then never spell out the accompanying tendency and semantic framework that is required for the validation of such attitudes.⁸⁶

Tackling the contemporary ‘state of the art’ in the ethics of architecture, then, sadly requires that we operate at a much greater level of primitiveness. As I said, we must begin by marveling how, on the wide spread anti-realist sentiment, we are even intended to *understand* moral statements about architecture before we begin *analysing* them for their philosophical content and nature. This problem arises, by the way, for any of the three positions above, (a) to (c), since all of them take a specific stance towards the *meaning* of the target statements in question. In §1.7.2 I raise a more specific problem with (b)’s claim that it correctly identifies, and demarcates, what *is* semantically ‘worth salvaging’ in the target group of statements from what is not – a further claim, on behalf of the anti-realist, that presupposes that we have a firm grasp of the original *meaning* of the target group of statements. But that presupposition is never borne out by such accounts in the first place, and that generates a major problem for such accounts.

For this, I allege, is the biggest problem with strategies of redescription and derivation in the ethics of architecture. Theories implementing such strategies are inherently unsatisfactory because they share a consequence with moral antirealist theories more generally – arising from the latter’s ‘domain neutral features’ (§1.2): they fail to motivate *which statements* such theories are supposed explain or account for. Isolating the class of statements by semantic ascent (putting them into quotation marks) succeeds technically – I show how in §1.7 – at the loss of treating these as *meaningful statements* in the first place. And that, I submit, is one concession too many for the anti-realist to make – for by that point the antirealist would have stopped to (pretend to) offer us an *account* of these statements (whether realist or not). Recall the core desiderata: an *ethics* of architecture requires a moral *semantics* and a moral *epistemology* of architecture. Instead of providing these, the redescriptionists and derivationists offer us dismissive remarks, or longwinded explanations, as to why such explanatory demands can be safely ignored. (Indeed, a perhaps less flattering label might paint such thinkers as ‘dismissivists’.) Now, some anti-realist positions for the appraisal of human behaviour have tried to meet their audience half way, by satisfying semantic questions up to a point. But as we shall see, no such effort is currently in sight from antirealists in the ethics of architecture. For they, it seems, would not even know *what* to absorb from a realist position, as that type of position has not received any exposure in that area – which is where the current work steps in, beginning with CHAPTER 2.

⁸⁵ As expressed previous in §1.2.1, the present work does not pretend to chart the exact nature of all those possibilities in detail. Some of these may well mount successful challenges to the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, provided we can work them out at prerequisite levels of detail and precision.

⁸⁶ This issue is raised for anti-realist semantics more widely, that is, across domains, by Williamson (2007, 287-289). For a critique of the ‘semantics’ expressivists typically favour see also Schroeder (2008).

Hence, having ventured into contemporary meta-ethics to outline how the ethics of architecture can draw on ‘domain neutral features’ of anti-/realist models more broadly, it is time to return to the ethics of architecture proper and focus (and develop) features for semantic models therein that are not merely ‘domain neutral’. For general attention to such models elsewhere can only go so far. It cannot fully show us how to understand moral statements *about architecture*, and it can certainly not help us to understand how we should interpret them – indeed, whether a realist or antirealist interpretation is to be favoured. To decide such questions we first need a more profound understanding of such statements themselves – the type of understanding that appears to be systematically sidelined by those harbouring anti-realist sentiments. And we need a philosophically more robust and profound understanding of architecture itself, to fully understand statements about it, moral and otherwise, which I offer in CHAPTERS 3 and following.

To restate, then, my final goal with the current chapter is to show how profoundly unsatisfactory anti-realist treatments of moral statements about architecture are. They are poorly motivated, poorly defended, and fail to give us any understanding of the very statements such treatments are ostensibly treatments *of*. While that is no argument *for* the validity and cogency of realist alternatives, it shows the genuine need to develop such alternatives with greater effort, and treat such effort with a greater openness of mind than currently typifies the literature – which is exactly where CHAPTER 2 takes off.

Let us now attend to ‘the literature’ itself. I focus on three recent contributions and proceed in chronological order. The selected contributions, I want to emphasize, characterize the field at its very best. If I single out the more problematic facets within the contributions, that is not only because that is what analytic philosophers characteristically *do*. Rather, I want to show how much we can learn from these contributions, albeit it indirectly, to construct a more satisfactory ethics of architecture in the future. Hence, my heavy critique of these authors arises from the significance I accord to their work, and arises from a keen appreciation of how fruitful a critical engagement with their efforts can be, where most other articles in the field afford no comparable fruits of labour (and often, none at all).

To remind readers, the point of §1.5 is to showcase derivationism in one of its contemporary varieties, that of §1.7 to afford the same for redescriptionism, and that of §1.6 to show further variants of derivationism, as well as showcase some pretty central problems in contemporary research on the ethics of architecture, such as a fixation on architecture’s symbolism that is not borne out by corresponding work in the philosophy of language (§1.6.1).

Before we begin, however, I wish to focus on a line of argument that is present in all three of these varieties – what I will call *The Intentionalist Prejudice* (§1.5).

§1.4 THE INTENTIONALIST PREJUDICE

There is one recurrent premise nearly all contemporary antirealist work (both redescriptionist and derivationist) on the ethics of architecture agrees on, and that is: if something *has* no intention or agency then it is not morally appraisable either. Or, slightly weaker, what is morally appraisable has to *include* something of that sort, or *relate to* something of that sort. The net result excludes architecture from direct moral appraisal, as we shall see. As stated previously, I call this *The Intentionalist Prejudice*. (I call it prejudicial because it biases an inquiry like ours out of the gate.) Even on the weaker reading, the domain of moral appraisal is still limited to ‘the human(like)’, broadly speaking, but can now include states of affairs including humans, or intentions of human affairs. (Neither category could literally be said to ‘have’ intention or agency, as on the stronger reading.) Thus Tom Spector writes,

To impart moral worth to inanimate objects – objects that have neither intentions nor actions – is nonsensical.

Andrea Sauchelli seems to agree on that point, writing,

When considering the relation between architecture and morality, we may wonder how a building can possibly have a moral character or be the object of moral evaluation. After all, a building is just an object; it does not have mental states and is not a rational agent

I discuss these authors in §1.5 and §1.7 respectively (where the sources of these remarks are properly referenced). My third and last set of authors, Christian Illies and Anthonie Meijers, to be discussed in §1.6, appear to agree on the point too, as we shall see in §1.4.2. This, then, presents a contention shared by writers who otherwise disagree on a wide range of details. And given the centrality of this contention to the antirealist case, I dedicate my critical energies on it first.

Before we turn to concrete cases in §1.4.2, §1.4.1 observes how that premise is not restricted to literature on architecture ethics, but also occurs in contemporary aesthetics too, for aesthetic artefacts more broadly. If other facets of inquiry show the two areas to diverge, this presents a rare instance of commonality. Let me kick off on a broader note, however. As we saw, Tom Spector says it is not clear how a stack of bricks can ever be immoral, short of collapsing on and killing a person. Jeremy Till says ‘a brick has no morals’, which is more or less the same claim. And from Christine Korsgaard to Christian Illies and Andrea Saucchelli (respectively discussed in §2.6.2, §1.6, §1.7), philosophers frequently claim that the attribution of morality to built artefacts is non-sensical, and commits a category error. But regardless of which particular moral and metaphysical premises this observation is based on, its basic appeal rests on a linguistic intuition that can be dislodged fairly easily. Or so it seems to me.

For, recall, all the present works seeks to establish is that we can literally and truthfully call some architecture morally good, and other architecture morally bad. That is what moral appraisal is. We are at this point not interested in claiming that a building *has* a morality, or that it *is* moral or immoral. For those claims, I think, really do border on a category mistake, or on something nonsensical. Only human agents, or something very like them, could be said to literally *have* a morality. And the idea that something ‘is moral’ also seems to import a person-like quality that buildings lack. But it seems to me that these connotations and imports are absent when we talk about a thing’s being ‘morally good’ or ‘morally bad’. And moral criticism of artworks along such lines has been rather favourably discussed by aesthetic philosophers. So the issue then becomes *on what basis* or *how* we can call a building morally good or bad, in a sense philosophical aesthetics has deemed to be largely non-problematic. To this we turn now – for there, I suggest, looms *The Intentionalist Prejudice* all over. Readers may also recall other problems with philosophical aesthetics touched on in §P.2, specifically the field’s fixation on representational content that fails to translate well into a discussion of *architecture’s* ‘morally relevant’ aesthetic features.

§1.4.1 THE INTENTIONALIST PREJUDICE IN PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS

Indeed, it features there pretty prominently in work on a topic directly relating to our inquiry – the moral status of aesthetic artefacts, as regards their aptitude for *moral appraisal*. Thus Noël Carroll writes,

Admittedly, not all art is equally suitable for moral evaluation. Some absolute music and some abstract [non-figurative] painting may be bereft of moral content altogether. [...] many philosophers, since the eighteenth century, have argued that the realm of art is essentially independent from the realm of morality. Thus, moral criticism is not germane in evaluating artworks as artworks. Or, in other words, morality is not truly relevant to art. Indeed, some even might say that it makes no sense, ontologically speaking, to criticize artworks morally, since only agents can be criticized in this way and artworks are not, strictly speaking, agents.⁸⁷

A bit later, Carroll returns to the point and says how it is directly linked to technical artefacts.

⁸⁷ Carroll (2008).

[T]he philosopher might charge common sense with speaking nonsense when we talk of artworks as being moral or immoral. People, it might be said, are moral or immoral, not things. This is the aesthetician's variant of the notion that 'guns don't kill, people do'. Likewise, 'artworks are not immoral, people are'. It is category error to think otherwise. Thus, on ontological grounds, the skeptical philosopher bristles at the basic assumption of ethical criticism [of art], however entrenched the idea appears in our artistic practices. (ibid., 129)

In the final instance, Carroll thinks the argument can be defused – but his approach here harkens so close to redescriptionism, I would allege, that his work is of limited value to my own ambition. Carroll's rejoinder is, however, highly relevant if we are to understand just how pervasive redescriptionism is in analytic philosophy today.

Carroll defuses the argument by first representing its premises more clearly. To paraphrase (2008, 140),

- P1 If artworks can be evaluated morally, then they must be the kinds of things [\cancel{k}] that can bear moral properties, viz. [P1.1] persons or persons-like entities [...].
- P2 Artworks are not \cancel{k} .
- C Artworks cannot be evaluated morally.

Carroll's strategy is to accept P1, but connect the moral appraisals of morals to something 'person like', namely (not the author, whose view point may differ from any moral view point directly expressed in the novel, or indirectly by one or several of her characters), the 'assumed perspective' that a novel conveys (2008, 141). Carroll himself realizes that this rejects C in a very weak sense only.

It might be said that if it is the point of view of the actual artist that is at issue, then we are not really morally evaluating the artwork, but the artist. (141)

He rejects this on the grounds that the *implied* view need not (as stated) be the author's. But the larger worry, that 'we are not really morally evaluating the artwork' (C) sticks:

It might also be objected that the implied author is not really the kind of thing to which moral predicates can be applied. (141)

Carroll manages to defuse this worry too – but the worry with redescriptionism surely remains in place, and that is, that artworks (here, novels) are only *indirectly* morally assessed, namely by their proximity to conveying an implied 'point of view', which is very much the feature of a human agent. While it is undeniable that *implied* points of view are not ontologically on a par with flesh and blood persons, they, like fictitious characters in a novel, are very much morally appraisable – and nothing in P1 says otherwise. Unfortunately, this really only cements P1, and its application to artworks without figurative content, as indicated by Carroll earlier, is surely as tenuous as ever. For instance, we must really wonder if the ascription to built structures of 'points of view' (implied or not) does not commit the very type of category mistake that the original argument (the one Carroll opposed) militates against. Carroll's response to that argument remains uncompromising in its attachment to human agents as the sole recipients of moral evaluatives.

Similar sentiments surface in discussions of technical artefacts. Thus Maarten Franssen holds that the surface grammar of sentences like 'artefact a ought to do ϕ in circumstances C ' indicates their logical form

(if at all) mistakenly only, and that the ‘ought’ is to be transferred from the thing promised to the ‘promiser’ who designed and/or delivered the artefact.⁸⁸

The challenge of expanding morale valuation beyond the domain of humans, or ‘human like’ things, then, remains in place, and we shall have to return it when dealing with architecture below (see esp. §1.6.3).

§1.4.2 THE INTENTIONALIST PREJUDICE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARCHITECTURE

Moving on to the ethics of architecture, I primarily consider two authors whose work I shall consider in greater detail in §1.6, Christian Illies and Anthonie Meijers. On their account,

Something has moral relevance in our definition if it substantially affects the moral evaluation of a situation or the ‘oughts’ of the agents involved. In general this requires that [for artefacts to be ‘morally relevant’,] artefacts are directly or indirectly linked to intentional actions and that they have an impact on basic moral goods, values, rights, etc., either by promoting or inhibiting their realisation.⁸⁹

While (as stated) this seems to express a sufficient rather than necessary condition for ‘moral relevance’, the paper’s sequel (2014, 164) makes it abundantly clear that the authors take it to express a necessary condition as well. Witness, not just how demanding the notion is for the authors, but their iterated use of the verb ‘requires’ (ibid., 164):

moral agency not only requires intentionality and freedom but also the ability to understand the moral options and moral demands of a particular situation. It also requires the ability to reason and to perform actions for good moral reasons and possibly even the capacity for empathy and for moral sentiment.

Hence, if something has moral relevance *only* if it is connected to human agency, it follows at once that moral appraisals of architecture have *no chance* unless we can preserve them by way of redescription or derivation.⁹⁰ And that is the *Intentionalist Prejudice* Carroll expressed more narrowly as the requirement that,

[to be] evaluated morally, [artefacts] must be the kinds of things that can bear moral properties, viz. persons or persons-like entities[.]

For Illies and Meijers (and others), the criterion of ‘personhood’ requires rational agency, that is, intentional states (whence the label, *Intentionalist prejudice*). This strong reading however yields a premise that is on inspection philosophically problematic. For, on consequentialism, moral features are attributed, not to actions and their agents and their agents’ intentions (all of which have to be reasonably rational), but to the states of affairs that are the *outcome* of such actions. Such states of affairs are themselves *not* rational, and are certainly not endowed with agency.⁹¹ They may *include* rational agents, but certainly *need not*, given how the widespread destruction of the ecosystem, and widespread harm dealt by humans to

⁸⁸ Franssen (2006). Cf. Dancy (2006).

⁸⁹ Illies and Meijers (2014, 161).

⁹⁰ That, however, is only relevant if we read the earlier passage from Illies and Meijers as making a quite strong point, when it permits a weaker reading. The weaker reading focuses on the qualifiers ‘directly or indirectly linked to’, and ‘have an impact on’. While these phrases receive disambiguation in the authors’ more technical work on action schemes (cf. §1.6.1), as a general thesis the passage leaves things rather open – not to say, unclear. So Illies and Meijers may (yet) escape the *Intentionalist Prejudice*, but only at the expense of their account losing all bite. I do not know which option is preferable, and in p.c. with Illies it seems the strong reading was the intended one anyhow.

⁹¹ A similar point is discussed by Illies and Meijers themselves (2014, 171n.16) when they respond to the objection that their account commits a ‘category mistake’ by ‘attribut[ing] moral properties’ to *action schemes* or *sets* of actions; as they point out, moral properties apply to objects across a wide array of ontological categories. Except for removing colloquialisms, that entire footnote is owed *verbatim* to an email sent to Meijers by the present author in 2011.

non-rational animals is increasingly deemed to be *morally* problematic, from a consequentialist point of view.

As an objection to this, Tom Spector (whose work §1.5 will scrutinize) has pointed out that,

we distinguish between states of affairs driven by human actions (anthropocentric global warming) vs. states of affairs driven by inhuman forces (ice ages) and attach no moral relevance to the latter.⁹²

The objection is well aimed, because it alerts us to how, even under utilitarianism, moral evaluation may pertain to (a) states of affairs, (b) human actions *causally* ('outcome-')responsible for the creation of (a suitably restricted subset of) such states of affairs, and (c) a subset of (a) that causally originates in human action, and that particular variants of utilitarianism will favour one over the other. Thus Spector points out how my point requires (a), but that (b) and (c) are just as available – and that (b) and (c) in effect support what I call the *Intentionalist Prejudice*.

I leave it to readers to decide which reading of utilitarianism is historically correct, or the philosophically most promising. All that my argument needs is the *availability* of (a), and as far as I can see, no argument has been put on the table to undermine that.

One further objection is to point out how the canonical cases where buildings (in subsequent chapters no less) feature in direct moral appraisal still involve their impact on *human* wellbeing. Two points need to be made in response to this. First, in such cases (as far as I myself substantiate them), it is the building that receives the moral value, and not (or, at least not exclusively) the impact it creates. We do the same in appraising human conduct, in assigning negative moral value to the cause of a morally deplorable or regrettable state of affairs. Second, it is not true that when buildings have morally regrettable 'consequences', their 'victims' are always human only. Some impacts are purely environmental and affect the non-human environment. Others affect further buildings, as the forced eradication of one building owing to the imposition of another shows, or the alleged 'mutilation' a new building exerts on the urban fabric it gets inserted in.⁹³ It seems that any unwillingness to treat such cases entirely analogous to moral appraisal elsewhere rests solely on the *Intentionalist Prejudice* – but that begs the question against how those cases are to be understood.

Subscribing to *The Intentionalist Prejudice*, then, yields the unsurprising result that buildings, devoid of agency and intentionality, cannot be bearers of moral properties. They may have 'moral relevance' in a weaker sense, a sense that leaves it unclear what that relevance consists in and what bearing, if any, such relevance has in deciding the truth value of outright moralizations of architecture (of the very variety encountered in the PREFACE and since).⁹⁴ However we parse 'moral relevance', buildings cannot be *bearers* of moral properties in their own right, or recipients of moral evaluation in any direct, straightforward sense. The result leaves Illies and Ray with few avenues to work with, namely (as we will see in §1.6), moral symbolism and psychophysical harm. Given how *The Intentionalist Prejudice* is premised on questionable assumptions, not least as to which variants of utilitarianism are and are not available, and given how work built on the prejudice (such as moral symbolism and psychophysical harm) issues in less than satisfactory results (see §1.6), considerable pressure is created to re-examine the foundations, prospects, and desirability of redescriptive and derivational strategies in the ethics of architecture. For, if such strategies

⁹² P.c. with author (8 March 2014).

⁹³ See PREFACE and §C.4 on the *SpuiForum*.

⁹⁴ As before, it is unclear a 'weaker' reading of some of Illies and Meijers' remarks salvages all that much. It purchases freedom from directly objectionable consequences at the cost of explanatory power. The argument in §1.7.1 against the 'normativity of optics' already applies here. If *some* relation or other to intentional states is all it takes to be 'morally relevant', the resulting notion of 'moral relevance' is so broad as to lose much philosophical interest. It is certainly of no relevance to the current project, of moral appraisals of architecture in a strong sense.

repeatedly fail us, the field is perhaps better advised to look elsewhere. And that means, as before, that we invest to a greater degree in developing strategies that take moral statements about buildings at face value.

If Illies and Ray do not draw this final conclusion, they certainly share many of the sentiments leading up to it. Assessing the field of architecture ethics more widely, they write (2006, 1227),

there are three principal reasons why it is so difficult to develop an Ethics of architecture: its inherent complexity, the difficulty of finding a clear definition [of architecture ethics], and an uncertainty about categories, particularly its [the ethics'] intersection with aesthetics.

Moreover, Illies and Ray are surely right about issue more generally, when they write (1228-9),

Traditionally, ethics was focused on human interactions, and it developed concepts, norms and values to be applied for this task. It is only recently (most obviously triggered through ecological and social problems) that ethics has turned systematically to new fields like technical artefacts. As a consequence, traditional ethics is conceptually inadequate for buildings, cities, or the like.

The authors leave it unfortunately unclear on what basis they issue this complaint of conceptual inadequacy. For, it is not *prima facie* clear that using extant concepts leaves us unable to address the ethics of architecture more satisfactorily than currently done. Speaking for myself, the failure Illies and Ray report, and which their work in some moments instantiates, is at least *partly* the result of the specific form an ethics of architecture has assumed in the current literature – in particular, the literature's wide spread refusal to ever take moral statements about buildings at face value, and to uphold certain assumptions like the *Intentionalist Prejudice* which discourages anyone to ever take concrete steps in that direction. Without re-examining such issues, issues which seem to form a silent consensus in the current debate, the ethics of architecture likely remains where it is, as described in the diagnosis of Illies and Ray here.

Such a bleak outlook, however, has to be backed up by concrete inquiry into the work of individual authors. To this I proceed next. As previously explained, readers may pick and choose at liberty which author's work they feel most interested in. §1.5 and §1.6 look at contemporary forms of derivationism, and §1.7 looks at redescriptionism. Impatient readers may wish to skip ahead to CHAPTER 2 right away, but are recommended to give at least §1.7.1 a cursory glance.

§1.5 TOM SPECTOR

Moving now on to my literature survey of contemporary work in architecture ethics, I begin with an author who can with some justification be regarded as the champion of contemporary derivationism. For already the title of Tom Spector's 2001 book, *The Ethical Architect*, indicates its orientation: architecture ethics has to start with the ethics of the practising professional. As Spector shows through many examples, architectural practice inevitably gives rise to ethical dilemmas that contractarian or utilitarian theories are ill equipped to resolve (even if the former at times succeed in explaining their origin). The same type of failure, Spector attests, arises from reading such dilemmas through the lens of the 'Vitruvian triad' of being solidly built, aesthetically pleasing, and meeting functional requirements. While that last point will receive extensive scrutiny in §3.1, the present subsection will examine Spector's more positive theses in their own right, especially where these touch on (other) central concerns of the present work. For Spector alleges that even if the 'values' at work in the 'Vitruvian triad' would never give rise to internal conflict (such as, beauty versus utility), the mere *presence* of values does not (sufficiently) instruct the architect how to *behave* morally.

To counteract these failings, Spector proposes to supplement a *value-centric* account with professional values of *good conduct*, including (1) an openness towards a pluralistic society to help the architect understand, not only why value pluralism is helpful (indeed indispensable) to deploy the triad correctly and

responsibly – that is, sensitive to constantly changing cultural contexts – but also (2) to approach the values internal to the triad as already (that is, prior to specific contexts) pointing towards a pluralism of necessity. In short, Spector wishes to *amplify* the values relevant to architecture, and wishes to *alter* our (that is, architects’) *attitude* towards these values.

There is a host of detailed problems emerging from this proposal. I begin by focusing on pretty general problems it gives rise to, problems that go to the heart of an ethics of architecture – or, its lack thereof in the contemporary landscape. As we go along, I shall add further details to Spector’s account.

To begin with, Spector’s motivation to have us move from value- to conduct-based (or agent-centric) ethics appears to vocalize a standard problem faced by so-called ‘externalist’ theories of moral motivation.⁹⁵ On such theories, the philosophy of value and of moral motivation can legitimately come apart – which is what motivational internalism denies. While the internalist’s charge is worth pressing, Spector’s argument could have been strengthened, or at least refined, by examining standard responses externalists typically avail themselves at this point. An examination of that would take us too far afield, and touch on concerns of Spector’s rather than my own. I will thus not pursue the matter further here.

Second, by moving from a value-centric to an agent-centric ethical orientation,⁹⁶ Spector’s framework appears to generate a problem of ‘reverse entailment’. If, as Spector’s own work shows us, the fact that a building is a ‘good one’ (whatever *that* requires to be appropriately qualified) does not entail that it is causally based on ‘good building practices’ (fair conduct among contractors, commissioners, and architects), no reverse guarantee seems to obtain either. The best of intentions, and most scrupulous of conduct, can issue in some of the worst buildings, and some of the best buildings could well come out of bad practices.

The same problem emerges from another author, whose work I will more fully examine in §1.6, but whose position on this point in particular is instructive in its assertiveness. Nicholas Ray writes,

Then, if the artifacts they [sc. architects] create are to be enjoyed by more than the privileged few, what are the responsibilities of architects to the public at | large? This question would entail measurable issues such as the responsibility that architects would bear towards issues of sustainability [...], and less easily measurable issues as to the manner, or style, of buildings. [...] the question of ‘propriety’ or *decor[um]* was one of [...] Vitruvius’ five crucial terms for the understanding of architecture, so the concern is hardly new. – The mention of style raises the question of aesthetics [...]. But can aesthetics be dissociated from ethics?⁹⁷

Observe specifically Ray’s confident use of the word ‘entail’. The final question is rhetorical, and we are meant to conclude, from the previous sentences, that tangible and even (more or less) quantifiable relations of entailment run from good practice to good stylistic results. This, however, appears to overestimate the causal links that connect them, by implying (or suggesting) they are more predictable, controllable, reliable, and deterministic than can be likely maintained or verified (Ray remains silent on this).

While Spector’s own work steers clear of assertions that raise these questions in a particularly strong way, the overall orientation of his work owes us a fuller answer, on his behalf, to some of them. This, then, presents a first lacuna. We now move on to more specifics in Spector’s own account.

⁹⁵ Smith (1994, chs. 3-4).

⁹⁶ Spector retains value-based (even utilitarian) considerations as part of that framework, as is overlooked by critics who paint him a ‘virtue-theorist’ (a term he himself never enlists). See Taylor and Levine (2011).

⁹⁷ Ray (2005, 1-2).

§1.5.1 NO ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE

Returning to Spector's own line of thought, he concludes the inquiry of his book by returning to the ethics of architecture he (more or less) began with. The book's concluding section is thus provocatively entitled 'The Virtuous Building' (2001, 199). Spector endorses David Watkin's dismissal of 'justifying for stylistic preferences' in architecture – such as Gothic over Romanesque – 'on moral grounds' (ibid), a claim we will re-encounter in Neal Leach's work in §2.6 and §3.2. More particularly,

Seeking to justify a given style by asserting its moral superiority is a doomed enterprise. To do so is to invoke the privileged point of view that does not exist. We may find that a given style is instrumentally better than another for our purposes, but this need not lead to [(1)] the erroneous conclusion of Watkin's targets [Pugin, Viollet-le-Duc, Pevsner] that their preferred styles were ultimately, objectively, or morally better. [(2)] The moral question in relation to style then, is not over which one is morally superior, but rather the ends each [style] is fashioned to serve. (Spector 2001, 199)

Spector's argument here seems to commit three steps. First of all (as previously), the *only* choices in architectural design he (apparently) thinks can, perhaps should, be justified 'on moral grounds' are stylistic ones, with 'style' being a stand-in for broad terms (like Gothic, Romanesque). This, later thesis chapters will amply demonstrate, is too narrow a domain of what can be justified in architectural composition on moral grounds. Secondly, claim (1) appears to equate giving moral grounds to giving *universalist* moral grounds that apply irrespective of context or further goal, whereas in (2) Spector says that context-specific goals *may* license justifying stylistic preferences on moral grounds.

I am not sure claim (1) is more than a rhetorical move served to dispatch Watkin's 'targets' swiftly. In any case, it is not argued for that moral universalism is obviously untenable, other than (perhaps) Spector's passing reference to an argument made famous by Bernard Williams, that moral universalism requires the assuming of a 'point of view' that, by definition, is not available – a point of view that is no one's in specific, and so, not a 'privileged point of view' at all. *If* this is Spector's argumentative intention here, it commits the same fallacy as a similar(ly phrased) argument in Bernard Williams's work. For universalism is not a position about assuming points of perspective in the first instance, nor does its defense require that one argue based on such a premise. The lesson should be familiar to readers of Berkeley on the alleged conceptual impossibility of 'conceiving of an object (or shape/colour property) unseen by anyone'. It is perfectly possible to imagine such an object, but conceptually impossible to conceive of an object not conceived of anyone. That is, the 'inconceived' attaches to the content, not the verb, of 'conceiving'.⁹⁸

What is more, Spector's own endorsement of non-universalism (he calls it 'pluralism') faces philosophical difficulties of its own, such as (most obviously) the inherent contradiction of mounting, by way of universal premise, a position that rejects universalist premises. I return to that and associated problems with value pluralism below.⁹⁹

What is noteworthy about the gist of Spector's argument is its unequivocally *endorsing* the moralization of architecture itself – if, so far, only as concerns, not this building or that, but architectural styles very generally. That is, so far Spector's argument merely objects to the specific *variety* of grounds typically

⁹⁸ For this refutation of Williams' argument of the unavailability of the 'absolute point of view', see now also Stalnaker (2008, 19-22).

⁹⁹ In response, Spector (p.c. March 2014) suggested that value pluralism is simply 'a recognition of the [ineliminably] diverse ways values come to bear on situations', whereas value relativism (to him) is 'a pretty strong normative statement about how we should value things'. While I acknowledge a (more than terminological) difference between relativism and pluralism, I fail to see on what grounds the latter escapes the charge of the current paragraph. More specifically, it seems pluralism, unlike relativism, is not a metaphysical thesis about what values essentially are, but about the epistemology of value. Pluralism then still seems to mount 'a pretty strong normative statement' about how to justify value judgments, and in making *that statement* is just as vulnerable to the present charge as relativism.

provided in such contexts – in that their universalist ambitions typically outrun what is philosophically feasible. That will be an important point to bear in mind for later chapters, for over and above facing the question as to *whether* one can provide moral grounds for the choices that inform architectural composition (the buildings themselves, not the process of their creation or the utilization of the built result by humans), there is the question when such grounds are *morally adequate*.

The extent of Spector's sympathy with moralizing architecture, however, should not be taken too far. As already indicated, so far he reserves it for styles alone. And indeed, Spector's concession with (2) is carefully hedged in the sequel, and reminds us that arguing for compositional preferences in architecture on moral grounds – whether these grounds are (illegitimately) universalist or (legitimately) pluralistic – still borders on a category mistake.

This is the time where we see that, in all earnest, and in the final instance, taking the ambitions of an ethics of architecture at face value – as Spector's ironic section header 'the virtuous building' already reminds us – is doomed from the outset, and commits a category mistake, we are told.

If one considers morality to be solely about best actions and intentions, then of course it makes sense to dispute whether, from a moral standpoint, it makes any difference if bricks are stacked into a pointed arch or a round arch. [NB Spector here alludes to the stylistic difference between Gothic and Romanesque buildings.] These various arrangements of bricks are good or bad only to the extent they facilitate good or bad results or reflect good or bad intentions. Short of stacking them so that they fall over and kill someone, it is silly to claim that my stack is more moral than yours. To impart moral worth to inanimate objects – objects that have neither intentions nor actions – is nonsensical. (2001, 200)

This is as good a statement as any we shall get, on the rejection of taking moral statements about buildings at face value. As customary for Spector's presentation, the crucial premises are carefully indicated in parentheses or interjections: buildings 'have neither intentions nor actions' and *thus* the ascription of moral categories to them is 'nonsensical'. We have already met this type of argument in §1.4.

As before with Spector's dismissal of universalism, we have to ask if his reasoning rests on a sound premise – if, as he suggests, having intentions or (committing) actions is *necessary* for moral appraisal. To all appearances, he provides no argument for this premise, but rather takes its cogency as taken for granted (by the reader as much as himself). Philosophically, as before, this is less than water tight, as we saw in §1.4, and the premise, if not outright unsound, is at the very least contestable.

If Spector alleges that taking moral statements about buildings at face value is 'nonsensical', other remarks of his indicate his appreciation of the moral *complicity* of buildings in social structures the moral appraisal of which is not nonsensical in the least. He thus sees (i) 'particular arrangements of bricks' as able to 'further or hinder in the way of community dialogue', and as able to 'reflect community values'; Spector further holds (ii) that neoclassicist buildings in Stalinist Russia and 'antebellum [that is, pre-Civil War US] Greek Revival architecture' alike 'were part and parcel of the power structure on which these oppressive cultures were based', in that these styles (iii) 'facilitated their builders and owners' participation in certain cultural conversations – about domination, racism, totalitarianism' (2001, 200). From these observations, he concludes that architecture, in such contexts, is far from 'morally neutral' (*ibid.*). More precisely,

One need not subscribe to the idea that these structures possess latent properties that made them morally inferior [or even reprehensible] to recognize that the choices made in these arrangements of bricks were not entirely arbitrary and | that it serves future generations to become familiar with their motifs. If a style can be expressive of virtue, it can be equally expressive of vice. (2001, 200-201)

The problem with this concession, however, is that, carefully as it is stated, it contains so many hedges that the statement's ultimate import is effaced nearly entirely. Sure enough, Spector's rejection of architecture having 'latent [moral] properties' is as explicit as ever, but what he puts in its place is left vague. If not these structures, where is the *locus* for moral appraisal now? Spector speaks, not of structures, but of 'choices' and 'motifs' that inform arrangement. These, however, seem to solely be features of human agents responsible for the creation of such architectural structures, and features that are at best reflected in the structures as a remote echo, a trace of a previous choice, and so 'expressive' of it (if that, indeed, is how we are to understand Spector's use of that elusive verb). This is like saying that the gun fired at Lincoln's assassination is 'expressive' of the agent's decisions and intents whose hand fired it, which does not remotely have much to do with the moral appraisal of the gun, or even of its context. It is, square and simple, a moral appraisal of a human agent or – as in Spector's example of Stalinist Russia and antebellum US – of a collective of such agents. Even the knowledge that informs such appraisals seems to operate largely independently of architectural construction, and a knowledge thereof. What matters is less the 'expression' of such choices in architecture – to the extent we can discern them in architecture at all, which seems doubtful – than historical knowledge of such choices and motifs in the first place, regardless of how these are materialized in built artifacts.

In the INTRODUCTION we already met with positions of that variety – positions that attempt to single out architecture's *moral complicity* in contexts that allow full blown moral appraisals of things *other than* architecture. Such positions typically permit architecture at most to either be an *instrument* or serve as the *location* where morally significant actions are transacted, but remove moral significance from architecture in its own right. Whether as instrument or context, architecture seems to be largely dispensable to and mostly exchangeable regarding whatever moral significance is in the offing here. That is, we can substitute pretty much *any other* architectural setting (it hardly matters which), and the end result does not alter the moral appraisal in the slightest.¹⁰⁰ I pursue this further in a *reductio* argument against the 'normativity of optics' in §1.7.1.

Talking of architecture's moral complicity, then, is often enough just a hedged way of saying that architecture *itself* is as 'morally neutral' as ever. It is one more strategy to drive home the lesson that moral statements about buildings cannot and should not be taken at face value. For doing so, we here learn, commits category mistakes and is simply 'nonsensical'.

§1.5.2 AN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE?

By way of post script to §1.5.1, I would like to discuss a stance Spector has more recently suggested, in response to my critique that his work does not really incorporate an ethics of architecture. He writes,

I'm really more interested in taking up your proposal about establishing a strong ethics of the [architectural] object. It seems to me that the ethics of objects run in two directions. There's [A] the potential ethical implications of these rather large objects called buildings on people's lives: the resources they use up, casting shadows on others, the harshness or felicity of the environments they create, etc. But then there's also [B] the ethics that run from people's actions to what they do with and to these large objects: historic preservation, their integrity as artworks, that sort of thing. We can recognize these ideas as reasonably commonplace and consonant with Western cultural values. But the interesting thing is that, unlike the ethics between rational adults, these directions are not symmetric. The [A] potential impact of buildings on people's lives will mostly trump [B] the value or dignity of the building to be protected from insensitive or

¹⁰⁰ This must also be said for Spector's immediate source, David Watkin (see opening lines of §1.5.1). As Reyner Banham noted (in a review upon the appearance of Watkin's 1977), contrary to the aspirations belied by the title of Watkin's book, it is not in the least a study of either morality or (let alone, the morality of) architecture, but a critique of historicism on Popperian grounds. (I return to this in CHAPTER 10, where I discuss the legacy of Popper's influence on the reception of modernist architecture and its alleged moral depravity.)

destructive actions. This certainly bears comparison with theories in environmental ethics which try to establish an asymmetrical ethical responsibility towards [some] creatures that would, if given the chance, happily kill us.¹⁰¹

This paragraph already makes architecture's *complicity* in moral contexts considerably clearer compared to the passage discussed earlier, because it places architecture at either *end* of moral relations – either at the active (A) or recipient (B) end, with the concluding observation that moral considerations arising from the first context will likely trump those from the second, in that the welfare of humans will always rank higher than that of buildings. In either case, however, I would like to add, is there no possibility in Spector's (even revised) framework to allocate moral significance to buildings they enjoy independently of (entering relations with) human beings. That is why, even here, an ethics of architecture (of architectural objects) seems to be arrived at, at best derivatively, by considerations originating from the ethics of humans. That said, Spector's revised account certainly opens up the trajectory for 'ethics of architecture' considerations proper, in that, for (B) to get off ground, it presupposes a philosophically persuasive understanding of wherein the value of *buildings* consist in – and why, *on those grounds*, humans enter relations of moral obligations *towards* such artifacts. In human-human relation, it is on account of human dignity and wellbeing, but neither dignity nor wellbeing seem to function well as concepts applied outside anthropocentric contexts.

§1.5.3 PROBLEMS OF (EXCLUSIVE) EMPHASIS

§1.5.1-§1.5.2 signaled how Spector's framework does not succeed in licensing an ethics of architecture by way of *derivation* from an ethics of architects. I then added how it is not quite clear he would ever endorse such a derivation in the first place, since he has strong reservations towards developing an ethics of architecture in the first place. In this section I want to argue, briefly, why I think that even if the derivation would succeed (and were intended), it would operate from questionable starting grounds. Hence, this and the next subsection scrutinize Spector's ethics of architects in its own right, that is, on its own grounds.

In general, in its broad orientation *The Ethical Architect* falls squarely within the ethics of architects, in that (a) none of the book's main examples (discussed in its opening five chapters) ever address ethical concerns that seemingly emanate from architecture, that is, from the buildings themselves. Relatedly, the only ethics we get are of architects, and that ethics in turn is squarely cast in terms of a professional ethics, that is, an ethics that mostly (b) regards architects as professionals with professional responsibilities towards the public, rather than lone artists having their lofty aesthetic visions compromised by considerations for the needs of building users. If this sounds polemical, it feeds into the way these two strands, (a) and (b), are united in Spector's analysis, more precisely his handling of (analysing) concrete examples. All these examples show how we have to balance *aesthetic* concerns, which arise from the building design, against *ethical* concerns, which (for Spector) solely arise from concerns of professional integrity and the public. (Indeed, the latter are the only prominent sources of ethical values in Spector's work.) This is the core value conflict his book addresses throughout, without once questioning *which* values are at play (ethical vs. aesthetic) and *whence* they arise (human affairs vs. building design).

If that is already a highly specific way to set up the debate – one, I would add, reminiscent of similar tendencies in contemporary philosophical aesthetics we encountered in §P.2 –, Spector's way of setting up the debate should signal to readers that many of the core philosophical decision points emerging from Spector's later chapters (1) already inform his book's composition *at the outset*, prior to any argumentation, and (2) condition our prospectus of architecture ethics in a way that, from the get go, regards buildings as (at most) vessels of aesthetic value. If, by contrast, ethical values *could* emerge from the building itself, we would then have a variety of value conflicts Spector never addresses in the book, namely, an *inner-ethical*

¹⁰¹ P.c. (29 January 2013).

value conflict of building ethical values vs. the public's ethical values.¹⁰² Some follow up questions then would be, (a) which set of values we should privilege, and (b) whether the architect functions (or should function) as an agent who authoritatively implements her own values, or rather as a 'service provider' securing existing values in the architectural public.¹⁰³ As a recent commentator on Patrick Schumacher's plea for moral quietism in architecture put it, a visit to the doctor's will not only feature discussion on *how* to (secure) obtain(ing) a prosthetic limb, but on the patient's need to obtain one in the first place.¹⁰⁴

§1.5.4 VALUE PLURALISM

Even if we accept Spector's way of setting up the field of architecture ethics – one that writes an ethics of architecture out of the picture right away –, problems remain, in that we can ask how the specific answers his book provides measure up against the problems Spector sets for the field to settle.

On the whole, Spector seems to allege, that during the course of the twentieth century, discussions of ethics in (not of) architecture went too quickly from position D1 to position D2, to wit,

- D1 Modernism: utilitarianism (buildings serve and shape functional needs of societies) is the one and only 'solution', to addressing all ethical issues in architecture.
- D2 Postmodernism: There are no inherent moral qualities to the practice of architecture, so 'anything goes'. Architecture is morally neutral, so architects can make any moral choices they wish, because it does not impact the practice of architecture.

Whether or not readers are prepared to recognize (my paraphrases of) D1 and D2 as *historically accurate* descriptions of two distinct phases (cf. however the discussion of *CLAM* in §1.6.2), these claims (D1-D2) render it instantly clear how Spector sees that too much is glossed over from transitioning from the perceived failure of *one highly particular* architecture ethics to the categorical failure of architecture ethics as such, which is here (D2) taken to be tantamount to the recognition that there is no morality to architecture. This transition overlooks the fact that architecture ethics can assume shapes that diverge from the content and presuppositions of utilitarianism (as understood by architectural modernism), and it is that overlooked 'inbetween space' between utilitarianism and value neutralism that Spector inserts his own position, 'value pluralism'.

Now whether or not we agree with how Spector motivates the emergence of his preferred architecture ethics, we should ask whether it is the best contender to assume the void left by D1 and D2. (Incidentally, the book never explicitly argues that it is the sole contender, so the argumentation at this point is pretty much left as an exercise to the reader.) The position is motivated, in Spector, by (P1) the alleged realization that we cannot avoid value conflicts,¹⁰⁵ and consequently (P2) the need to come to terms with value pluralism. The latter is decidedly not the same as value relativism, for such relativism would simply relapse into D2. One could restate P2 thus – (P2') the only way of avoiding the conflicts mentioned in P1 is to acknowledge value pluralism. P2', however, is open to doubt, in that it ignores the possibility of value contextualism as developed in contemporary ethics in the wake of Peter Unger's work.¹⁰⁶ P2', then, minimally requires an inquiry into the comparative merits of contextualism versus pluralism as ways of avoiding the dilemma of either universalism or relativism/nihilism we are familiar with in many areas of philosophy. Relatedly, an inherent motivation for pluralism is never quite offered by Spector's work; it repeatedly urges its intended readers (I suppose, most of them architects) to 'embrace uneasiness' and

¹⁰² This is how I put the point to Spector in an email, and it now strikes me that his response, quoted in §1.5.2, is a very successful response to flesh out how and where he is willing to locate value conflicts of *this* variety.

¹⁰³ This question is raised in Wagner (1903) or more recently by Düchs (2011).

¹⁰⁴ For the plea see the PREFACE, referencing the same website to which this comment is owed.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. the opening remarks of §1.5.

¹⁰⁶ Unger (2006, 211-292), Unger (1996, 158-176).

settle into a comfort zone that allows for irreconcilable differences and discrepancies in the programmatic and wider requirements of building commissions. But the nature, motivation, and promise of that embrace is largely left for the reader to fill in.

§1.5.5 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS?

Another instance where Spector's work seems to orient the field of architecture ethics in a too one-sided way is by casting the debate so firmly through the lens of *professional* ethics. For there is a larger question here, namely why decidedly professional values should be the ultimate point of explanation, or worse, the exhaustive delimitation, of moral values relevant to architectural design and appreciation. For it seems perfectly conceivable, and Spector concedes this in his opening chapter, that an architect acts well, aesthetically (design-wise) and ethically (taking responsibility towards the public), even in the absence of a professional framework – or even in its deliberate evasion, as when an architect fled or was ousted from his professional association, an association typically of the type that upholds professional values in the first place. As Spector puts it (2001, 4), a propos a concrete commission where an architect was first employed and then ousted from one such association *after* the commissioned building was realized, 'The building was the same.' Now, even if Spector grants that professional values can perfectly emerge and be sustained outside professional associations, it remains puzzling why professional values and the institutions that typically propagate them should be an *explanatory point of orientation* for architecture ethics.

On the other hand, Spector wants to grant that such associations, if not explanatorily, still serve as the institutional source of such values, and guarantee that a 'bargain' of sorts is entered between architects and the public commissioning them to provide buildings to a certain standard. (One might recall Rousseau's idea of a 'social contract', except delimited to a more specific domain.) That seems descriptively accurate, if a tad metaphorical. (Few of us literally enter contracts with architects unless we become their project specific clients.) Even so, some sharp questions, actually ethical questions, arise. (a) Is such a 'bargain' or contract *necessary* for the relation between architecture and public to be 'ethical', and (b) even if it is necessary, does that 'bargain' necessarily have to be secured by a professional contract and association?

As to (a), what seems missing from Spector's account is a comparison to professions that are not as strictly legally regulated as architecture, contain no professional unions, and so on. It is certainly no accident that society regulates the ethical (and other) performance of certain professions legally, and no accident that architecture, like medicine, falls within that domain. But, as before, one wonders what would happen to architecture if it were less heavily regulated than it is now, given how previous eras or, for that matter, different states in the U.S. and the E.U., operated under states of affairs that are fairly de-regulated compared to what is happening (in certain countries) at the moment.

Spector's argument addressing (b) is equally spotty, in that it solely operates (at 2011, 11-12) on a highly specific, and predictably untenable, variant of the challenge contained in (b), namely conflict theory. We may easily agree with Spector that that theory is conceptually and empirically unsustainable (which is why I do not even bother the reader with its specifics here), and still feel that, as readers, we deserve more by way of an answer to (b). It is simply not obvious, without further ado, that a professionally encoded 'bargain' between society and architects is needed, not simply to *uphold* certain values, but to *establish* their content in the first place. That, one might have thought, is a huge question in political philosophy – the question of the *legitimacy* of enforcing certain procedures on a public so as to secure it certain benefits. At this point, architecture ethics seems to tap into premises that more properly belong to political philosophy, and it is a missed opportunity for Spector's own account to not have (as of yet) pursued this avenue further.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ I understand Spector is currently researching precisely this connection, so we can expect this lacuna in his overall theoretic framework to be filled over the coming years.

§1.6 CHRISTIAN ILLIES AND NICHOLAS RAY

In 2006, philosopher Christian Illies and architect(ure historian) Nicholas Ray teamed up to write a handbook entry for the ‘Philosophy of Architecture’.¹⁰⁸ Their stated goal was to show the field in its variegated form at that point in time, drawing on contributions from both disciplines, and emphasizing (as it were) specifically the aesthetics and ethics of architecture as two core areas of ongoing concern.¹⁰⁹ With respect to the latter, the authors identify six ‘ethical areas’ they deem relevant to architecture. Of these, the first refers to the building *process* and the other five to properties of the final *product* of a building process. These areas are delineated as follows (inserted nomenclature mine),

[1] issues of professional behaviour and interaction during the planning, designing and construction phase, [2] the morally acceptable or unacceptable nature of the function and use of a building, [3] the impact of the building on nature (broadly under the heading of what we would call ‘green issues’), [4] the impact on the health and safety of those who use the buildings, [5] the psychological influence on human behaviour, individually and collectively, that the building promotes, | [6] the furnishing of cultural or symbolical meanings, by choices of forms, materials, colours, and aesthetic style[.]¹¹⁰

My own take on [1] is contained in my critical remarks in §1.5. We may also bracket [3] and [4] for current purposes, but acknowledge their cogency. Major problems, however, emerge with the remaining three categories. That is, Illies and Ray instantly home in on a building’s *function* [2] as the major area where architecture’s moral appraisal really takes place, and they lump nearly all other design facets, once these have no tangible *causal impact* on the natural and human habitat [3-4], including the selection of *forms and materials*, into category [6], which they somewhat mystifyingly label, ‘cultural and symbolical meanings’.¹¹¹ This already indicates that, once we go beyond functionality, there is little left in a building that is directly morally appraisable – a view we shall re-encounter in §1.7, where I also engage category [2] directly. Here I first address category [6], before going on to [5] in §1.6.2. As we saw in §P.2, focusing the moral appraisal of architecture on category [6] is part of a wider trend. Several philosophers are convinced that moralizing architecture on the basis of its symbolism is a workable foundation. If the arguments in the next section go through, this shared conviction lacks adequate philosophical credentials and should be revised.

§1.6.1 MORAL SYMBOLISM

Attempting to yet map moral appraisals of architectural elements, Illies and Ray give us examples like the following. First, of Frank Lloyd Wright’s *Prairie Houses* in the US, which allocate pride of place to a fire place or hearth, we learn,

This fire-place served not merely as physical gathering area, but served to express the family life and its values, especially unity, harmony with nature, and the simple life. (1224)

Or again,

Ceausescu’s palace in Bucharest [...] was a symbol of everything that is evil. (1225)

Unfortunately, the critical verbs ‘serve to express’ and ‘being a symbol’ of, that respectively flank architecture and moral evaluative vocabulary, are left frustratingly vague; no analysis is even attempted.

¹⁰⁸ Illies and Ray (2009).

¹⁰⁹ A more recent study of Christoph Baumberger (presented at Delft on 1 April, 2014) appears to do better in providing a carefully *reasoned* overview of how to categorize the field effectively. As that paper is undergoing elaboration and alteration at the time of writing, however, it would be premature to extensively comment on it here.

¹¹⁰ Illies and Ray (2006, 1219-1220).

¹¹¹ Somewhat uneasily, the authors themselves recognize [6] as ‘the most complex of the six issues identified’ (1220). I cannot ward off the impression that category [6] is a hodge-podge of things they could not omit, but had no sense of classifying more accurately (a bit like Hume’s use of the term ‘imagination’ to denote whatever he felt he could not place within the boxes of ‘reason’ and ‘perception’).

Rather, we learn that any such ‘meaning’ (another term left unexplained) requires a recipient or audience capable of interpretation, from which they conclude that the meaning can change over time.

the language – and thus meaning – of an architectural message can change over time; the meaning we attach to an artefact is inherently unstable.

This is some surprisingly imprecise language for an analytically trained pair of authors, in that ‘language’, ‘meaning’, and ‘message’ are all happily attached to architecture, but no explanation is forthcoming even though their usage is evidently metaphorical. Nor is the impact of diachronic alteration on moral appraisal ever explained. What is more, however we interpret this talk of ‘language’ and ‘message’, it seems to get something woefully wrong. The meaning *of* a sentence does not change over time, simply because people choose to interpret it differently. That is like saying that the meaning of a sentence changes over time, depending on whether it is read in Latin or Italian. But then, it is only *interpreted* sentences that have meanings, or propositions. (And neither of these change their meanings over time.) It appears Illies and Ray are aware of this problem, because they do not talk of inert meanings, but of meanings ‘we attach to an artefact’. If, then, Illies and Ray want to liken buildings to *interpreted sentences*, with the interpretation arising from (and not just being ascribed to them by) an external agent, sc. the interpreter, then buildings themselves are semantically inert as much as uninterpreted sentences are. But then buildings *have* no meaning, they are simple sites for the convenient *projection* of meanings by others. Which means, they are not bearers of moral ‘messages’ either, and in that regard are not morally appraisable.¹¹²

I am unclear whether the authors did not ultimately intend this as a *reductio* of smuggling as elusive a category as [6] into an ethics of architecture. In a later paper co-authored with Anthonie Meijers, Illies effectively concedes the point, when *he folds category [6] into [5]*, and re-translates its (largely meaningless) terminology into that of category [5]. Observe the switch from ‘express family life and its values’ towards ‘action schemes’ (on which more presently) in this note:

New kinds of behaviour can also be opened up in subtle ways – for example, by making people think about new issues, or about old ones in new ways. Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, designed most of his so called Prairie Houses around a fireplace or hearth to express family life and its values, especially unity, harmony with nature, and the simple life. Expressed in terms of action schemes we might say that having such a fireplace in a house can lead to different kinds of behaviour by fostering the attractive option of sitting together around a fire-place. And this might trigger reflections about the fundamentals of family life etc.¹¹³

The only hope to evade the impression that this flat out collapses [6] into [5] is to construe ‘trigger reflections’ as a semantic or semiotic reflection between buildings and humans.¹¹⁴ I do not find this plausible, but let us suppose it is. Even then, the suggestion merely exacerbates the vagueness observed for earlier terms under heading [6]. A sunset may *occasion* me to think of my family, just as a fold on a woman’s dress may *bring back* childhood memories. Either episode may cause me to violently reject, rather than endorse, the ‘values’ and ‘fundamentals’ (if any) disclosed in such moments. How could the *causal* output of buildings, and a pretty irregular and indeterministic one at that, be at all *attributed* to the building prompting it? The examples here are poster boys for the type of unsavoury ‘associative meanings’ bestowed on architectural compositions on a pretty flimsy basis, and decried by Schopenhauer as such (§7.2). Focusing on [6], which I would subsume under a strategy of derivation rather than redescription,

¹¹² A similar point was argued by Weber (1994, 114) who offered several considerations to conclude that, ‘meaning is not an intrinsic property of [architectural] form; it is *inferred* by the beholder on the basis of concepts [she] derived from [her] cultural conventions, individual experience, and learning.’

¹¹³ Illies and Meijers (2014, 179n.38); cf. *ibid.* 177-182 (entitled, ‘Analysing Action Schemes: Applications from Architectural Design’). On a point of detail, one may also wonder whether the current passage correctly specifies ‘family life and its values’.

¹¹⁴ As suggested to me by Christian Illies (p.c., 28 March 2014).

then does not afford a cogent pathway to make headway towards an ethics of architecture – or, at least not unless the surrounding philosophical machinery is significantly revised and sharpened up.

§1.6.2 ILLIES AND RAY ON PSYCHOPHYSICAL HARM

By comparison, Illies and Ray's category [5] is much more straightforward. If Illies, in paper authored with Meijers we encountered in §1.4.2, will explain the moral appraisal of artefacts in terms of 'action schemes', that is, sets of options for actions that artefacts disclose to their agents, Illies (here with Ray) similarly probes the potential to escape mono-causal deterministic relations of mapping building material choices onto certain psychological (consequently, mental and, possibly moral) impacts, appraise the choices such decisions in architectural designs (pertaining to materials and other facets) have for their users. As Illies and Ray say,

buildings can also suggest ideals to their occupants: an obvious way is to make certain actions easy and others difficult or impossible. (1222)

The moral appraisal of such (courses) of actions is then entirely straight forward, and the authors prefer to cast it very simply in terms of desire-satisfaction theories of the human good. That means, they raise the issue of 'informed desires' that ostensibly (and not only apparently) feed into the good life of the agents whose desires they are. As they put it,

What is the morally right way to deal with human needs? It seems plausible that buildings must satisfy at least those needs that are essential for human well-being and whose frustration makes human beings sick. (1222)

There are, however, two problems with this view. First, speaking historically, there is the question on *who* gets to say *which* needs to be served by a building qualify as 'essential for human well-being'. The second CLAM conference in Frankfurt (1929) for instance

focused exclusively on the issue of housing. It produced the (later) highly controversial *Existenzminimum* standards (suggesting acceptable minimal housing square footage).¹¹⁵

CLAM's later ambitions for architecture were virtually boundless, developing in 1943 the so-called *Athens Charter* that literally declares architecture 'responsible for the well-being and the beauty of the city.' More than that, 'Architecture is the key to everything.'¹¹⁶

It is, however, much more controversial to map actual architectural decisions straightforwardly onto impacts (benign or malign) of human well-being. Without, say Illies and Ray, wishing to fall 'in the trap of naïve [psycho-physical] determinism', they cite the example of the 1951 *Pruitt-Igoe* housing project,

their structures seemed to invite vandalism and crime so that no one wanted to live there. The complex got demolished after just 20 years. (2006, 1222)

However, it is far from empirically certain that it was the *architectural design* that facilitated the destructive response, and not the *surrounding social setting*, forcing fathers away from their children, and enforcing untenable working conditions outside the housing complex – not to mention the total abandonment by city management of the building facilities' maintenance (including electric lighting and waste disposal) –, which led to the families *housed* in Pruitt-Igoe to finally react against the only physical scape-goat in their own reach – the building the factory contractors and the US government, thereby the ostensible *authors* of the tenants' social setting, had bequeathed them.

¹¹⁵ Mallgrave (2005, 177), who contextualizes this against the 1930s *Lebensraum* ideology of the Nazis.

¹¹⁶ Eardley (1973, 104), cited and discussed *apud* Mallgrave (2005, 278). Sources like these seem to confirm the historical accuracy of what in Spector's account, discussed in §1.5.4, is position D1.

If, as recent authors have argued, this is the correct interpretation of the housing complex's fate, then Pruitt-Igoe's widespread vandalization and ultimate destruction was not *causally provoked* by, and a response to, its architectural design; rather, that design simply served as the site in which the aggressive act of destruction took place, the end *target* of that aggression, and a replaceable one.¹¹⁷ We can only imagine what would have happened if the aforementioned factory owners and governors had *their* houses and cars located in the vicinity of the site, at security standards comparable to Pruitt-Igoe's own – that is, none.

Similar remarks appear to apply to further attempts by Illies and Ray to fill their category [5] with persuasive examples. They say (2006, 1223),

even highly private decisions like family planning seem influenced by our housing conditions[.]

Certainly so, if the extra bed room is not available. But that, again, seems to have less to do with the *design* of the house, as with (again) the surrounding issues –the real estate housing market, the income level of the families forced to inhabit such sites, and so on. For this reason, cases like Pruitt-Igoe do not merely raise the issue as to which *moral* standards we enlist to evaluate the causal impacts of architecture on human wellbeing. Much rather, we still lack a philosophically careful, empirically informed framework that allows us to assess such allegations of causal relations for their truth.¹¹⁸ (Making that claim does not presuppose that we already know that *no such* allegations can ever be made (that they are false across the board); rather, it only presupposes that we cannot yet assent to such allegations *at any level of informative detail*, pending further conceptual refinement and empirical documentation.)

I do not aim to provide such a framework in this thesis either but want to remind readers of what §I.2 called 'Architecture First'. It seems to me that, time and again, philosophers and (in particular) ethicists are happy to talk about how ethical issues arise for architecture *in its relation to* other things, when it is entirely unclear what we mean by architecture, how we can properly assess its causal (material, psychological, mental) impact, when the ('it' in that) 'its' is entirely unclear.

In the current case, it seems to me that no compelling case has been made, by Illies and Ray, to regard either category [6] *or* category [5] as affording us genuine insight into the ethics of architecture. Category [6], we saw, is philosophically defective in that it contains much unexplained metaphorical terminology of a quasi-linguistic variety. Illies himself seems more confident to ultimately collapse (most of) [6] into [5].

[5], we now see, however, is very underdeveloped too. The nature of the causal impact of buildings on humans, while having some intuitive promise, lacks the philosophical articulation and empirical validation the basic idea requires before we can lend it any credibility. (That is, we cannot use the material for the 'justification' part of an ethics of architecture: see §2.1.) This is not remedied by Illies's most recent work even where it clings to the same idea.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ See Fishman (2004, 27): 'I do not wish to challenge the conventional wisdom that the public-housing towers were bad design, still less to deny that the traditional neighborhoods often embodied a far superior urbanism. But I do wish to challenge the presumed central responsibility of modernist design for the failure of low-rent public housing.' Similar views are contested in Fahey (2014). Tom Wolfe (1981) propagated the contrary view, which squarely blames the architecture.

¹¹⁸ Arguably, this point is recognized by Illies and Ray: 'However, to which extent architectural forms are [causally] responsible (or even to be [morally] blamed) for the behaviour of the inhabitants remains controversial. [...] But even if there were agreement on the factual question whether buildings can shape the life of people in such profound ways, there remains the questions of ideals and values: how do we evaluate any influence they may have on human behaviour? Again, it depends on the presupposed moral standards.' (2006, 1223). But it seems to me that *that* recognition pertains more to the factual, empirical accuracy on particular *instances* of their wider claim, and not the lack of conceptual clarity in how they put the claim itself forward.

¹¹⁹ See Illies, (2014, 11): 'auf der einen Seite gibt das den Erbauern, den Architekten und Bauherren eine umfassende Verantwortung dafür, wie sie durch Gebäude Menschen beeinflussen. Nicht zuletzt deswegen haben sich immer wieder Architekten berufen gefühlt, durch ein neues Bauen bessere Menschen zu formen (mit vielfach furchtbaren

I raised more general worries for both [5] and [6] above in §1.4.2, in discussing the authors' subscription to the *Intentionalist Prejudice* that, to me, seems to infect their discussion of [5] and [6]. I shall not rehearse these misgivings any further here, but instead move on to our next author.

§1.7 ANDREA SAUCHELLI

In this section I outline and critique a view due to Andrea Sauchelli.¹²⁰ Engaging Sauchelli's work has proven more instructive and fruitful to the development of my subsequent framework (in CHAPTER 2) than anyone else's. My appreciation for the need to develop a formal framework for the ethics of architecture arose directly from trying to put Sauchelli's informal claims inside such a framework (§1.7.1). Still, I have to disagree with his account on nearly all of its key points. That account focuses on what in §1.6 was category '[2] the morally acceptable or unacceptable nature of the function and use of a building'. What is important to Sauchelli's contribution is, (1) how he delineates 'function' in architecture, and (2) how he, in particular, thinks delineating function contributes substantively towards establishing an ethics of architecture. I think both points are problematic; problems with (1) naturally port over to and exacerbate problems we encounter under heading (2). That said, I want to reverse my presentation of these problem groups, so as to highlight how general problems with (2) arise quite independently from the wanting definition of 'function' in Sauchelli's account.

§1.7.1 SAUCHELLI ON ARCHITECTURE ETHICS

Sauchelli's opening question under (2) is to raise the issue as follows.

When considering the relation between architecture and morality, we may wonder how a building can possibly have a moral character or be the object of moral evaluation. (2012, 138)

This certainly invites the impression that Sauchelli commits himself to providing an adequate ethics of architecture, even if the '[r]ecent important contributions' in the 'vast' 'literature on the topic' he instantly references should give pause (138n.25), naming works by (i) Watkin, which does not engage the ethics of architecture (see above, n.40), (ii) Harries's which, as §1.2.1 argued, fails likewise, (iii) Wasserman et al.'s work, which is on the *professional ethics* of architecture (as, especially, all but *one* of their workbook case studies testify), and (iv) Warwick Fox's work, the ostensive purpose of which is precisely to embed the built environment in the context of the human and natural habitat to make the overall mesh amenable to moral appraisal. So either Sauchelli references work he does not *really* think aligns with his own purposes; or his own purpose by mounting the issues in the lines I just quoted, is as confused with issues *outside* the ethics of architecture as it is by his referenced authors. His subsequent presentation, I would allege, veers towards the latter.

Consider how, a page later, Sauchelli grounds his approach on the general idea to understand

the [a] ascription of mental qualities to a work of art if we see these ascriptions as [b] judgements about the action performed by the artist through her work. (2012, 139)

Folgen)? A much later footnote (Illies 2014, 19n.'xxx') references a two-page 1984 paper by Roger S. Ulrich on how (as the title promises), a '*View through a window may influence recovery from surgery*'. I suppose the emphasis is on the 'may'? As the CODA will point out, subsequent work by Ulrich and others has so far failed to establish consensus in the field whether alleged 'evidence-based design' (of which the 1984 paper is an early instance) carries conclusive weight. We certainly need not doubt psychophysical interactionism more broadly, but to concede this is one thing, to mount an ethics of architecture, ready to issue in *determinate moral judgments*, on so slender a basis an entirely different one. We face the same issue whenever (alleged) accumulation of *statistical evidence* for an incredibly broad, vague generalization is taken to license moral appraisals of *particular data points* within that evidence. The influence violent computer games are alleged to have on real life behaviour has so far not led to the banning of a single PC game.

¹²⁰ Sauchelli (2012).

This account, Sauchelli argues, opens up the trajectory of moral appraisal of architecture by focusing on the ‘mental qualities’ of buildings. Tellingly, the ‘ascription’ moves from properties attributed to works of art (*a*-attributions) to properties attributed to artists, specifically, their expressivist intentions (*b*-attributions). This shift from *a*- to *b*-attributions already telling moves the (to be) moral judgement away from the domain of buildings, and locates it firmly within the domain of human agency.

That Sauchelli ultimately aligns himself with such (as we have seen, wide-spread) strategies of re-description, instead of tackling the ethics of architecture head on, is immediately confirmed in the sequel.

[W]e can apply this [aforementioned] model to our moral judgements about works of art. In the case of architecture, we can re-describe [*a*] moral judgements on buildings as [*b*] evaluations of what is done through the work by the architect and all those who have taken part in the realisation of the construction and maintenance and can be meaningfully considered as responsible for it. This account can be expanded to include, as [*a*] moral ascriptions to buildings, [*b*] those acts performed by people that use, commissioned, or designed the building, in brief, all those who can be taken as responsible for the building’s function. (2012, 139)

The final clause indicates the entry point of Sauchelli’s (1) theory of function, but the more general gist of his strategy, in the paragraph just quoted, seems to be highly problematic irrespective of how ‘the building’s function’ is ultimately defined (and accounted for, in empirical instances). That is because the *slip* from *a*- to *b*-ascriptions is never quite explained – and the very phrase that introduces and defines the position on that point, ‘we can re-describe... as’, remains itself undefined. Are these supposed to be, (A) *logical equivalence* claims of two classes of statements? (B) *Synonymy* claims? (C) Are *a*-statements to be *reduced* to *b*-statements (if so, on what grounds)? (D) Are we to construe *a*-statements as effectively a fragment of language containing only *uninterpreted* sentences in an object language, with *interpreted* *b*-statements constituting the major explanatory wheels fuelling the semantic interpretation of that language fragment?

We never find out, because Sauchelli never tells us. We are simply told, categorically, that *b*-statements are what *a*-statements actually *mean*. Well, I do not think they do, unless, that is, we were to hold that *a*-statements do not *mean* all that much in the first place. But *what* they mean, we are never told here.

While I do not claim that (A)-(D) exhaust Sauchelli’s options here, I think of the ones under offer only (D) even comes close to give him what he needs. Technically, (D) amounts to the following, with ‘V’ and ‘*v*’ ranging either over the set {morally good, morally bad} or over graded notions of moral goodness,¹²¹

‘Building *b* has moral valency V’ is true iff *b*’s architect [or construction team] has expressive intentions *i* to realize function *f* in *b*, such that we can attach moral valency *v* to *i* in the ordered triplet $\langle b, f, i \rangle$.

As we can see here, there is not even a *whiff* of pretense that V-values (featuring in *a*-ascriptions) map onto *v*-values (featuring in *b*-ascriptions), since the very *recipient* of value ascription shifts from *b* to *i*, in direct violation of the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT introduced in §1.1 and discussed in §1.2.1. The building’s own (alleged) moral valency ‘V’ features only as a variable on the *uninterpreted* left hand side. In that sense, what this (outline of a) meaning theory offers us is a way to *interpret* sentences of the form ‘V(*b*)’. Such sentences do belong to an ethics of architecture, but before a theory is provided that tells us what *would* be required to treat them *at face value*, their treatment *at the hand of other frameworks* cannot conclusively be said to provide an ethics of architecture – insofar that requires a stance on content and justification.

In saying this, I do not mean to rob redescriptive and derivational strategies (and, indeed, our analysis of them) of all interest. However, as CHAPTER 1 emphasized from the get go, the very *contribution* such

¹²¹ For treating ‘is morally good’ as a scaling predicate like ‘is loud’, cf. the work on ‘degrees of rightness’ in Peterson (2013, 23-48).

strategies make towards a substantive ethics of architecture is left rather unclear, since by their very nature the *goal* these strategies serve is rendered somewhat opaque, and perhaps even out of reach. For, unless we already know *which* statements we want to redescribe, or which statements we want to have a derivation *of*, it is unclear which purpose such strategies serve, other than perhaps allowing subjects to voice certain sentences without ever leaving semantic ascent behind. That is, perhaps we really are to envisage redescriptionists and derivationists as voicing such statements only ever with figurative ‘scare quotes’ in place. If so, their efforts do not seem all that impressive, since the same is accomplished much quicker, and ‘theoretically cheaper’, by a fictionalist sentential prefix (‘It is fictionally the case that...’). If this is already deemed to afford us a substantive ethics of architecture, then I give up. But if an ethics of architecture is to provide a comprehensive, systematic explanation as to which moral appraisals of buildings are true, and why, then redescriptionism and derivationism owe us a more elaborate story. For neither theory tells us *what* it does, *why* it does it, which statements we should redescribe (and when and how). Neither theory seems to be all that much of a *theory* anyhow.

Given, then, how Sauchelli’s account does not really aspire to, much less accomplish in, giving us a theory of the *content* of moral appraisals of architecture – before reducing them to something else –, we may wonder if Sauchelli’s account is not, in the end, an *eliminativist* account of *a*-ascriptions as opposed to a *substantive* theory thereof.¹²² In metaethics (as we saw in §1.3), the latter would be regarded a realist account, with Sauchelli’s alternative being a particular strand of *anti*-realism for architecture moral property attributions, one that either comes close to *reductivist* accounts (similar to normative *naturalism*), and thus (C), or (as just stated) to *fictionalism*, and thus to (D).

In this context, it is of course striking that none of these meta-ethical anti-realist frameworks has really been applied to moral statements about buildings, in the manner §1.2.1 suggested. Nor shall I follow this up more fully myself here, since my preferred alternative effectively amounts to interpreting *a*-ascriptions of the logical form ‘(b)V’ *at face value*, and thus, without creeping redescriptive tendencies.

That Sauchelli ultimately regards such statements and ascriptions as not having any semantic content – or, at the very least, not any semantic content *worth saving* – is confirmed by further remarks in his paper. He writes,

According to this model of understanding moral judgements on buildings, the ethical appraisal of a work of architecture is thus not directed towards an inanimate object, but rather towards those acts performed by people through the building [...]. It is not the building itself that is morally reprehensible; it is the people who use/commissioned/designed or even constructed it (if not forced to do so).¹²³

¹²² I understand that those engaged in *revisionary semantics* may balk at my misgivings about their enterprise, but the point remains that *revisionism* of any sort (metaphysical or semantic) is a thankless task in philosophy unless the task is clearly related to a set of data which that revisionism seeks to accommodate and ‘live up to’. My objection that the data or (to use a now unfashionable word) ‘intuitions’ redescriptionism and rederivationism seek to accommodate or account for are never outlined, then, is not a categorical rejection of revisionism itself, but of its deployment in the ethics of architecture. Hence, while I acknowledge *properly motivated* revisionism as an adequate contender to (what I call) the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, it is ultimately unclear which explanatory purpose precisely redescriptionism and rederivationism serve, and if they and I even compete over the same spot. This, of course, is the one point on which I hope future work on such strategies points up, not just better ways of going about their task, but a substantive response as to what their task actually consists in.

¹²³ Sauchelli (2012, 140). He adds (*ibid.*), ‘In addition, a building can be evaluated as immoral in virtue of the morally wicked acts that brought about its construction (such as the use of slaves or forced labor).’ While a valid point, it obscures his overall project, which is to generalize the aforementioned theory of attributing moral qualities to artwork *via the expressivist* intentions of their originators (here, tied to function), where, as Sauchelli reminds us (2012, 139) how the feature his account homes in on ‘should not be understood as prior to the work or as the cause of some of the work’s features’. It appears to me his account should equally sharply demarcate the moral appraisal of building’s expressive/intentionalist features from an appraisal of building’s causal impact (on which see §1.6).

These lines expressly *deny* that the aim of his account is to provide even a *theory* of *a*-ascriptions. This means what readers were *really* meant to take away from the opening remark, ‘we may wonder how a building can possibly have a moral character or be the object of moral evaluation’ (2012, 138), is to realize that it was a rhetorical question. Buildings have no moral character, and they *cannot* be the object of moral evaluation. That is precisely what Sauchelli just said, in the last quote. If this is what a reader is meant to conclude initially, it certainly goes beyond Sauchelli’s immediate remarks in the sequel there.

When considering the relation between architecture and morality, we may wonder how a building can possibly have a moral character or be the object of moral evaluation. After all, a building is just an object; [P1] it does not have mental states and is not a rational agent. (Christine Korsgaard, for instance, argued that [P2] agency requires, at least, rationality. [P1] A building does not have a mind, so, strictly speaking, it cannot be rational. It can be an expression of rationality [on Korsgaard’s account], in the sense of being well-designed, but, in itself, it does not decide what to do.) As a result it may seem that [C1] moral judgements on buildings are based on a category mistake; in particular, attributing morality or [C2] responsibility to objects that cannot have any. [C3] However, at the same time, there are senses in which judging buildings morally, in certain qualified ways, seems reasonable and is used in common practice. (2012, 138 with note)

I have inserted indicators for premises and conclusions. P1 should remind us of §1.5, where I showed how it features in Spector’s argument for the conclusion C1 that buildings cannot be attributed moral features (recall his largely dismissive treatment of ‘virtuous buildings’). Sauchelli seems to add little to that argument, except to add an additional premise, P2, and to expand the argument, not just to the attribution of morality, but also of responsibility in C2. And that renders him vulnerable to the same considerations that §1.4 marshaled against *The Intentionalist Prejudice*.

Indeed, if we recall the opening rejoinder in §1.4 to those clinging to that prejudice on the basis of alleged linguistic intuitions, we can observe that something similar appears to be in the offing here. That is, Sauchelli’s discussion explicitly invokes a special gloss on ‘being moral’, one on which agency is required – as in, not ‘this is moral’, but ‘this is a good moral agent’, or ‘he is a good, moral person’. We already encountered this premise in Spector’s work (§1.5), and discussed (and rejected) it in relation to Illies and Ray; it makes a return here, at P1. Recall that the key agenda of the present work is *not* to issue in statements like ‘this building is moral’, or ‘this building is immoral’, but in less truncated moral evaluations of the sort, ‘this building is morally bad because...’. The reason for that is that our inclination, as ordinary speakers, is to connect ‘is moral’ to *conduct* in a strong sense that ‘is morally bad’ appears to lack. To run the two predicates together, then, obscures a vital point in this line of inquiry, and trades rhetorical effect for philosophical argument. If, of course, a watertight argument could be given that there *is* a valid inference pattern in the offing here – from ‘is morally bad’ to ‘is immoral’, for instance – the situation would change. But presently no such argument is in sight, and the claim that moral evaluatives are as anthropocentrically ‘tinged’ as talk of ‘moral things’, and that their application to buildings bespeaks of anthropomorphism, should be kept at bay.¹²⁴ (Similarly, Spector’s largely dismissive remarks on ‘virtuous buildings’ should not be accorded much philosophical weight.)

P1 apart, let us look at the other elements in Sauchelli’s argument. As I said, his ‘P1 should remind us of §1.5, where I showed how it features in Spector’s argument for the conclusion C1 that buildings cannot be attributed moral features. Sauchelli seems to add little to that argument, except to add an additional premise, P2, and to expand the argument, not just to the attribution of morality, but also of responsibility in C2.’ In all these regards, however, the gist of his remarks is very unclear, because all these are hedged with ‘it may seem that’ (prefixing C1) and, even the remarks that introduce what (we now know) is going to be his own account, C3, is not deemed an outright ‘reasonable’ way to judge buildings morally so, but

¹²⁴ Thanks to the Rotterdam philosophy faculty (to which parts of the present work were presented in May 2014) for raising questions to which the present paragraph is a response.

(again) only ‘seem[ingly]’ so. As before, Sauchelli leaves it entirely open whether or not we are *really* meant to treat his account as an account *of a*-ascriptions, or as a *replacement* of them.

The same elusiveness arises from Sauchelli’s later remarks which employ a similarly shifty language, of which more presently.

There are cases of immoral buildings wherein their immorality depends on their function [...]. The function can be moral or immoral (that is, the acts performed by people through the building can be either moral or immoral). (2012, 143)

As before, such hedging idioms as ‘that is’ make it really hard for readers to discern the ultimate intention of Sauchelli’s account (just how anti-realist is it?). For instance, is the second sentence here meant to explicate the first one, and if so how? And why does the very gloss the first half of the second sentence receives in its second half eliminate talk of a building’s function? How do we not simply erase all that has gone before, and end up with ‘acts performed by people through the building’, where ‘through’ is again in- and extensionally imprecise, and raises the same issues as before (as does the first sentence’s use of the verb ‘depends on’)? And, as before, the precise *nature* of the emerging position remains opaque – just where does it sit with respect to (A)-(D)? To the best of my knowledge, the article evades these questions, even when it comes close to facing them. For instance,

A possible objection to my argument is that it does not show that the aesthetic merit of a building is [ever] grounded on its *immorality*, but rather that it is grounded on the function of a such a work of architecture, whatever this function may be. (2012, 146, italics in original)

The sequel, however, addresses only the broader issue of how on Sauchelli’s account aesthetic and moral features really *are* connected, and the larger question still stands: what *does* the idiom of ‘is grounded on’ really mean? That the moral judgement *attaches* to the function of the building? If so, is the ascription of that function an *intrinsic* property of the building, or does it actually hold, not *of* the building itself but, as before, of the intentions and expectations and actions *of people* designing, constructing and inhabiting the building?

This is as good a place as any to move us to our other problem category – just what does Sauchelli mean by ‘function’? Before we move on to that (in §1.7.2), however, I want to close with a general worry that touches on this final point. Regardless of how we individuate the *content* of architectural functions, we need to raise the further issue of how that function is *related* to the architecture it is a function of. Whatever else we might say, it seems to me that architectural functions are fickle creatures, in that they are assigned, appropriated, and re-appropriated quite easily.¹²⁵ To retroactively smear buildings with the functions they find themselves complicit with, often unwittingly and (not that it matters) against the express intent of their designers, strikes me as dubious reasoning. Even if, as Sauchelli wants to uphold, buildings *express* their functions.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ For a striking example where a French *socialist housing* block became the site for the *interrogation* and *detainment* of prisoners by the Nazi occupation, see Priemus and Kroes (2008). Sauchelli (2012, 134) treats such cases – he discusses the use of deconsecrated churches as nightclubs – as deviant cases, where the ostensive (visual) function of a building collides or is even in ‘visual tension’ with its *de facto* function. But he solely discusses such cases in terms of how they interact (often negatively) with our *aesthetic* appreciation of them, not our moral appraisal of them. In any case, on the whole, repurposed buildings seem to pose one more general problem in Sauchelli’s account – what if the building is a church on Sunday, a nightclub on Tuesday, and a night shelter for gate crashers and the homeless who squat it whenever they can? Which ‘function’ then is the ‘right’ one, and why would ‘visual fit’ with that function (to the extent such a fit exists in the first place) dictate the choice, as Sauchelli appears to recommend?

¹²⁶ I doubt they always do. Functionalism in architecture, taken as a doctrine on the *expressive intent* and *achievements* of building covers at best a narrow slice of architectural history, even when confined to recent history. See §1.7.2.

To see this, compare the following. If I use a stone to smash the rear wheel of Billy's bike, and unprovokedly so, does that functional appropriation of the stone render *it* morally reprehensible? – And what is changed to your answer to that question if I now tell you that the stone featured (implausibly enough, but there we are) an engraving saying, 'I am to be used for smashing Billy's bicycle.?'

How does an object's function ever lead (or significantly help to lead) to *its* moral condemnation, and not that of the person assigning the object that function and that acting on (following through) that assignment?¹²⁷ Of course, if Sauchelli flat out rejects the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT not just with respect to buildings but also their functions, he can arguably escape the present charge. But the cost of that is that the 'moral relevance' of architectural functions is highly indirect. And that seems to pose a dilemma, comparable in structure to the one we encountered in §1.4.2. Either the moral 'relevance' of architectural function is so indirect as to undermine the moralization of buildings on even the *partial* basis of their function. Or its moral relevance is so strong that it over-generates.

Let me elaborate the dilemma's second arm. If an object's function would lead to *its* moral condemnation, the ensuing *moralization of objects* would over-generalize. Consider, in this regard, an instructive example by Jason Bridges. Bridges objects to people who have taken influential work by Saul Kripke to have established the inherent normativity of meaning, such that, if pressed to answer 'What is 2+2?' I *should* answer '4', given what '2' and '+' *mean*. As Bridges points out, there is no moral or otherwise normative obligation in place, not unless I (the addressee of the question) intend to answer sincerely, and wish to do so, and *intend* my answer to accord with the standard meanings of '2' and '+'. This distinction, says Bridges, is hardly pedantic, as it differentiates a categorical from a hypothetical imperative, where the latter's normativity arises *only* because of the agents' mental states, that is, desires and beliefs. What is more, the normativity, says Bridges, *attaches* to those desires and beliefs (and the statements they give rise to, in avowals or answers governed by them), as opposed to the standard meanings of '2' and '+'.

The example Bridges uses next to drive that lesson home, directly shows how his argument plays havoc with Sauchelli's account for the morality of (built) artifacts. For Bridges helpfully brings in a technical artifact to illustrate the point.

[Suppose Kripke had said,] 'Facts about what I mean determine what I ought to do contingent on my possession of particular aims desires or intentions.' This is hardly a noteworthy thesis, for facts about *anything* can determine what I ought to do contingent on my possession of particular aims, desires or intentions. If I want clearer vision, I ought to wear corrective lenses. Obviously the possibility of this kind of remark should not motivate a thesis of the normativity of optics.¹²⁸

By parity of reasoning, an account of moral statements about buildings where the normativity of these statements is ultimately and ineliminably grounded in the 'possession of particular aims, desires, or intentions', should not motivate a thesis of the normativity of architecture. It really is that simple.¹²⁹ If anything, Sauchelli's own framework, as outlined earlier in §1.5.1, assigns moral evaluatives *contingent* on such 'desires or intentions' in variable *i*. It thus falls flatly within the reach of Bridges' argument.

¹²⁷ It is as if one said, 'Look, we built concentration camps. Well, now that we have built them, we better use them.' I understand the morality of functional *assignments*, but how does that ever *relate to* a morality of the objects to which the functions are assigned? This is just what I find so puzzling in Sauchelli's overall account, as expressed *a propos* other features of his account earlier – it is just that this puzzlement now arises again.

¹²⁸ Bridges (2008, 3-4).

¹²⁹ The same argument undermines the claim that 'the ethical value of a work of architecture is without a doubt [] determined largely by its extrinsic or instrumental value, for this has a bearing on the conditions of life. How does the space or building function? In creating spaces where people interact and work, live and learn, are cared for or punished, does it promote certain values and ideals or bring certain possibilities to the foreground?' (Taylor and Levine 2011, 40) The authors never expand on 'bearing', 'function', or 'promote' in a philosophically adequate sense.

A final problem, before we turn to Sauchelli's account of functions, is this. It transpires from our discussion thus far that Sauchelli ultimately regards moral statements about architecture as not having any semantic content – or, at the very least, not any semantic content *worth saving*, that is, worth preserving or worth salvaging. This returns us to a general problem with anti-realist strategies we first encountered in §1.2. For the assumption is open to question – why is there *no* content, or at least, none 'worth salvaging'?

This question points to a key difficulty with anti-realist accounts in that they seem uncertain on where to demarcate what is and is not semantically 'worth salvaging' in a target group of moral statements (cf. §1.2). Given that anti-realist accounts do not preserve *all* semantic content, we can clearly rule out options (A) and (B) from above (p. 32) which presuppose semantic *equivalence*. More generally, as Blackburn (1986, 156) points out, the explanatory 'asymmetry' of *a*- to *b*-ascriptions – to wit, that the latter explain what the former *really* mean but not vice versa –,

is incompatible with the view that the content of the [*a*]-statements is identical with that of some suitable set of [*b*]-statements.

And, given how we do not have semantic equivalence, the question arises, 'what right has anyone to separate out the reduced content [in *b*-ascriptions] as the only true content of the original' sc. in *a*-ascriptions (ibid., 155)? For Blackburn, such problems point to the unsatisfactory nature of reductive programs in semantics (of, but not only, moral statements), specifically their allegation that they 'supposedly reveal[] the true or proper content of remarks in the [target] area.' (ibid. 151) This reminds us of the general problem we encountered in §1.2 – the relation of anti-realist accounts to what they are accounts *of* remains largely elusive. This makes appraising their success, *as* such accounts, problematic.

§1.7.2 SAUCHELLI ON FUNCTION IN ARCHITECTURE

We have already seen how Sauchelli's theory does not afford us an ethics of architecture, but at best an ethics of buildings users, commissions, constructors, and architects. I do however want to point out that the very delineation of architectural 'function' itself is highly problematic. I have no superior account to offer on that front – indeed, the (in my opinion) exceeding difficulty of offering an even *remotely satisfactory* account thereof is so far out of reach, in the present state of research (architectural and philosophical), that pinning one's hopes and ambitions on that notion seems a risky undertaking. There is more than one reason why the ethics of architecture I offer in later chapters focuses its major explanatory ambitions on firmness rather than functionality (on *firmitas* rather than *utilitas*, in Vitruvius' terms).

Speaking of, and here our trouble already begins, unlike Vitruvius who sought to demarcate the requirement of a building *as a house* to be well constructed (firmness) from the further functional requirements *specific to that building's use*, contemporary philosophers are happy to lump all such considerations into one undifferentiated category, 'functionality' (cf. §3.6.3). So even before we begin to dissect Sauchelli's own remarks on the matter, it may serve to illustrate how the very conceptual foundations of function-driven ethics of architecture is in disrepair, as can be easily gathered by looking at the field more widely. On the very point just mentioned – broad versus narrow function –, Larry Shiner mentions in passing how,

As Larry L. Ligo has shown, most architecture critics in the period between World War I and 1950 conceived of function as 'structural articulation, meaning either the articulation of materials and techniques or the revelation [sic] of the floor plan. After mid-century, there was a shift among critics to thinking of function in broader terms as practical, expressive, social, symbolic and

aesthetic. [...] The social, symbolic, ethical and aesthetic functions dominate the three main book length philosophical treatments of architecture published over the last few decades[.]¹³⁰

Among other things, philosophers' confidence to take Ligo's study as continuing to exert the authority on 'architectural function' it held when first published (if then) may increasingly look questionable (Ligo 1984). It is doubtful Ligo's efforts are adequately comprehensive and systematic as regards the use of 'function' in architecture; his book never ventured beyond functionalism as a term or doctrine or stance in the *pre-1920* eras of architecture when, as more recent research has shown, the foundations for functionalism in its various guises were laid. Ligo's book came out in 1984, pre-dating some of the most influential historical research on the topic recent decades have unearthed. It thus deserves a much needed update from sources like Wieser's (2005, 67-206) study.

The point is not purely historiographical (though it certainly is also that). It is that the very conceptual foundations of function-driven ethics of architecture look to be in need of revision. One symptom of just how unsatisfactory the debate right now is, is certainly recognized by even those who champion such an ethics – the semantic width of how philosophers use the term 'function' here. In that regard, Shiner says he cannot be bothered,

to beat the dead horse of 'functionalism' as often ascribed to various Modernist architects, partly because several of them were more concerned with 'structural functionalism' than with the issue of practical function that is my concern, and | partly because few of them denied the important place of aesthetic properties in design [that certain accounts of 'functionalism' entail].¹³¹

The origin of this view is in the (historically doubtful) allegation of Ligo's that,

The 'honest' revelation of structural methods on the surface design of a building is a characteristic which came to be associated with functionalism in the narrower sense. Some critical statements convey the implication that such a treatment is simply the logical outgrowth of the structure, as if in the formula 'structural technique = form;' the role of aesthetic preference and of artistic choice is minimal.¹³²

Observe how, in the wake of Shiner's passage, we now have 'functionalism' (legitimate usage by analytic philosophers), 'functionalism' (legitimate usage attributed to Modernist architects), and 'structural functionalism' which, we here learn, contrasts 'practical functionalism'.

Just where, as regards the latter two, sits Sauchelli's article? We never quite learn, but I suspect he mostly focuses on practical as opposed to structural functionalism, even though at one point he speaks of 'a structural need' (2012, 136) in passing, if that was simply one more facet for a building to have (or realize) a function.

Like Shiner and Ligo, Sauchelli treats 'functionality' as encompassing an incredibly broad varieties of, not just entries, but categories, beginning (a) by likening them to (Kendall Walton's) categories of works of art that Walton alleged should govern our *aesthetic* appraisal of them, like 'Modernist architecture' (Sauchelli 2012, 131), (b) being 'a tall office building' (2012, 132), (c) a repurposed, 'deconsecrated church' used as a nightclub whose function is to 'provide fun to the client and money to the owners' (2012, 132), and (d) the (inevitable) prison camps where Jews are detained and 'exterminated' (2012, *passim*).¹³³

¹³⁰ Shiner (2009, 80n.6). Shiner goes on to mention monographs by Scruton, Harries, and Winters.

¹³¹ Shiner (2009, 81-82n.12).

¹³² Ligo (1984, 22).

¹³³ To be fair, it seems '(a)' is a lead-in for Sauchelli's preferred instances of 'function'. Still, the absence of a strict definition of the latter never quite renders clear where the limits of the term's application lie when it comes to architecture. Some of Sauchelli's more recent work complicates the picture even further, owing to his lenient

Where, then, are the definitional constraints on ‘function’, for Sauchelli, that enables us to understand the drift of his position on the ethics of architecture? He begins with appropriate modesty, deferring to the authority of other authors (in that case, Shiner and others),

I will not discuss their general analysis of the concept of ‘proper function’ for buildings or artefacts. I will assume that it is somehow possible, even though it might be difficult to individuate and attribute one or more functions to various kinds of constructions in all cases. (2012, 132n.12; cf. further references *ibid.* 129n.2)

The emphasis in this puzzlement must lay on the semi-confident juxtaposition of ‘proper’ with ‘somehow’.¹³⁴

More confidence emerges from specific cases. Let me pick one I will discuss more fully in CHAPTER 10.

Mies Van der Rohe’s *Seagram Building* is [...] often regarded as elegant, because it displays only those features that are essential to functioning as a tall office building. (2012, 132)

So this, then, is an acceptable example (indeed, a clear instance) of a building’s ‘proper function’? So all the toilets, elevators, the foyer, façade design, the plaza – *all* these are there *exclusively* to serve the *Seagram*’s function of being a ‘tall office building’? If one were to say the toilets et al. are there to ‘facilitate a smooth work process’ that makes an office environment function? (And is that, by the way, the same function as that of being, not an office, but an office *building*, and a *tall* one at that?)¹³⁵ And does the surrounding urban scenery, quite beyond the plaza, and the smooth public transport from and to the site equally contribute to ‘that function’, or can we somehow – spatially or conceptually – delimit the extensional reach of that particular instance of the function? Moreover, is that a function *of* the building, or of the hybrid of the artifact with its (intended) users operating in it?¹³⁶

And even if we could settle such issues in principle, let alone in detail (neither is far from clear), we would still have two related difficulties – first, *who* is the normative authority on the ‘proper’ function of a building? The client, patron, user, builders, or architects?¹³⁷ Do we commensurate among these, or simply go for a disjunctivist account? If the latter, how is that even feasible for the built realization and moral appraisal of such a building, once the disjuncts begin to contradict one another? Second, and relatedly, other than the ‘who’ there is the question of setting a *temporal index* point for the designation of function – is it at the building’s inception (its gestation), or as it transpires during the built process, or later (re)appropriations by clients? These two matrices intersect (people and time indices), complicating the

epistemology of functional ascriptions to architecture. Given the way he discusses a Gehry museum in his (2013, 45-46 and 50), Sauchelli appears allow that the most uninformed opinions of (for instance) the typology of museums are allowed to operate in respectable readings of buildings. This compounds the errors about functional ascription to buildings in his (2012). However, I have not drawn on his (2013) paper more fully since it is unclear they belong to a continuous project, and since regarding them as so belonging may be uncharitable.

¹³⁴ I do not doubt that *some* of the literature referred to here has something to salvage, even if the current research does not invite optimism. For instance Shiner (2011, 35), discussing several competitors, with considerable hesitation settles on the proposal to ‘determine a building’s “proper function” by appealing to a “selected effects” concept modeled on evolutionary biology: the proper function of an artifact is some effect in the recent past that led it to satisfy a need in the marketplace, resulting in its continued production.’ This position, however, faces considerable difficulties, in light of Beth Preston’s work (e.g. Preston 2009).

¹³⁵ I suspect Sauchelli simply alludes to the *title* of Sullivan’s famous 1896 essay which introduced the infamous ‘form follows function’ slogan, sc. ‘The Tall Office Building artistically considered’, without inquiring deeper (into Sullivan’s own essay or elsewhere) what the function of the ‘tall office building’ actually *was*, and how it actually related to architectonic form in Sullivan’s own high rise buildings. The limitations of (reductively) functionalist interpretations of Sullivan’s written and built work are outlined in Weingarden (2009). I return to the *Seagram* in CHAPTER 10.

¹³⁶ See e.g. Maarten Franssen’s work on socio-technical systems, in Franssen et. al. (2011).

¹³⁷ See again §1.6.2 on the question on *who* gets to say *which* needs served by a building qualify as ‘essential for human well-being’, with discussion samples from *CLAM* proceedings.

entire process enormously. Sauchelli touches on these factors (2012, 134 and 145), but his cursory engagement of such questions acknowledges them as needing rather than receiving resolution.

In sum, the amount of issues surrounding the proper (sic) individuation of buildings' 'proper' function leaves it entirely unclear how that notion can figure, at this point, in a satisfactory ethics of architecture. If Sauchelli had provided a purely formal framework for how to proceed (which he has not, see §1.7.1), one that explains *at which point* the variable of a building's 'proper function' enters, and what type of a building property it is (to wit, is it a relational or intrinsic feature; if relational, relational to what, and so on), we could declare such difficulties are *external* to his larger concerns. But at this point, not only do we not know how to insert the variable, and relate it to the other entries in the evaluation triplets (from my suggested model in §1.7.1 above, $\langle b, f, i \rangle$) and, most importantly, to the *evaluation variable* itself (v), we could bracket such concerns. Rather, at this point we have no idea as to whether that variable is even well-founded, and does not present a place holder that *cannot* be filled. We have no guarantee that, once all the above difficulties are met, there is anything left we can *feed into* our evaluation model. That is why, ultimately, the absence of a satisfactory account of a building's 'proper function' debilitates the prospects of Sauchelli's intended research program as a whole. To all appearances, that program will crash before even getting off ground.

§1.8 CONCLUSION

This concludes my selective foray into contemporary attempts at an ethics of architecture. As we saw, no satisfactory treatment of moral statements of building is currently on offer that takes the semantic import of these statements at face value, and provides an adequately realist semantic analysis thereof. This is what this thesis aims to provide in the next chapters.

The current chapter's ultimate strategic goal has been to demonstrate that problems arise for what §1.1 called strategies of *redescription* or *derivation*, problems that render such strategies unsatisfactory at the level of their intended performance – to afford us an insight into moralizations of architecture. They are unsatisfactory because, given their current shape in the literature, they are both *poorly motivated* and *poorly defended*. They are poorly motivated because theories pursuing such strategies inadequately clarify the lacuna or desideratum such theories are meant to fill or satisfy in the first place; and they are poorly defended because the arguments supporting these theories are open to doubt and (at times) even rejection.

Appropriating a verdict Scott Soames has leveled at theoretic ambitions elsewhere in philosophy, we may conclude,

For these reasons, we cannot accept [certain authors'] proposal for justifying the claim that [redescriptive or derivational strategies] of the sort [they] favou[r] qualify as providing [an ethics of architecture]. This leaves us with no justification for the claim. There are two main possibilities to consider. Either there is no satisfactory justification for the claim, and it should be rejected, or the claim is correct, and has some other justifications we haven't considered.¹³⁸

While readers may doubt the adequacy of the theoretical framework I develop in the thesis's sequel, one that steers free of such strategies, I want readers to bear in mind that the alternative is currently infected by steep problems that, to my mind, look even worse. We here face the type of *stand off* that characterizes philosophy in many of its best researched areas, including the question of realism as regards 'the mental' and 'the moral' in the philosophy of mind and ethics. In both areas, there are good reasons to show that taking statements purporting to invoke mental or moral properties at face value is as problematic as *not*

¹³⁸ Soames (2003, 309). The inserted phrases 'redescriptive or derivational strategies' and 'an ethics of architecture' respectively replace Soames' 'truth theories' and 'theories of meaning'.

taking them at face value. Neither mental nor psychological anti-/realism are currently deemed to be free of problems – and that is what many debates in those areas are all *about*, and what keeps them alive.

I want to suggest that the ethics of architecture deserves to have an analogous, and analogously well argued, debate on its very foundation when it comes to the question of realism. As suggested earlier, without at least looking at the *conditions* that go into the formulation of a realist contender, we have no chance to develop the prerequisites of a fully functional ethics of architecture – one that develops an adequately spelled out *moral semantics* and *moral epistemology* of architecture and (as we shall see in the next chapter) *metaphysics* of architecture.

But to develop these conditions is one thing, and to argue that we have to subscribe to realism quite another. As indicated previously, and as CHAPTER 2 will clarify further, if we look to current ‘strategies’ in meta-ethics, anti-realist alternatives thrive because they have managed to *take on board* elements of realist strategies – not least, when it comes to explanatory power in the areas of semantics and epistemology. Blackburn’s little ‘road map’ reproduced in §1.3.2, fig. 1.1, provides a neat window into that situation. The ‘trick’ is to see how *far* one can go before parting company with the realist – from outright rejection of the target ‘area of commitments’, to gradual erosion of individual features in realist semantics and epistemology for those commitments, we face a host of carefully documented alternatives that broaden the playing field beyond a brute ‘realism *or* antirealism’ dichotomy. As we saw, such alternatives draw on ‘domain neutral’ features such as commitment to truth and content, that are certainly relevant to the ethics of architecture, and not just a ‘meta topic’ for global antirealism. If moral antirealism in architecture is to ever grow, it will likewise have to adopt at least certain of those features, some of which will be borrowed from the realist stance. Hence, even antirealists for a given target area of commitments must *inspect* the realist case at least *once*.

In that vein, then, I do not expect all readers having finished this thesis to think its effort at a realist ethics of architecture to be entirely compelling and free of problems, when my thesis constitutes the first sustained attempt ever at such an effort and certainly (it is hoped) not the best one ever to come. Rather, I hope readers take away from this thesis the following core claims.

- (1) We cannot and should not opt for an anti-realist ethics of architecture as a ‘default stance’.
- (2) A debate on moral realism in architecture is worth having.
- (3) To address and resolve that debate (2) more satisfactorily requires, not simply the *application* of extant philosophical models in meta-ethics to architecture, but a more profound philosophical understanding of architecture itself before such models can be applied to it. (Cf. §I.2 on ‘Architecture first’).

With the promises stacked sky high, it is time to unveil the framework to deliver them – and, where needed, begin to poke more concretely at the stacked up pieces that that framework comprises. It is time for constructive work. In short, it is time for CHAPTER 2.

CHAPTER 2

AN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE: THE FACE VALUE TREATMENT

I do not make it an inviolable principle to take seeming existential quantifications in ordinary language at their face value. But I do recognize a presumption in favour of taking sentences at their face value, unless (1) taking them at face value is known to lead to trouble, and (2) taking them some other way is known not to. – David Lewis¹³⁹

§2.1 INTRODUCTION

As established previously, there is a genuine philosophical need for a system that tell us what would be required to take moral statements about buildings at face value, and enables us to decide which of these statements, once interpreted thus, we can justifiably endorse. For only then can the broader project of developing an *ethics* of architecture get underway, requiring as it does a properly worked out *semantics* and *epistemology* for the statements in its target area. In short, to moralize architecture responsibly we require a theory that explains such issues of content and justification – and this chapter provides one.

This chapter outlines an ethics of architecture that takes moral statements about buildings *at face value*, with the locution of ‘taking (something) at face value’ having been made philosophically precise in §1.2.1. Having clarified what is required, CHAPTER 2 now tells us how it is accomplished. Thus, it provides a formal presentation of how such ‘FACE VALUE TREATMENT’ can be sustained. I construct a formal framework, an ‘ethics’ that enables to assess (for meaningfulness, cogency, and truth value) statements conjoining morally evaluative predicates to noun phrases picking out individual buildings.¹⁴⁰ As a result, this framework enables us to systematically test, on a case by case basis, which of these statements are meaningfully formed, and which of them are true. This does not issue in a wholesale vindication of such statements across the board; indeed, if it did, this would amount to a *reductio* of the framework, since the framework would vindicate both statements and their contradictions. Rather, the framework issues in vindicating a *select subset* of that class of statements and, as subsequent chapters demonstrate, licenses fewer, not more, of those statements than are customarily volunteered in the *architectural* literature, if also considerably more statements philosophers are typically willing to concede (namely, next to none, as per CHAPTER 1).

Some readers might find the presentation of this framework hard going, as it brings in philosophical technicalities from several sub-disciplines, including the philosophy of language, of mind, and meta-ethics. I therefore precede my presentation by an informal summary in §2.2 of the treatment’s major accomplishments and how these differ from what is currently available in the literature. The informal presentation out of the way, I proceed to a formal presentation of the framework and its defence. §2.2.1 opens with a capsule presentation of the model that elaborates its more cryptic preview in §1.2.1. As my model comes in ‘two steps’, and these raise separate questions, I deal with these in two separate sections, §2.3 and §2.4. Such specifics in place, §2.5 defends the merits of my model on a broader and more detailed level than §2.2 did. In §2.6 I turn to an issue that is pretty central to my model, but not a formal component of it: the assumption that talk of architectural normativity makes sense and can be

¹³⁹ Lewis (1973, 84).

¹⁴⁰ At this point, I eschew answers on how to expand the framework to apply to *sets* of buildings, city districts, or even entire urban regions. The analogous challenge to expand, by way of summation as it were, frameworks for the moral appraisal of individual *agents* (or, individual *actions* thereof) to the moral appraisal of *human collectives*, seems just as daunting. As we will learn by CHAPTER 9, there is a readily available way to expand CHAPTER 2’s framework to sets of building, but this requires us to forego thinking of the required expansion as one of ‘summation’.

philosophically substantiated. As part of that, I articulate a further assumption of my framework, one I expect many contemporary readers from architecture to resist: an essentialist stance on the term ‘architecture’ (§2.6). §2.7 continues in that vein, and seeks to address, if not always rebut, likely reservations from contemporary readers (now drawn equally from architecture and philosophy) over specifics in my overall account. The ultimate vindication of my framework however lies not in such argumentation over principled matters, but in putting it to work on specific cases. This is where later chapters come in, even if their work is necessarily preceded by material of a more foundational nature found in the present chapter. In many regards, CHAPTER 2 is the centre piece of the present work in that all subsequent chapters heavily rely on it.

Given that, it behooves me to provide a word of caution to readers on matter that return us to §2.1’s opening paragraph. The present work presupposes that *questions of content* and *questions of justification* have to be addressed jointly for either of them to be addressed adequately: developing a fully satisfactory ethics of architecture requires (as it contains) a *moral semantics* of architecture and a *moral epistemology* of architecture. But some readers may contest that presupposition, and will want to tease apart certain strands in my presentation that, as stated, will be closely run together. For, much in what follows inevitably touches not just on questions of semantics, epistemology, and ethics, but also on questions of metaphysics – specifically, which non-moral and moral properties buildings have. If some of these properties outrun our epistemic ability to verify their presence, that leaves moral statements about *buildings having these properties* beyond our epistemic reach. And that drives a wedge between content and justification.

Given the emphasis on *justifiable* moralizations of architecture in the present work however, such cases pose not so much a challenge to the current undertaking as a useful reminder of its limitations. Epistemically challenging cases alert us (and rightly so) of our responsibilities in moralizing buildings, and caution us to withdraw (or at least qualify) such moralizations when we lack the evidence to back them up – not because they are (verifiably) false, but because, given the lack of evidence, they are not justifiably accorded much weight in public decision making, historical writing on architecture, and elsewhere. I will more fully address such issues when I turn to a particular case of this nature in §C.3, and move us from there to an appeal to moralize architecture *responsibly*. By that point, the intervening chapters will have done much to fully explain the proper ‘calibration’ of the metaphysics, ethics, semantics, and epistemology of architecture. For instance, §2.5.1 will argue that we certainly stand no chance to address issues of justification in the absence of having tackled the issue of content first. *Some* connection between the two is inevitable then, even if future work may reveal the connection to be of a different variety than transpires in (and is defended in) the present work.¹⁴¹

§2.2 INFORMAL SUMMARY OF THE MODEL

The present ethics secures a FACE VALUE TREATMENT for moral appraisals of architecture, in that it (1) enables one to regard certain statements that report such appraisals as *literally true* and (2) accounts for what *justifies* one in voicing certain such statements. Both points restrict the class of statements to ‘certain’ ones, meaning, (3) that ethics divides the class of moral statements into (a) those which are demonstrably (and so, justifiably) true, (b) those which are demonstrably false, and (c) those which fall in between and on whom (pending further information) judgment should be suspended, (d) those which are *demonstrably* neither false nor true but meaningless, and which can likewise be rejected. Recognizing class (c) harkens to the Skeptic precept to ‘withhold assent’ from statements which are neither demonstrably true nor demonstrably false,¹⁴² and brings second-order clarity to statements that are first order undecided. Later chapters (especially CHAPTER 10) will look at empirical instances of (a) to (d).

The model accomplishes these things by unpacking the moral attribution into two separate steps (formally described in §2.2.1). First, it individuates buildings in terms of their compositional properties, and second,

¹⁴¹ For a helpful overview of the varieties of that ‘connection’, see Peacocke (1999, ch.1).

¹⁴² If a statement *p* is demonstrably false one should assent to its negation, ‘It is false that *p*.’ See Burnyeat (1984).

it provides a moral evaluation of the building on the basis of those properties. The end result has the morally evaluative property attach to the building whose compositional properties these are. Because the building earns that (moral) property in virtue of its own (compositional) properties, the account secures that the building itself is morally appraised, and not that a human agent (causally linked to the building's design, construction, or utilization) is. Hence, in contrast to redescriptionist tendencies (on which the moral evaluative property attaches to *something other than the building*) and eliminativist tendencies (on which the moral property attaches to *nothing at all*), the FACE VALUE TREATMENT preserves the predicative structure moral appraisals of buildings have at face value. It does so because it explains how that moral property is indeed a property *of the building*, and literally so.

If this result can be upheld (and I argue that it can), then the FACE VALUE TREATMENT is philosophically superior to its redescriptionist and eliminativist competitors because, firstly, it does not impugn 'massive error' to agents attributing moral properties to buildings, and secondly, it explains the *literal* content of statements hitherto deemed to have no such content. Even if one were to doubt that *commitment* to such content is ever *justified*, the fact that we can now *understand* statements expressing such content provides a clear theoretical advantage. The result enriches the field of the ethics of architecture itself by providing it with one more thing in need of explanation – namely, how these statements can have the content they do.

There is now more *to be explained*, instead of *to be explained away*. For instance, on most redescriptionist strategies, the moral appraisal attaches to human agents instrumentalizing or creating buildings, never to buildings themselves. If, in such contexts, readers are willing to concede that redescriptionism manages to 'preserve' the instrumental *value* of architecture at the expense of its non-instrumental (inherent) moral value, I must ask (1) what prevents us from likewise attributing instrumental value to artefacts like contact lenses and umbrellas, and (2) why that attribution should be dignified with the label 'an ethics of contact lenses'. (2) is a *reductio* in my view, and touches on the 'bogus' normativity of optics discussed in §1.4.1. Of course a theory of *such* a normativity is still a theory, but it does not seem to be an *ethics* of optics.

Some components required by the success of this model are only established in later chapters. Thus, for the model to work we need to know (Q1) *which* compositional properties precisely drive moral evaluation, and (Q2) *how* precisely such properties can themselves be morally evaluated. Under heading (Q1), beginning in CHAPTER 3 I argue that the values in the Vitruvian triad – in short, TRIAD VALUES – delineate (by constraining) such compositional properties directly or indirectly, and that this in turn answers (Q2). More precisely, the TRIAD VALUES of *being firm*, *being functional*, and *being aesthetically pleasing* are all values that, if earned by concrete buildings, enable us to evaluate these buildings either directly, once we regard the italicized properties *as thickly moral*, or indirectly, once we recognize that the attribution of TRIAD VALUES is itself *morally constrained*.¹⁴³ These in/direct avenues of evaluation are tackled in §§2.4-2.7.

The present chapter, then, does not yet answer questions (Q1) and (Q2), but it helps *place* future answers to them in the wider concerns of the present work – by outlining a formal framework that can deliver precise moral appraisals, once that model is substantiated by (*re*:Q1) concrete input as to the compositional properties of particular buildings and (*re*:Q2) appropriate 'linking conditionals' specifying that, if a building has such and such compositional properties, then it is to be morally evaluated as thus and so. *Every* chapter from CHAPTER 5 to CHAPTER 10 scrutinizes sample answers to these two questions, so (Q1) and (Q2) really set the agenda for the entire present work from here on.

The remainder of the chapter explains and defends that formal framework. For, if that framework were formally invalid, its specific substantiation tackled in later chapters would be a worthless toil.

¹⁴³ Recall from CHAPTER 1 that this is talk *of values* is only 'loosely speaking', and not in a strong, committal way.

§2.2.1 THE MODEL IN A NUTSHELL

Where the previous section provided an *informal* description of my ‘two step’ model, we now proceed to a formal presentation, elements of which are to be spelled out in §2.3 and following:

<i>Step 1</i>	Σ^*	‘ b is V ’ is true iff b has properties Π .
<i>Step 2</i>	LC	For any building x : if x has Π then x is V , as per \mathcal{M} .
<i>Conclusion</i>		b is V .

Step 1 and *Step 2* respectively pick up on questions (Q1) and (Q2) above, in that *Step 1* correlates compositional with moral properties, and *Step 2* provides an explanation and justification of why that correlation exists.¹⁴⁴ More precisely, *Step 1* links [1] the attribution of a moral value V to a particular building b to [2] the attribution of compositional properties Π (that is, a salient subset thereof) to b . *Step 2* links a generalization on [2] to [3] the attribution of a property that is flatly moral (V), underwritten by a moral account \mathcal{M} . The net result, reported in the *Conclusion*, is that V is applicable to b just as the original statement in Σ^* purported to be, thus preserving disquotation. §2.3 will deal with *Step 1*, to develop a semantic model called ‘ Σ^* ’, and §2.4 will deal with *Step 2*, to focus on what are here referred to as ‘linking conditionals’ (LC).

§2.3 FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL, *STEP 1*: THE SEMANTIC MODEL Σ^*

Earlier in §1.7.1, I provided a formalized version of Sauchelli’s model for the semantics of moral appraisals of buildings, a model that correlated ‘ a -attributions’, statements that attribute moral properties to works of art, to ‘ b -attributions’, statements that attribute moral properties to artists (specifically, their expressivist intentions). Although Sauchelli never suggested what type of correlation he had in mind, I suggested a reading on which we construe a -attributions as a fragment of language containing only *uninterpreted* sentences, with *interpreted* b -statements providing the meta-language enabling the semantic interpretation of that language fragment. To simplify, sentences in that language fragment all share the surface grammatical form ‘ $V(b)$ ’ representing ‘Building b has moral valency V ’, where ‘ V ’ ranges over either the set {morally good, morally bad} or graded notions of moral goodness where moral absolutes sit at the end points of a wider spectrum. (I shall later query whether we can allow for so-called ‘thick moral concepts’ in ‘ V ’-position, but that point requires philosophical caution.)

Sauchelli’s model, §1.7.1 suggested, was effectively a theory of meaning for the aforementioned language fragment such that,

Σ ‘Building b has moral valency V ’ is true iff b ’s architect has expressive intentions i to realize function f in b , such that we can attach moral valency v to i in the ordered triplet $\langle b, f, i \rangle$.

What in Σ matters most for current purposes is its explanatory *ambition* (as indicated on the biconditional’s left hand side) rather than how it *realizes* that ambition (on the right hand side, critiqued in §1.7.1). In this regard, Σ aspires to explanatory ambitions of truth-theoretic semantics for a fragment of language, where the right hand side ‘gives the meaning’ of the left hand side, indicates the conditions which (if met) suffice to truthfully assert the statement to the left (that is, particular instances of that sentence schema where

¹⁴⁴ There is one complication I mention so as to drop it right away: the biconditional in *Step 1* is not necessitated, and so does not cover counterfactuals. In particular, it takes no stance on what moral appraisal b should earn in circumstances where its compositional properties diverge from what they actually are. I thus leave for future work the question as to how much change in Π b tolerates before b changes its moral value V . My framework allows us, however, to morally appraise *another* building which bears the hypothetically changed set of properties Π , in a manner reminiscent of David Lewis’s counterpart theory in his (1968). That is, *Step 2* is rigid with respect to the Π variable, but my model leaves open which of Π are essential to any given b .

constants replace variables ‘ b ’ and ‘ V ’). Maybe stronger interpretative ambitions are at work – such that *understanding* the truth conditions suffices us to *understand* the statements these are truth conditions of – but I leave that aside. (CHAPTER 1 argued that this latter ambition, intended or not, cannot be met by Sauchelli.) That aside, I want to revise the present account in three regards.

First, I want to incorporate an aspect of the anti-realist reading of the *Euthyphro* biconditional presented in §1.3. There the claim was not how ordinary speakers *de facto* understand a certain class of statements (indicated on its left hand side), but how a philosophically enlightened thinker *ought* to understand such statements. As in anti-realism, and indeed on Sauchelli’s own account, there is an element of *revisionism* at work here, in that the explanation given on the right hand side does not lay claim to *descriptive accuracy*, but targets a philosophically defensible account of how to understand certain statements, in line with ordinary speakers’ inclination to take at least some of them on certain occasions at face value. Thus, in contrast to redescriptionism and related strategies, I want to show that core elements of what we, as ordinary speakers, take moral appraisals of buildings to convey are precisely correct – at least once we *supplement* our initial understanding with an appropriate semantic and metaphysical apparatus (in the meta-language). The resulting account preserves certain surface appearances of what we say about and in such cases. In particular, it preserves the predicative structure of the sentence schema ‘ $V(b)$ ’ at the level of *logical form*.¹⁴⁵ This is what §1.2.1 referred to as the DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT.

Furthermore, while we may single out *Step 2* as the clearest entry point for a *moral epistemology* of architecture in my model (see further §2.5.1), it is harder to squarely locate an entry point for a *moral semantics* of architecture in any single step of the overall model. Much rather, the joint upshot of *Steps 1-2* is that the DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT is met. Hence, in a condensed way one could say that on my proposal, the *moral semantics* of architecture is the disquotation schema itself:

‘ $V(b)$ ’ is true iff $V(b)$.

Because the proclamation that this is the moral semantics of architecture is supplemented by explanatory material in *Steps 1-2*, the proclamation can escape a charge of explanatory vacuity. In this, my framework parts company with a BRUTE DISQUOTATIONALISM about ‘ $V(b)$ ’ (§1.2.1 and §1.7) on which the above proclamation is interpreted under so-called deflationary accounts of the truth predicate, and any explanations of a metaphysically more substantive variety (of the truth-condition on the bi-conditional’s right hand side) are deliberately eschewed. As I observed in §1.2.1 and §1.7, this trades metaphysical parsimony for loss in explanatory power at a degree we should not accept – at least, not if the task is to develop a theory that helps us *understand* statements of the type ‘ $V(b)$ ’. (See further §2.4.2.)

Second, from here on we are interested in the philosophical ambition to provide a semantic model for statements that express moral property attributions to buildings, a model like Σ , except with a right hand side that departs from Sauchelli’s, given that my ambitions do not match his, and given that (as §1.7.1 showed) his right hand side is philosophically problematic. I shall call the first part of my overall model ‘ Σ^* ’, though as already explained, that part or step only yields a satisfactory semantics once it is conjoined to *Step 2*. To properly develop that part of my model, we need to clarify what goes into its left and right hand sides.

Third, as I argued in §1.7.1, Sauchelli’s Σ fails to observe the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT. Whatever virtues his theoretic model may have, explanatory and otherwise, providing an ethics of architecture is not among them. As a result, I depart from the move, which I attribute to him, of replacing the recipient of moral evaluation on the right hand side with something other than b . As proposed by my two step model, the direct recipient of moral appraisal is still b , insofar the moral appraisal \mathcal{M} directly pertains to b ’s intrinsic

¹⁴⁵ A statement’s ‘logical form’ renders perspicuous its entailment relations to other interpreted statements in the same language as that statement. As a result, sometimes a statement’s logical form will diverge widely from its surface grammatical form. For instance, the logical forms of ‘Jones buttered the bread quickly’ and ‘The present king of France is bald’ arguably feature ‘hidden’ existential quantification not legible from their surface grammatical form.

compositional properties Π . At this point, one could argue that my model does not morally evaluate buildings but their compositional properties, and that the resulting moral predication is second order. If (1) this argument goes through and, moreover, (2) a *literal* construal of moral appraisals of buildings has to construe them as first order predications, then the treatment afforded such appraisals by my two step model would fail to preserve face value appearances, and could itself be classified as redescriptivist (at least, up to a point). While I postpone full consideration of (1) and (2) to §2.4.2, there is one point to be made right away. On my model, a building b earns a moral evaluative ‘V’ by virtue of its own compositional properties Π . These properties are *intrinsic* to b in contrast to the expressive intentions i that figure in Sauchelli’s model’s right hand side. Because they are intrinsic to b , and do not hold of b conditional on (a) b standing in a relation to something else or (b) b ’s featuring as a ‘context’ or ‘instrument’ to a morally appraisable action or intent of some human agent(s) or other (see §I.1), a model based on Σ^* can satisfy the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT.

Admittedly, there is no *a priori* argument that intrinsicity of Π to b is *necessary* to meet the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, but it seems to me difficult to challenge that it *suffices* to meet it.¹⁴⁶ (\mathcal{M} raises a separate matter, sc. whether the *moral value* accruing to b from Π is instrumental or intrinsic to b . See further §2.5.1 and §7.5.1.) Now if, as §I.1 suggested, we can provide an account of architectonic functionality that makes buildings’ *functional properties* intrinsic to their bearer, *then* a functional-based ethics of architecture would meet the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT. But it is also fair to say that, by that point, we have left both the overall theory of Sauchelli behind (namely, Σ) and his (sketchy) individuation of ‘function’ in architecture by way of architects’ intentions, respectively discussed in §1.7.1 and §1.7.2.

§2.3.1 CLARIFYING THE LEFT HAND SIDE OF Σ^*

In all regards where I revise Sauchelli’s model, the simplification (in the left hand side of Σ^*) to one schema ‘V(b)’, however, is inessential for the larger argument; it is only introduced to focus discussion; the idea being that, if the project (to provide a satisfactory model) fails for §2.3’s aforementioned ‘language fragment’ built around instances of ‘V(b)’, it will fail for larger language fragments which that fragment is a proper part of.

The issue as to which natural language idioms (in English or German, say) can be used to form sentences that express moral property attributions to buildings is a separate matter; one I shall ignore for the most part. What matters is not the *lexical* repertoire or expressive potential of natural languages to form such sentences – but to assess claims voiced by the use of such (and similar) statements, *when made*, for their truth value and meaningfulness.

If the present work ignores a large class of idioms of service in the making of such claims, that would detract from the model’s value only if the model would fail to interpret such idioms correctly. And to assess the model’s failure in this and related matters, one would need not only an exhaustive enumeration of all such idioms i , but also a correct semantics s of such idioms including, minimally, an account of the logical form of i (or, where subsentential, ‘logical-form-contribution’) – in other words, a complete *lexicon* complemented by a complete *translation manual* of i into s ’s metalanguage. That task is left to those who wish to object to my model on such grounds. As for myself, I focus on a small, representative sampling of those idioms, to see if we can establish the model’s validity in this limited regard.

¹⁴⁶ In §9.3 I suggest that some relational/extrinsic *compositional* properties of buildings can figure in a model that obeys the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, provided they are properly related to a building’s *intrinsic* compositional properties. – Further, my arguments in CHAPTER 1 (as to why specific theories *fail* to meet the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT) are not driven by a priori reasoning either (but by reflecting on such theories case by case). Accordingly, I anticipate future debate on the content and applicability of the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT, indeed of its being well motivated at all.

§2.3.2 CLARIFYING THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF Σ^*

To simplify things further, I base my model on three predicates to figure (at various places) in the two step model outlined in §2.2.1, and elaborate the model from there (§2.4). The three predicates to be applied to some building *b* are ‘is firm’, ‘is functional’, and ‘is beautiful’. These predicates, I allege, introduce normative requirements that Vitruvius’ *De Architectura* levels at buildings (see CHAPTER 3), requirements or (loosely speaking) ‘values’ that for him express demands core requirements of *good architecture* in a sense to be specified in §2.6. I shall refer to these as TRIAD VALUES.

While discussion of Vitruvius’ own reasons for introducing these particular values is postponed until §3.3, what matters for the validity of my two step model is what *status* such values have. I clarify that status in §2.6, and for now focus on the proper way to *formally embed* the TRIAD VALUES in my two step model.

If other parts of the present work (like §1.7.2 and §3.8) focus on attributions of functionality and beauty to buildings, I will develop the following points with respect to firmness. However, given the RECIPROCITY THESIS to be developed in §3.3, the predication *to buildings* of any one of ‘is firm’, ‘is aesthetically pleasing’ and ‘is functional’ to yield a meaningful and true sentence, requires the predication of the respective other two predicates to the same building.¹⁴⁷ Accordingly, the claims I now go on to develop for ‘is firm’ have ramifications for the other two predicates of the Vitruvian triad. Moreover, the content of each of the three terms, I will argue, is context bound, in that the demands or requirements expressed by them allow for semantic variation across different contexts, and allow for different architecture briefs to realize them differently.¹⁴⁸ Finally, I want to suggest that the attribution of firmness (what Vitruvius calls *firmitas*) to a building can operate at three levels, or more precisely, figure in three types of statements (‘can’ but need not, in that in actual practice it rarely will, since speakers usually only intend the first sense of firmness).

TYPE 1 The attribution of the property *firmitas* can be devoid of ambitions to make moral statements of any kind, though on occasion it may be used to single out a (to some agents) factually desirable but otherwise non-normative property of buildings.

Compare: to an agent who wants her apples to be green, the apple’s colour is factually desirable to her. But that does not render the apple’s colour property, let alone colour properties more widely, into normative properties. (I touched on this point in §1.7.1, discussing the ‘bogus’ normativity of optics.) Or, compare how we may term an agent’s behaviour ‘aggressive’ without meaning to import (or explicitly cancel) a conversational implicature as to its moral undesirability.¹⁴⁹ It is one thing to describe a car driver as aggressive in traffic, another one to label (and perhaps even applaud) an ice hockey player for displaying similar behaviour traits on the ice rink. – Many subsequent chapters allocate to firmness this basic role in moral appraisals – firmness *constrains* the non-normative properties of buildings that license us to appraise them morally (see again §3.3). And, as indicated before, ‘values’ is intended as shorthand for ‘(core) required properties (or categories thereof)’, with these properties given in functional role and allowing for multiple realization by different project briefs and buildings); that said, the variable Π in *Steps* 1 and 2 denotes these realizers, not the functional role specifiers.

¹⁴⁷ See §3.3. In one sense, the three predicates are ‘reciprocally entangled’ in that the attribution of *architectural* beauty or functionality presupposes the building’s firmness. But the reverse dependence seems less intuitive – why should a building be firm *only if* it is also functional and pleasing? As §3.3 will argue, only a compositionally *properly arranged* building will be firm, and that type of arrangement cannot be defined or realized in the absence of functional and aesthetic concerns. This is obviously a highly revisionary semantics for ‘is firm’. But the point of the exercise never was to see how close it hews to ordinary English usage, but to avail us of a technical term for philosophical purposes.

¹⁴⁸ For a metaphysically more precise sense of the ‘realization’ of architectural properties, see my (2013), §4.6.

¹⁴⁹ Alternatively, its *conventional* implicature, depending on where one sits on the nature of thick moral concepts in general, and on attributions of aggression in particular. The example works on either view.

TYPE 2 The property *firmness* is attributed to a building on grounds that are themselves moral. Firmness thus figures in the moral appraisal of that building, not as grounds, but as the ‘surface level’ which such grounds attach to. Firmness is still morally inert, but now ‘morally engaged’.

In a TYPE 2 account, the morality of a building is contingent on something further, whereas in TYPE 3 (below) it is not so contingent (I explain this distinction more clearly in §2.4).

Suppose an architect wants his buildings to be firm and ‘stand up’ so as not to kill people. Aetiologically speaking, the building owes this property (its firmness) to the fact that its being endowed with the property is owed, at least in part, to normative, and even moral considerations. The *reason* for the building’s having the property it has is a normative one. Contrast the case where the reason is flatly prudential, in that the project brief required construction techniques of a certain sort. If so, the building realizes those techniques, but not out of regard to factors that need invoke factors beyond the brief, let alone moral factors. (If, however, ‘flatly prudential’ reasons figure in a larger *utilitarian* framework, the contrasting scenario here already falls under moral appraisal.)

At TYPE 2 (I shall say) firmness operates as an ‘entry point’ for moral considerations to attach to the composition and built construction of buildings. As in Σ above, we always have to ask if the end result means that such moral considerations parasitically attach to these buildings (in such scenarios) or properly only belong with the agents whose considerations they are.

TYPE 3 Firmness is a regulative ideal on (or featuring in) the moral appraisal of architecture.

Here, at last, the attribution of firmness is no longer a preliminary entry point or the output level to moral attribution proper (as on TYPE 2 and TYPE 1 accounts respectively). Rather, firmness operates analogous to attributions of ‘is rational’, and attributing it to buildings is to already make and not just presuppose (or segue into) a normative, and arguably moral, statement about a building. I return to this analogy of the constitutive (or ‘regulative’) ideal of firmness to that of rationality at §3.2 (and briefly at the close of §2.7). Moreover, ‘is firm’ may function to some degree analogous to a morally thick concept like ‘is violent’ (§1.1), in that it has not just a normative dimension that its correct attributions to instances (firm things) have to respect – it also has a factual or descriptive component that instances have to live up to. It is this factual component, which we will learn in CHAPTER 3 and 3*, that sets ‘architecture’ in an elevated sense apart from mere building. What, however, of the alleged normative dimension attached to firmness?

Type 3 predications appear to mount the strongest case for a moral dimension to architecture (that is, a properly selected subset of buildings), but they also appear hardest to substantiate philosophically. As we will see in §3.4.1.3 and beyond (specifically, §8.2 and CHAPTER 10), there is quite some architectural history behind seeing firmness as a notion shot through with normative, and (at least in part) moral, considerations. But history apart, the challenge is to regard particular instances of ‘*b* is a good building’ as instances of TYPE 3 statements at all. Arguably, the literature on how exactly to construe statements that surface in discussion of ‘good architecture’ is notoriously unclear, as I show in §2.6. Yet attention to such literature, I argue in §2.6, can also help us to explain TYPE 3 attributions and defend their cogency.

That said, a more thorough discussion of firmness attributions and their types will only emerge in CHAPTERS 3 and following. What matters for now is that (1.) attributions of firmness can become ‘ethically relevant’ in more sense than one – namely, in two, as indicated above in my talk of TYPES – and that (2.) a formal model for an ethics of architecture need not ground its (explanatory) *right hand side* in the type of outright moralization that the (‘to be explained’) *left hand side* invokes (in my simplified sentence schema ‘ $V(b)$ ’). Instead, I propose we both widen the left and right hand sides of candidate properties to feature in the LINKING CONDITIONAL, with firmness operating on both its left and right hand sides,

respectively in line with the property's TYPE 2 and TYPE 3 attribution. My contention, then, to be tested against the remainder of the thesis work, is as follows.

CORE CLAIM Firmness operates as a core value for architecture in several regards (or 'types'), in a way that provides illumination and constraints on any legitimate ethics of architecture.

That CORE CLAIM too, has not been argued for so far, and I doubt an *a priori* argument could be offered for it, at this stage or later. Rather, I will look in great detail in the formative role firmness plays as a regulative and explanatory value in an 'ethics of architecture' model, and the core claim of (to restate),

CORE CLAIM' The concept of firmness is necessary for a satisfactory ethics of architecture, and for a moral appraisal of buildings (and, for buildings to qualify as suitably moral, in the categorical sense 'moral at all, yes or no?' and the positive sense of 'morally praiseworthy'),

only emerges once we have seen (1) in great detail what this means for concrete architects and their works, where 'works' includes both the documented thought of architects in writing, and their built works, of the variety discussed in CHAPTERS 6 and 8 to 10, and (2) additional constraints on Π that emerge from the writings of Vitruvius – see specifically §3.3-§3.4 and §3.6, which revisit firmness as a 'core value'.

Summarizing, firmness is to play an explanatory role on *both* the left and right hand sides of *Step 1* (Σ^*) in the revised model. Firmness is to play a central role in the resulting model, in its being a moral and compositional *value*. Point (1.) is, for now, certainly the most pressing, in that 'ethically relevant' stands in need of elucidation.

§2.4-§2.7 now proceed to establish the indirect and direct moral relevance of the TRIAD VALUES, with a philosophical defense of their content left to §2.7 and CHAPTER 3. And as before, the final vindication of my model and its subscription to the TRIAD VALUES arises from subsequent chapters taken as a whole.

§2.4 FORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL, *STEP 2*: THE LINKING CONDITIONAL

§2.3.2.1 singled out three issues regarding model Σ^* awaiting elucidation, foremost the need to explain what it means for attributions of firmness to be(come) 'ethically relevant'. I also said how 'is firm' can figure in a variety of predicative uses, and thus become 'morally relevant' in more than one way.

To address these concerns, it is important to understand, first, that firmness is of itself neither a *clearly normative* or *clearly non-normative* property; for if it were, its usage in respectively non- and normative contexts would amount to an error, which I am uncertain is the case. It is better, then, to say that firmness, other than permitting of contextual variation depending on which building we are talking about, also allows contextual variation depending on how (TYPE 1-3) its cognate predicate is employed. Alternatively, and this is an option to be explored later, firmness is a *thick moral concept* with a descriptive and normative component, and TYPE 1 and TYPE 3 predications, so far from misapplying the term, simply figure on respectively different components, without thereby erasing or negating the other component.¹⁵⁰

Even so, many questions regarding the Vitruvian values picked out by the three sample predicates – firmness, beauty, and functionality – remain. What *makes* them values – moreover, values of the particular variety they are? What is that variety? What variety of normativity is 'architectural normativity'? Are the Vitruvian values analytically or normatively reducible to something else yet? And does our answer to these questions totally avoid bringing in an ethics of humans, as CHAPTER 1 at times suggested?

¹⁵⁰ This (bipartite) way of thinking about thick moral concepts is challenged by Blackburn (2013).

To help answer such tricky questions, it is necessary to supplement, as §2.2.1 already explained, our model Σ^* with a second step that explains (and justifies) moral appraisal of specific buildings – where the second step is what §2.2. called the ‘LINKING CONDITIONAL’, or LC for short. Recall from §2.2.1 the structure of the overall model:

<i>Step 1</i>	Σ^*	‘ <i>b</i> is <i>V</i> ’ is true iff <i>b</i> has properties Π .
<i>Step 2</i>	LC	For any building <i>x</i> : $\Pi(x) \rightarrow V(x)$, as per moral account \mathcal{M} .
<i>Conclusion</i>		<i>b</i> is <i>V</i> .

The net result of this model is to correlate predicates of moral appraisal ‘*V*’ to properties that are clearly moral, or allow (ground) moral appraisal, sc. \mathcal{M} . But in contrast to other writers in the field (CHAPTER 1) this correlation is not simply declared to be there by fiat, or in need of being analysed away, but is accomplished by a ‘middle man’, the building’s own compositional properties Π . Given the centrality of Π , which relates to the Vitruvian triad and (especially) firmness and tectonic composition, readers will understand why subsequent chapters look so heavily into the analysis of particular buildings and the analysis, submitted by architects and architecture theorists, into a proper delineation of Π .

Talk of a ‘middle man’ may remind readers of the usage of a ‘middle term’ in Aristotelian syllogistic. That is intentional. For, as in that syllogistic, the conclusion permits a brief statement (as above), or a longer one, on which ‘*b* is *V* insofar it is Π ’, a statement which clarifies that, if *b* did not have Π , it would not earn *V* (as per \mathcal{M}) either.¹⁵¹ It is this qualification that sets my account apart from the rival views outlined in CHAPTER 1, a regard in which it is crucial that the left hand side of LC is used, not mentioned. In order words, LC is a *correlation claim*, not a reductive semantic account of what it means for buildings to have certain properties.¹⁵²

§2.4.1 RESTRICTIONS ON Π

As just stated, if *b* did not have Π , it would not earn *V* (as per \mathcal{M}) either. But for that qualifying clause to be effectively in place and distance my model from rival views, my model must not *individuate* Π in a manner that makes its attribution to *b* contingent on human intentionality and subjectivity, as it would on response-dependent accounts of the variety discussed in §1.3. Rather, the individuation of Π follows strictures Alan Goldman made about aesthetic properties more narrowly, and that is, give a ‘realist’ account of Π in the following sense.

A property is real in the relevant sense if the truth of its ascription is independent of the subject’s evidence and system of beliefs. It is possible for one to make an error about the presence of a real property despite its appearing to be present [...]. If aesthetic qualities are real properties of objects, then there must be [or, more precisely, it must be possible for there to be] some distinction between how they appear and how they are.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ I owe this point to Charles (2000). The syllogistic structure of my overall model also seems close to what Charles calls Aristotle’s (*Posterior Analytic* B.10’s) ‘Three Stage View’, and to de Clercq’s ‘(a’)-(b’)-(c’)’ account of *being well proportioned* to be discussed in §2.6.1. On Charles’ (2000, 22-43) ‘Three Stage View’, Stage 1 specifies the *meaning* of a term (‘thunder signifies *noise in the clouds*’), Stage 2 establishes the *existence* of the term’s denotation by unpacking the *meaning* into a predication (‘*noise* holds of *clouds*’) that, if true, secures that existence; and Stage 3 gives an account that *justifies* the truth of that predication by a middle term (*fire being quenched*, which is the source of noise, and which occurs in the clouds).

¹⁵² If ‘*x* is Π ’ is mentioned rather than used in LC, we could arguably ‘cut out the middle man’ to reach our conclusion. See §4.6 of my ‘Architects on Value’ (2013), particularly the discussion of McDowell.

¹⁵³ Goldman (1995, 26-27). For discussion, see Bender (2006).

I thus turn, in CHAPTER 3, to views which look upon the Vitruvian values claimed by me to inform Π , as ‘response dependent’ in the sense my model needs to avoid to sufficiently distance it from its redescriptionist competitors like Sauchelli. This neither presupposes, however, that we follow a *non-* rather than *naturalist* variety of property realism for Π , nor any particular defense of aesthetic property realism’s correctness (see §11.1).¹⁵⁴ It simply requires that we uphold the same realist strictures upheld for moral properties earlier. To repeat a quote given in §1.3.1, with special emphasis on clause (iii):

Moral realism is the view that (i) moral judgments are beliefs that are meant to describe the way things really are; (ii) some of these beliefs are true, and (iii) moral judgments are made true in some way other than by virtue of the attitudes taken toward their content by any actual or idealized human agent.¹⁵⁵

§2.4.2 RESTRICTIONS ON \mathcal{M} (AND V)

Nor, further, does commitment to the *rejection* of response dependent individuation of Π infect how we approach the right hand side of LC. But there are some constraints at work here.

First, as far as the content of \mathcal{M} is concerned, we have three possibilities (possibilities that will subsequently impact the semantic range of ‘V’).¹⁵⁶

- (1) The content of \mathcal{M} refers exclusively to properties (actions, goals) of people.
- (2) The content of \mathcal{M} refers exclusively and essentially to properties of buildings which are partly but not squarely moral.
- (3) The content of \mathcal{M} refers both to properties of people and properties of buildings.

Option (3) can be further specified through constraints on the properties of buildings involved, sc.

- (3i) The properties of buildings involved in (3) are all non-moral properties.
- (3ii) The properties of buildings involved in (3) are partly but not squarely moral.

Both (2) and (3ii) can then be further specified through the relation between the properties of buildings and the properties of people: (2*a*) and (3ii*a*), the partly but not squarely moral properties of buildings are independent of properties of people; (2*b*) and (3ii*b*) the partly but not squarely moral properties of buildings are (partly) dependent on properties of people. Option (3ii) for instance might allow to construe ‘is firm’ as a thick moral concept, such that ‘*b* is firm’ can figure in \mathcal{M} itself (see §2.3.2 on TYPE 3).

Second, given the logical hierarchy of V (grounded in \mathcal{M}), we again (have) three possibilities. As observed earlier, the linking conditional in *Step 2* permits three readings – (A) a first order predication (as favoured here), (B) a second order predication, or (C) something harder to classify, apparently in between these two. Following (B) one could rewrite *Step 2* as a second order predication ‘ Π is V’. Following (C) requires not so much rewriting LC as to understand it in a manner that departs from (A). More precisely, my preferred phrasing for LC, ‘If any building has properties Π , then it is morally appraisable V *as per* \mathcal{M} ’, could in principle allow for readings of ‘*as per*’ that leave open whether V attaches to *b* directly or only

¹⁵⁴ Among others, see Zangwill (2006, 79) who argues from our *ascriptive practices* to their *metaphysical presuppositions*, to conclude ‘that folk aesthetics is thus realist’. As an argument for the correctness of metaphysical (aesthetic) realism itself, this will not do, given the availability of quasi-realism. Quasi-realism accommodates realist ascriptive practices in a metaphysically antirealist framework (cf. *ibid.*, 74-5).

¹⁵⁵ Shafer-Landau (2007, 62).

¹⁵⁶ The following material until ‘Second’ is taken nearly verbatim from Maarten Franssen (p.c., 21 March 2014).

indirectly (namely, via Π). (Quite apart from that possibility, there is of course the wider question where and when the imprecise locution ‘as per’ receives an adequate gloss to lend it philosophical precision. I return to this in §2.5, but a fully satisfactory answer will only emerge from concrete cases employing LC in later chapters, specifically CHAPTERS 9 and 10.)

Which of these possibilities are correct?

Any will do, as long as the theoretic ambitions of the FACE VALUE TREATMENT are preserved – and that is, to preserve the predicative structure that moral appraisals of buildings have on the face of them, and to avoid the explanatory account to relapse into redescriptionist tendencies, such that the moral features of buildings are all ‘owed to’ moral features of humans, and ‘owed’ in a way enabling reductive correlation of the former to the latter type of features. For instance, suppose we implement (B), and argue that my model does not morally evaluate buildings but their compositional properties (Π is V). The resulting moral predication reported in the *Conclusion* of the two-step model would also be second order. If one were then to demand that a *literal* construal of moral appraisals of buildings has to construe them as first order predications, then the treatment afforded such appraisals here would fail to preserve face value appearances, and we would have to rule out (B). So whatever we do to fine-tune the two step model has to obey §1.2.1’s ADEQUACY CONSTRAINTS.

If the requirements generated by the FACE VALUE TREATMENT leave our options among (1) to (3) and (A) to (C) still fairly open, these requirements do come at a price. Given my commitment to property realism and anti-reductionism, my model eschews semantic reduction and ontological reduction, whereas a redescriptionist account like Sauchelli’s seems to offer both.¹⁵⁷ Sauchelli’s model, as it dispenses with normative properties of buildings and only recognizes features ‘of buildings’ realized by and through agents’ intentions, is the ontologically more parsimonious and naturalistically more acceptable, the latter on the proviso that agent intentions can be naturalized. As elsewhere in philosophy, added explanatory power comes at the cost of added ontological (and what Quine called, ‘ideological’) commitments, and future work will need to assess the comparative merits of where Sauchelli and I prefer to settle the trade off between these two factors. As in CHAPTER 1, my goal is to argue for a specific position within this debate, but my larger aim is to enrich the field of the ethics of architecture with added options and enable debate on their comparative merits. For instance, it should be clear how the following two positions are equally inferior, at least in explanatory power, to Sauchelli’s and my own.

ONTOLOGICAL NIHILISM All instances of ‘ $V(b)$ ’ are meaningless or false since there is no such thing as b .

I have in mind here a stripe of ontological eliminativism that dispenses with buildings entirely.¹⁵⁸ If there is no b , then predicative statements about b like ‘ $V(b)$ ’ are either meaningless or false, depending on one’s view of presupposition failure.¹⁵⁹ Or take this view,

BRUTE DISQUOTATIONALISM ‘ $V(b)$ ’ is true iff V is true of b .

Brute disquotationalism is usually favoured by so-called minimalist or deflationary accounts of a certain class of statements, accounts that evade substantive accounts of what those statements require to be true; for instance, such accounts typically evade factualist accounts of truth conditions for those statements.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ See Kim (1998, 30-38) on the difference, and absence of inter-entailment, between *logical* behaviourism, a revisionist thesis on the (correct) use of psychological expressions, and *ontological* behaviorism, a thesis about which mental states or facts there are (and what they are).

¹⁵⁸ See for instance van Inwagen (1994), or Unger (1979).

¹⁵⁹ See von Fintel (2004).

¹⁶⁰ See Field (1994/2001).

Going ‘full on’ disquotational *and* invoking a factulist semantics would incur the worst of both worlds – maximal ontological commitments, and minimal explanatory illumination.

Finally, as a more substantive point about \mathcal{M} , nothing so far precludes it to contain the attribution of moral values V to humans H to show up in the right hand side of LC. If so, the correlation of ‘ $V(b)$ ’ with ‘ $V(H)$ ’ is now rendered clear, given a clear explanation, where in Sauchelli’s account it remained a *fiat*. That, too, is an advantage my account has over the redescriptionist’s. On my take, if b is deemed to be morally good or bad on grounds Π and \mathcal{M} , I take this to have the consequence that any agents’ H complicity in the design and built realization of b is itself *prima facie* moral or immoral.¹⁶¹ As before, such cases establish a *connection* of the ethics of architects H to the ethics of architecture b , with the explanatory priority assigned to the latter.¹⁶² And as before, we have to beware oversimplified or hasty reasoning to forge such a ‘connection’, as we saw in §1.3 on ‘reverse entailment’. I return to the larger issues here shortly, when §2.5.1 turns to what will be called claim ‘ C ’. First I will briefly mention two methodological problems that my model incurs in *Step 2*.

§2.4.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE LINKING CONDITIONAL

The sole point of my model is to afford a moralization of a building on the basis of its compositional properties – and that means, of *any* building sharing those properties. But this incurs two problems noted in the literature, not for the *moral* appraisal of artworks, but their aesthetic appraisal. More specifically, a step such as my linking conditional (LC) incurs (i) a commitment to generalism, as opposed to particularism, and (ii) a commitment to the availability of a value-free (and more particularly, ‘not yet moralized’) description of Π . Both can be challenged. James Shelley writes of Arnold Isenberg,

...in appealing to the descriptive features of a work we are not acknowledging tacit appeal to principles linking those to aesthetic value [...]. Isenberg, as noted, is a particularist with respect to the distinction between descriptions and verdicts, i.e., he maintains that there are no principles by which we may infer from value-neutral descriptions of works [of art] to judgements of their overall [? artistic? aesthetic?] value.¹⁶³

In that my framework, at *Step 2*, relies on linking conditional that *universally* quantifies over Π and V , it relies on the type of principalism or generalism that Frank Sibley would reject.

On top of that, regardless of how the inference from ‘ $\Pi(x)$ ’ to ‘ $V(x)$ ’ is drawn – that is, regardless of whether it is drawn on particularist or generalist grounds – Sibley would contest the individuation of Π as a ‘value neutral description’ of the building in question.

[A] fully explicit, adequate set of reasons for aesthetic evaluation must itself describe the work in terms that have an evaluative component. In addition to considerations I previously sketched, my sympathy with Sibley [on this point] rests on my acquaintance with what critics have written. I have never encountered a cogent critical argument in support of an evaluation that did not rely, almost always quite explicitly, on tendentious characterizations of the [art]work.¹⁶⁴

I concede that similar issues frequently arise in architectural criticism (see Chapter 9, n.2). But strictly speaking, this observation is compatible with the (non-generalist) facet of *Step 2*, since I do not suppose that Π is a value-neutral when it comes to *aesthetic* value – after all, Π is constrained by the RECIPROCITY

¹⁶¹ I say ‘*prima facie*’ because context specific countervailing facts (of for instance a consequentialist nature) may on occasion outweigh moral considerations arising from \mathcal{M} . While I do not address this possibility directly, my work indirectly helps assess \mathcal{M} ’s *comparative* ‘moral weight’ (in such contexts) by specifying its *inherent* moral weight.

¹⁶² §2.6 discusses a related point by Christine Korsgaard. For her, ‘constitutive standards’ govern activities like building a house and exert normative constraints on both the activity and its product.

¹⁶³ Shelley (2013, §2.2), a text I return to in §7.5.1.

¹⁶⁴ Milles (1998, 57-58n.12), discussing Sibley’s 1959 ‘Aesthetic Concepts’.

THESIS, which is a thesis on buildings being *aesthetically pleasing*. *Step 2* is only threatened by an *analogue* of Sibley’s reservation for *moral* value, not aesthetic value. Hence, as before, we can ignore a Sibley’ian objection to my *Step 2* unless (and until) critics manage to develop its specifically moral analogue.

§2.5 THE MERITS OF THE TWO-STEP MODEL

The merits of my own model, I would allege, are borne out by its evaluative power – and that is a point that needs to be demonstrated on a case by case basis, rather than (purely) *a priori* argumentation. In that vein, let us look at two sample syllogisms, the latter being an example lifted from later chapters (indeed, later chapters are precisely there to provide this ‘case by case’ demonstration). I draw attention to their parallels in structure particularly to highlight that what we get, in Syllogism V(*b*), is a moral appraisal of a human agent *b* (not of someone or something else), and in Syllogism V(*b*) (a sample syllogism of my overall model, with *Steps 1* and *2* in place) unequivocally providing a moral appraisal of a building, and not of something or someone else.

Syllogism V(*b*):

‘Sulla [*b*] is morally bad’ is true iff *b* has committed actions Θ under intention *i*.
 Actions Θ committed under intention *i* are morally bad, given moral theory \mathcal{P} .
 Hence, *b* is morally bad (insofar *b* has committed Θ under *i* which are bad).

Syllogism V(*b*):

‘Mies’s *Seagram* building [*b*] is morally bad’ is true iff *b* has compositional properties Π .
 Any building that has properties Π is morally bad, given moral account \mathcal{M} .
 Hence, *b* is morally bad (insofar *b* has Π).

This model is not, by virtue of its sheer existence, a *validation* of the target sentence, but a tool for its *appraisal*. In CHAPTER 10 I will look at various moral accounts \mathcal{M} that researchers have volunteered to substantiate their moral appraisal of the *Seagram* and other buildings by Mies van der Rohe. Indeed, one larger goal of my work is entirely interdisciplinary, in that it seeks to provide an entry point for substantial research by architecture historians and critics on particular buildings. Such work is *directly relevant* to applied ethics, on the proviso that such works’ tacit or explicit moralizations can be validated (or replaced by one that can). The point of my formal model is to evaluate how, if at all, and where such accounts \mathcal{M} relate to a building’s compositional properties, and whether these compositional properties are as value laden and morally tinged as certain writers allege.

The interest of my model, then, entirely depends on which particular accounts we come across in the literature and can come up with ourselves. That is why my model is an assessment tool of *statements* that express claims of moral appraisal of buildings, and not simply a vindication of moral property attribution to buildings. And while the ‘interest’ in particular cases depends very much on how the triplet $\langle b, \Pi, \mathcal{M} \rangle$ is spelled out in detail, my main argument in putting the model forward is to claim that without such substantiation any moral claim ‘*b* is *V*’ cannot be substantiated, and cannot be evaluated for cogency. So, in the absence of such input, ‘*b* is *V*’ claims cannot even be seriously entertained – for they amount to a statement comparable to, ‘Sulla is an evil man, but I cannot tell you why’ (or, ‘but I cannot tell you on what *grounds* I make that statement’). More than that, my model is more than a simple demand for *some* substantiation or other. It is very specific in the *type* of grounds it considers legitimate. Thus, the claim that the moral appraisal of buildings operates via their compositional properties – and particularly those that relate to their firmness – is a substantive one, is (what I above called) my CORE CLAIM.

§2.5.1 MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF ARCHITECTURE

Recall from §2.1 that the present work runs together issues of content and justification. Since we have heard a lot about content and much less about justification so far, it is time to rectify the matter.

My two-step model adheres to a so-called ‘internalist’ understanding of epistemic justification. On that view, possession of knowledge requires the *possession of good reasons* where, moreover, such reasons are epistemically available to (or ‘accessible by’) the knowing subject upon reflection.¹⁶⁵ My two-step model (§2.2.) is about the provision and nature of such reasons, if nothing else. That is why §2.3 said that ‘we may single out *Step 2* as the clearest entry point for a *moral epistemology* of architecture within my model’. If §2.1 pointed out general criticism my model attracts by running issues of content and justification together, additional points of criticism accrue from my subscription to this particular view of epistemic justification. More precisely, critics could object on one of two grounds here. One, they could be externalists, and thus reject the presence of reasons as (always) required for justifiably held beliefs. This would, as before, drive a wedge of sorts between issues of content and (now) *my* epistemology, since the externalist is going to reject this claim of mine:

J The reason proffered by *Step 2* provides a justification for the content specified in (mostly) *Step 1*.

The externalist and I are agreed that J is only true if ‘justification’ is glossed as ‘internalist justification’. But that (if-)clause is the premise the externalist will reject, and what consequently licenses her to reject J.

Two, my critic could subscribe to (a) a *stauncher* or to (b) a simply *different* variety of epistemic internalism than I do, and on that basis claim that the reasons I marshal in *Step 2* are (a) on the right track but not *good enough*, or (b) of the *wrong type* altogether. As before, either claim suffices to reject J.

These are severe objections that undercut a significant part of my project. They undercut the positive conclusions I put forth, such as, §2.1’s and §C.6’s claim that my model affords us a way to moralize buildings in an epistemically *responsible* way. If J is false, this larger claim is false. The objections also undercut some of my negative conclusions, specifically when in CHAPTER 10 and the CODA I go after other people’s moralizations and lambast them for standing on epistemically shaky grounds because the *reasons* they give us for moralizing the buildings in question are not validated by the strictures of my model. As before, if J is false, either because externalism is true or because J relies on the wrong type of internalism, then the *quality* of those people’s reasons for doing or believing what they do – or, my model’s *assessment* of that quality – is epistemically much less damning (and damaging) than I allege.

In response, there is little I am confident to offer of a conclusive nature. As elsewhere, it is one thing to point up the *possibility* of contrary views – here, various ways to negate J – and another to proffer conclusive arguments for them. If, say, we were to accept epistemic externalism when it comes to moralizing buildings, this would have consequences for how we permissibly circulate such moralizations in public decision making. For one, the giving of *good reasons* would be largely gratuitous, or at the very least optional. This is a consequence that, absent further reasons (sic), I think few of us would be willing to accept – responsibility in the absence of accountability.

Further, the contrary views would not only need arguments backing them up in their own right – I think we would also deserve to here a great deal more about their substance and content, to even understand what is behind them, other than some dialectical motivation to dislodge J (which I grant they effectively accomplish, *if true*). But regardless of this, I would like to remind readers that such disputes on the correct *moral epistemology of architecture* could not even get *off ground* if there was no content whose (type of) justification was in question. And that provides grist to my mill (in §2.1) that, in the current context at

¹⁶⁵ For a defense, see Feldman (2005). Naturally, internalism comes in several varieties, depending on what qualifies reasons as ‘good’ ones, and depending on how one cashes out ‘accessible’ (see again Feldman 2005). My own view does not depend on taking a principled stance on those issues, so I merely mention them to drop them.

least, we are justified to run issues of content and justification together. At least, we cannot conceivably pursue the latter in the absence of the former.

It is often held that moral and aesthetic realism incur intolerable epistemic costs, such as the postulation of weird ‘faculties’ of cognition that put us in touch with ‘queer properties’,¹⁶⁶ and that their antirealist ‘cousins’ are vastly preferable as they avoid any such thing. To me, the situation looks exactly reversed. The compositional properties that enable us to moralize buildings have nothing queer about them – they are right there, and later chapters will reference them in great, empirical detail. Moralizations do not require queer properties or faculties either, as long as we are licensed (as my model requires us to be) to use, and not just mention, statements of the form that figure in my *Conclusion*: ‘this building is morally bad’.

If however a realist semantics of such statements ($\forall(b)$ -statements) was *wholly unavailable*, in that we could not even *conceive*, *formulate*, or even (momentarily) *inspect* it, as various authors looked at in §1.3-§1.7 would have it, then we would lack a clear enough understanding of the *content* of such statements. The irony, as I see it, is that antirealists, if they refuse (as in the present context they do) to address issues of content, are bereft of a theory of justification as well: if (1) is unavailable, so is (2).

(1) [That] *b* is V.

(2) *S* knows that *b* is V.

If statements of the form $\forall(b)$ do not *really* mean anything, but either express something rather different (as on redescriptivism) or not all that much (as on expressivism or eliminativism), then there is literally nothing left for us to know about (1) – and (2) would remain entirely opaque. There would literally be no *entry point* for a moral epistemology of architecture, just an elaborate story how to get on with life and other things *instead* (such as, how to tell elaborate stories about architects’ expressivist intentions, or the feelings we privately harbour about this or that façade). Or again, if (1) is unavailable, then ordinary inferences and epistemic inferences embedding (1) are unavailable as well. Let *N* be some non-moral property of a building *b*. Then:

(3) *b* is V. *b* is N. Therefore, *b* is both V and N.

(4) If *S* knows that *b* is N, and *S* knows that *b* is V, then *S* knows that *b* is both V and N.

(5) *b* is N. If *b* is N then *b* is V. Therefore, *b* is V.

(6) If *S* knows that *b* is N, and *S* knows that if *b* is N then *b* is V, then *S* knows that *b* is V.

These are all standard inferences, with (5) invoking the so-called ‘Frege-Geach problem’ for expressivists, and (6) importing knowledge closure under entailment. None of these standard inferences are available if (1) is meaningless or not truth-apt – as it is, on antirealist semantics for $\forall(b)$. But all these inferences are in principle available if J is true. So J secures the place of moralizations of architecture in various (non- and epistemic) forms of reasoning, where its rejection (in some of its guises) fails to do so.

Hence, antirealism incurs significant epistemic problems of its own, its avoidance of (allegedly) ‘queer properties’ and ‘dubious faculties’ aside. And that really underscores two major contentions of the present work. One, the *pursuit* (if not always the truth) of a realist semantics for the ethics of architecture is a *sine qua non* for establishing the ethics of architecture as such. And two, issues of content and justification are related in the ethics of architecture – failing to have one of them means, nearly always and everywhere, failing to have the other.

¹⁶⁶ The modern classic on that point is Mackie (1977). I cannot here dwell on realist rejoinders, but direct readers to the work of Gilbert Harman and Peter Railton.

This is not to say that radical *moral skepticism about buildings* is self-contradictory, inconceivable, or otherwise untenable. But other than earning an intriguing moniker (‘the secret moral life of buildings’), I see few intellectual charms or benefits we accrue by subscribing to the position. As before with other competitors, the position deserves a fairer shake than I give it here, and hopefully my brisk dismissal will spur on others to actually develop, and not just (as before) merely sketch the possibility of such a view. One initial clue may be provided by the rejection of what §2.6 will refer to as *The Essentialist Stance*, to which we will get shortly.

§2.5.2 THE MERITS OF THE TWO-STEP MODEL, ELABORATED

Several points made just prior to §2.5.1 bear out elaboration. In particular, let me explain more fully how and where my model differs from the redescriptionist’s, and how exactly my model differs from, but can avail itself of material deployed in, analogous models for the moral appraisals of humans, $V(b)$.

Take the following claim C, where Π is an algebra over properties (F, G, H, \dots) relevant to the moral appraisal of a building b (in a sense of ‘relevant’ to be spelled out shortly):

- C** If building b has properties Π then it is (im)moral for any architect b to be complicit in the built realization of b .

I largely bracket concerns that arise from a proper analysis of ‘be(ing) complicit in’; broadly, this taps into b ’s role responsibilities (cf. CODA, §C.5) and demands a reasonable degree of foresight of b as to the impact on the natural and human environment of b ’s built realization, and much else besides.

Claim C links the ethics of architecture (b) to an ethics of architects (b), without any pretense to a strong derivation of the latter from the former (for one, C is no biconditional). But the redescriptionist (like Sauchelli, for instance) and the face value theorist (like myself) differ on what in C explains the (positive or negative) moral value of b . For the latter it is the properties of *buildings* themselves, for the former, properties of *architects* (of architects’ actions or intentions):

FACE VALUE TREATMENT Building b is morally good (or bad) because b itself has features Π .

REDESCRIPTIVISM Building b is morally good (or bad) because something other than b has certain (moral) features.

(REDESCRIPTIVISM, EXAMPLE) The expressivist intentions i of architects b for b to have Π explains why b is said to be morally good (or bad).¹⁶⁷

The disagreement between these (types of) accounts arises from the question we encountered with respect to the *Euthryphro dilemma* in CHAPTER 1 – which part in a correlation claim should receive explanatory priority. Neither account requires that features Π are themselves flatly moral (or, that they are thinly or thickly moral, or neither), as long as Π can help *rationalize* b ’s receiving moral appraisal ‘V’. Earlier I said how Π is an algebra over properties F, G, H, \dots relevant to buildings’ moral appraisal. But which properties are these, and what exactly does ‘relevant’ mean here?

My thesis’ overall argument – made by CHAPTERS 2 to 10 in accumulation – is that Π is to be constrained by the demands expressed by the TRIAD VALUES, specifically that of *firmitas* or *being solidly constructed* (§I.1). My thesis proposes that that the application of each of these demands, and the resulting set of properties deemed ‘legitimate’, is contextual. So, *firmitas* amounts to something different, depending on whether we are talking about Semper’s or Mies van der Rohe’s (understanding of) architecture (see CHAPTERS 8-10).

¹⁶⁷ As before, ‘said to be’ is not to imply that REDESCRIPTIVISM is a thesis about (standard) linguistic usage, but to indicate that it never cancels semantic ascent for ‘ b is V’ – so b is *said* to be V, but is not literally held to *be* V.

A contextualist semantics for ‘is firm’, however, does not render LC or C themselves relativist or contextualist. It simply means the truth conditions *in* (L)C are contextualist, as opposed to invariantist.¹⁶⁸

To understand how Π could play such a role as in C, it needs of course to ‘team up’ with candidate theories of moral appraisal \mathcal{M} as indicated in *Step 2*. While later chapters will offer sample instances of \mathcal{M} that have been offered in the literature (that of architectural historical writing, for one, or by architects themselves), let me offer a greatly simplified illustration – precisely to illustrate the intent of the model once it is put to work.

To begin with, consider a different context of moral appraisal first. Ethicists frequently invoke ‘avoidance of pain’ or ‘leads to pain’ to *rationalize* the ascription of moral evaluatives to (instances of) human actions (or action types). These considerations would enter our syllogism (for Sulla’s moral appraisal) in §2.5 at juncture \mathcal{P} :

Actions Θ committed under intention *i* are morally bad, given moral theory \mathcal{P} .

Avoidance of pain or *being conducive to pain* play a role in the moral appraisal of human actions (on some ethical theories at least) analogous to what \mathcal{M} does for the moral appraisal of buildings on the two step model of §2.2.1. Once we understand how *avoidance of pain* or *being conducive to pain* (not to mention other such features) accomplish that, we can draw on that understanding to explicate the (explanatory) relation of \mathcal{M} to the moral appraisal of buildings. For Guy Kahane or Derek Parfit, for instance, (p1) pain, if not disliked by the subject, does not qualify as morally reprehensible harm.¹⁶⁹ For *avoidance of pain* or *being conducive to pain* to be directly relevant to moral appraisal, then, presumably requires (p2) pain to figure (positively or negatively) in subjects’ preferences, and (p3) for these preferences to figure in moral evaluations under preference utilitarianism.

The challenge for the ethics of architecture, then, is to provide a body of ethical theory analogous to (p1) to (p3) for \mathcal{M} . One way, of course, is to seek correlations of Π to (a) the type of properties that either feature *in* accounts of the moral appraisal of human actions, or to (b) properties like *being in pain* whose moral status is accounted for in such accounts. If, for instance, we can argue that certain buildings demonstrably impact humans by putting them in pain, the ethics of architecture can tap into (p1) to (p3) to explain why this renders buildings themselves immoral. (The point about a consequentialist ethics like p1-p3 is that the entity bringing about a state of affairs involving subjects in pain need not involve any specific intent. What matters is the resulting state of affairs. On this view, a world of suffering is not any less morally reprehensible if the theory from (intelligent) design is false.) This may underwrite for instance (what we may call) ‘function-driven’ variants to an ethics of architecture, variants on which the intended or actual performance of buildings is appraised via standard ethics.¹⁷⁰ This locates the ethics of architecture firmly in the ethics of humans, but at least does not issue in violations of the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT.¹⁷¹ (It does however raise the issue of extrinsic *value* – see below.)

Put differently, if we can correlate compositional properties to subjective preferences – in that, for instance, certain design choices militate strongly against personal wishes, to the extent that they give offense or even cause (psychological or physical) harm – we already have a fairly straightforward moral

¹⁶⁸ On this difference, see Unger (1984, 6-11 and 21-26).

¹⁶⁹ Kahane (2009); Parfit (2011, 54): ‘When we are in pain, what is bad is not our sensation but our conscious state of having a sensation that we dislike.’ Depending on how demanding the notion of a ‘conscious state’ of disliking is, such statements might clash with attempts that attribute *moral* rights to non-human animals on the basis of their capacity to experience pain. If the latter ‘capacity’ were morally neutral, this attribution would not succeed.

¹⁷⁰ But not such variants alone: even those who eschew (what they believe to be) a functionalist stance may wish to measure architecture against the morally reasonable production of certain states of affairs. See Scruton (1979, 242-243).

¹⁷¹ For elaboration, see the ‘Third’ regard in which my account departs from Sauchelli’s outlined in §2.3.

analysis of buildings. This is of course an outline of an explanation in lieu of an actual example. That said, the outline is roughly in line with statements other ethicists are prepared to take seriously – such as taking talk of (some) buildings be literally ‘eye sores’ (see PREFACE) and thus morally intolerable – and also conforms, again roughly, to some things I will develop in CHAPTER 10 on *Lafayette Park* by Mies van der Rohe. A major difficulty for any such ‘straight forward’ implementation of (preference) utilitarianism, however, remains the issue of uninformed preferences. As we will see in CHAPTER 5, it is simply not clear what qualifies as ‘informed’ here, and what is required, for instance, to dislodge the epistemic authority of architects on the aesthetic (and other) quality of their own designs. Another difficulty for implementing (preference) utilitarianism is the ensuing lack of intrinsic value: the sole moral value accruing to buildings under the current proposal is flatly instrumental. I postpone full consideration of this challenge to much later, when §7.5.1 considers how Parfit himself draws this conclusion from his own use of (p1) and (p2). Until then, we do well to remember that *b* can fail to have intrinsic moral value in one of two ways (the first one scrutinized in CHAPTER 1, specifically §1.7.1): the non-moral properties on the basis of which *b* is morally appraised are extrinsic to *b*, or the value that accrues to *b* on such basis is extrinsic to *b*.

That aside, a more challenging way to draw on extant ethical frameworks (from outside architecture ethics) is to refine, revise, or expand the notion of ‘pain’ and ‘wellbeing’ that such frameworks customarily invoke. In §3.5 I show how Vitruvius aligns architecture with a type of ‘cosmic harmony’ that caters (among other things) to the mental and physical health of humans and the natural habitat; and how later writers, from Schopenhauer (see CHAPTER 7) to Ruskin, have similarly aligned a certain ‘cosmological’ role, uniquely played by architecture (they claim), with the physical and mental well being of humans. Such claims, if we can take them seriously or (at least) revise them to current standards of conceptual and empirical adequacy, can feed quite directly into a consequentialist, utilitarian ethics of architecture. They require, however, a certain delineation of Π , and an added theory of how these features Π relate to extant ethical systems \mathcal{M} – which is the intended role of the linking conditional in *Step 2*. Before we can pursue such particular variants of the ethics of architecture in greater detail, we need to straighten out the general theory on exactly those general points.

While neither account (above) of the moral appraisal of buildings requires that features Π are themselves flatly moral, we still have to face the question how Π relates to moral categorization at all, and that of buildings in particular. The FACE VALUE TREATMENT, then, cannot function in the absence of (1) a proper account of the explanatory relation that \mathcal{M} invokes, and (2) a proper (extensional) delineation of the class of \mathcal{M} itself that meets this explanatory ambition.

Here is another way of raising these questions. What figures in the right hand side of my Σ^* (part of which will re-appear in the left hand side of LC)? First of all, the right hand side does not give the sense or customary meaning of ‘ $\forall(b)$ ’ statements in the sense of being elucidating of linguistic sense (standard meaning); nor is it highly revisionary either, as in redescriptionism. Rather, I view the overall explanatory achievement of my model as akin to that of the *Euthyphro* biconditional in §1.3, which correlates two *disquoted* types of statements. That is, by the time we reach my model’s *Conclusion*, we are allowed to use ‘ $\forall(b)$ ’ in disquoted form – are allowed to use and not just mention it. (This, after all, is the importance of the DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT.) And we have correlated that statement (now used) with further disquoted statements (sc. propositions) about Π and \mathcal{M} . It is these further propositions that justify our asserting various instances of ‘ $\forall(b)$ ’ in a way that neither *eliminates* those instances’ assertive content nor *reduces* their content to that of those further propositions.

Two questions then surface. First, what kind of explanatory relations pertains between ‘ $\forall(b)$ ’ and ‘those further propositions’? Second, how do we individuate that class of further propositions? Both questions, in their own way, go to the heart of the matter – namely, how the ‘further propositions’ introduced by my model enable us to morally appraise buildings.

As indicated earlier, in answer to this challenge I seek to explain that *firmness* falls inside or is directly correlated with the range of properties that, when attributed to *b*, explain *b*'s morally evaluative features (thus help analysing *b*'s moral appraisal). Several important points of a technical nature emerge at this point, with a larger, non-technical one treated in §2.6.

First, for Π to figure in a *satisfactory* right hand side of Σ^* and play its intended role in LC vis-à-vis \mathcal{M} , Π must be an intrinsic property of *b*. Otherwise, I allege, the right hand side fails to provide the rationale or explanation for *b*'s own moral appraisal, as per §I.1's and §1.2.1's ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT. (Recall from §1.4 what happens to the left hand side when the right hand side of Σ singled out architects' *b* expressivist intentions *i* – the resulting moral appraisal was of *b*, not of *b*.) To simplify, I shall say that a property is intrinsic to *b* if its ascription to *b* does not depend on *b* being non-trivially related to something else. The ascription to *b* of certain properties Π^* is contingent on *b*'s featuring in a particular frame of reference or being related to a comparison class,¹⁷² or its being assimilated to a 'category of art' or 'artistic genre'.¹⁷³ I regard Π^* as intrinsic to *b*, as long as their holding of *b* is not conditional in more substantial ('non-trivial') relations to some *c* other than *b*, since not doing so trivializes the distinction of properties into non- and intrinsic.¹⁷⁴

Second, I use firmness as a sample property to show lessons that, I claim, generalize. The lessons generalize in more than one way. One, many claims made in the current and later chapters on how firmness operates in (and on behalf of) moral appraisals of architecture can be replaced *salva veritate* by similar claims about properties other than firmness. Two, on the RECIPROCITY THESIS defended in CHAPTER 3, attributions of firmness to buildings, if true, cannot be disentangled from attributions of beauty and functionality. Accordingly, any attempt to *replace* my ethics of architecture based on firmness by an ethics based on, for instance, beauty and/or functionality, would first have to reject the RECIPROCITY THESIS, and secondly have to revise the *individuation* of architectural beauty and functionality under offer here. For this reason, the RECIPROCITY THESIS is absolutely essential for how I *develop* my general model but is not a formal *ingredient in the content* of that model itself, which is exhausted by Σ^* and LC. Rather, the RECIPROCITY THESIS acts as a *constraint* on the content of Π and the (proper) individuation of sample properties (or 'realizers') in Π . And while the present work does not pursue in great depth the prospects of an ethics of architecture based mostly on considerations arising from beauty or functionality *rather than* firmness,¹⁷⁵ an elaboration along such lines, I would contend, would need to hold on to beauty or functionality being *reciprocally implicated* in attributions of firmness. Firmness, then, remains an ineliminable component of my overall ethics, even in sections where it leaves centre stage.

But firmness may be a controversial choice to base an ethics of architecture on, in that some readers may not want to regard it as either a paradigm case or an ineliminable component in accounting for a building's moral features. This may be because (a) such readers do not think that buildings ought to be firm (on particular disambiguations of 'is firm'), or because (b) such readers doubt that firmness is apt to ground moral appraisal.

As to (a), I want to argue that firmness is a necessary property of buildings for buildings *themselves* to at all be morally appraisable; so disregarding it amounts to de-moralize buildings, at least on my own account. But that point is optional in the more restricted sense that readers can follow (and endorse large portions of) my argument without conceding the centrality and indispensability of firmness. See however the arguments in §3.4.

¹⁷² Harman (1975).

¹⁷³ Walton (1970).

¹⁷⁴ The trivialization occurs e.g. in van Woudenberg (2013). Its avoidance is argued for by Dunn (1991).

¹⁷⁵ See however §3.7 on architectural beauty and §4.2 on architectural function or 'purposiveness'.

As to (b), there is the famous fact/value distinction, and the related point of Moore's challenge such that, for any descriptive or naturalist property *d*, something can lack *d* but still be deemed 'good'; and, if so, this undermines that *d* is what *explains* goodness.¹⁷⁶ Just so, one could doubt that firmness cannot underwrite the moral goodness of buildings in any strong sense. I want to diffuse Moore's challenge by rejecting the premises on which it is based – here, that attributions of firmness (and the aforementioned 'further propositions' about Π and \mathcal{M}) more generally give the meaning or 'sense' of attributions of (moral) goodness to buildings. As soon as we release my account from that ambition, Moore's challenge can no longer go through, as it lacks one of its key premises. For Moore's can no longer employ (what Gareth Evans called) Frege's 'Criterion of Intuitive Difference' on which two propositions *p* and *q* differ in meaning or 'sense' if a subject can take contradictory propositional attitudes to *p* and *q*, such as reject the one but endorse the other.¹⁷⁷ To repeat from §2.3, (part of) the inspiration behind my two step model is the *Euthryphro* biconditional, on which a particular right hand side *explains* why the left hand side holds, without meaning to claim that the right hand side gives the *precise* meaning of the left hand side. Rather, my account preserves *core elements* of what we, as ordinary speakers, take moral appraisals of buildings to convey, particularly the predicative structure of such appraisals (§2.3), but it need not preserve *every one last feature* of them. Hence, if some subjects can correctly entertain the possibility 'b is morally good but not firm' (plus some 'further propositions' about *b*) or 'b is firm but not morally good', that does not contradict the two step model above – though I would contest such subjects' understanding of firmness (see §3.4).

Just where to draw the line between the statements' alleged 'core features' and 'every last feature', this marking a normative distinction between features worth and not worth saving by an explanatory account of such statements, is of course a tricky affair. It is also the central bone of contention here. As I said in §1.2.1, realist and antirealist treatments of moral appraisals about buildings differ with respect to *what* or *how much* content they take statements reporting such appraisals to contain, and differ in which *attitude* they recommend us to take towards that content. As I signaled (also in §1.2.1), there may well be stripes of realism and anti-realism about the moral appraisal of buildings that CHAPTERS 1-2 fail to chart. If so, we can reasonably expect a certain amount of future debate on where to draw the line precisely between what needs and needs not to be preserved in moral appraisals of architecture, especially when one wants to take them at face value.

This concludes the exposition of my position's major theoretical ramifications and issues, at the level of pure philosophical abstraction. Subsequent sections and chapters delve deeper into the refinement and application of my model to the concrete world of architecture.

§2.6 NORMS OF ARCHITECTURE, ARCHITECTURES AS A GOODNESS FIXING KIND

If later chapters mostly focus on the moral content the TRIAD VALUES inherit due to their moralization \mathcal{M} provided in my model's *Step 2* (the LINKING CONDITIONAL), I want to discuss the possibility of regarding these values being themselves thickly or partly moral, as they are alleged to be on what §2.3.2 called their TYPE 3 attribution. We here also return to a question broached in §2.3, as to the precise normative status of the TRIAD VALUES. I begin addressing this question by way of a broader observation.

¹⁷⁶ For a contemporary analysis of Moore's challenge, see McGinn (10-13), Gibbard (2003, 21-40).

¹⁷⁷ Evans (1982, 18-19), 'the thought associated with one sentence *S* as its sense must be different from the thought associated with another sentence *S'* as its sense, if it is possible for someone to understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking different attitudes towards them, i.e. accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting (accepting), or being agnostic about, the other.'

§2.6.1 ARCHITECTURAL NORMATIVITY IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE

Philosophical discussion of architecture frequently touches on normative requirements towards architecture, and towards good architecture. In some regards, this is perhaps the enduring legacy of Vitruvius briefly referred to at the end of §2.2, and his TRIAD VALUES in particular. Speaking of those very TRIAD VALUES, Neal Leach comments,

Since Vitruvius architects have used moral terms to justify a certain type of aesthetics [for buildings].¹⁷⁸

It thus seems to Leach, quite correctly I think, that Vitruvius uses the triad values to define, not just what architecture itself is, but what is required of *good* architecture. And moreover, the application of certain norms – here, moral norms – to architecture is apparently (if problematically) regarded to justify particular design choices. (I return in CHAPTER 3 to the philosophical question as to whether Leach’s complaint can be sustained.)

In a related vein, Joseph Pitt (2008) researches ‘design criteria’ in architecture. But he leaves out what these criteria are criteria of, and what normativity is at stake in their deployment. Christoph Baumberger (2013) is willing to classify such criteria as aesthetic norms. For reasons outlined in CHAPTER 1, that seems doubtful, and in any case, Baumberger does not really argue the point.

Or take William Saunders, whose work on ‘Multiple Criteria in the Evaluation of Architecture’ reaches the following conclusion:

[An] ideal evaluative response to architecture [is] receptiv[e] to its object in all its aesthetic, sensory, social, moral, political, historical, environmental, economic, programmatic, and functional dimensions[.]¹⁷⁹

But this demand (and the article it concludes) leaves the *correct aetiology* of such responses unclear. Do such responses have a grounding in particular properties of buildings, and are these properties themselves normative? Or are we to assign explanatory priority to the ‘recept[ivity]’ that (on Saunders) creates, or at least co-creates such responses? We never find out, because the quote more or less presents the termination point of Saunders’ own inquiry, whereas it serves as the starting point for ours (here in §2.6).

Recently, Rafael de Clercq discussed what makes for a ‘successful building’, though he never stops to outright define the meaning of the phrase, or provide criteria for its correct application.¹⁸⁰ In earlier work, however, de Clercq probed the semantics and metaphysics for (what is arguably) one such criteria, namely a building’s *being well proportioned*.¹⁸¹ De Clercq rejects Scruton’s argument that the term’s *meaning* can be given a mathematically precise definition *d*. Developing G. E. Moore’s famous ‘open question argument’, Scruton had argued that a building’s *b* proportions could instantiate *d* while viewers would still not identify *b* as *looking well proportioned* (what de Clercq calls its *apparent* proportionality). The counter argument is to simply reject the demand that *d* comply with the *meaning* of ‘is well proportioned’, let alone, of ‘*looks* well proportioned’.¹⁸² Rather, de Clercq suggests, we should see *d* as giving the *extension*, discovered *a posteriori*,

¹⁷⁸ Leach (2005, 135n.3).

¹⁷⁹ Saunders (2007, 146).

¹⁸⁰ De Clercq (2014); he attempts to clarify the notion indirectly, saying that writers from Watkin to Scruton have deemed modernist architecture to be ‘unsuccessful’. However, he does not discuss the *content* such writers associate with this evaluation (or evaluate its cogency), let alone, whether the set of writers presents a coherent set of criteria overall. The argument given, then, appears to solely rest on an appeal to authority.

¹⁸¹ De Clercq (2009).

¹⁸² I return to Scruton’s conflation of the two predicates, which is philosophically motivated, in CHAPTER 3. As de Clercq puts it (2009, 410), ‘Scruton has another reason for denying that rightness of proportion can be given an exact, mathematical definition: visual harmony is relative to a point of view while mathematical structure is not.’ This clearly shows that Scruton writes the qualifier ‘visual’ into *the term to be defined*, which seems to beg the question.

of the term ‘is well proportioned’, following a model for the identification of natural kind terms made popular by Putnam and Soames:

- (a) A simple natural kind term E is introduced with the stipulation that it applies in any possible world to all and only instances of the property possession of which (causally) explains certain phenomena (in the actual world).
- (b) It is then discovered scientifically that the property of being such and such (causally) explains the phenomena.
- (c) From this it follows that the kind E just is the property of being such and such.¹⁸³

This is then (ibid., 408-409) transferred to architecture as follows.

- (a’) The term ‘well-proportioned’ is introduced with the stipulation that it applies in any possible world to all and only objects whose proportions make a positive contribution to their aesthetic value.
- (b’) It is then discovered scientifically that proportions exemplifying the Golden Ratio make a positive contribution to the aesthetic value of objects that possess them.
- (c’) From this it follows that being well-proportioned is just having proportions exemplifying the Golden Ratio.

De Clercq however thinks both premises are defective. *Pace* (a’), we cannot reliably pick out which among several candidates is to be privileged to create the stipulative meaning of ‘well proportioned’. And the sentential prefix ‘it is scientifically discovered that’ in (b’) is followed by a *normative claim*, when it is ‘problematic’ to expect science (adept at unearthing descriptive, causal explanations) ‘to establish normative facts’ (409).

Whether or not one shares this final reservation (‘Cornell realists’ have long upheld that normative facts, while not established by empirical facts, are empirically discoverable),¹⁸⁴ we need not share de Clercq’s larger conclusion – that the whole trajectory of his reasoning, up to that point, ought to be rejected. Instead, I propose the following, which I will call *The Essentialist Stance*.¹⁸⁵

§2.6.2 THE ESSENTIALIST STANCE

On *The Essentialist Stance*, the denotation of ‘architecture’ is fixed by an underlying (*de re*) essence of the term that fixes the normatively correct application of the term. This is in analogy to (A) *natural kind terms* like ‘water’, or predicates like ‘is water’, that are denotationally fixed, or *rigid*, and always denote one and the same substance (H₂O), and to (B) *proper names* of individuals, like ‘Moses’, the referent of which is fixed by an essentiality of origin, rather than a cluster of descriptions that uniquely single out a referent.¹⁸⁶ That is, ‘Moses’ designates a certain individual born to certain parents (thus the ‘origin’), and that

¹⁸³ De Clercq (2009, 408), citing Soames (1998, 275).

¹⁸⁴ Railton (2003).

¹⁸⁵ As before and later, readers need to be aware that many thinkers working on architecture today reject such a stance. Scruton, an author deemed to have offered ‘the best known treatment’ of twentieth century aesthetics of architecture, is said to be ‘opposed to cultural relativism and claims aesthetical justification for a particular strand of Western architecture: classicism. [...] Given the perceived dangers of essentialism, progressive discourse has tended to avoid the word aesthetic when addressing kindred topics such as the pleasure of architecture, desire as a spatial structure, sensuous embodiment, and buildings as devices of seduction. [...] In general, then, the older, dowdy aesthetics focused on the concept of beauty and hence the claims to innate value that architectural theory has been impatient with.’ (Macarthur and Stead 2012, 126, 127, 127) As elsewhere in the same volume (cf. ibid., 93, 386, 569), ‘essentialism’ and ‘essentialist’ do not ever receive terminological explanation (presumably to do so would relapse into the very error to avoid), and this is one instance where Fahey (2009) does much to clarify the usage of ‘anti-essentialism’ in, and its importance for our understanding of, architecture. Cf. Fahey (2010).

¹⁸⁶ See Kripke (1980); for elaboration, Soames (2002), and for criticism, Salmon (2005).

individual *is Moses* even if many things we hold true of the historical individual ‘Moses’ (such as, ‘led the Israelites through the desert for several decades’) turn out to be false.

The application of (A) and (B) to architecture, however, only proceeds by *analogy*, not by literal implementation. First, the thesis is one about *denotation*, not about (ordinary) speakers’ meaning.¹⁸⁷ (I already clarified this point in response to Moore’s ‘open question argument’ at the end of §2.5.) Second, the idea is *not* to construe ‘architecture’ as a pseudo-natural term that (as de Clercq suggests and dismisses) is fixed by a *posteriori inquiry*. Admittedly, many essentialist claims about architecture (such as Laugier’s, on which more shortly) fall precisely into this trap and endow a (purported) empirical historical ‘fact’ with normative power of a foundational variety. Such claims about ‘architecture’ can be unpacked (and shown to be defective) via Kripke’s semantics of ‘causal chains’ initiated by ‘baptism’s,¹⁸⁸ or by Wittgenstein’s work on the ‘standard metre in Paris’.¹⁸⁹

Rather, there are certain norms and criteria that fix *the correct application* of the term, and these criteria are not subject to change. Such criteria and norms, in turn, need not even be empirically informed, though they well might be; for, being empirically informed need not mean that they are empirically *grounded*, i.e., that their normative force *derives* from a certain set of (contingent) empirical facts (analogous to the example of H₂O). To illustrate what this means in an architectural context, consider modern era French and German architectural theory. Significant portions thereof subscribe to an analogous *essentiality of origin* for ‘architecture’, in that they regard a privileged building archetype (in Laugier, ‘the primitive hut’, in Semper, ‘the Carib hut’), as a *normative point of reference* that settles the extension of what else belongs to architecture.¹⁹⁰ As Semper (see CHAPTER 8) repeatedly says, this is not a historical or (literally) developmental thesis, operating at a descriptive level (as it did in Vitruvius, V II).

A rejection of this premise would construe the denotation of ‘architecture’ as contextually and conventionally bound, meaning, the term’s application is not fixed by *de re* necessities, but can vary according to context.¹⁹¹

If, then, architecture operates in a *de re rigid* manner, and its denotation is *fixed* by certain normative facts, it follows that architecture is (what Judith Jarvis Thomson called) a ‘goodness fixing kind’.¹⁹² For something to *qualify* as architecture, it has to meet certain norms, norms that *emerge* from the kind itself, provided it is itself fixed in the manner *The Essentialist Stance* dictates.¹⁹³ And for something to qualify as *good* architecture, it has to meet these norms in excess of the average or the minimal (the satisficing). This is where the aforementioned three predicates that (I allege) for Vitruvius form architectural ‘values’ come in, so we return to them in CHAPTER 3. The point is, however, that these values help *fix* the denotation of ‘(good) architecture’, and that their application exerts, not just semantic normativity (akin to the normativity that governs ‘is water’ and ‘is Moses’) but, given how the denotation fixing factors are themselves moral, exert *moral normativity* on any building’s aspiration to qualify as architecture. I elaborated this point in §2.4, where I called it a ‘TYPE 3’ statement employing Vitruvian values. The key point is that,

¹⁸⁷ What Putnam (1973/1985) called the ‘intension’ of water, being ‘the liquid that fills the rivers, streams, and lakes (etc.)’. By contrast, the *denotation* or ‘extension’ is fixed by water’s molecular structure.

¹⁸⁸ See Evans (1973), discussing Kripke (1980).

¹⁸⁹ See Wittgenstein (1952, §50) and Kripke (1980, 55).

¹⁹⁰ Hvattum (2006) presents three variants of (what I call) the *essentiality of origin* thesis in architecture – (a) there is one origin point, given by historic reference (e.g., Greek classicism), (b) there are plural origin points ‘on a par’ (classicism for the Greeks, Romanesque and Gothic for other strands of ‘architecture’), rendering the term essentially disjunctive, and (c) rejection of origin thesis in either guise, in favour of a conventionalist fixation of ‘architecture’. Arguably, (c) is a rejection, not a variant of, the *Essentialist Stance*.

¹⁹¹ A historically famous example are some buildings of Alvar Aalto, which at one point were excluded from the elevated category of ‘architecture’, and retroactively brought into its fold (see again Fahey 2009).

¹⁹² Thomson (2008); Harman (2010).

¹⁹³ Arguably, ‘goodness fixing’ is also possible if we construe architecture as a disjunctive or contextually variant kind, but I shall not explore that possibility here.

given that *architecture* is fixed as a kind, as per *The Essentialist Stance*, the kind in turn is ‘goodness fixing’. And the goodness thereby fixed feeds into our two-step model, elaborated in §2.4.

I am not the first author to bring Thomson’s idea to bear on aesthetic kinds. Recently, Dominic Lopes has suggested the same for a wide array of arts, so as to define what (on his view) qualifies as a ‘good’ or ‘valuable’ instance of a given aesthetic kind, where the kind is dictated by each art form individually; the resulting value (Lopes alleges) can be termed ‘art form value’, a disjunction over which is to replace the more general category of ‘artistic value’. The wide array of arts for which Lopes intends such treatment includes painting, photography, movies, music, dance, theatre, poetry, and literature.¹⁹⁴ Strangely missing from this list – as in most general works in philosophical aesthetics – is architecture. I thus turn to an author who has come as close as any to treat architecture as a goodness fixing kind.

§2.6.3 KORSGAARD ON CONSTITUTIVE STANDARDS

I am not the first author to attempt to bring the idea of ‘goodness fixing’, or something very much like it, to architecture. Christine Korsgaard has done so recently as well, though she prefers to speak of ‘constitutive standards’ that govern any activity (and in the case of crafts, their products), and hence can be applied to the activity of ‘building a house’.¹⁹⁵ She elaborates that point in two regards that diverge from my own approach, however.

First, Korsgaard appears to tie the point to architectural ‘genres’ or ‘styles’ such as the Romanesque, in a manner reminiscent of Kendall Walton’s point on *aesthetic* appraisal of art works depending on ‘categories in art’ referred to earlier. (Thus, an art work is not ever good *simpliciter*, but can be a *good* Dutch painting of such and such an era, in such and such a style, done in such and such a technique.) I do not mean to restrict the goodness fixing kind of architecture in this manner, though I am aware of the live possibility that doing so might render *The Essentialist Stance* more amenable to some quarters. A major conclusion of the present thesis is precisely that the standards developed here for the moral assessment of architecture do not apply to classical architecture alone, though they largely emerge from it. They are applicable to modernist architecture too, and no relativity to ‘styles’ is intended to limit the scope of their ambition. This is a key point on which I take my position to diverge quite sharply from earlier, partisan writing in analytic philosophy of architecture.

Second, where Korsgaard eschews such relativity, she thinks she has to limit the point to a very narrow understanding of ‘architecture’, on which it is defined functionally, and where that function is defined in terms of ‘providing shelter’:

[E]very object and activity is defined by certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it. These standards are ones that the object or activity must at least try to meet, insofar as it is to be that object or activity at all. And object that fails to meet these standards is bad in a particular way. It will be useful to give this kind of badness, badness as judged by a constitutive standard, a special name[...]: *defect*. So in the somewhat special sense that I will be using the term, a house that is so constructed as to be ill-adapted for sheltering is *defective*; while a house that blocks the neighborhood’s view, thought it may for that reason be a bad thing, is not a *defective house*. (2009, 32)

I agree with Korsgaard’s larger point, and that is, that the moral appraisal of an activity, or an agent engaging in it, can on occasion be appraised via the qualities of her output. That is, if, say, a building is appraised as morally bad, and that statement is literally true (as on the FACE VALUE TREATMENT), then an architect engaged in the design and built realization of that building is herself morally blameworthy. In that case, the ethics of architecture has consequences for, rather than being parasitic on results delivered by, an ethics of architects. On that broad point, Korsgaard’s account and my own would agree.

¹⁹⁴ Lopes (2014, 131 with 125).

¹⁹⁵ Korsgaard (2009, 29-30); cf. Korsgaard (2003).

However, both the relativity to genre and the restriction to functionality (that is, sheltering) she champions are too narrow for what I take to be the goodness fixing consequences of architecture. For architecture, as here defined, is subject to the TRIAD VALUES.

§2.7 VITRUVIAN SPECIFICS OF THE TWO STEP MODEL AND THEIR PLACE IN CONTEMPORARY ARCHITECTURE

My model aims to import, not just Vitruvius' selection as to *which* evaluative predicates are salient to employ in a framework like that of §2.2.1, but also Vitruvius' understanding of the *content* of these predicates, their *logical relation to one another*, and their *logical relation to the building* they are correctly attributed to. While CHAPTER 3 deals with the first two of these points, readers should be aware of theoretical commitments arising from the third point up front. I will hence detail that (second) logical relation and address the concern that the resulting understanding of architectural composition might be out of touch with contemporary forms of architectural production.

For Vitruvius and later writers like Alberti, predicates like 'is firm' and 'is beautiful' attach to buildings both *as wholes* and *as compositional parts*. What is more, they often write as if the beauty of the whole is a function of the beauty of its parts, and that of the parts is a function of the beauty of a whole they compose. Similar claims, we shall see, are voiced for firmness and, to a lesser extent, functionality.¹⁹⁶ Thus Alberti (*Ten Books of Architecture*, I.§9) employs the Vitruvian triad as follows.

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Premise 1</i> | Compartition (is that which) divides the building into articulate parts and 'integrates [these] into a single harmonious work [...] the whole work'. |
| <i>Premise 2</i> | This compartition 'respects utility, dignity, and delight'. |
| <i>Premise 3</i> | Especially, however, 'compartition [...] contributes more to the delight and splendor of a building than to its utility and strength;' |
| <i>Conclusion</i> | That which imposes order on a building is also the primary cause of its beauty. ¹⁹⁷ |

I return to this argument in §3.4 to highlight the interrelation of beauty and (compositional) order more widely; and will show that, contrary to *Premises 2* and *3*, *Premise 1* applies further to a building's 'strength', that is, to its firmness or *being solidly built*. I sample Alberti's argument here to highlight the part-whole interdependence that figure in classical architecture, that is, a tradition of architectural reflection (realized in built works) oriented on a particular set of values and a particular way of understanding these values' realization in built work. For, the same 'interrelation' surfaces in Vitruvius' understanding of beauty in *De Architectura* I.3.§2 (of which more in my §3.7),

venustatis vero cum fuerit operis species grata et elegans membrorumque commensu iustas habeat symmetriarum ratiocinationes.

Beauty will be achieved when the appearance of a building is pleasing and elegant and the commensurability of its components is correctly related to the system of modules.¹⁹⁸

And it also surfaces in Palladio:

La bellezza risulterà dalla bella forma e dalla corrispondenza del tutto alle parti[.]

¹⁹⁶ On firmness, see CHAPTERS 7 and 8 on Boetticher and Schopenhauer writing on physical balance or 'Gleichgewicht'. And, as we already saw in §1.7.2, the attribution of functionality to architectural wholes, such as 'office building' and 'hospital' is not so much mistaken as vacuous and underdetermined, and it makes more sense to attribute functionality to compositional units as indicated in a floor plan. See further §3.3.

¹⁹⁷ Alberti (1989) with *Premise 1* and *Premise 2* owed to I.9 (1989, 23), and *Premise 3* owed to VII.1 (1989, 189).

¹⁹⁸ Text: Fleury (1990, 20). Translation: Schofield (2009, 19).

Beauty will derive from a graceful shape and the relationship of whole to the parts[.]¹⁹⁹

In analysing such passages, we have to be careful to avoid the appearance of circularity – the beauty of a whole cannot be a function of the beauty of its parts *and vice versa*. Instead, I suggest, we view such claims as correlation claims, such that the beauty of wholes and parts are mutually calibrated. Vitruvius’ understanding of this calibration further involves him to regard the building as telically oriented, for as on the classical Aristotelian (other writers have alleged, ‘organicist’) understanding of a telic unit, the unit’s overall orientation *and that of each of its parts* (whether spatial, as in the case of buildings, or temporal, as in the case of *processes*) is owed to an ‘end point’ or *telos* that serves as a regulative ideal on that whole and its parts, and is in the final instance to its being properly (‘harmoniously’) attuned with its external environment (see §3.7, and §3.4.1 on Barbaro).²⁰⁰ It is exactly this conjunction of claims that §3.4.1 will bring to the individuation of *being solidly built*, defined in terms of being *tectonically composed*:

A building *b* is *tectonically composed* iff (1) the physical properties of *b*’s parts and the physical properties of *b* as a whole are mutually constrained so that (2) *b* as a whole is held up.

As before with *venustas*, clause (1) talks about the mutual calibration of parts and wholes, and (2) defines the whole as a telic(ally oriented) unit. We will pursue these points in CHAPTER 3.

If later chapters will detail how these – admittedly broad and abstract – claims fare in concrete contexts, contemporary readers deserve to be informed why they should be taken in by such claims in the first place. As will be clear to seasoned readers of modern architecture, the later tradition (certainly in some of its moments) has seen fit to reject nearly all of Vitruvius’ sentiments outlined so far. That is, it is no longer held that beauty, as such, forms a value for architecture informing its composition, a value having to ‘surface’ visibly in the compositional output – in façade design, for instance – if we attend to Macarthur and Stead’s misgivings about the ‘dowdy aesthetics focused on the concept of beauty’ discussed in §2.6.1.

Such reservations have to contend with the revisionist efforts of much modern aesthetics to disentangle beauty, and what is (more generally) *aesthetically pleasing*, from old fashioned concerns for the visually harmonious or even ‘pretty’. Already in 1915 Bernard Bosanquet had attempted, Guyer explains,

to make philosophical room for modern art’s need to go beyond the boundaries of conventional beauty in order to allow for the expression of feeling, without losing sight of the fact that there are expectations of pleasure connected with the objective embodiment of feeling. To this end, Bosanquet argues that there must be two kinds of beauty. In the narrower sense, beauty is that which is ‘prima facie aesthetically pleasant’ (Bosanquet 1915:84), or simply that with which it is easy to be pleased; in the broader sense, however, beauty is whatever we can consider ‘aesthetically excellent’ (Bosanquet 1915:83), whether doing so is easy or difficult. What makes some beauty difficult is characteristics like ‘intricacy’, ‘tension’, and ‘width’, or a breadth of conception that undermines all sorts of normal expectations. Difficult beauty includes the sublime and even the ugly, as long as those can be found in ‘a creation, a new individual expression in which a new feeling comes to exist’ (Bosanquet 1915:109). Whether the relation between the feeling and its embodiment is harmonious or tense, if the object can ultimately be perceived as the

¹⁹⁹ Text: Palladio (1570, 6). Translation: Tavernor and Schofield (1997, 7). See §3.7.3 for discussion.

²⁰⁰ For this view, see Charles (1992). For a meticulous documentation of the view in classical, Renaissance, and pre-modern architecture, see van Eck (1995). In contrast to van Eck, however, we should perhaps regard telic unity mostly as a *design principle*, that is, a principle ‘indigenous’ to architecture and as such not tied to the fate of teleology *outside* aesthetics (one of the major factors van Eck attributes to organicism’s demise). For me, the dissolution of telic unity as a *design principle* comes with the factors Kaufmann (1933) labels as ‘autonomous’ at an urbanist and architectural scale; that is, the dissolution of the Baroque urban fabric (*Städteverbund*), and of *parts of a building being reciprocally dependent*, what Vitruvius calls ‘modularity’ (see main text). – I return to modularity and its challenge when discussing Le Corbusier (CHAPTER 7), and address Kaufmann’s argument in CHAPTER 9.

embodiment of a feeling and the feeling understood through its embodiment, then the purpose of art has been realised.²⁰¹

While the application of Bosanquet's bipartite account of beauty to architecture requires work, its availability alerts us to the fact that the *usage* of certain aesthetic terminology in some quarters, even when one hears talk of 'beauty', does not license us to infer a particular aesthetic value set (dowdy or not). Rather, that value set needs to be unearthed by attending to the commitments incurred. And even if and when Vitruvius and company push for a (to us, overly narrow) understanding of aesthetic excellence in architecture – on which parts and wholes of a composition are harmoniously 'calibrated' rather than brought into outright and visible tension –, we can still query whether a formal model of moral appraisal like my two step model can allow for contextual variation in (the semantic interpretation of) some of its terms, 'is beautiful' included. I shall of course argue that it does allow that, just as some building programs place less strict functional requirements on their built realization than others.²⁰² In a similar sense, our understanding of firmness, as a value, is itself open to revision and refinement. It is that flexibility that perhaps explains the enduring value of many of Vitruvius' reflections and what we can build on their foundation.

Even so, some commitments of my two-step model cannot be downplayed entirely. In that vein, the 'mutual calibration' of (architectural) compositional wholes and their parts – a 'calibration' that surfaces for functionality, being aesthetically pleasing, and firmness – is likewise contested, and the idea that buildings form compositional and telic 'units', objects whose major value properties emerge from similar properties being enjoyed by their parts, is likewise out of fashion in many quarters today. Some may reject the part-whole relations of dependency, in favour of a more 'additive' design stance made famous in the writings of Durand and since, and discussed at great length in §6.3.²⁰³ Others may reject the delineation of utility (not so much here as in CHAPTER 3) as overtly technocratic and so on, pointing to Rossi's work as the saner contender. And so on. In short, there is plenty of room for departure and disagreement.

At the most profound level, perhaps, readers may reject the idea that buildings form compositional and telic units at all, on a sufficiently strong (metaphysical) reading of 'unit'. In the wake of Brian Massumi's work, for instance, many architecture theorists resist 'highlighting the experience of the built form' and '[an emphasis on] the building itself [as the] end that animates the [architectural] process all along'.²⁰⁴ There is an equal emphasis, in phenomenological work on architecture, on resistance towards viewing architectural works as, in David Leatherbarrow's words, 'proclaiming themselves to be internally defined and self-sufficient', or, as invoking 'the individual building's freestanding self-governance'; instead, we are asked to endorse 'a disavowal of sovereignty – not just of the building's but of the designer's too'.²⁰⁵ Such sentiments pick up on notions of autonomy and autarchy seemingly championed in other quarters of contemporary architectural phenomenology, not least Kenneth Frampton's work which called for a

²⁰¹ Guyer (2003, 353-354). The reference is to Bosanquet (1915).

²⁰² It is an error to think that contextual denotational variation in a building's functionality in any way undercuts the RECIPROCITY THESIS. The argumentation in Taylor and Levine (2011, 21-28) appears to me defective in this way.

²⁰³ I owe this point to Michiel Riedijk. As he points out, if Durand is correct, then the present ethics of architecture is married to a mistaken conception of architecture – that is, that a Vitruvian understanding of Π is neither necessary nor sufficient for the moralization of buildings. This differs from the point made in the INTRODUCTION where a Vitruvian delineation of Π is not sufficient to moralize buildings properly so long as it restricts Π to intrinsic (non-contextual, non-relational) properties such as site specificity.

²⁰⁴ Massumi (1998); Mallgrave (2013), its core argument touted on the publisher's website as admonishing us to 'turn our focus away from the objectification of architecture (treating design as the creation of objects) and redirect it back to [the people] for whom we design'.

²⁰⁵ Leatherbarrow (2008, 9-10).

‘return to the object’ (in our analysis of architecture) and a counterpoint to (what Frampton perceived to be) a dominance of a ‘scenographic’ approach.²⁰⁶ For Frampton (ibid.),

architecture must of necessity be embodied in structural and constructional form. [... We return] to the structural unit as the irreducible essence of architectural form.

The current work firmly aligns itself with this latter (explicitly essentialist) sentiment, as against its rejection assumed by a spectrum of authors between, and including, Massumi and Leatherbarrow.

Beyond matters of stylistic preference and what is or is not ‘in fashion’ nowadays, however, we should take very seriously the importance to assess competing ontologies of architecture for their comparative merit. If, for instance, we look to the anti-objectualist view’s recent defense in Manuel DeLanda’s work, we can see that (1) the view is not nearly as original and ‘fresh’ (or hip) as its author proclaims, and that (2) the view borders on pragmatic self-refutation in that it cannot (or appears at least unable to) state its own premises in terms that themselves escape the very object-centric hold the view militates against.²⁰⁷ Both points are related. DeLanda’s (2009, 31) contrast of an ‘essentialist’ hylomorphism of sorts, where the ‘[a]rtisans or craftsmen’ impose form on an ‘inert receptable’, to the craftsmen (by extension, architects) ‘collaborating’ with a matter, where that matter is endowed ‘with morphogenetic capabilities of its own’, simply recalls a twenty five centuries old contrast between ontologies first contrasted in Plato’s *Timaeus* and Plato’s *Theaetetus*. The latter, however, features a pragmatist refutation of a ‘Heracliteian’ thesis of (all things being in) ‘flux’ or constant change, on the grounds that the theory breaks down when stated in the only language at its (and our) disposal, a theory premised on stable (however minute) relations of reference.²⁰⁸ If the new ontology is available, as Heracliteans profess it to be, it cannot be defended in terms of a language that reimports stable relations of reference (word-world relations) the new ontology proclaims to be impossible. The defense of new ontology in old ontology garb, then, is a futile exercise in self-refutation. This, too, presents a difficulty that DeLanda’s ‘novel’ ontology of architecture appears to fail to overcome.²⁰⁹ A successful defense of, not just particular analyses favouring a non-objectual ontology of architecture, but of the ontology itself, then, is still something the current literature owes us.

For such reasons, I favour the objectual alternative. It is in this regard and others, that the Vitruvian inspired model for the ethics of architecture I offer here might well strike many readers as parochial, and might strike even those who favour its sentiments as delivering at best relative results (that is, results relative to a small domain of architectural practice, possibly one not overlapping contemporary practices).

To some extent, I postpone a full rejoinder to such charges when more material has been amassed. For it is one of the present work’s many ambitions to confront such challenges to the Vitruvian model – and, especially, to a model centered on firmness or (what I shall call) the centrality of tectonic composition – head on, and see what our prospects are to construct an ethics of architecture, along the above two step model, not just on the grounds I here outline (and favour) but on alternative grounds in wild disagreement with them. This is, for instance, how I proceed in CHAPTER 6 on Le Corbusier. At other times, however, I reverse the charge, and argue that the Vitruvian-based model is simply the more compelling one over more contemporary competitors. Newer publication dates do not automatically guarantee superior viewpoints, and as my arguments in §3.3 and §C.5 will show, the culture of architectural design at work in

²⁰⁶ Frampton (1990/2002, 91-92).

²⁰⁷ DeLanda (2009, 23-41). Thanks to Andrej Radman for discussion here.

²⁰⁸ As Maarten Franssen reminds me, this argument made a more recent reappearance in Simons (1987).

²⁰⁹ E.g., ‘unlike properties [old ontology] which are always fully realized in an individual entity, tendencies and capacities [new ontology] may not ever be realized.’ (DeLanda 2009, 32) The article ends as such articles always do: ‘The ontology sketched here can be only an introduction to such a philosophy of difference, a first step in the direction of breaking the monopoly on explanation that the general and the particular have held so long, replacing these terms and the static and closed classifications they yield with an open-ended becoming based on individual and universal singularities.’ (2009, 40) In other words, the actual work of defending and developing the new ontology is postponed indefinitely, and attributed to limitations of space.

the practice (and statements of) Zaha Hadid and Robert Venturi, for instance, afford us little reason to put the Vitruvian model in doubt. If anything, we have grave reason to doubt theirs.

Even so, some readers may balk at the revisionary or anachronistic results created by my account when viewed against wide spread critical judgments of what constitutes architecture, or good architecture, and what does not. Frank Lloyd Wright's *Fallingwater* (1936), for one, has attracted an enthusiastic mass audience by site visits, even though its failing as architecture (let alone, as good architecture) in some of the criteria suggested above (and in CHAPTER 3) are apparent, for instance, in its failure to accord certain functional or tectonic requirements a greater degree (perhaps, an adequate degree).²¹⁰ And similar judgments could be offered about a wide range of judgments on (good) architecture in various areas of criticism for various types of architecture and from a variety of sources. Accordingly, the extensional discrepancy between *that* set of judgments and the set of judgments licensed by a theory like mine is pretty drastic. How to answer this? One, I could bite the bullet, console myself with having offered a radically revisionary metaphysics or essentialism about (good) architecture, impugn massive error to the unwashed masses, disavow any pretense to vindicate commonly shared judgments of architectural criticism, and let matters rest there. This seems philosophically problematic, to say the least. On the other hand, revisionism in some quarters may be acceptable, not least over as contentious a notion as architecture, when we accept similar revisionism for the semantics of other terms that we take ordinary speakers to be much more thoroughly acquainted with. (I have in mind here the type of divide between lay and expert opinion on the extension of 'water' introduced by Hilary Putnam's work.) However, a more sensitive strategy, to my mind at least, would focus on rephrasing (or redescribing, perhaps) the set of contested judgements as not being about architecture or good architecture in the elevated sense under debate here. That is, highly favourable reactions to or utterances about *Fallingwater* may just as faithfully be reported as, 'This is a striking building', or 'I find the aesthetic composition of the building (or its engagement with the natural environment) quite impressive', or 'I would say this is a work of art'.²¹¹ And such reports could then be analysed as either about *Fallingwater* considered as a building rather than 'architecture' with a capital 'A', or about some of *Fallingwater's* more impressive compositional details and properties. And such observations (provided they are factually and observationally correct in the first place) could be highly *salient* for *Fallingwater's* status as architecture without *deciding* the matter of its unequivocally belonging to good or outstanding architecture.

Finally, the results of the present work should be (and are certainly meant to be) of interest even to those who reject its most basic assumptions and consequences. (Not a day goes by when I do not feel compelled to rethink some or other of these commitments myself – and like any other reader of these pages, I have to query just where and why things appear to veer off track.) As Williamson put it, a propos the methodological diversity in much contemporary philosophy,

each form of philosophical discipline is itself contested by some philosophers. But that is no reason to produce work that is not properly disciplined by anything. It may be a reason to welcome methodological diversity in philosophy: if different groups in philosophy give different relative weights to various sources of discipline, we can compare the long-run results of the rival

²¹⁰ I owe this objection to Noël Carroll.

²¹¹ I am not making this up either. *Time Magazine* ('Usonian Architect', 17 January 1938) describes the building as Wright's 'most beautiful job'; Wright spoke of it 'as his own child', and Paul Rudolph called it 'a realized dream' (*apud* Levine 1996, 225). It is not clear which, if any, of these utterances should be taken at face value, and which, if so taken, presuppose that *Fallingwater* should be seen to exemplify good architecture in every regard. I pressed, they may indeed regard *Fallingwater* as at best a partial success, if an historically extremely important or indeed unparalleled one. See also §3.2 on architecture as a *constitutive ideal*: as with rationality, entities *aspiring* to it may still fall short of *instantiating* it perfectly or in every regard. And this need not require us (a) to withhold the ideal's being at all ascribable to these entities, only (b) that we clarify that their instantiation of the ideal is imperfect. That distinction is logically marked by whether the 'imperfectly' attaches to the copula or the attributed predicate, i.e. '*b* imperfectly-is F' vs. '*b* is imperfectly-F' (see Nehamas 1975).

ways of working. Tightly constrained work has the merit that even those who reject the constraints can agree that it demonstrates their consequences.²¹²

While I personally favour the specific ethics of architecture developed in the present work, its step by step development seem to me highly relevant to anyone who wishes to reject it. By laying out that ethics' base assumptions, and showing its argumentative 'architecture', readers will be better informed about *what* they reject (if they wish to do so), but also better informed *on what grounds* they can reject it. This, of course, will only be available to readers willing to follow the overall argument, which has barely started.

Indeed, with so many promises in place, it is time to move on, towards concretion. It behooves me, however, to emphasize the 'promissory' nature of the present material. Much in the current chapter employed hedging idioms like 'I allege' and 'I want to suggest'. This is done to avoid the impression that the model on offer here, thus far, has been argued for in a water-tight, knock-down fashion that most analytic philosophers (myself included) prefer. Much rather, I submit the remainder of the present work as providing a *substantiation* of the content, and consequently the *defensibility*, of the model under offer here; and am the first one to call for, and aid, its dismantling if it fails to live up to that reality.

²¹² Williamson (2007, 285-286).

CHAPTER 3

TRIAD VALUES

There are three basic types of architectural drawings. The plan diagrams function; the section (in part) diagrams structure; the elevation [aims to] evoke[] beauty [...]; plan, section, and above all elevation demonstrate the architect's design, his formal solution to the building program. Think of the Vitruvian factors [utilitas, firmitas, and venustas ...as] the legs of a tripod called architecture. None can stand alone; each is dependent upon the other two to form the work of architecture. [...] To understand a work of architecture is to recognize this mutuality, to learn as much as you can about all three interactive features.

– James F. O’Gorman²¹³

§3.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters mounted the need for a position in the ethics of architecture that takes statements of moral appraisal about buildings at face value, and outlined how such a position could be developed fairly generally. As indicated in CHAPTER 2, the present work imports into that framework three normative constraints or ‘values’ introduced by Vitruvius’ theoretic work on architecture: *being solidly constructed (firmitas)*, *being aesthetically pleasing (venustas)*, and *being functional (utilitas)*. Thus the INTRODUCTION’S ‘three core requirements’ towards architecture, and what the CHAPTER 2 framework referred to as its TRIAD VALUES. The present chapter explains in greater detail how the framework interacts with these values, and why it should do so at all.

The core argument is that a particular understanding of what informs architectonic composition is indispensable for the framework to get off ground at all – for it to interact with architecture properly – and that, contrariwise, the theoretic demands (metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological) that accrue from working out the framework properly (in past and later chapters) exerts constraints on what that understanding should be. That understanding accords an ineliminable and central place to the TRIAD VALUES. Getting the specifics of architectonic composition right, at an appropriate level of generality, and getting the ethical model of CHAPTER 2 to work (that is, be applicable and informative) are two ‘tandem goals’ that inform the entirety of this thesis, beginning with the current chapter.

CHAPTER 3 addresses two particular concerns, and that is, how to understand the components of the TRIAD VALUES *individually*, and how to understand their proper *relation to one another*, respectively outlined in §3.4 and §3.3. Both sections highlight how getting these details right has palpable consequences for the ethics of architecture; and both sections explain how these concerns are more fully fleshed out in later chapters, when we attend to the work of individual architects. Of equal importance is the fact that, getting the individual content or the interrelation of the TRIAD VALUES *wrong* has consequences for an ethics of architecture too – namely, that such an ethics on the basis of the TRIAD VALUES runs philosophical consequences not worth adopting. On that point I am agreed with contemporary writers, and indeed, the current chapter begins by carefully outlining their misgivings. For, Vitruvius is currently not in high demand or high regard by writers interested in the ethics of architecture, his immense (indeed, unequalled) canonical status commanded over previous centuries notwithstanding. If, then, the present work wishes to recuperate a Vitruvian understanding of which moral concerns inform architectonic composition, we first need to appreciate why that understanding has been deemed so hopeless in recent years. After a brief explanation of the context, §3.2 immediately takes the plunge into the heart of recent criticism.

²¹³ O’Gorman (1998, 1).

§3.2 CONTEMPORARY RECEPTION OF THE TRIAD VALUES

Vitruvius' *De Architectura* (completed around 23 B.C.) is our only remaining authority on architecture dating back to the Classical period itself.²¹⁴ Vitruvius pronounces to record views of major Greek authorities on architecture, drawn from handbooks and project descriptions for historical and professional purposes. Because we lack any independent sources to verify the content or accuracy of these views, Vitruvius has enjoyed an unequalled canonical status to subsequent architectural thought and production ever since. Even for those who design and teach architecture today, his thought presents the benchmark and starting point of any inquiry into the topics he touched upon. It is no coincidence that his thoughts bearing on the ethics of architecture enjoy the prominence they currently do. Even writers who fiercely contest their status admit that Vitruvius' remarks 'should be background beginnings' for everyone, and that they present obligatory starting points for anyone writing to engage 'architecture's basic values'.²¹⁵ But what *are* these values?

Vitruvius' treatise explicitly comes with a hotly disputed in-built notion of what architecture is and (more controversially) what good architecture is. Vitruvius demands that buildings be beautiful, serve functional needs, and be solid – the famous 'triad' of values introduced in *De Architectura* book I, chapter 3, paragraph 2 (I.3.§2). A building failing to meet those demands *at all* would *ipso facto* fail to qualify as architecture. That is one reason the introduction of those demands comes immediately after Vitruvius' account of what architecture extensionally consists in, sc. the construction of (public and private) buildings (*aedificatio*), alongside water clocks and sundials and (war) machines (I.3.§1). More controversially, only a building (*aedificatio*) that exhibits these values to a sufficiently high degree might ever qualify as *good* architecture.

Whether Vitruvius himself intended it or not, later writers (especially in a tradition that CHAPTERS 4 and following will scrutinize) have taken these remarks to offer not merely a view of what architecture (the portion denoted by *aedificatio*) happens to be, most of the time. Rather, it was interpreted to be a normative view on what it takes for something to qualify as architecture, analogous (we may say) to how recent philosophers, notably Donald Davidson, have argued that the ability to reason is *constitutive* for the having of certain (namely, propositional) mental states.²¹⁶ In a similar manner, the three requirements Vitruvius offers in I.3.§2 may be taken to imply a 'constitutive ideal' of architecture. They are constitutive in that they define what architecture is, but they are also ideal in that they constitute something empirical instances have to aspire to if they are to qualify as 'architecture'. Hence, unless a building meets certain requirements, it does not qualify as 'architecture', let alone, as good or excellent architecture. In that sense, the triad of values on display in I.3.§2, the TRIAD VALUES, are the constitutive ideal of architecture.

Another sense to cash out how what is at stake in Vitruvius' I.3.§2 is to interpret it in terms of what my §2.6.2 called the *Essentialist Stance*. On that view, the term 'architecture' is inherently normative, and affords (or is associated with) a normative understanding of architecture itself, codified into *criteria* or requirements any built work has to meet to qualify as 'architecture'. (As before, meeting these criteria significantly beyond a level that is called for, falls into the category of the supererogatory, and could be called '(outstandingly) good architecture'.) This is no different than Kripke's views on, and discussion about, which individual *ought* to be called (referred to as) 'Moses' or which materials qualify as 'water', given the right *criteria* or conditions at work. In all such cases, we need a substantive theory that explains the normative weight of the criteria underlying the *semantic normativity* behind (the applicability of) such

²¹⁴ Vitruvius references his sources in the 'Prologue' to book VII (VII.Prol.§§10-12). The precise compositional date of his own text remains unclear but is conventionally placed in the decade of 30-20 BC: see (1914, 462-4), Fleury (1990, 116), Schofield (2009, 361n1). Regardless of their precise date, Vitruvius' 'writings are more important for the light they shed on Greek and Roman Republican architectural practice than as a commentary on his own age' (Wilson 1986, 772) Basic tenets of architectural practice in 'his own age' are discussed by Torelli (1996) and Favro (2005).

²¹⁵ Till (2009, 27); Spector (2001, 35).

²¹⁶ Davidson (1981). I analyse this work in Koller (2003).

terms.²¹⁷ I.3§2 contains Vitruvius' *criteria* for 'architecture', and accordingly we have to look at his understanding of and arguments for accepting these criteria.

The contemporary discomfort with absolutes, certainly when dealing in norms and value judgements²¹⁸ – not to mention an increasingly wide spread skepticism of essentialism (§2.6.2) –, has led to a predictable back lash against Vitruvius, and his triad in particular. Neal Leach, for instance, regrets Vitruvius' tendency to introduce to architecture 'moral and moralizing terms that have been used over the years to justify certain aesthetics'. Jeremy Till laments the 'unthinking acceptance' of the triad, and complains that the triad's 'qualities are so self-evident that they should be background beginnings rather than the foreground ends that the Vitruvian dogma suggests.' Tom Spector complains about many a 'built-in quandary' the triad creates, and about Vitruvius 'unreflective temperament' more generally. And these are not the only voices.²¹⁹ It is no exaggeration to say that most work published in the last ten years on the ethics of architecture, where it did not simply declare the Vitruvian triad irrelevant, has ridiculed its hollow- and shallowness.

Now, for the Vitruvian triad to play the heavy role intended by Vitruvius and critiqued by contemporary writers, one must first understand the triad correctly. First, it matters that one correctly understand the meanings of the terms composing the triad *individually*, and secondly how the terms *relate* to *one another*. In both regards, I wish to suggest, scholarship of the past decades overlooks some positions that appear worth probing as alternatives. The present chapter develops these alternatives and explains how they serve the thesis' larger goals. I begin by substantiating contemporary opposition to Vitruvius.

As regards the Vitruvian triad, Leach laments

the way that ethical terminology has been appropriated within architectural theory and practice to defend a certain aesthetic practice. Since Vitruvius architects have used moral terms to justify a certain type of aesthetics. It has been easy enough to justify *firmitas* (structural integrity) and *utilitas* (usefulness) in fairly objective terms, but the third term of the Vitruvian triad, *venustas* (charm, beauty), has proved so subjective that architects have resorted frequently to moral terminology to justify it. 'Becoming', 'seemly', 'appropriate', 'sincere', 'good' – these are all moral and moralising terms that have been used over the years to justify certain aesthetics.²²⁰

Leach claims that (1.) *firmitas* and *utilitas* have been 'justified' on 'objective' grounds (whatever those are, and whatever makes them 'objective' in the first place), but that (2.) *venustas* was justified on moral grounds, using moral(ising) terminology, because *venustas* would otherwise be inescapably relativistic and devoid of justificatory grounds. By implication, (3.) *firmitas* (as much as *utilitas*) does, for Leach, *not* require a justification on moral grounds (and, maybe, does not even permit one?).

The present chapter will equip us to appraise the philosophical cogency of these remarks, as well as their exegetical groundedness in Vitruvius' text. In both regards, as readers will be able to see for themselves, Leach's capsule summary is less than satisfactory. For now, however, I want to attend to another source

²¹⁷ See Kripke (1980) and, for the application to natural kind terms, Soames(1998). Even in the latter case, semantic normativity is not assimilated to descriptive or 'nomic' normativity, though that form of normativity *plays a role* in giving an account of the semantic normativity of, for instance, 'water'. See McDowell (1980). On semantic normativity, see the literature in the wake of Kripke (1982) such as Gibbard (2012). I do not at all mean to convey that the various ways philosophers have tried to understand the normativity for terms other than natural kind terms are akin to one in every respect –only that a multitude of such positions is available, and that some of them appear to be friendly towards developing a similar view about the term 'architecture'. Nor do I claim that the present section has fully developed this point.

²¹⁸ 'Can architects embrace an ethical imperative without resorting to moralistic prescriptions of grand meta-narratives?', asks Panayiota Pyla (*apud* Crysler et al. 2012, 555).

²¹⁹ Leach (2005, 135-136n.3); Till (2009, 27); Spector (2001, 35 and 36). Similar verdicts are reached by Bruegmann (1985) and Piatt (2008).

²²⁰ Leach (2005, 135-136n.3).

of criticism that strikes at the heart of the TRIAD VALUES – namely, not how we are to interpret, or even justify, these values *individually*, but how they are *related to one another* in the first place. Here is Tom Spector.

[According to Vitruvius,] all architecture ‘must be built with due reference to durability, convenience, and beauty,’ in Latin, *firmitas*, *utilitas*, and *venustas*. All subsequent theories of architecture’s basic values have been obliged to grapple with this simple wisdom of Vitruvius’ statement. Despite its longevity, the Vitruvian formulation of what good architecture provides carries with it a built-in quandary. How does one begin to prioritize the imperatives of *firmitas*, *utilitas*, and *venustas* in cases where these values conflict and a trade-off is required? If these are the basic architectural values, and if they are, indeed, irreducible, then to what superior value does one appeal for judgment when these imperatives pull in opposite directions rather than reinforce each other? (2001, 35)

In that regard, Spector concludes, Vitruvius failed to

perceive the logical problem entailed in holding proper preparation to be the solution to the problem of conflicting values. (2001, 36)

Spector’s two main claims are that, (1) the TRIAD VALUES are in fact *mutually irreducible*, and that (2) Vitruvius ignored the possibility of *value conflicts* among the Triad values. While Spector thinks (1) goes beyond what Vitruvius was prepared to acknowledge or recognize in the text, he thinks the position that emerges from Vitruvius’ text is vulnerable to (giving rise to) a logical dilemma.

- V1 There are three *mutually irreducible* values in architecture, namely the TRIAD VALUES.
- V2 These three values will at times be in *conflict*.
- V3 In order to resolve such value conflicts (V2) we need to *prioritize* one of the conflicting values over the other two.
- V4 In order to prioritize one value over others (V3) we need to *reduce* the latter to the former (e.g., beauty to function – ‘functionalism’; function to beauty – ‘formalism’).

This set of propositions creates a logical dilemma, in that V1 and V4 are contradictory. There are several ways of disarming the dilemma, by rejecting any one (at least one) of V1 to V4.

- R-V1 If we reject the impossibility of value reduction (\sim V1), V4 will no longer create a problem.
- R-V2 If we deny the empirical reality of value conflicts among TRIAD VALUES (\sim V2), V3 and V4 will not create intellectual pressure to abandon V1, because the values referred to by V1 (sc. the TRIAD VALUES) are no longer in the target domain of V3 and V4.²²¹
- R-V3 If we reject the idea that value conflict resolution requires prioritizing, V4’s notion of reduction will not get off ground, and so not be in conflict with V1.
- R-V4 If we reject the idea that value prioritization requires value reduction, the reductivist pressures from V4 disappear, and no longer create a problem with the statement (V1) that the TRIAD VALUES are mutually irreducible.

Spector’s own discussion fails to do justice to the full spectrum of the options at our disposal, R-V1 to R-V4 – indeed, it seems to me it only recognizes the first (R-V1):

the problem of weighing the values of *firmitas*, *utilitas*, and *venustas* is more complex than Vitruvius would have it appear. Subsequent architect and theorists have contended with the problem of conflicting architectural values in several ways. Some have insisted that, [k1] although Vitruvius

²²¹ Formally, V3 and V4 feature universal quantification over values, and if we negate V2 we will deny that *firmitas*, *venustas*, and *utilitas* are in these quantifiers’ domains.

was correct about the plurality of values, one value can always be identified as superior to the others; its trump value does the necessary prioritizing. Others have argued against the Vitruvian idea of the irreducibility of architectural values proposing instead [k2] a unity of values, such as function and beauty. A third, and more recent, response to the problem of multiple and conflicting values in architecture asserts that [k3] one should withdraw from the inevitable compromise of values [...] and instead concentrate design efforts on breaking up this ancient antagonism. (2001, 37-38)

Spector's own solution (2001, 39 ff. and *passim*) is to, firstly, recognise the mutual irreducibility of values ($\sim k2$) but not subscribe to one value always trumping another ($\sim k1$). Because Spector's favoured solution contains negations of k1 and k2, we may subsume it as a variety of k3.²²² Apart from Spector's own incomplete analysis of V1-V4, there are then three more general points.

First, there is a general lack of clarity among architectural writers on the notion of reduction. It is frequently confused with elimination, such that A reducing to B entails the elimination of A .²²³ But this is philosophically false since, 'If facts of one kind reduce to facts of another, then the latter determine the former. And if one sort is real, then so is the other.'²²⁴ Further, the actual semantics, epistemology, and metaphysics of reduction claims are not discussed at all, and in their absence architectural writers obfuscate on key points.²²⁵ And one could just as easily show that arguments *for*, as much as *against*, reduction of values in architecture fail to be valid and/or sound. This means that, personally, I will steer free of Spector's premise V4.

Secondly, it seems to me that premise V4 is false anyhow, in that value trade offs, or the 'weighing' of values (to use another of Spector's phrases), does not at all mean (or require) that we either *reduce* competing values to one another, or to a yet further (meta-)value, or (relatedly) that we *commensurate* competing values on a common denominator. It does not mean that because of the distinction of ordinal and cardinal ranking, and since 'the lack of a single scale of units of value does not entail incomparability.'²²⁶ Spector later (2001, 74, 79-81) finds the ordinal alternative too woolly to merit consideration, so his discussion instantly relapses into discussion of (in)commensurables. This, however, points up the need to inquire which positions may have been overlooked outside these two suggestions. We already saw how Spector's own solution is (to repeat) to, firstly, recognise the mutual irreducibility of values ($\sim k2$) but not subscribe to one value always trumping another ($\sim k1$). This makes it seem as if R-V3 requires or presupposes R-V1, which overlooks varieties of substantiating R-V3 on other grounds.

For thirdly, and finally, there is a position the possibility of which is not so much as sketched in Spector's categorization – on which the three values are, not comparable, commensurable, reducible, or bear any other feature the ascription of which assumes that we are dealing with three independent values that need to be brought in line. The assumption I here challenge is that we start out with three independent values, and then see how they relate. To this I proceed next.

²²² Unless, that is, k3 involves withdrawing from, or outwardly rejecting *en toto*, the values in the triad at all, as Spector's discussion of Robert Venturi at times seems to suggest. If this is the correct reading of Venturi, Venturi's position is highly vulnerable to philosophical objections: see §3.3.2. That apart, Spector's position is clear enough to *not* belong to k1, so William M. Taylor and Michael P. Levine (*Prospects for an Ethics of Architecture*, Routledge: London 2011) are wide off the mark in claiming that Spector's account always has beauty trump function.

²²³ For the confusion, see Ockman (2009) and Till (2009).

²²⁴ Salmon (2005, 198n.). See also Tim Crane's stance on reduction, discussed in my (2013).

²²⁵ For discussion, see Koller (2013).

²²⁶ Chang (1997, 1-2).

§3.3 THE RECIPROCITY THESIS

On what is arguably the customary understanding, the TRIAD VALUES are three mutually *independent* values. In opposition to that, I shall argue that the TRIAD VALUES are in fact mutually *interdependent* values. That thesis could be glossed in several ways:

- (a) the values themselves are *semantically* interdefined,
- (b) the values' *application* is reciprocally constrained,
- (c) the way we *understand* any of these values is 'tinged' by our understanding of the others.²²⁷

While an argued defense of *any one of* (a) to (c) suffices to undercut the aforementioned 'customary interpretation' of how the TRIAD VALUES are related to one another, it is also clear that we cannot defend all of (a) to (c) at once, when (as I just argued) they are, not only not logically equivalent, but actually overdetermining of the same matter to be explained. So which of (a) to (c) is it going to be?

I will reject (a) because it is too narrow, bordering, as it does, on an implausible claim of lexical interdefinition on the model of 'married male' and 'bachelor', a model that cannot be sustained once we attend to how Vitruvius defines the terms (and I shall, for present purposes, regard his text as authoritative at least on the *lexical* definition of the terms). I will suggest that (b) is plausible, and consistent with those primary sources. And while I do not have room to address and rule out (c), I shall suggest (b) is the more plausible of the two as it does not (implausibly) implicate all ordinary speakers in semantic competence on architectural technical terms. I shall call (b) the RECIPROCITY THESIS. Before I proceed to its defense, let me give an informal and formal statement of it that includes some preliminary clarification of its component terms (§3.4 will return to their clarification more fully).

Informal Statement. The basic idea is that the predicates 'is beautiful', 'is functional', and 'is solid' are not applicable, or at least *truly ascribable*, to something architectural unless that something satisfies all three of them. So if you have something that is beautiful but non-functional, that may be a stylish piece of landscape art, but is not architecture. Or again, if you have something functional and solidly built but not beautiful, that may be a perfectly serviceable building, but not architecture. The key point to understand is that the three predicates are co-conditional or reciprocal because their *content* constrains the application of one another.

Take an ordinary predicate like 'is large'. That predicate has completely different correctness conditions once we apply it to a mouse or an elephant. Something may be big for a mouse, but it is still small when compared to an elephant. Just so, on the classical understanding of architectural beauty, one does *not* start off with an entirely general understanding of beauty – one that one gets from a fully general aesthetic view – and then sees how far it applies to architecture. Rather, from the get go, we establish that the very ascription of beauty to a building is already constrained by that building's function and solidity, as that is what architectural beauty pertains to.²²⁸ A building is beautiful, in an architectural sense, if the properties that account for its functionality and solidity are aesthetically pleasing – are beautifully arranged. So, architectural beauty is always already beauty *of a solid construction*, a thesis we will re-encounter in Carl Albert Rosenthal's writings, discussed in §4.2.

The same applies to firmness, which seems comparatively counter-intuitive. Even if the attribution of *architectural* beauty (or functionality) presupposes the building's firmness, the reverse dependence seems

²²⁷ (c) will collapse into (a) if a theory of meaning (a) is what a theory of understanding (c) is a theory of. Likewise, (b) will collapse into (a) if a theory of meaning (a) is what a theory of pragmatic word use (b) is a theory of. However, recent work in philosophical semantics and pragmatics has made it unlikely that either (c) or (b) so collapses.

²²⁸ On a different view, a building has to *first* be solidly built and functional to even merit consideration of its aesthetic value, where the latter is to be characterized *independently* of solidity and functionality. This fails to escape the objections of §3.2, and seems to be a fairly inconsequential variant of the assumption §3.3 is designed to challenge – that the *content* of architectural beauty, functionality, and solidity can be specified independently of one another.

less intuitive – why should a building be firm *only if* it is also functional and aesthetically pleasing? Here the idea is that only a compositionally *properly arranged* building will be firm, and that *that* type of arrangement cannot be defined or fully realized in the absence of functional and aesthetic concerns. This is obviously a highly revisionary semantics for ‘is firm’. But the point of the exercise never was to see how close it hews to ordinary English usage, but to avail us of a technical term for philosophical purposes. What is more, CHAPTERS 4, 8, and 10 all show that *this* usage is legitimate when it comes to architecture and taps into a specific understanding of architectonic composition that has been historically highly influential. As before, historical relevance does not equate to philosophical validity. But my point is a more modest one – that this understanding of ‘is firm’ being *a technical one* is licensed in the context of the present work.

Finally, the same type of consideration (offered thus far for beauty and firmness) applies to functionality, in that we do not start off with a fully general idea of what functionality is (say, ‘what it takes to perform a certain role’) and then ask, whether this building meets the function. Rather, we (co-)define functional success in terms of the building’s beauty and its construction or solidity; a suggestion contemporary philosophers seem open to, in that they allow that certain (prima facie) aesthetic merits or ‘virtues’ such as ‘delicacy’ are inappropriate for certain buildings, such as a triumphal arch, given the buildings’ non-aesthetic functions.²²⁹ More broadly, the key question is: how does the way the building is composed (how it is put together to form a solid structure) help to realize a certain function? Is the composition or solidity necessary and sufficient to help realize that function? If not, and no other composition will do either, we thereby know that the ‘function’ in question is *not* an architectural one. (It might, however, be a function for future architecture to realize. Architecture’s history is full with *joint* innovations on program and construction techniques (functionality and firmness), cf. §9.1.) As we shall see in CHAPTER 4, quite a lot of aesthetic philosophy in the (early and high) modern period departs from this view, a point that nets it much critique from architects of the same period. So besides its being a core element in Vitruvian thought on the ethics of architecture, the RECIPROCITY THESIS also provides an indispensable *chiffre* to parse some key developments in modern philosophical thought on architecture and their merits.

To be sure, given the poor contemporary understanding of ‘function’ in the philosophy of architecture (§1.7.2), any claims in the present thesis on ‘function’ are subject to revision by future progress in the field. As we saw in CHAPTER 1, a major shortcoming of talk of ‘function’ in philosophy of architecture has to do with the vague and generic nature of functional attributions to buildings, of the variety ‘medicare’ (hospital), ‘houses artworks’ (museum), ‘facilitates office work’ (tall office building) and so on. Minimally, we can improve on that situation as follows. We can assert that a building *b*’s function includes *b*’s circulation, lighting, ventilation and other climatological features that human occupancy of *b* presupposes, and that these features are to be attributed (and appraised) vis-à-vis a functional decomposition of *b*’s function as a whole.²³⁰ So we move, from the function *b* has a whole, to the realization of that function in *b*’s parts; for example, from *b*’s having to cater to the needs of hospital patients (if *b* is a hospital) to how *b*’s compositional parts (rooms, walls, outdoor spaces) realize these needs in virtue of the climatological and lighting (etc.) properties of *b*’s parts. Since the latter properties can (and ideally are) selected with a view to satisfy constraints of solidity and of being aesthetically pleasing, it follows that there is no tension between functionality and aesthetical considerations that define so much modern philosophical writing on

²²⁹ Zangwill (1995, 324); the example is owed to Stephan Burton’s work on thick concepts (cf. *ibid.*, 329n.15). As before, I lament philosophers’ tendency to allocate functionality and tone to artworks in so monolithic a manner. An effective tragedy will rely on moments and moods of a non-tragic manner, by way of *chiaroscuro* (think of an Ingmar Bergman film). Just so, a building, even where its overriding function is one that seemingly requires *gravitas*, may benefit from occasional lighter touches in its detailing. And the notion that buildings have ‘overriding functions’ that govern, in a very simplistic manner, the allocation of features to their compositional parts is questionable.

²³⁰ The point itself is entirely familiar to first year students of architecture, if textbooks like Ching (2007) are any indication. This perhaps indicates the extent to which contemporary philosophy of architecture still operates independently of such literature. On ‘climatological’ see further §3.5.

architecture, focusing as it does exclusively on *b*'s function as a whole without regard to that of its parts.²³¹ (In §2.7 and §3.4.1 pursue structurally analogous points about the 'part-whole' calibration with respect to *being aesthetically pleasing* and *being solidly built*, which help to further underwrite the core tenets of the RECIPROCITY THESIS and the essentialist definition of architecture it engenders.)

A final qualification on 'function' in architecture is that (on some views at least) it is interdefined with expressive purpose typically aligned with aesthetic quality and realized by compositional means of being solidly built. In a justly famous remark, Wittgenstein claims:

Architecture glorifies something (for it <is a gesture that> endures). It glorifies its purpose. (...) Architecture immortalizes & glorifies something. Hence there can be no architecture where there is nothing (to immortalize &) glorify.²³²

This remark has to be viewed in light of Wittgenstein's view, expressed five years earlier, on architecture as gesture:

Architecture is a *gesture*. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. Just as little as every functional building is architecture.²³³

For Wittgenstein, *purpose* is the central element of architecture – architecture is purposive, and cannot escape the function or purpose it serves. The notion of 'purpose' and Wittgenstein's enigmatic invocation of 'gesture' receive joint elucidation in §290 of Part Two of his *Philosophical Investigations*:

'Why did you look at me and shake your head?' – 'I wanted to convey to you that you...'. This is supposed to express not a symbolic [or, signifying] convention but the purpose of my action.²³⁴

Suppose you and I are in conversation, and as I talk I move my hand forward to grab my cup of coffee. This (hand) movement is clearly purposive, in that the movement serves a purpose – to further my moving the cup towards my mouth, drink the coffee, slake my thirst, and aid my concentration to better attend to the intricacy of your words. There is, then, not just one purpose, but a significant concatenation of several purposes. But in not a single step so far do we get a *gesture*. Contrast the case where I pause your train of thought and speech by raising my hand, signaling to you to pause. Here my movement serves an end, but it does something else – it is *expressive* of that use. It serves its function only because it intends to be understood as serving that function. And that, for Wittgenstein, is what elevates a bodily movement to a gesture: its *expressive intent*.

Nearly any narrowly functional bodily movement – or, indeed, nearly any suppression thereof – can be elevated to a gesture. If I drink my wine prematurely before the dinner's host has raised her glass, if I *do not* drink it when she raises it, if I *do not* get up in a US baseball stadium when the national anthem is sung – all these are (suppressed) bodily movements that, if caught unaware, might excuse me from the offense they cause to etiquette. But if deliberate (replace 'do not' with 'refuse to'), they are not so excused precisely because it is understood, by myself and my audience through a shared language of gestures, that my intent

²³¹ See CHAPTER 6 on how the play of sunlight on a building's surfaces both in- and outside a building (by extension, the building's volumetric composition) becomes a co-defining feature of architecture for Le Corbusier. The idea that his writings or buildings focus on *either* the aesthetic *or* the functional, at the brute exclusion of the respective other, is premised on understanding 'the aesthetic' and 'the functional' in ways that run counter to pretty much everything in §3.3. For that idea, see the writings of Roger Scruton and his exegetes, for instance, Hamilton (2012). This is likely a good juncture to briefly address some foundational positions underlying Roger Scruton's influential work on the aesthetics of architecture. Scruton (1979) marries (i) a classical understanding of architecture to (ii) a positive commitment to a Kantian aesthetics of architecture and to (iii) a wholesale rejection of modernist architecture (including Mies van der Rohe's) on moral and stylistic grounds. CHAPTERS 5 and 10 could be profitably read as responses to (ii) and (iii) respectively, with material in CHAPTERS 3 and 3* indicating where I part company with Scruton's views on (i) and (indeed) on how (i) relates to (ii-iii). Further specifics of Scruton's philosophy of architecture are critically discussed in §§2.6.1-2.6.2, §3.6.3.1, §3.7, §6.2.1, and §9.4.

²³² Wittgenstein, (1998, 75), editor's insertion; remark dated 1947-1948.

²³³ Wittgenstein, (1998, 50); remark dated 1942.

²³⁴ Wittgenstein (1952/2009, 229e).

was deliberate. Moreover, in that case it is understood that I *wanted* my intent to be understood *through my gesture*, and that the *expression* itself was part of, and not incidental to, my moving (or not moving) my body in the specific way I did.

All this, Wittgenstein alleges, applies to architecture, which after all has its own body or *corpus* to look after, and is able to ‘gesture’. (See further §3.4.2 on architectural beauty (*venustas*) being defined in terms of how one carries one’s own body (*vestitus*).) Any building corpus serves a function (by *hosting* it), but when it does so with a degree of apparent intent and self-awareness, and is moreover confident enough to *draw other people’s attention* to it, *then* we can begin to speak of architecture, and not mere building.

Wittgenstein’s views need not command universal agreement. Most importantly, they leave open *just what precisely* a building’s ‘drawing attention’ to its function consists in: as before, absent a proper understanding of ‘architectural function’, the point is bound to be comical, as we saw in §1.7.2.²³⁵ Nor is it likely Vitruvius or other architects shared something very much like Wittgenstein’s views in detail. But if nothing else those views highlight one way in which talk of functionality *in architecture* goes beyond talk of functionality in ‘mere building’, just as purposiveness *in gesture* enjoys an added significance it lacks in much goal-directed bodily movement more generally. And those views highlight how backwards it is to *start out* with a fully generic notion of functionality, to be only applied to architecture in the next step (or further down the lane). Finally, they provide a salutary reminder that, contrary to much modern reflection on architecture since Kant, functionality or purposiveness is *not* something ‘mere building’ has to overcome or forget, in order to attain the elevated status of architecture. And that, of course, is a core contention of the RECIPROCITY THESIS, to whose formal statement we turn next.

Formal Statement. The RECIPROCITY THESIS begins from the truth-functional equivalence of three first order predications involving a building *b*, [E]:

[E] Is beautiful (*b*) iff Is functional (*b*) iff Is solid (*b*)

Claim [E] is underwritten by the *co-application* of the predicates, analogous to (1) non-intersective and (2) scalar adjectives. (If it were not so underwritten, [E] could still allow the very assumption §3.3 rejects, sc. that the lexical and non-lexical *content* of architectural beauty, functionality, and solidity is *independently specifiable*.) In the following pairs of statements, the asterisked version contains an incorrect semantics of the quoted statement.

- (*1) ‘Brigit Bardot is a good mother’ is true iff BB is good *and* BB is a mother.
- (1) ‘Brigit Bardot is a good mother’ is true iff BB is good *as* a mother.
- (*2) ‘Mickey is a small mouse’ is true if Mickey is small *and* Mickey is a mouse.
- (2) ‘Mickey is a small mouse’ is true if Mickey is small *for* a mouse.
- (*3) ‘The Barcelona Pavilion [*b*] by Mies van der Rohe is a beautiful, functional, and solidly constructed building’ is true iff {B(*b*) and F(*b*) and S(*b*)}.
- (3) ‘Is beautiful (*b*) *and* Is functional (*b*) *and* Is solid (*b*)’ is true iff *b* is beautiful with respect to how its mode of composition (solidity, *firmitas*) realizes *b*’s function *f*.

(*3) allows the three first order presentations to be true independently of one another: the three predicative terms are brought together by conjunction, yielding an intersective reading like (*1). By

²³⁵ Graham Gordon (2000, 125) asks: ‘How could St Pancras railway station in London, though undoubtedly impressive, be thought to express the idea of travelling by train? Besides, there is a further question about what exactly the idea to be conveyed is. Should St Pancras say ‘travelling by train’ to the spectator or just ‘travelling’, or even more abstractly ‘movement’? It is not so much that we find it difficult to answer these questions but that they seem inappropriate to raise.’ What generates the apparent ‘inpropriety’ is certainly owed, at least in part, to Gordon’s questionable choices of semantic terminology (is ‘*say to the traveller*’ really the apt relation?) and of functionality (‘travelling by train’) – the mix of factors that CHAPTER 1 drew attention to (see respectively §1.6.1 and §1.7.2).

contrast, the (quasi-)reciprocal reading in (3) shows how the predicates are implicated in one another's application. (3) uses semantic primitives 'with respect to how' and 'realizes' that receive elucidation in the sequel. However, given the poor contemporary understanding of 'function' in the philosophy of architecture (§1.7.2) which the current thesis has not and will not be able to repair adequately, any relation on *f* as in (3) will remain imperfectly precise, absent the suggestion volunteered (and elaborated) above that *f* includes *b*'s circulation, lighting, ventilation and other climatological features that human occupancy of *b* presupposes.

This concludes the formal statement of the RECIPROCITY THESIS. Moving on to its defense, I argue that we should adopt the RECIPROCITY THESIS on grounds of its historical accuracy and its philosophical superiority over competitors.

§3.3.1 THE RECIPROCITY THESIS: HISTORICAL DEFENSE

CHAPTERS 3-4 (will) argue that *subscription* to the RECIPROCITY THESIS (b) informs the understanding of the TRIAD VALUES that Vitruvius himself brings to the table, and the understanding that later architects in (what CHAPTER 4 shall call) the 'tectonic tradition' bring to the table, including Hirt, Schinkel, and others. If we look at Semper's commentary on Barbaro's edition of Vitruvius,²³⁶ he observes how Barbaro attempted to import a distinction of absolute and relative predicates.²³⁷ The former, like 'is a man' can be attributed to things in isolation. But others predicates like 'is a brother (of)', notes Barbaro, cannot be satisfied by things in isolation. Barbaro surmises, as Semper puts it, how much of Vitruvius' aesthetic vocabulary in *De Architectura* book I should be read against this logical distinction of predicables, and Semper's own later work will likewise employ such logical apparatus.²³⁸ The point, for Barbaro and Semper, is apparently that this holds for the predicates expressed by the TRIAD VALUES as well, and that we should look at them as mutually 'inseparable' (Semper 1884, 206) – that is, as not correctly applicable in isolation from one another, just as (b) says. Moreover, since this seems a substantive thesis about the *referents* of those terms rather than their lexical usage, this corroborates the correctness of favouring (b) over (a).

The same point transpires from Renaissance discussions of the types of architectural drawing. In Palladio's illustration of the *Villa Rotunda*, section, elevation, and plan come together, to indicate that the three are there to contribute to a coherent overall design.²³⁹ In his accompanying notes, Palladio roughly correlates the three types of drawing with, respectively, *firmitas*, *venustas*, and *utilitas*,²⁴⁰ where 'correlation' means, that these drawings are especially important for elaborating how a concrete design meets the requirements expressed by the three terms respectively – meaning the reciprocal relation of the three types of drawing translate into reciprocal dependency over the values the types are informed by. A similar subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS emerges in Alberti, if we think back to his three step argument detailed in §2.7. What complicates our reading of Palladio on this point, however, is that he only has one term for section and elevation, namely *profilo*. This transpires from the way Palladio's drawings, which accompanied Barbaro's commented edition of Vitruvius, are annotated. (Recall that Semper's point is likewise rooted in Barbaro's edition of Vitruvius.)

Vitruvius listed *ichnographia*, *orthographia*, and *sciographia* as the three modes of architectural presentation; his explanations [I.2.§2.] indicate that by these he meant plan, elevation, and one-point perspective. Vitruvius thus omitted the section and included one-point perspective instead. In his commentary, Barbaro explains that *orthographia* is elevation, *ichnographia* ground plan, and suggests interpreting *scaenographia* as *sciographia*, which he translates as section (*profilo*), not as

²³⁶ Semper (1884, 191-212, at 203-204), referring to Barbaro (1567).

²³⁷ A distinction likely imported from Plato and Aristotle into Renaissance thought via Porphyry's *Epagôgê*. Cf. Porphyry (2003, 61-62 and 95-96).

²³⁸ See Semper (1860, vol. I).

²³⁹ Palladio (1570/1997, 95), II.3.

²⁴⁰ Palladio (1570/1997, 6-7), I.1.

perspective. A drawing by Palladio, showing a section through a Greek temple designated as *profilo*, is included to make the interpretation clear.²⁴¹

So far, my defense of the RECIPROCITY THESIS only rests on its exegetical adequacy. But that point should not be underplayed either. If we are to engage the most representative thinkers in the architectural discipline, and they are all agreed on how precisely to understand the relation of the TRIAD VALUES to one another, then our critical engagement with their thinking should at least get the target right. I mention this right away, in that Spector's own analysis (2001, 38-42) invites us to consider Alberti, Palladio, and Schinkel as all committed to V3. On the reading offered here and in CHAPTER 4, however, all three architects actually endorse its rejection, R-V3, since they all champion a variant of position k2 that foregoes the need to prioritize any one particular value in the Vitruvian Triad (to reference §3.2's nomenclature). And this means, further, that their actual position is much stronger than suspected, because it is not tied to dubious claims on value reduction that are *open to philosophical objection* (see §3.2). With Alberti, for instance, the argument quoted from his text in my §2.7 makes it impossible to see him as defending V3.

§3.3.2 THE RECIPROCITY THESIS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE

This already moves us to my second argument in defense of the RECIPROCITY THESIS – its philosophical superiority over its competitors. For R-V3 seems to be superior to V3, in that it avoids pretty strong objections. More controversially however, we also seem to be now committed to the rejection of V2, in that the RECIPROCITY THESIS upholds R-V2:

V2 The TRIAD VALUES will at times be in conflict.

R-V2 We deny the empirical reality of value conflicts (\sim V2).

While it may be *prima facie* unclear why R-V2 is philosophically superior over V2, I can argue that it is. For, if the RECIPROCITY THESIS is correct, value conflicts among the terms in the triad do not ever arise, not even in principle. Any architecture for which such a conflict would appear to arise, would by definition not be good architecture. Possibly, it would not even qualify as architecture, but as an unsuccessful attempt at it, in the manner comparable to (a) someone untrained at piano may 'attempt' a Prelude by Chopin or (b) an agent still trying to acquire the fundamentals of reasoning (such as children at certain developmental stages) will only imperfectly instantiate traits contained in what Davidson called 'the constitutive ideal of rationality' (see §2.7 and §3.2). Hence, if the RECIPROCITY THESIS and the analysis of values that informs it are correct, contemporary notions of architectural achievement may need to be reappraised. Some contemporary work on Vitruvius needs to be reappraised too, specifically negative one. Among other things, Spector's claim that the triad comes in with the 'built in quandary' of giving rise to value conflicts it cannot resolve turns out to be, not a challenge to Vitruvius' position, but a misunderstanding of it. The same holds *pari passu* for Robert Venturi's claim that,

architecture is necessarily complex and contradictory in its very inclusion of the traditional Vitruvian elements of commodity, firmness, and delight. And today the wants of program, structure, mechanical equipment, and expression, even in single buildings in simple context, are diverse and conflicting in ways previously unimaginable.²⁴²

These charges presuppose rather than establish an understanding of Vitruvius at odds with the RECIPROCITY THESIS. But this also means that an understanding of Vitruvius *not* at odds with but rather *in line with* the RECIPROCITY THESIS can escape the type of philosophical problems leveled at his triad by Spector and Venturi. And that means that adopting the RECIPROCITY THESIS, as far as the philosophical challenges outlined so far go, is philosophically superior to adopting its more conventional alternatives. (It

²⁴¹ Mitrovic (1998, 670).

²⁴² Venturi (1977, 16).

also means that historically rather influential ‘arguments from complexity and contradiction’ to undermine a classical, TRIAD-based understanding of architecture are based on philosophical and historical error.)

But this can hardly conclude a fully satisfactory defense of the thesis’ philosophical merits. For other than learning what (problematic consequences) do *not* accrue by accepting the RECIPROCITY THESIS, we also need to properly assess what consequences (positive and negative) *do* accrue by endorsing it. In one way or another, each of the subsequent chapters engages the question what these consequences are, and they each revisit (to varying degrees) the question as to its comparative merits over the conventional understanding of the triad put into question by Spector and Venturi. Thus, in CHAPTER 4 I outline two contrasting stances on how functionality and beauty interact in architecture, with CHAPTERS 5-6 showing in great detail how a position that sees them opposed and entirely free of mutual constraints accrues many more philosophical problems for the metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics of architecture.

CHAPTERS 7-10 then focus on a contrary position, one that (I allege) reintroduces *firmitas* as a core concern for our individuation of architecture, and enlists it as tying the other two elements in the triad together, in line with the RECIPROCITY THESIS (b). Those final chapters show just how far we can go as regards a properly grounded understanding of the ethics of architecture, that is, one properly grounded in attention to compositional and constructional detail. Without such attention, the present work suggests, no ethics of architecture can meet the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT. The importance and relevance of the RECIPROCITY THESIS for the overall argument, then, is very high, if also slightly indirect.

The RECIPROCITY THESIS constrains how we individuate the morally salient compositional properties that buildings have. That is, we could in theory attend to one and the same building’s properties, say, those we hold to contribute to its being aesthetically pleasing, without yet subscribing to the RECIPROCITY THESIS. But as the material in CHAPTER 6 brings out, if we individuate those properties in a certain way, namely as totally unconstrained by regards for utility and being solidly constructed, we end up with a dubious understanding of architecture. And, as a result, we end up with an ethics of architecture that fails to home in on architecture, properly understood. So the RECIPROCITY THESIS is both there to refine the proper workings of the CHAPTER 2 framework, but the argument also runs the other way: the theoretic *adequacy demands* introduced in the INTRODUCTION and CHAPTERS 1-2, with further ones introduced on the epistemology and aesthetics of architecture in later chapters, jointly necessitate subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS. To function properly and optimally, the ethical model in CHAPTER 2 requires a certain understanding of architecture. But the theoretic constraints that transpire *from* the model constrain our individuation, our metaphysics, of architecture. If the ethical model and the metaphysics are then interdependent (if not strictly inter-entailing), to consistently reject either one of them requires rejecting both. And that means one would need not only to come up with (i.) counter-arguments that undermine the specific defense all these positions receive in the present work, but also (ii.) an argument to show that the very desirability *to at all have an ethics of architecture* (as argued for in the PREFACE and INTRODUCTION) is misconceived as well. This is certainly possible in principle. But it also requires considerable amounts of philosophical labour, and at present there is little reason to believe it can be done concretely.

But what about rejecting the very desirability of having an ethics of architecture at all, a model needed to systematically account for moralizations of architecture? In fairness to Venturi, this is likely a position he would invite us to consider. In that regard, Venturi is entirely *consistent* in his position, even if it is not always backed up by strong arguments. We are faced, then, with one of two internally consistent positions. While their systematic comparison is beyond the confines of the present work, that task is helped indirectly by building up a strong contender to Venturi’s position and by documenting at each step the precise arguments on which the contender rests. For that, of course, is what the present work is all about.

At the same time readers should remember that *if* they are alright with accepting as legitimate and felicitous certain moralizations of architecture (as explained in the PREFACE) and think there is a legitimate concern to explain what is going on in moralizations of architecture, then the dominos fall. For, given the hypothesis that at least some moral appraisals of architecture make sense when taken at face

value, one subscribes to certain adequacy constraints such as the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT and the DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT. From there, one is compelled to accept the only correct theory that currently meets these constraints, the FACE VALUE TREATMENT. But that treatment is premised on the TRIAD VALUES and the RECIPROCITY THESIS, claims flatly incompatible with Venturi's non-moral beliefs about architecture. As a result, the latter beliefs can only be internally consistent if Venturi also proclaims that all moral appraisals of architecture are nonsensical, a supposition CHAPTER 1 saw much to contest.

So without going further into the specifics of Venturi's thought, we can already see how the present material mounts considerable intellectual pressure on Venturi's non-moral views about architecture. The *Coda* will outline a similar response to the moral evasiveness of Zaha Hadid, as likewise premised on a philosophically dubious understanding of the nature of architecture and architectonic composition. In short, the RECIPROCITY THESIS, while not itself flatly moral, is a central element in the moral appraisal of architecture, and in the appraisal of architects' moral views on architectonic composition and buildings.

§3.4 THE TRIAD VALUES: CORE CLAIMS

Just as a proper understanding of how the TRIAD VALUES feature in the CHAPTER 2 model requires a revisionary understanding of their relation *to one another*, we also require a proper understanding of the values' individual content. In that regard, the present section argues for a couple of claims concerning *utilitas*, *firmitas*, and *venustas* (or, in their INTRODUCTION cognates, *being functional*, *being solidly constructed*, and *being aesthetically pleasing*). More precisely, I split my presentation of the arguments into two parts. The present section *summarizes* the core claims, and explains how these fit into the larger thesis framework, where the next chapter, CHAPTER 3*, presents the in-depth defense of these claims. This is intended to enable readers interested mainly in pursuing the thesis' philosophical core argument to move on quickly, while providing readers interested in the philosophical, philological, and historical background to these core claims with the necessary materials. I want to underscore as strongly as possible, however, that CHAPTER 3* is strictly optional except for brief summary sections (§3.6.7, §3.7.1, §3.8). Here, then, is a summary of my core claims on the TRIAD VALUES's content.

§3.4.1 TECTONIC COMPOSITION

I argue that Vitruvius' term for architectural firmness (or, being solidly constructed) allows two readings, one focusing on buildings' *synchronic* features, and one reading focusing on their *diachronic* features. That is, buildings can respectively have certain features *at a particular time*, whereas they can have others only when we consider their temporal progress *throughout* a stretch of time. I argue that firmness is a synchronic feature, that of being *tectonically composed*. That is, a building's being firm means that it is composed in manner where its parts interlock in certain way to help 'holding up' the entire structure. Formally,

- (1) 'Building *b* is firm' is true iff *b* is tectonically composed, and
- (2) *b* is tectonically composed iff the physical properties of *b*'s parts and the physical properties of *b* as a whole are mutually constrained so that *b* as a whole is held up.

Beyond CHAPTER 3*, we will encounter more thorough presentations of these views at the hands of Schopenhauer, Viollet-le-Duc, and Boetticher in CHAPTERS 4, 7, and 8. In Boetticher (§8.2) for instance, (2) gets expanded so as to comprise the idea(s) that,

- (2.1) a 'system of statics and segmentation' on masonry construction *individuates* the formal aesthetic features of buildings' compositional elements (*b*'s parts),
- (2.2) the building is a *segmented composite* of parts bearing these features, so every compositional part is individuated with respect to its role and place in the overall *fitting*, accounting for the *morphological* and *static* properties assigned to each element,
- (2.3) the parts' static properties are individuated as *dynamic* forces of bear and load, and

(2.4) the unity or jointness of the parts is dictated by the composite's primary static property, its remaining firmly in place and balance, ensuring its lasting endurance.

It is not hard to see how these views retain contemporary relevance once we update the empirical details and conceptual refinements that go into this 'system' of static properties and dynamic forces. A brief foray gives some indication of this, to reassure readers of the contemporary relevance of the material, but those primarily interested in Vitruvius (at this point) can skip ahead to §3.4.1.2. I should also like to remind readers that we met in §2.7 with a view of architectural beauty – by Vitruvius, Alberti, and Palladio – that ported structural analogues to clauses (1) and (2) into the definition of *being aesthetically pleasing*, by defining it as likewise a calibration of parts and wholes to serve a telic end.

§3.4.1.1 FIRMNESS IN CONTEMPORARY TECTONICS

In one fairly contemporary text,

Statics gives us a theoretical and scientific background for understanding why architectural structures look the way they do, both in form and dimension. Our knowledge of structures can also influence such architectural concepts as visual appearance, function, weight, texture, light, shade, and shadow. Good architecture can result if the structure's own logic is founded on these concepts.²⁴³

The authors later explain this (up to the point of 'visual appearance') as 'structural dualism' (had they included 'function', we would have the TRIAD VALUES complete), whereby

A building structure can be said to have at least two aims of equal importance: the technical and the aesthetic. The first aim, the technical function, is to stand upright, secure from collapse or excessive deformation. The structure accomplishes this by withstanding loads and transferring them, through the building components, to the ground. The second aim, the aesthetic function, is to act as a potent and meaningful visual vehicle that, through the process of refinement, can become a convincing and recognizable medium of architectural expression. Both the technical and the aesthetic function of a building structure must be satisfied simultaneously if the structure is to be more than just an assemblage of answers to various technical problems. | There is little disagreement with regard to the theory of statics that is presented in this book. It is mathematically and scientifically founded and logical in its composition. At present, however, there are many opinions about the world of structural design to which this theory can be applied, especially in an architectural context. (1992, 12-13)

And moreover,

A structure is the material's answer to an architectural problem. It is meaningless to design a structure without respect for and understanding of the materials to be used. The structural design, as a whole and in detail, must be in accordance with the inherent properties of the structural material. For this reason a brick building manifests itself in a considerably different fashion from a steel building. (1992, 20)

Let me focus on what the authors call the 'technical function' of structure, namely,

to stand upright, secure [a building] from collapse or excessive deformation. The structure accomplishes this by withstanding loads and transferring them, through the building components, to the ground. (1992, 12)

This is mostly a paraphrase of *firmitas* in Vitruvius (once read in terms of claim (2) above, §3.4), although we get a clearer statement here as to which *forces* a firm structure is there to resist – collapse (horizontal

²⁴³ Sandaker and Eggen (1992, 7).

pressure) and deformation (vertical pressure). And that constitutes the ‘contemporary update’ or face-lift of a Vitruvian understanding of (one of) architecture’s core values, the TRIAD VALUES, indicated earlier.

Quite generally, firmness is buildings’ resistance to various types of *load*, and we can individuate these types either by (a) the type of load *effect* or (b) the *causal source* of the load.²⁴⁴ Under (a), a load ‘is defined as any influence that causes forces of deformations in a structure. It can take the form of compression forces in a column or stretching forces acting on a steel cable.’ (1992, 16) And under (b),

loads can be divided into separate categories. The two major loads are *dead loads* and live loads. Dead loads are loads that are considered constant through time. The most important dead load is the weight of the structural elements and building materials themselves. This load has a vertical orientation and, owing to gravity, is directed downward. [...] Live loads are loads that vary over time. The most important types of live loads are snow loads, wind loads, and occupant/user loads. (1992, 16)

As an example, CHAPTER 10 will discuss the lateral bracing in modern steel frames that help it avert horizontal pressure; and will discuss how this surfaces in the building’s design, visibly and non-visibly. Further categorizations of (b) are possible, but shall not be pursued here.²⁴⁵

§3.4.1.2 VITRUVIUS RESUMED

For now, we may retain the simpler individuation of firmness up to claims (1) and (2) above (§3.4), and hence shorn (as of yet) of later refinements by writers like Boetticher or more contemporary architects.

Firmness understood as a synchronic feature – a feature a building can have *at a time* – is also a categorical feature, with the dispositional and diachronic upshot that, if done properly, a *tectonically composed* building will also be stable *across time*, or ‘durable’. Or, more precisely, synchronic firmness is a *set* of categorical and dispositional features (like *size*, *shape*, and *solidity*) that form the ‘categorical basis’ or foundation for further dispositional features, namely diachronic ones (*endurance*). As a result, the following conditional holds,

(3) ‘Building *b* is firm’ is true only if *b* is an enduring physical structure.

because given (1) and the grounding of diachronic in synchronic firmness just mentioned,

(3’) if *b* is tectonically composed then *b* is an enduring physical structure.

However, the reverse of (3) does not hold, such that,

(4) If *b* is an enduring physical structure then *b* is firm (or, then ‘*b* is firm’ is true).

To parse out such differences, CHAPTER 3* goes into specifics on the lexical attribution of this type of composition to Vitruvius’ term for ‘firmness’, and it does so for two reasons. First, as the INTRODUCTION pointed out, on fairly weak understandings of firmness, architectural artifacts are not discernible from other artifacts. Vitruvius’ term, however, helps differentiate architectural artifacts from other solid things, since these further things will not be composed in the manner described (1-2), even if they likewise pursue or display an endurance of sorts. The falsity of (4) is all important in this regard, and we will encounter it in Kant’s own understanding of architecture and that of his contemporary exegetes (§3.6.3.1 and §5.4). Paul Guyer, for one, believes that, ‘*Firmitas* or durability is [...] what allows a building with its *utilitas* or convenience and *venustas* or beauty to endure and be enjoyed over time.’²⁴⁶ Hence, as before with the

²⁴⁴ Following Sidney Shoemaker’s work, I would use this to individuate load types by their causal profiles. See my discussion of Shoemaker on ‘architectural properties’ in Koller (2013).

²⁴⁵ Among (b) we have occupancy loads, impact loads (‘kinetic loads of short duration resulting from moving vehicles, equipment, and machinery’), thermal stresses, water pressure, settlement loads (these are ‘imposed on a structure by subsidence of a portion of the supporting soil and the resulting differential settlement of its foundation’), and environmentally caused loads from wind, snow, rain, flood, and soil (Ching and Seckler 2012, 282-286).

²⁴⁶ Guyer (2011, 8).

RECIPROcity THESIS, getting such specifics about the TRIAD VALUES right has lasting philosophical relevance, and helps correct philosophically erroneous understandings of architecture still prevalent today.

Secondly, I go into some length on explaining how firmness means or is to be explained in terms of tectonic composition (and its synchronic upshot) to forge a link with a strand of architectural reflection in the nineteenth century that CHAPTER 4 will call ‘the tectonic tradition’. Forging this link is important because it enables us to see how later writers refine Vitruvius’ understanding of firmness. More importantly, however, these writers are often architects who, unlike Vitruvius, have an impressive track record of buildings that survive into the contemporary world. Their work, written and built, helps us see how building with the imperatives of tectonic composition in mind interrelates to moral concerns, indeed helps us understand better where the latter concerns enter architectonic composition. This feeds directly into the CHAPTER 2 framework, which precisely sought to juxtapose and connect these two domains: the moral and the compositional. In that regard, attending to how later architects refine Vitruvius’ demand for firmness enables us to, first of all see a certain continuity in the architectural tradition across a considerable time span, and secondly enables us to see much better why firmness should be so important to ethics.

§3.4.1.3 *FIRMITAS SINE AVARITIA*: FIRMNESS AND THE ETHICS OF GREED

That firmness should be shot through with moral consideration, however, is already present in Vitruvius. Vitruvius tells us in I.1.§7 that architects should attend philosophy lectures because this enables them to better understand the workings of nature (in particular, natural laws, discovered by ‘natural philosophy’) and equips them with moral precepts.

philosophia vero perficit architectum animo magno et uti non sit adrogans, sed potius facilis, aequus et fidelis, sine avaritia, quod est maximum; nullum enim opus vero sine fide et castitate fieri potest; ne sit cupidus neque in muneribus accipiendis habeat animum occupatum, sed cum gravitate suam tueatur dignitatem bonam famam habendo; et haec enim philosophia praescribit.

Philosophy in fact makes the architect high-minded and ensures that [1] he will not be arrogant, but rather flexible, fair and trustworthy without greed, which is the most important quality, since no work can be carried out satisfactorily without loyalty or integrity; and [2] that he will not be avaricious or preoccupied with receiving rewards, but will safeguard his own standing rigorously by maintaining his good name; this is what philosophy teaches us.²⁴⁷

Among those moral precepts, keeping one’s name in good standing and observing honour is especially important, whereas greed (*avaritia*) is to be avoided at all costs. If we look to some of Vitruvius’ literary ancestry on that point,²⁴⁸ it transpires that the type of greed at issue here is not simply material – greed for monetary gain – but also immaterial – greed for honour, the recognition of one’s peers and the public by way of attaining a significant number of sizable public commissions (cf. III.Prol.§3 and VII.Prol.§3).

When we turn to Vitruvius’ very definition of firmness in I.3.§2, these points should resonate, because Vitruvius says firmness involves the ‘proper’ selection of building materials and construction techniques, while avoiding greed. He even reuses the very same phrase, *sine avaritia*.

Firmitas erit habita ratio cum fuerit fundamentorum ad solidum depressio, quaque e materia, copiarum sine avaritia diligens electio[.]

²⁴⁷ Text by Fleury (1990, 7), translation by Schofield (2009, 9). I have removed the translator’s interpolation preceding ‘[2]’, ‘<philosophy also ensures that>’ insofar ‘also’ could imply that the two sentences state separate points (which I doubt they do). Also, when quoting Latin, I depart from modern critical texts in not spelling ‘v’ as ‘u’.

²⁴⁸ See Cicero *De Officiis* I.53 and I.60-68; also, the relation of (the avoidance of) greed to justice, as regards ‘overreaching’ (*pleonexia*), on which see Burnyeat (2006, 21) and Sachs (1995, 212). A related point pertains to the fair competition among (professional) equals over honor, on which see Williams (1993, 100) and van Wees (2008, 287-289).

The ‘greed’ that I.3.§2 inculcates us to avoid has been consistently mistranslated as the tendency to either be *insufficiently economical* with one’s resources (‘do not be wasteful’) or as being overly much so: ‘do not cut corners’, as Schofield’s recent translation has it. That Vitruvius uses the same phrase – *sine avaritia* – in the two passages is obscured by such idiomatic translations, and fails to display that the very definition of the TRIAD VALUES in I.3.§2 recalls the role of philosophy and ethics Vitruvius outlined in I.1.§7.

Moreover, focusing the ‘greed’ to be avoided as attaching to materials alone (as current translations suggest) misses the full ethical force of Vitruvius’ point in either passage. What Vitruvius has in mind is that architects should have their buildings composed, materially, in a manner that avoids being overly greedy *for honour* – and that means, to build in ways that overextend the proper status of the buildings’ projects, commissions, patrons, or architects (I.2.§7). Choice of materials is impacted by this, but is not the actual target of moral considerations here, only their visible manifestation. For the nature of greed to be avoided, as already emphasized, is immaterial, not material. Given all this, the nineteenth century’s accomplishment to marry an exploration of *tectonic composition* (the morally proper arrangement of materials) to the moral ambitions of architecture in a wider (at times, trans-material) sense, is not so much a departure from Vitruvius’ writings as a fulfillment of their promise. As before, what matters less is the precise philological defense of this or that claim in Vitruvius, than seeing the philosophical *significance* of such claims, especially when they take on built form, as they do in the works of Semper and Schinkel (see CHAPTER 9).

Finally, Vitruvius’ non-material understanding of greed also enables us to see other remarks in their proper light, as when Vitruvius ventures to address the specifically *material* ramifications of ‘being economical’. Expanding his mention of ‘*distributio*, called οἰκονομία in Greek’ in I.2.§1, he writes,

Distributio autem est copiarum locique commoda dispensatio parcaque in operibus sumptus ratione temperatio. Haec ita observabitur, si primum architectus ea non quaeret, quae non potuerunt inveniri aut parari nisi magno.

Distribution consists of the appropriate management of resources and of the site, and the prudent control of the finances during construction thanks to careful calculation. This will be achieved if, at the outset, the architect does not try to acquire materials that either cannot be found or can only be acquired at high cost [such as marble]. (I.2.§8)²⁴⁹

These strictures operate independently of I.1.§7’s against ‘preoccup[ation] with receiving rewards’ but certainly anticipate the avoidance of greed in the ‘prudent selection of building materials’ (*copiarum sine avaritia diligens election*) that surfaces in I.3.§2’s definition of one of architecture’s core values – firmness. The ethics of tectonic composition, then, is Vitruvius’ lasting contribution to the discipline of architecture. Astonishingly, it lay dormant until the nineteenth century, and has all but been forgotten in our own day. If, as I suggest at the outset of my book, that ethics could be said to have enjoyed a continuity of sorts across the Western canon, that continuity is of course a very fragile one.

§3.4.2 ARCHITECTURAL BEAUTY

So much for firmness. When it comes to beauty, there is again a (mostly) categorical and a dispositional reading we have to distinguish, and as before, I will argue that the categorical is the more basic and philosophically more significant one. This helps ward off certain types of aesthetic relativism (that is, relativity to perceiving subjects) that (i) characterizes some current Vitruvius scholarship scrutinized in CHAPTER 3* and (ii) resurfaces in CHAPTER 5’s discussion of Kant’s aesthetics of architecture. More particularly, I explain how the root for Vitruvius’ term for architectural beauty, *venustas*, arises from Cicero’s reflections on *vestitus*, that is, of cladding. Cicero inquires how a rhetor at a public meeting is to carry himself, and that also means, how he carries his garb. As before with *firmitas*, tying into extant words for tectonic composition (of non- or pre-architectural woodcraft), Vitruvius chooses a word – *venustas* –

²⁴⁹ Similar sentiments are later expressed in Durand (1802-1805/2000, 83-85). Unlike Vitruvius, Durand elevates strictures of material economy to first principles in design.

with clear relevance for architectural composition. And, as before, he thereby chooses a set of concerns that the later architectonic tradition will take up in full, by inquiring into the nature of ‘cladding’ in architecture.

CHAPTER 8, in particular, will inquire into Semper’s theory of dressing, and there are many contemporary reflections too, which show the relation of this term to materiality and a building’s underlying structure.²⁵⁰ Most decisively, as before there is a moral undertone that accompanies these reflections. Already in Cicero, *vestitus* – and hence, *venustus* – is shot through with moral considerations of propriety visibly expressed at the level of dignified posture. When Semper and later Loos take up the morality of cladding in (and, regarding Loos, also outside) architecture, by talking about propriety and taste (for them, a moral quality), we can again see that there is a certain continuity in reflection from the very first formulation of architectonic principles to their being worked out in the era immediately preceding, and shaping, modernist architecture.

None of this (as CHAPTER 11 will again emphasize) requires us to subscribe to lines of explicit intellectual lineage, if that means presupposing not only that Loos read Vitruvius, but that he read him in the way suggested here. Loos once quipped that an architect is a stone mason or bricklayer who has learnt to speak Latin,²⁵¹ but that is of course inadequate support to attribute grander claims of intellectual debts in Loos’s work. The injunction that those who build masonry walls (re)learn Latin, however, seems entirely *a propos*, not only because it recalls the humble professional origins of Palladio and Mies van der Rohe, but because it is highly relevant for us today. If we re-learn the actual meanings of Vitruvius’ Latin technical terms, and come to them with a keen appreciation for compositional concerns arising from the workings on solid materials, we stand a better chance to wrap our head around this most tricky of the arts: architecture. And we begin to see that, and where, that art is shot through with morality, and what kind of morality that is.

I conclude the current chapter with a foray into one aspect of Vitruvius’ thought bearing on the ethics of architecture that, while historically influential, will not bear the same weight in the thesis’s sequel. Its inclusion is mandated on historical grounds, but readers should feel free to skip to the defense of the ‘core claims’ in CHAPTER 3*, or skip ahead to CHAPTER 4 where the main argument is resumed.

§3.5 VITRUVIUS ON HARMONY

The INTRODUCTION lamented the degree to which most contemporary architectural ethics remains beholden to an ethics that pertains solely to human(like) agents. CHAPTER 1 showed, moreover, how such a fixation comes across in *The Intentionalist Prejudice*, and that we can legitimately escape it once the moral appraisal of states of affairs (as under utilitarianism) is allowed to include states which are not the causal upshot of humans or do not feature human wellbeing at their core. Strikingly enough, we find a similar line of thought hinted at in several elements of Vitruvius’ writings, which tap into the ancient (specifically Stoic) view of ‘the cosmos’ as presenting an overall harmony, and its harmonious state (to which humans can contribute) as a moral good in its own right.

Later philosophers, like Augustin or Leibniz, have arguably tapped into a more negative version of this view, on which the material world represents an evil of sorts (*a malum physicum*). In more recent times, two architectural thinkers have groped after roughly similar views, specifically Warwick Fox with his notion of ‘responsive cohesion’ and Christopher Alexander who views ‘life’ as a paramount value.²⁵² The problem with any such view is that it invokes a notion of moral goodness that is not recognisable as such while we

²⁵⁰ Baumgartner (2010, 195): ‘Der Begriff der Fassade ist alles andere als eindeutig. Vom lateinischen *facies* abgeleitet bedeutet er wörtlich das Angesicht und meint damit die äußere Erscheinung, die Physiognomie des Gebäudes. Von außen betrachtet wird die Fassade häufig als Gebäudehülle oder als Außenhaut bezeichnet. Diese Begriffe lassen vermuten, dass die Fassade eine tendenziell dünne Oberfläche sei, welche wie ein Kleid über ein sich darunter befindliches Gerüst gelegt wird. Sie thematisieren die Anmutung der Oberfläche, deren Materialität, Aufbau und Gestalt.’

²⁵¹ Loos (1924/1982, 178): ‘Ein architekt ist ein mauerer, der latein gelernt hat.’

²⁵² Thanks to Christian Illies for alerting me to the views of these writers, first referenced in §1.2 above.

cling to the *Intentionalist Prejudice*. Furthermore, nearly all such variants on the Stoic view of the cosmos as essentially ordered, and of order being morally good, run afoul of re-importing the type of intentionality that typifies human-centric ethics, and which we wanted to avoid. Not only is the cosmos endowed with a ‘world-soul’,²⁵³ later writers like Cudworth also alleged that a ‘god’ underlies the notion and,

that Zeno and Chrysippus conceived their God as ‘an Intellectual Nature’ and the ‘supreme architect and master-builder of the world’.²⁵⁴

The origin of that view, however, lies with even earlier sources, and it is to these that any ancient reflection like Vitruvius’s on buildings (and their environments) as ‘harmonious wholes’, has to turn. More particularly, any discussion of ancient reflection on ‘harmonious wholes’, and the claim that buildings at once emulate and belong to them, has to begin with Plato’s *Timaeus*.²⁵⁵ The dialogue focuses on a creation account (*logos*, or *mythos*) of the ‘whole’, of the *kosmos*, and so, on cosmology. That account begins (not *ex nihilo* but) premised on an unordered world of matter and a ‘demiurge’ to provide order (*kosmos*). The demiurge’s first question is what he should orient his ordering task on.

[W]henever the demiurge of anything looks to that which is always unchanging and uses a model of that description [sc. looking to ‘that which never changes’] in fashioning the form and quality of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be *beautiful* (τοιούτω πινι προσχρώμενος παραδειγματι, τήν ιδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζεται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης). If he looks to something that has come to be and uses a generated model, it will not be beautiful. (28a)

Plato also refers to this demiurge as ‘ὁ τεκταινόμενος’ (28c5), which can also mean ‘the builder’ and, once conjoined with the qualifier ‘ἀρχή’, the Greek noun for ‘principle’ or origin, gives the phrase ‘master builder’— the etymological basis for our term ‘architect’. While Plato does not run the two terms together, as Aristotle would a generation later (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.1-I.2), he does call ‘the maker’ a principle (ἀρχή) at 29e4.²⁵⁶ This affords us at least a somewhat loose conjunction, of the ἀρχή and τεκταινόμενος. Together with the fact that Plato elsewhere classifies architecture (*oikodomia*) as one of the ‘ordering crafts’ or ‘demiurgy’ (*demiourgia*),²⁵⁷ we may feel licensed to talk of ‘the architect’ in Plato’s thought.²⁵⁸

Plato’s *Timaeus*, then, presents the architect’s role as one who imposes order (*kosmos*), and requires him to solely look to eternal, changeless ‘forms’ in his attempt to establish an order in the material world that is beautiful. Looking to anything that is amenable to change or instability, we learn, will automatically result in a lack of beauty in the architect’s work. Importantly, these forms (or ‘ideas’, as Plato also calls them) exist outside the architect’s mental life, and they set a standard and regulatory ideal for his work that does not depend on his, or anyone else’s, approval or discovery. Architectonic forms, for Plato, are discovered, not made.

²⁵³ See Algra (2003, 157-9, 177-178).

²⁵⁴ Israel (2006, 462).

²⁵⁵ For the dialogue’s importance to the (modern) architectural tradition, see further Jencks (1973, 250), Mallgrave (2005, 1).

²⁵⁶ Cf. Carone (2005, 29). On Plato’s understanding of ‘the architect’, see also *Politicus* 259e-260a, on which Coulton (1982, 15) comments, ‘for Plato, [...] what distinguished the architect was that he did not just work out what should be done, like an accountant, but also gave the necessary orders to the workmen until the building was finished [...] Plato takes as accepted that the *architekton* is not himself a workman but a director of workmen, and that he contributes theoretical knowledge not practical craftsmanship’. Regarding the second point, Coulton (1984, 161n.4) further references Aristotle *Metaphysics* 981a30 and *Politics* 1325b23. The relation of the architect to his assistant (contractors) would thus mirror that of the demiurge to the ‘helper gods’ in the *Timaeus*.

²⁵⁷ *Republic* 401a2-3 (on which see Burnyeat 1999, 218).

²⁵⁸ Other writers on Plato’s *Timaeus* feel less hesitant over such exegetical scruples: ‘At that time [sc. when I met Eisenman] I was writing a text on the *kbóra* in *Timaeus*, in which Plato tackles the problem of space, of the architect as a demiurge.’ (Derrida, quoted *apud* Vidler 2005b, 125n.6) The final clause receives no further gloss or defense.

More important than this highly idiosyncratic epistemology of architecture is the result it is claimed to serve – the creation of an overall harmony or order. The demiurge’s work results in an overall order, encompassing the natural world, men, and their buildings, and this value is operative in Vitruvius too.

More precisely, Vitruvius operates on a medical understanding of humans whereby their health, or wellbeing, depends in part on the balance of ‘the elements’ in humans – meaning the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet. Illness, bodily or psychic, is attributed to a disturbance or lack of balance in those elements which, jointly, make up human temperament.²⁵⁹

When Vitruvius explains the physical characteristics of various building materials, he pays attention not only to their environmental function, but also to how they harmonize with the people living in them. Of their own, such building materials will exemplify dryness and humidity, hot- and coldness – these all being

properties with which they [building materials, such as various forms of timber] seem to be endowed by nature (II.9.§17).

But at other times we read about these properties not in the positive but the comparative. Specific bricks are ‘too hot’, others are ‘too dry’; certain types of wood ‘too cold’, and so on (II.8.§2). What they are respectively too hot, or cold etc. *for*, or in relation to, is expressed either functionally – for certain building purposes, such as a dam or a city wall – or, relative to *human temperament*. Building elements cannot be ‘too hot’ etc. because the end result, of the human-building hybrid, has to itself compose a balance of the elements.

The same considerations, Vitruvius tells us, already pertain to the selection of a building site:

[I]f the city-walls are to be on the sea and face south or west, they will not be good for the health [of humans], because in the summer the zones exposed to the southern sky heat up with the rising sun and burn hot at midday, while a site facing west is warmed when the sun has risen, is hot at midday and swelters in the evening. So the result is that these oscillations between hot and cold will damage the bodies of people living in these places: one also notices the same thing in the case of inanimate objects. (I.4.§§1-2)²⁶⁰

It is customary to subsume such considerations nowadays under the labels of ‘sustainable (or ecological) architecture’ and ‘healthy building’ – the first, relating to the harmony of the built to the natural environment, the second relating to the effect of buildings on the physical well-being of their users. But the subsumption of these themes under those labels – and, what is even worse, their separation from one another – presents a significant diversion from Vitruvius’ (and Plato’s) implied approach to the ethics of architecture.

The subsumption and separation masks something more fundamental that we get in Vitruvius, Palladio, and onwards – and that is, that these concepts of architecture’s harmony with nature and human beings are themselves driven by a yet more general, overarching *understanding of ‘the good’*. And that understanding derives, not from separate, let alone scientific or *physical* accounts of what is ‘good’ for man and nature respectively, but from a cosmological (*meta-physical*) account that pertains to the goodness of the whole – an account of what is good overall, all things considered. Just as ideas, or forms, are there for Plato prior to humans and the material world, so the ultimate (account of the) good is taken to predate the interrelation of humans and nature – ‘the good’ orders the affairs of nature, human or not, built or not. It

²⁵⁹ Cf. our modern notion of ‘temperature’ as the right point between the hot and the cold; the doctor checking our tongue as to whether it is too dry, etc., as invoked by Leatherbarrow (2014). The *Timaeus* (in its final pages) emphatically links psychic disorders, various forms of mania or obsession/madness, to disorderly arrangements of these elements and the temperaments they give rise to.

²⁶⁰ Again, echoes to Plato are not far off. Surrounding the (especially younger) people of a city by craftsmen – including architects (*Republic* 401a3) – of *good character* is important for these people ‘to dwell, as it were, in a sane place (*topos*)’ (401c5); and the work of these builders will bring good effects to their people, ‘like a breeze bringing health from wholesome places (*topoi*)’ (401c7-8, tr. Burnyeat 1999, 210).

is this aspect of ‘the whole’ view which makes it, and the ethics it gives rise to, ‘Platonic’, and explains further how architectural practice, aligned properly, can be oriented on a notion of goodness that integrates the natural, human, and built environment altogether.

Vitruvius’ claim that ‘these oscillations between hot and cold will damage’, not just the physical well being of people inhabiting buildings, but the very ‘inanimate objects’ that compose these buildings, should remind us of his ethics of tectonic composition discussed in §3.4.1.3 above. For if there is climatic tension in the materials,²⁶¹ owing to environmental input, then that is precisely what a proper selection of materials is sensitive to – to the various dynamic forces that exert pressure of load and physical alteration on a building. However far-fetched the implied cosmological outlook of *De Architectura* may seem, Vitruvius offers it a place directly relevant to the core tasks of architectural building practice – the selection and arrangement of materials. And if the idea of cosmic harmony informs the task and value of *firmitas* at this juncture, we will later see how cosmological metaphysics informs the values in the Triad more generally (§3.6.2).

It is, finally, these aspects that explain why Vitruvius, in I.1.§7, runs the ethical values bestowed on architects by philosophy (see §3.4.1.3) together with the study of ‘the elements’ (physical prime materials), a proper understanding of which is bestowed on architects by the philosophical study of nature:

Philosophia vero perficit architectum animo magno [...]. Praeterea de rerum natura, quae graece φυσιολογία dicitur, philosophia explicat. Quam necesse est studiosius novisse, quod habet multas et varias naturales quaestiones. Ut etiam in aquarum ductionibus. Insursibus enim et circuitionibus et librata planitie expressionibus spiritus naturales aliter atque aliter fiunt, quorum offensionibus mederi nemo poterit, nisi qui ex philosophia principia rerum naturae noverit.

Philosophy in fact makes the architect high minded [...]. Furthermore, philosophy includes the study of nature, which the Greeks call *phusiologia*, which must be pursued in some depth because it covers many different problems in nature, such as how to conduct water. For pressure-pockets naturally form in one place or another in conduits that run downhill, [...] and anybody who has not learnt about the laws of nature from a study of philosophy will be unable to avoid the resulting damage.²⁶²

The notion of ‘order’ that informs the quasi-medical ambition of Vitruvian architecture also informs his strictures on architectural beauty, as Renaissance commentators were not slow to realize (see §3.2 on Alberti linking goodness and beauty to ‘order’, and the analysis of *venustas* in §3.7).

I shall not pursue this ‘the quasi-medical ambition’ further in the present work, except to note two points. First, if we are to take the ambition seriously, we would need to update it to contemporary standards of empirical adequacy. What, if anything, are the shared ‘building blocks’ of humans, buildings, and the natural world that allow us to assess compounds thereof as more or less ‘harmonious’? What is needed, here, is an inquiry into the shared foundation, if any, of contemporary cosmological inquiry (one that does, for instance, not tie the universe’s building blocks to Platonic solids), of contemporary medicine, and finally, of where elements from both of these domains intersect with the material and non-material means at the disposal of architectural production. Vitruvius’ own remarks in I.4.§§1-2 on the *climatologically sensitive* selection of building materials may point the way. Recall from §3.3 how, on the RECIPROCITY THESIS, a proper selection of a building *b*’s compositional properties Π interacts with a building’s function, where that function includes *b*’s circulation, lighting, ventilation and other environmentally sensitive *climatological*

²⁶¹ I owe this point to Michiel Riedijk.

²⁶² The more basic point remains, however, and that is how I.1.§7 seems to divide philosophy into ethics and natural philosophy. Howe (1999, 266) believes VII.Intr.§§1-2 picks up on this division, in that the division of philosophers into two separate ‘lists’ (sc. Thales, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, vs. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus) – ‘follow[s] the distinction between physical [*physiological*] and moral philosophy, the first being moral, the second being physical, although most members of this second group would also classify as natural philosophers.’

features of *b* that *b*'s occupancy presupposes. A climatologically sensitive individuation of Π would simply need to pay attention to current science on building materials conducted under the label 'building physics', catering as it does to the very characteristics Vitruvius' 'natural philosophy' relies on – natural temperature, humidity, ventilation, heating, and even acoustics.²⁶³

Second, we may observe how the 'quasi-medical ambition' of Vitruvius' account may be separated out from the ethical vision that drives it, in light of other (post-Vitruvian) authors who precisely pursued the vision in the absence of that ambition. (Though this precisely raises the question what such authors put in place of that ambition, to realize the vision. This too I leave for others to inquire.) In CHAPTER 7 we will see how Schopenhauer demarcates the aesthetic function of architecture in precisely this way, to help humans understand their place in a world – even if, for him, that type of reconciliation to the world does not precisely end with an understanding of the world as fundamentally harmonious. In contrast to Vitruvius, however, this is not accomplished by the *causal power* of architecture to effect a microphysical change in man's well being (at the molecular level of his bodily constitution), but is accomplished by its *visual communicative power* to instill in us an understanding of reality, an understanding that is then morally operative in our own well being and our action to secure the well being of others.

Another writer who ties architecture's cosmological mission to architectural contemplation is Ruskin. Ruskin has art place demands on us, demands that are

justified only by the seriousness of [art's] purpose: namely, to reveal fundamental features of the universe. Beauty is something objective, not a mere product of custom. The experience of beauty arises from a truthful perception of nature, and leads on to an apprehension of the divine. [...A]rchitecture in [Ruskin's] definition, is the art that disposes and adorns edifices so that the sight of them may contribute to man's mental health, power, and pleasure. And the essential element in mental health was a just appreciation of man's place in a divinely ordered universe.²⁶⁴

This intriguingly juxtaposes architecture's cosmological mission with its content disclosed in contemplation, and of both with 'mental health', thus returning us to the 'quasi-medical ambition' of Vitruvius' account – if by radically other means. I return to Ruskin briefly in §6.6, but would for now alert readers that his claims leave two questions open. First, is this a value architecture *ought* to pursue? And secondly, is it a value architecture is even *capable* of promoting? If we cannot give firm affirmatives to either question, little in Ruskin's subsequent moralizing (on architecture and much else besides) should command lasting interest. If we can, a moral appraisal of built institutes like forensic clinics (see §P.1 and §C.3) would already begin to take much more concrete and conclusive shape.

²⁶³ For lack of expertise, the present work does not discuss or utilize these factors more systematically. See Willens (2013).

²⁶⁴ Kenny (2006, 263).

CHAPTER 3*

THE TRIAD VALUES: DEFENSE OF §3.4'S CORE CLAIMS

This chapter contains supplementary material on the correct understanding of two elements in the TRIAD VALUES, namely *being solidly built* (firmness, *firmitas*), and *being aesthetically pleasing* (beauty, *venustas*). The central role of these values to the present work was explained in §3.1 and §3.3.2. For the TRIAD to play this role, certain claims about it made in §3.4 have to be true. The present CHAPTER provides an in-depth philosophical defense of these claims as well as more historical background to properly ground our comprehension of the what firmness and beauty mean on a Vitruvian understanding of architecture. All material from here until the beginning of CHAPTER 4 is strictly optional, and purely offered for readers interested in or skeptical about such material. However, to be able to pick up several philosophical substrands in later chapters, readers are advised to at least browse the intervening (and fairly short) summarizing sections §3.6.7, §3.7.1, and §3.8. The latter, in particular, provides a natural 'lead in' to CHAPTER 4.

§3.6 VITRUVIUS ON FIRMITAS

The present section will deal with *firmitas*, and show that its definition in §3.4's as *being tectonically composed* merits ascription to Vitruvius' text. §3.7 will offer an analogous argument for §3.4's claims about *venustas*.

§3.6.1 THE VITRUVIAN TRIAD: CICERONIAN STARTING POINTS

Our exposition and analysis begins, as it must, with the very passage that introduces us to Vitruvius' 'triad' of *venustas*, *utilitas*, and *firmitas*: *De Architectura* I.3.§2.

Haec autem ita fieri debent ut habeatur ratio firmitas, utilitas, venustatis. Firmitas erit habita ratio cum fuerit fundamentorum ad solidum depressio, quaque e materia, copiarum sine avaritia diligens electio; utilitas autem <cum fuerit> emendata et sine inpeditione usus locorum dispositio et ad regiones sui cuiusque generis apta et commoda distributio; venustatis vero cum fuerit operis species grata et elegans membrorumque commensu iustas habeat symmetriarum ratiocinationes.

And all these buildings must be executed in such a way as to take account of durability, utility and beauty. Durability will be catered for when the foundations have been sunk down to solid ground and the building materials carefully selected from the available resources without cutting corners; the requirements of utility will be satisfied when the organization of the spaces is correct, with no obstacles to their use, and they are suitably and conveniently orientated as each type requires. Beauty will be achieved when the appearance of a building is pleasing and elegant and the commensurability of its components is correctly related to the system of modules.²⁶⁵

As scholars have realized, this passage is clearly indebted to Cicero's *De Oratore* III.380.²⁶⁶ In that passage, however, Cicero only employs the terms *venustas* and *utilitas*, giving no mention of *firmitas*. This is offset by Cicero's illustration of the two terms being happily an architectural one, the Capitolium in Rome. Cicero's point is that even if the building was to be placed in heaven, it would still deserve to have its beautiful gabled roof, even though there is no rain in heaven – even if, to put it otherwise, the roof no longer serves its function or *utilitas*:

Linquamus naturam artisque videamus. Quidam in navigio necessarium quam latera, quam cavernae, quam prora, quam puppis, quam antennae, quam vela, quam mali? quae tamen hanc habent in specie venustatem, ut non solum salutis, sed etiam voluptatis causa inventaesse videantur. Columnae templa et porticus sustinent; tamen habent non plus utilitatis quam dignitatis: Capitoli fastigium illud et ceterarum aedium non venustas, sed necessitas ipsa fabricata est; nam, cum esset habita ratio, quem ad modum ex utraque tecti parte aqua delaberetur, utilitatem

²⁶⁵ Text: Fleury (1990, 20). Translation: Schofield (2009, 19).

²⁶⁶ Homo (1971, 18), Gros (1982, 680-681), Fleury (1990, 122).

templi fastigi dignitas consecuta est; ut, etiam si in caelo Capitolium statueretur, ubi imber esse non posset, nullam sine fastigio dignitatem habiturum fuisse videatur.

Or let us turn from natural objects, and cast our eyes on those of art; what is so necessary in a ship as the sides, the hold, the prow, the stern, the yards, the sails, the masts? which yet have so much beauty in their appearance, that they seem to have been invented not for safety only, but also for the delight afforded by the spectacle. Pillars support temples and porticoes, and yet have not more of utility than of dignity. It was not regard to beauty, but necessity, that contrived the pediment of the Capitolium, and other buildings; for when a plan was contemplated by which the water might run off from each side of the roof, the dignity of the cupola was added to the utility of the temple; but in such a manner, that should the Capitolium be built in heaven, where no rain can fall, it would appear to have no dignity without the pediment.²⁶⁷

If *De Oratore* III.180 indeed stood patron for *De Architectura* I.3§2, and I see no reason to contest this claim, Cicero's own handling of his architectural illustration raises some sharp questions for (our understanding of) Vitruvius. When Vitruvius imported Cicero's vocabulary, did he also opt to inherit Cicero's philosophical stance? More precisely, how does Vitruvius relate *venustas* to *utilitas*? In particular, does he agree with Cicero's understanding of the inseparability of the two? And how does Vitruvius understand *firmitas*, a term for which there is no precedent in *De Oratore* III.180?

This last question is given the lion's share in the remainder of this chapter, because it marks Vitruvius' sharpest point of departure from Cicero. Before we turn to *firmitas*, however, we need to examine one of *De Oratore* III.180's broader implications for our understanding of the triad as a whole – including the question of how the triad's values are related, a question that sheds light on the RECIPROCITY THESIS.

§3.6.2 THE TRIAD'S IMPLIED COSMOLOGY

De Oratore III.180 regards utility and beauty as closely intertwined, a point on which Cicero could look to ancient precedents like Plato's *Hippias Maior*, which likewise upheld the union of utility and beauty, and anticipates more modern accounts of functional beauty.

Plato apart, we also have Xenophon's testimony of Socrates in *Memorabilia* III 8.8-10, a passage

where Socrates sets out his remarkable views on architecture, views which would not have sounded altogether out of place in the Bauhaus. His initial premise is that, in house design, beauty and utility are altogether inseparable. But it quickly becomes clear that not two but three values are being aligned, because the utility of a house is itself in turn explained largely in terms of its occupants' enjoyment of it. The house's orientation, Socrates explains, should in particular be chosen to produce pleasant temperatures in all seasons. A design providing this kind of comfort, along with adequate security, will be sufficient to ensure that the most beautiful possible house is built. Further embellishments, he importantly adds, for example wall-paintings, are not only not necessary, but will actually detract from the occupants' enjoyment of the house, and hence, implicitly, from its utility.²⁶⁸

But Cicero's point in *De Oratore* III.180 like Plato's in *Hippias Maior* is not restricted to the domain of artifacts, even though its application to architecture is explicit, be it in either source. This wider intent becomes explicit in Cicero's introduction of the pair '*venustas – utilitas*' in *De Oratore* III.178,

Sed ut in plerisque rebus incredibiliter hoc natura est ipsa fabricata, sic in oratione, ut ea, quae maximam utilitatem in se continerent, plurimum eadem haberent vel dignitatis vel saepe etiam venustatis.

²⁶⁷ Text: Wilkins (1985-1903). The translation is based on J. S. Watson's (1848), though I have replaced Watson's rendition of *Capitolium* as 'Capitol' and of *fastigium* as 'cupola' (for reasons given below). Mankin (2011, 90) has *puppis* for *puppis*, *inventa* for *inventae*, and his apparatus observes the omission of '*quam vela*' in some manuscripts.

²⁶⁸ Sedley (2004).

[A]s in most things, so in language, Nature herself has wonderfully contrived, that what carries in it the greatest utility, should have at the same time either the most dignity, or, as it often happens, the most beauty.

(‘Dignity’, as we shall see in §3.7.4, is for Cicero a synonym for beauty, and not a value separate from it – enforcing, once again, how closely intertwined the values are for him.)

Cicero’s inextricable connection (as regards artifacts) of beauty to utility, then, run much deeper, owing to the invocation of ‘Nature’ – more precisely, to the idea that all of created nature is cosmologically ordered, accounting for the inextricable dependence of beauty on functionality. In Mankin’s commentary on those lines, Cicero appeals here

to a doctrine with many antecedents in Greek thought but by his time especially associated with the Stoics, according to which a rational and providential force (here *natura*; elsewhere *dues*, *mens*, *providentia* and | the like) ‘fabricated’ (below) a universe both functional, so it would be stable, and beautiful, so that it would draw humans to contemplate and emulate its order[.]²⁶⁹

An even longer note by Elaine Fantham makes the point even more forcefully.

Adopting Stoic ideas, [Cicero’s] Crassus illustrates the beauty of functionality first from the cosmos itself and the geocentric system of sun, moon, and planets, then from human and animal bodies, of which every part is perfect by design, not by chance (*arte, non casu*, [III].179). (This phrase might seem to beg the question, since the argument assumes a binary opposition of Nature and Art: but in Stoic thought Nature and the divine mind were identical, and divine purpose practiced its own form of art (for the transition from Nature to Art compare [III].26 above). The same Stoic notion of the world and its human and animal creation as products of teleological design is used in *De Natura Deorum* 2.49–56. Cicero may be dependent on Poseidonius here.) Trees with their complex branching structure make a fine | transition to the perfection of human constructions, transferring to the products of crafts the same convergence of utility and beauty found in Nature. Crassus’ last examples are the construction of ships (surely a Greek preoccupation), and temples, culminating in the Roman shrine of Capitoline Jupiter. In speech too, as he said in [III].177, appeal and charm come from the utility of its necessary parts, and the mere need to breathe produces rounded sentence units that delight the listener.²⁷⁰

The architectural relevance of Cicero’s illustrative choice of, first, trees in nature with their trunks and other compositional elements, and second, of timber construction in human artifice like ship hulls, will become apparent in §§3.6.5-3.6.6, when we explore the connections of Vitruvius’ notion of *firmitas* to post-and-lintel construction, primarily in timber, and look to precedents of that in Cicero, who does not mention *firmitas* in its own right.

Of relevance right now is the following. It is an implicit *cosmological philosophy* that, for Cicero, explains the reciprocal dependence of *utilitas* and *venustas*, in line with the RECIPROCITY THESIS Vitruvius will uphold later on. And though the term ‘firmitas’ is absent from Cicero, observe the adjective ‘stable’ invoked by Mankin. Mankin’s passing reference to Cicero’s term ‘fabricated’ is of even greater interest to Vitruvius exegesis, given the use Vitruvius will make of ‘*fabrica*’ to define the architectural discipline itself.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Mankin (2011, 269-270). He cites further passages making a similar point in Cicero (*De Rep.* 6.17, *Ac.* 2.30, 86-7, *Natura Deorum* II.81-153). Other passages in *De Oratore* dealing with *venustas* are III.30, 60, 199-200, 206 (Mankin 2011, 123).

²⁷⁰ Fantham (2004, 277-278, with 277-278n.19 inserted in brackets).

²⁷¹ On the term’s intended usage in Cicero *De Orat.* III.178 and elsewhere, see *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* [TLG] vol. VII p. 19 s.v. ‘fabricor’, as per Mankin (2011, 270). As for Vitruvius, see *De Architectura* I.1.§1,

Ea [sc. architectura] nascitur ex fabrica et ratiocinatione. Fabrica est continuata ac trita usus meditatio ad propositum deformationis quae manibus perficitur e materia, cuiuscumque generis opus est. Ratiocinatio autem est, quae res fabricatas sollertiae ac rationis pro portione demonstrare atque explicare potest.

On all three of these points, however, we need to raise again a question of methodology. When Vitruvius inherits the vocabulary for his triad from Cicero's *De Oratore* III, does he thereby also inherit the cosmological outlook that informs Cicero's vocabulary and Cicero's own understanding of that vocabulary?

Barbaro certainly thought so, in his 1567 commentary on Vitruvius. For Barbaro regards Vitruvius' vocabulary as flatly philosophical, metaphysical even, that just *happens* to be applied to architecture. Discussing 'categories' from *De Architectura* II such as *distributio* (which co-defines *firmitas*) or *ordinatio*, *dispositio*, *eurythmia*, *symmetria*, and *décor* (which co-define *venustas*), he writes,

Ordine è moderata attitudine de i membri dell'opera, partitamente, & rispetto a tutta la proportionione al compartimento, ilquale si compone di quantità. Perche in molte cose ritrouamo ordine, dispositione, decoro, distribuzione, & le altre parti sopradette, però diremo che questi termini sono generali & communi: & come generali, & communi hanno le loro diffinitioni nella scienza generale, & commune, che è la prima detta Metaphysica. Ma quando alcuno artefice uuole applicare alcuna di quelle parti alla propria cognitione, restringe quella uniuersalità al particolare, & proprio dell'arte sua. come si uede al | presente, nelle dette diffinitioni, & prima nella diffinitione dell'ordine.

[...] these terms are general and common and as such have their definition in the general and common science which is the first and is called metaphysics. But when an artist wants to apply one of those elements to his own profession, then he restricts that universality to the particular and special needs of his own art.²⁷²

What, according to Barbaro, explains this 'metaphysical tinge' of Vitruvius' vocabulary? It is, once again, the vocabulary's cosmological underpinning. Barbaro's starting point, however, is not cosmology as such. Rather, he begins his commentary on Vitruvius I.2.§3 with the principles, borrowed from the opening of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (A.1) that knowledge of any (sublunary) thing requires knowledge of its causes.

Il sapere non è altro che conoscere gli effetti per le proprie cause. ogni effetto è fatto da alcuna cosa, di qualche cosa, ad alcun fine, con alcun modo, & forma. (1567, 37)

This passage invokes terms of Aristotle's four-fold distinction of causes (*Physics* II.2-3), a point Barbaro makes explicit later,

Le cause principali adunque sono quattro. Noi dello agente artificioso, quale egli si sia, et die che conditione esser debbia gia dette hauemo quando et l'ufficio, et le virtu dello Architetto narramo. La forma similmente in uniuersale è state espоста. Restaci a dire della materia, et del fine. (1567, 37)

Aristotle's distinction importantly includes the categories of, not only material and efficient, but also formal and final causation.²⁷³ And with final causation enters teleology, and with teleology the idea that the universe is teleologically ordered. Thus the starting point for the more anthropomorphically tinged cosmological thesis, such as Plato's 'Demiurge' from the *Timaeus* – a figure that becomes explicit in Barbaro's thought, since he, like Cicero before him, believes that all artifice, driven by human intellect, is there to imitate the work of Nature, driven by an intelligence agency (*una intelligenza*):

L'arte quanto puo imita la natura: Et questo adiniene per che il principio dell' arte, che è lo intelletto humano, ha gran simiglianza col principio, che muoue la natura, che è una intelligenza. dalla simiglianza delle virtù, & de i principij nasce la simiglianza dell' operare, che per hora chiameremo imitatione. Questa imitatione si uede in tutte le

As Barbaro (1567/1987, 40) points out, '*fabricata*' has two senses, a generic and a specialized sense. On the generic sense, the term is applicable to all arts that proceed by composing things, hence to smithery but (presumably) not to sculpture (*Fabrica è nome generale, & particolare; in generale fabrica è arte, & componimento d'alcuna cosa, come latinamente Fabbro è detto ogni ope-rario*). A more special sense of the term reserves it for the operation of composition in the construction of buildings (*la edificazione, ibid.*). Barbaro discusses further connotations of 'fabrica' in Vitruvius in his (1567, 8-9).

²⁷² Barbaro 1567; the translation of the current passage is taken from Wittkower (1949/1988, 66), giving no indication of its location in the original. Maarten Franssen (p.c., 17 Dec 2013) managed to unearth the reference as being to Barbaro (1567, 27-28), kindly transcribed the Italian original for me, and pointed out to me that the corresponding passage in Barbaro's 1556 text (page 8) lacks many elements, including 'is called metaphysics'.

²⁷³ The best modern study on the topic is Hennig (2009). See also Charles (1992).

Arti, ma molto maggiormente in quella che è giudice di tutte. imiteremo adunque la natura nel trattamento dell' Arte. (1567, 37)

Insofar architecture as one of the Arts compositionally orders things with respect to their form and nature, it must obey the values dictated by natural 'intelligence'. And this is where Barbaro, like Cicero, sees the values that (would) enter the Vitruvian triad at play:

Ma perche il principio, che regge la natura, è d'infinita sapienza, ottimo, & potentissimo, però fa le cose sue belle, utili, & durabili: conuenevolmente lo Architetto imitando il fattor della natura deue riguarda- re alta bellezza, utilità, & fermezza delle opere. (1567, 37)

Bellezza, utilità, & fermezza. these are the values of the triad, and this concludes their cosmological derivation in Barbaro.²⁷⁴ For now, such textual elements alert us that Vitruvius' vocabulary, if it is indeed inherited from Cicero, is tinged with a great deal of philosophical assumptions. But is it so inherited? And what, more properly speaking, are the strictly architectural ramifications of that vocabulary? With these questions in mind, I now resume our analysis of 'firmitas'.

§3.6.3 SYNCHRONIC VERSUS DIACHRONIC READINGS OF *FIRMITAS*

When discussing masonry bonds in II.8§1, Vitruvius (seemingly) plays off the values of *firmitas* and *venustas* against each other:

Structurarum genera sunt haec, reticulatum quo nunc omnes utuntur, et antiquum quod incertum dicitur. ex his venustius est reticulatum, sed ad rimas faciendas ideo paratum quod in omnes partes dissoluta habet cubilia et coagmenta. incerta vero caementa alia super alia sedentia inter seque imbricata non speciosam sed firmiorem quem reticulata praestant structuram.

These are the types of masonry: *opus reticulatum*, which everyone uses now, and the ancient type called *opus incertum*. *Opus reticulatum* is the more attractive [*venustius*] of the two, but is apt to form cracks because it comprises disconnected bed- and vertical joints in all parts of the wall. But the rough stones <of *opus incertum*>, lying one above the other and interlocking, create masonry that is not pleasing to look at but is stronger [*firmiorem*] than *opus reticulatum*.²⁷⁵

Vitruvius goes on in II.8§2 to invoke Empedoclean criteria of moisture and dryness to further discuss the *solidity* and *longevity* of the construction i.e. of these masonry bonds (cf. my §3.5). Pierre Gros employs such terms in discussing II.8§1 itself:

La notice n'est pas seulement brève, elle s'avère aussi dépréciative puisque, non content de reprocher à l'opus reticulatum une tendance aux lézardes obliques, qui ne se vérifie guère dans les vestiges observables, l'auteur rappelle les fâcheuses conséquences que de mauvais dosages dans la composition du blocage interne peuvent avoir sur la longévité des murs. (1982, §31)

²⁷⁴ On this point, see Mitrovic (1998, 679-680): 'The Principle that operates nature is wise, powerful, and good; His [sc., the Divine Demiurge's] products are beautiful, useful, and durable ([Barbaro (1567,] 37). Architects should imitate Him and make beautiful, durable, and functional works of architecture (37). Barbaro thus deduced | the Vitruvian triad of *firmitas*, *utilitas*, *venustas* from the imitative theory of the arts. [...] The architect's work is imitative since the world itself is similar to a building; thus Barbaro refers to the 'building... which we call the world' (97). Similarly, in the preface to book 4 of *I quattro libri*, Palladio described the world as a big temple and said that architects should imitate that big temple when they build small temples – an argument probably motivated by Cicero's *Dream of Scipio* [in *De Rep.* 6.15].' – Incidentally, Barbaro's own gloss on the triad itself, by comparison, is surprisingly brief and purely paraphrastic, driven by his belief (here stated at the opening) that the terms' fuller meaning can only be gathered by their employment, which (he thinks) has to mostly await Vitruvius' Book V, '*Di queste cose si tratta nel quinto libro distintamente. Queste cose di tal maniera deono esser disposte, che egli si habbia riguardo alla fermezza, all' utilità, alla uenustà. Alla fermezza si riguarderà, quando le fabbriche saranno ben fondate sin sul sodo. & se senza auaritia si farà elettione, & scielta della materia d'ogni sorte. All' utilità si prouederà, quando senza impedimento al commodo, & uso de i luoghi, & senza menda saranno le cose disposte, & bene accompagnate, & partite ad ogni maniera. Alla bellezza si satisfierà, quando con bella, & gioconda maniera dello aspetto, la compartita de i membri, sarà giusta, eguale, & proportionata.*' (1567, 41)

²⁷⁵ Vitruvius II.8.§1. Text: Rose 1899 (cf. Callebat 1999, *ad loc.*). Translation: Schofield (2009, 50).

In other words, Gros interprets ‘firmiorem’ in II.8§1 in terms of its *effect* – ‘longévité’. And this is precisely one of the major points I wish to contest in §3.6. That point is by no means peculiar to Gros but informs other volumes of the Budé commentary series on Vitruvius as well:

La *firmitas* est ici envisagée sous les aspects complémentaires de la perfection de l’ouvrage et de sa durée.²⁷⁶

More broadly put, it seems that the Latin ‘firmitas’ is ambiguous between two readings, one of them diachronic, i.e. connoting a quality buildings have *over time*, the other one synchronic, a property had by buildings *at a given time*.

On the first reading, *firmitas* connotes ‘endurance’, the longevity of a building, owing to its being stably built. Accordingly, many English translations of Vitruvius from Morgan (1914) to Schofield (2009) render it as ‘durability’.²⁷⁷ That is a point on which contemporary commentators have been happy to follow suit, a point which has caused some of them to gloss *firmitas* as architecture’s ability ‘to endure and be enjoyed over time’.²⁷⁸ I shall call this the diachronic reading.

On the other reading, *firmitas* connotes the solidity of a building’s construction, what architects sometimes call its structural integrity. That is a property we can coherently attribute to a building *at a given time*. Moreover, that property will *have* diachronic effects, including that of longevity of course. But ‘firmitas’ does not itself *connote* a diachronic property. I shall call this the synchronic reading.

Translations pursuing the synchronic reading would render *firmitas* as ‘solidity’ or, literally, ‘firmness’. Thus Henry Wotten has ‘firmenes’ (1624), Christopher Wren has ‘Firmness’ (mid 1670s), and Durand ‘solid[ity]’ (1805); Wren certainly believed ‘Architecture aims at Eternity’, but did not load this into the meaning of *firmitas*.²⁷⁹ Among modern translators pursuing the synchronic reading we have Fleury (1990, 20) with ‘solidité’.

In the remainder of §3.6, I argue for the correctness of the synchronic reading on largely philological grounds. I first address two corollaries reader are invited to skip at their own discretion, though §3.6.3.1 adds to an argument for the correct interpretation of architectural functionality (*utilitas*) sketched in §3.3.

§3.6.3.1 COROLLARY 1 OF THE DIACHRONIC READING: *UTILITAS* WITHOUT *FIRMITAS*

There is a corollary to the diachronic reading best heeded from the outset. If ‘firmitas’ literally *means* ‘longevity’, where does that leave structural integrity? It is natural for proponents of the diachronic reading to fold that, not into the causal antecedent(s) of *firmitas*, but to place it with *utilitas*.

This is particularly obvious of writings in the (philosophical) aesthetics of architecture with strong leanings towards Kant. When Roger Scruton writes on ‘utility or function’ at one point, and of ‘construction’ and ‘structure’ at another, the two (sets of) terms serve him as convenient antonyms for aesthetic considerations (say, for *venustas*), but remain otherwise largely undifferentiated from one another.²⁸⁰ In a similar vein, Paul Guyer (2012, 8-9) first collapses constructional concerns into ‘utilitas’, and then goes on, consistently, to construe *firmitas* as ‘durability’. In either case, I submit, this is no coincidence. The works of Scruton and Guyer have been expressly and formatively shaped by Kant’s views on architecture, views that systematically marginalize *firmitas* in favour of *utilitas*. I discuss all these points at greater length in CHAPTER 5, specifically §5.4.

The same tendency towards marginalizing *firmitas*, on its synchronic reading at least, is already apparent in the passage from Cicero we discussed in §3.6.1. When Cicero observes how columns ‘support’ the temples

²⁷⁶ Callebat (2004, 236). By contrast, we have Fleury (1990, 20) with ‘solidité’, and Cam (1995, 84).

²⁷⁷ Hicky Morgan (1914, 13), Schofield (2009, 19). Gordon Smith (2003, 73) has the somewhat opaque ‘strength’.

²⁷⁸ Guyer (2011, 8). Harries (1998, 28) also has ‘durability’.

²⁷⁹ On Durand and Wren’s dictum, see Mallgrave (2006, respectively 336 and 91).

²⁸⁰ Scruton (1979, respectively 5-6 and 23-24).

and porticoes (*Columnae templa et porticus sustinent*) and muses on what would happen if we *erected* the Capitolium in heaven (*etiam si in caelo Capitolium statueretur*), he categorizes such structural considerations as flatly falling under the rubric of *necessitas/utilitas*. Moreover, Cicero’s description of the Capitolium’s roof is at once structural and functional (‘a plan was contemplated by which the water might run off from each side of the roof’). But again, the only categorization he deems necessary to offset it from aesthetic considerations, from *venustas*, is a single homogenous category, as in Scruton – and it is utility.

What invites such dialectic maneuvers, whether they occur in Cicero or Kant(ians), is most likely a tacit belief that structural integrity is, after all, just one more facet to a building’s function. (§1.7.2 discussed contemporary instances of this among philosophers not necessarily sharing a Kantian orientation.) Indeed, ‘solidity’ (*firmitas* on the synchronic reading) may be viewed as a building’s function *par excellence* – to stand up, and not to collapse. But that, I submit, collapses a vital distinction – vital to Vitruvius, and of vital importance to architects then as now – among the functionality of buildings, broadly construed. On the one hand, we have the *generic* function of a building, to stand up, and provide shelter – to not collapse on those it provides shelter for. Indeed, that is the functional definition of a house Aristotle gives in *De Anima* A.1,

ὡσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσκει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ’ ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος <οὔ> ἔνεκα τῶν δι.

Thus the essence of a house is assigned in such an [sc. *logikós*] account as ‘a shelter against destruction by wind, rain, and heat’; the physicist [or, the *physikós* account] would describe it as ‘stones, bricks, and timbers’; but there is a third possible description which would say that it was that form in that material with that purpose or end. (403b, tr. Barnes 1985.i)

But what specific functions a building ‘houses’ is left wide open on this account – an account, we might add, that may even have influenced Cicero’s description of the Capitolium’s roof as that which ‘protects against rainfall’. For, the house in question could be a hospital, a prison, a museum, or (finally) serve residential purposes. Architects prefer to speak of *this* as a building’s function, its program, as expressed by its type. Precisely because architects distinguish construction from type – how ever closely the two are intertwined – we need to follow Vitruvius in *not* conflating the two, in *not* folding one into the other. The functional prerequisites of ‘house’ are vastly less specific than that of a specific type of house. Vitruvius ties *utilitas* explicitly to type in I.3.§2, whereas *firmitas*, provided we understand it as structural integrity, expresses the broad function of a ‘house’, one that is not differentiated yet by building type. And that, of course, is why (and how) he distinguishes the two notions, where Cicero does not.

For reasons like these, I shall argue, the synchronic reading is correct. The synchronic reading explains the cogency of the triad, as a distinction of three values, in a manner that respects core concerns of architects then and now. By contrast, the diachronic reading leaves such concerns either obscure or leaves some of them untouched. That apart, I have three arguments for the correctness of the synchronic reading, and at the close of §3.6 and §3.8 I outline the (considerable) philosophical consequences the correctness of these arguments have, not only for our historical understanding of Vitruvius, but of his philosophy of architecture. Because that philosophy affords us our perhaps best shot at a firmly grounded ethics of architecture to date, the correctness of the Vitruvian account is a matter of contemporary relevance. It places a considerable burden of proof on those who would reject rather than endorse a Vitruvian understanding of architecture.

§3.6.3.2 COROLLARY 2: CICERO ON *FASTIGIUM*

Before I embark on this voyage, one more point about the passage in *De Oratore* III.180. When Cicero discusses the Capitolium, Watson’s (1848) translation actually suggested to render *fastigium* as ‘cupola’. This is correct, if by that we mean a roof, not necessarily a domed one. For, the building Cicero has in mind is

the Capitolium, ‘a kind of nickname for the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline hill’.²⁸¹ Contemporary coins reveal unambiguously the nature of its roof:



Fig. 3*.1. Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, displayed on Æ Sestertius (26.23 gm, 5h). Rome mint. Struck 76 AD.
Source: H. Mattingly et al., *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*. 6 Vols (London 1932-1962, 722).

For that reason, Pierre Gros (1982, §40) construes *fastigium* as ‘le besoin de faciliter l’écoulement des eaux de pluie’, and insists (ibid., n.113) ‘C’est en effet ici le sens de *fastigium*.’ In other words, Gros claims the term cannot possibly mean ‘cupola’ in the sense of a domed roof, but must mean the *gable* of a classical pediment.

Lewis & Short (1879, s.v. ‘fastigium’) would agree with him on this, giving as the word’s primary sense ‘the top of a gable, a gable end, pediment (syn.: cacumen, culmen, vertex, apex)’. Their primary source for this is the very passage from *De Oratore* III. 180 under discussion here. Mankin (2011, 272) feels justified to render Cicero’s *fastigium illud* as ‘that well-known gable roof’, adding that it ‘was ornamented with statues and figured prominently in depictions of the temple on coins’ such as the above. Wilson makes an even stronger claim, saying that Vitruvius was a man more or less out of touch with innovative developments in the architecture of his times, especially as regards new construction techniques and materials, with ‘the hemispherical dome’ among them.²⁸² And Gros’ argument, to repeat, is that the roof is stated to facilitate the flow of rainwater – and do so, as Cicero said, ‘in all directions’, a statement that makes more sense for a gabled than a domed roof, the latter having no ready sense of discretely separate ‘directions’. This is especially so once we translate Cicero’s *ex utraque tecti partii* as water running off, not in all, but in *both* directions (*utraque*), with the Oxford translation:

It was not beauty, but necessity itself that built the gabled roof of the Capitol and the other temples. People first took account of how rainwater might flow down from both sides of the roof, and then the dignity of the gabled roof followed as a consequence of its utility for the temple[.]²⁸³

Gros’ argument is certainly borne out by strong parallels about rainfall, rafts, and triglyphs in Vitruvius IV.2§3,

Postea alii in aliis operibus ad perpendicularum triglyphorum cantherios prominentes proiecerunt eorumque proiecturas simaverunt. [...] Ita fere in operibus lapideis et marmoreis mutuli inclinatis sculpturis deformantur, quod imitatio est cantheriorum; etenim necessario propter stillicidia proclinati conlocantur. Ergo et triglyphorum et mutulorum in doricis operibus ratio ex ea imitatione inventa est.

Later on, other carpenters working on other buildings extended the projecting principal rafters so that they were perpendicular to the triglyphs, and then cut off their projections. [...] This is why the mutules in stone and marble structures are usually made of sloping relief-work because they imitate the principal rafters; for it is essential that they are built with an incline because of the rainfall. Therefore, in general, the scheme of triglyphs and mutules in Doric buildings derives from this imitation <of timber buildings>. (tr. Schofield 2009, 97)

Gros, having established that *fastigium* must mean ‘gable’ in *De Orat.* III.180, draws a momentous conclusion: Vitruvius got his idea, pursued in IV.2§2 and so next to the one we just quoted, that stone

²⁸¹ Mankin (2011, 272).

²⁸² Wilson (1986, 772). On cupolas in first century B.C. Rome see also Rasch (1985, 118-119).

²⁸³ Translation by May and Wisse (2001, 279).

architecture is in effect a ‘petrification’ of wooden post-and-lintel construction from Cicero *De Orat.* III.180. How so? Because of the way Cicero deems the gable indispensable to the Capitolium, even in heaven:

Mais la seconde idée cicéronienne, plus paradoxale d’apparence, trouve aussi un écho chez Vitruve: le Capitole, nous dit le ‘De oratore’, doit une telle majesté à son toit à double pente, imposé par le besoin de faciliter l’écoulement des eaux de pluie (C’est en effet ici le sens de *fastigium*), que même si l’on imaginait le temple dans les cieux, là où il ne pleut pas, on ne saurait le concevoir sans un faîte triangulaire. C’est exactement la pensée qui sous-tend la fameuse déduction vitruvienne de l’entablement dorique à partir des constructions archaïques, entièrement faites de bois: chaque partie de cet entablement correspond à un élément du système de poutraison; c’est à cela, nous dit-il, qu’elle doit sa raison d’être, et partant sa beauté (IV.2§1-2). Si l’on y réfléchit, et indépendamment des énormes problèmes historiques posés par ce postulat de la ‘pétrification’ (Cf. en dernier lieu G. Gullini, *Sull’origine del fregio dorico*, Memor. Accadem. delle Scienze di Torino), on ne peut manquer de s’étonner qu’une valeur reste attachée à une fonctionnalité qui n’en est plus une, puisque les impératifs tectoniques d’une construction de pierre s’avèrent différents de ceux d’une construction de bois. (Gros 1982, §40-41, with nn.113-5)

This argument, if true, supports a position that leans towards the synchronic reading of ‘firmitas’ (never mind the term’s own absence in Cicero) in a somewhat indirect way. As we shall see in ARGUMENT 2 (§3.6.5), there is a road from ‘firmitas’, via its Greek cognates, to post-and-lintel construction, which in turn serves to define the term ‘tectonics’ in that segment of nineteenth century architectural discourse I shall label ‘the tectonic tradition’. Insofar post-and-lintel construction was characteristically wooden, and that type of construction is alluded to in Cicero, Gros’ argument to see early traces of Vitruvius’ ‘petrification’ thesis (of wooden by stone architecture) in Cicero’s text enjoys some credibility. What is more, Cicero’s passage certainly contains the idea that architecture’s constructional details may justifiably ‘survive’ in a context devoid of their functional needs.²⁸⁴ That too is a key point for the tectonic tradition, as when Boetticher grounds the *Kunstform* in the *Kernform* (see §8.2).

Gros’s arguments, however, can be challenged. For *fastigium* may just as much mean the highest point, usually the roof, of a building, whether that is domed, a gable, or something else.²⁸⁵ So we cannot be entirely certain Cicero really meant gable or pediments when he invoked the term ‘fastigium’. This would leave it unclear whether he really had post-and-lintel construction in mind, and alluded to the pediment’s being placed above the entablature, both supported by columns. But Cicero does not leave it unclear, since he alludes to this when he writes, *Columnae templa et porticus sustinent*: the columns support the temple and porticae. In other words, construction and *firmitas* are nascent in *De Oratore* III.180 – but it is left to Vitruvius to single them out with a term of their own, to properly demarcate it from notions it is too easily confused or conflated with. Whence the birth of *firmitas*.

This last paragraphs assumed the correctness of the synchronic reading, so it is high time we turn to supporting arguments for its correctness over the diachronic reading.

§3.6.4 ARGUMENT 1. *DE ARCHITECTURA* II.8§1 AND *DE FINIBUS* III.74

In the passage quoted earlier from *De Architectura* II.8§1, Vitruvius explains the comparative firmness of different types of masonry bonds. These are types of structural composition, explaining how bricks are put together. Moreover, Vitruvius highlights that what is especially salient in discussing masonry bonds are the types of *joints* they invoke, *cubilia et coagmenta*. These elements are all definitive of the synchronic reading.

A passage from Cicero’s *De Finibus* (III.74) highlights this link between firmness and ‘coagmenta’:

²⁸⁴ Gros (1982, §40), ‘la maiestas une fois acquise, grâce au respect initial des nécessités ‘naturelles’, peut et doit vivre ensuite d’une façon autonome, et se maintenir telle, même si lesdites nécessités ont cessé d’exister. C’est cette survivance de la beauté à l’utilité qui explique, sans aucun doute, la valeur intrinsèque de l’entablement dorique de pierre, pour Vitruve.’

²⁸⁵ Lewis and Short (1879), s.v. ‘fastigium’ I.B. and II.; cf. Caesar, *De bello gallico* 7.85.4 and 8.41.5.

However, I fear that I am now being carried beyond the scope of my original plan, drawn along by the marvelously systematic way in which Stoic philosophy sets out its doctrines. [*Verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me traxit ordo.*] Heavens above, does it not fill you with admiration? Surely no work of nature (though nothing is more finely arranged than nature) or manufactured product can reveal such organization, **such a firmly welded structure?** [*...aut in natura... aut in in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum inveniri potest?*] Conclusion unfailingly follows from premise, later development from initial idea. Can you imagine any other system where the removal of a single letter, like **an inter-locking piece**, would cause **the whole edifice** to come tumbling down? [*quid non sic aliud ex alio neclitur ut, <non> si unam litteram moveris, labent omnia?*] Not that there is anything here which could possibly be altered [*moveri*].²⁸⁶

I have liberally interspersed the Latin to enable the reader to share Schofield's impression that this translation, while 'not very literal' also has 'lots of style'.²⁸⁷ In particular, the bolded terms, integral for our argument, have no close analogue in Cicero's Latin – and yet, they do pick up his vocabulary. For 'firmly wedded' we get '*compactum et coagmentum*', which reinforces the view that a building's firmness can also be expressed by its *compactness*, a point I shall more fully resume in ARGUMENT 2.

Cicero's metaphorical use of architectural similes climaxes in the inalterability (not: the fragility) of 'the whole <edifice>' (*omnia*), from which no piece can literally be removed (*moveri*), as it is so tightly constructed. As Woolf and Annas comment, the philosophy sketched in this passage is 'holistic in structure; each position can ultimately be understood only in the light of the whole system.' (2001, 89n.48) This 'interlocking holism', to appropriate terms from their translation and commentary, also captures what I take to hold, not just of *firmitas* as a value of its own – see again its definition in §3.4.1 in terms of *being tectonically composed* –, but of the whole triad in Vitruvius I.3.§2, in terms of §3.3's RECIPROCITY THESIS.

On the whole, the relation of firmness to *coagmenta* strongly encourages the synchronic reading, as being primarily a term denoting the composition of a building *at a point* in time, as opposed to (what points us towards the diachronic reading, sc.) its longevity *over time*.

§3.6.5 ARGUMENT 2. GREEK COGNATES OF 'FIRMITAS', PART 1

Another way to get at the intended meaning of 'firmitas' is, of course, to consult the standard dictionaries, bearing in mind that, (1) such evidence is by its nature less conclusive than we might wish, given how authors (ancient or modern) need not always comply to standard recorded usage, and (2) provided that whatever we unearth from lexical inquiries conforms to Vitruvius' own gloss of the notion in I.3.§2, sc.

Firmitas erit habita ratio cum fuerit fundamentorum ad solidum depressio, quaque e materia, copiarum sine avaritia diligens electio (Durability will be catered for when the foundations have been sunk down to solid ground[,]) and the building materials carefully selected from the available resources without cutting corners[.]

In §§3-5, I shall outline two such routes, one based on the noun 'firmitas' itself, and one based on the cognate adjective 'firmus', which respectively gets us to the Greek words στερέμνιον and θῦρος. While I concede that the second route is vastly more plausible than the former, on either way the diachronic reading is ruled out: 'firmitas' is a synchronic, not a diachronic notion. Let us see how this can be shown.

If we consult Lewis and Short on 'firmitas', they immediately point us to a technical term in ancient Greek, στερέμνιον:

I.firmness, durability, strength (class.; syn.: constantia, firmitudo, perseverantia). I. Lit.: *ea, quae ille* (Epicurus) *propter firmitatem* στερέμνια *appellat*, Cic. N. D. 1, 19.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ Text: Reynolds (1998). Translation: Woolf in Annas and Woolf (2001, 88-89).

²⁸⁷ Schofield (2006, 236n.3).

²⁸⁸ Lewis and Short (1879, *ad loc.*).

The quotation is from Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* (ca. 45 B.C.), an inquiry into the metaphysical, especially religious, beliefs prevalent in pre-Socratic philosophy. Helpfully, the line has Cicero himself say, of *firmitas*, that it designates what Epicurus meant by *στερέμνια*. Hence, once we know what Epicurus meant by the term, we apparently know what *firmitas* means.

Στερέμνια connotes the solidity of elements that make up the primary bodies in Epicurus' (meta)physics. An explanatory note to Cicero's text by Francklin adds,

Στερέμνια is the word Epicurus used to distinguish between those objects which are perceptible to sense; and these which are imperceptible, as the essence of the Divine Being; and the operation of the divine power.²⁸⁹

Translators of Cicero then render his term 'firmitas' variously as 'substantiality', 'solidity', and even 'firmness'. The major reference in the preserved fragments of Epicurus' own writings, of his treatise *On Nature*, now largely lost, comes at Treatise 23, fragments 23 and 43 (available at TLG). However, even if we agree with Rowlands (1999, 135) that

Vitruvius knew and sympathized with aspects of Epicurean philosophy (e.g. atomism), with which he was familiar through Lucretius' didactic poem *De Rerum Natura* (9.Praef.§17),

it seems implausible to believe Vitruvius had a narrow technical term in mind from Epicurus' philosophy when he chose the term *firmitas*. More frequent, however, is the cognate adjective *στερεός*, which we get for instance in fragment 16 of the Bailey edition of Epicurus:

ἄτομον ἐστὶ σῶμα στερεόν ἀμέτοχόν κενου παρεμπλοκης – κενόν ἐστι φύσις ἀναφης.

The atom is a hard body free from any admixture of void; the void is intangible existence.²⁹⁰

The idea here is broadly reminiscent of Plato's *Sophist*, which at 246a7-b3 describes a group of philosophers assuming that the only things that exist are bodily or corporeal, and singles out not just the notion of (things having) 'body' (σῶμα ἔχον), but the fact that we are talking about physicality, corporeality – things we can touch (ἐφαπτόμενοι, cf. 'haptic'), and most importantly, things that *resist* our touch, are *impenetrable*. These notions of 'body', 'solidity', and 'impenetrability' however, are not philosophically equivalent. As Frank Jackson puts it, while attributions of physicality may *entail* those of solidity (Jackson calls this 'inclusion by entailment'), it leaves open whether we should identify the solidity with impenetrability, or, with the dispositional property of things to 'resist encroachment'. For, one can leave it open

whether we should identify solidity with being disposed to resist encroachment, or whether we should insist that *impenetrability* is being disposed to resist encroachment, and identify solidity with the categorical basis of impenetrability[.]²⁹¹

These philosophical notions become all important when we now look to the meaning of *στερεός*, meaning 'firm' or 'solid' (e.g., solid gold; but also figuratively hard, e.g. stubborn). On occasion the term can qualify the idea of 'body' more generally, so that it means a 'solid' or 'cubic' body, a term Plato uses of geometric planes (*Philebus* 51c5). For precisely this reason – the proximity of the term, not to physical bodies, but geometric ones – the term has engendered discussion among philosophers of ancient science, that of Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus Mathematicos* 83-4) in particular. Both Ian Mueller and Andrea Falcon discuss the two meanings of σῶμα and come to the same conclusion.²⁹² The term 'body' itself is ambiguous between geometric and physical ones, and so are certain properties ascribed to bodies like depth. In Sextus we precisely get the question whether three dimensionality already implies corporeality,

²⁸⁹ Francklin (1829, 30n. 'e')

²⁹⁰ Text and translation in Bailey (1926, 124-125).

²⁹¹ Jackson (1998, 3n.3). It is frequently held that dispositional properties, while categorially distinct from categorical ones, are metaphysically inseparable from them. Cf. Campbell (2002, 235-254).

²⁹² Mueller (1983, 73-76). Falcon (2008, respectively 45-50 on Aristotle and 51-54 on Sextus Empiricus).

yielding a negative verdict due to the existence of geometric ‘bodies’. Another term is needed, then, to denote solidity more clearly, and this is where, for Aristotle and Sextus, the term *στερεός* comes in.

Falcon (2008, 45) in effect defines the term as connoting the compactness of a body, of its being held together, in a sense that a loose (and largely unconstituted) mereological compilation of corpuscles lacks. Now, this is a feature of a body, or, of body (*σῶμα*), but, for Aristotle at the least, it is not *σῶμα* itself let alone matter (*ἔλη*) that *explains* what holds a body together – that would rather be the body’s principle (*ἀρχή*), form or substance (*Metaphysics Z.3*); in the case of animated living bodies, its soul (*ψυχή*; *De Anima B.1*). And because these bodies are compact (*στερεός*) they differ from geometric ones which lack a material principle of constitution.²⁹³

If Falcon is right to define *στερεός* as ‘compact’, we should also recall from ARGUMENT 1 the relation of firmness to joints, *coagmenta* (Vitruvius II.8§1), a notion Cicero conjoined with compactness: *compactum et coagmentum* (*De Fin.* III.74). The adjective *compactus* derives from the verb *compingo*, derived from *com-* + *pangere* (to fasten), and meaning ‘to join or unite several parts into one whole, to put together, frame, make by joining, compose’ (Lewis & Short). Whence the English adjective ‘compact’, meaning ‘having a dense structure or parts or units closely packed or joined’ (Merriam Webster). This connotations all point towards the synchronic reading. More generally, if construing *firmitas* as *στερέμνια* and *firmus* as *στερεός* is on the right track, we have (albeit, ultimately inconclusive) support for the synchronic reading and complete lack of support (inconclusive or not) for the diachronic reading.²⁹⁴

§3.6.6 ARGUMENT 3. GREEK COGNATES OF ‘FIRMITAS’, PART 2

Suppose we leave the noun *firmitas* behind and instead go for the adjective it is based on, *firmus*. In that case, Lewis & Short inform us that it means ‘I. *firm* (in opp. to frail, destructible), *steadfast, stable, strong, powerful* (freq. and class.; esp. in the trop. sense; syn.: *constans, stabilis, solidus*).’ More importantly, however, we learn about the Sanskrit and Greek cognates of the term:

firmus, a, um, adj. Sanscr. *dhar-*, *dharā-mi*, hold, support; Gr. *θρᾶ-*, *θρή-σασθαι*, to sit down, *θρήνυς*, *θρόνος*

Turning to Liddell, Scott and Jones for the Greek cognates, we find the substantive *θρόνος*, derived from the verb *θρόμαι*, meaning ‘to be seated’, of which *θρήσασθαι* is the aorist infinitive:

θρόνος, ὄ, (*θρόμαι*) [I.1.] bench, form, Ar. Pl.545 (gen. *θρόνους* codd., *θρόνου* Poll.). 2. close-stool, Hp. ap. Gal.19.104. II. Archit., 1. wooden beam, ὅσα κατέρρωγεν τοῦ τείχους ἐνδήσει θρόνοις IG22.463.75; *θρόνους* ἐπιθήσει διανεκεῖς, of beams supporting floors, ib.1668.81, cf. 1672.208. 2. ὁ θ. τοῦ νεῶ the top course of masonry in a temple, ib.11(2).161A49 (Delos, iii B.C.); θ. *ποικίλος* PCair.Zen.445.5 (iii B.C.).

Chantraine likewise defines *θρόνος* as meaning, ‘in architectural materials, ‘cross beam’, principally made of wood’ (‘Dans les inventaires d’architecture ‘poutre transversale’, en principe de bois’), ‘a board (of wood) laid across, a foot stool’ (‘planche en travers, banc escabeau’); derivative nouns often have designate wooden furniture like benches and foot stools.²⁹⁵ This confirms the tectonic meaning of *θρόνος*, and by implication, of *firmus* and *firmitas*, and lends support to construe these terms under the synchronic reading.

Chantraine (ibid. and 443) notes that the semantic width of *θρόνος* is more or less exactly that of *θρόνος*, which Lewis & Short had listed as related to *firmus*. He mentions a connection to proto-Indoeuropean roots **dber-* and **dbr̥a₂-*:

²⁹³ Contrast Mitrovic (2005, 51), whose exegesis of (the architectural relevance) of the term *stereon* solely rests on (1) the occurrence of the term’s conjunction with *schema* in Euclid, and on (2) an interpretation of the latter phrase to mean ‘immaterial shape’. I doubt Euclid is our only valid reference here, or that *schema stereon* should be interpreted as anything other than the *outline* of a corporeal body. Hence, the item whose *schema* is in question is not bereft of physical properties altogether, but we are invited to attend to it schematically, that is, *in abstraction from* its physical properties.

²⁹⁴ This conclusion remains in place even if some of the supporting considerations are open to doubt. For instance, it seems unlikely that the technical *στερέμνια* rather than the non-technical *στερέοτης* is the more relevant cognate noun of *στερεός*.

²⁹⁵ Chantraine (1968-1974, 439).

Suppose une racine **dber-* “soutenir, porter”, qui est attestée dans le skr. parf. *dadbhāra* (serait grec *τέθορα), etc. ... Avec une autre structure radicale, **dbreθ2-*, on a θροῖνος, θροῖνος, p.-ê. aussi θροσεύω, etc.²⁹⁶

, related to the Sanskrit adjectives *dhāra* and *dhāraṇa*, which both mean ‘holding, bearing, supporting’, and the substantive *dhāraṇā*, meaning ‘the act of supporting’; Chantraine’s own entry on θρόνος says,

The Sanskrit *dadbhāra* is the perfect of the verb root *dbṛ*, third person singular *dharati*, usually replaced by the causal form *dhārayati* with the same sense; supposedly it is what the *dhar-*, *dharā-mi* mentioned by Lewis and Short refers to. Its principal meaning is indeed ‘hold, bear, support’.²⁹⁷ Chantraine (443) sees the root **dber-* present in the Greek word ἐν-θρ-εῖν, which Hesychius equates to φυλάσσειν, ‘to guard, protect’. These associations might explain how *firmitas* gets linked in later usage to words for fortresses or fortifications, that is, words for solid and fortified buildings.²⁹⁸ That, as before, the core meanings are those of ‘holding (up)’, of ‘bearing’ something, and of (structural) ‘support’, again confirm to read *firmitas* in synchronic terms, and see it as a closely related to §3.4.1’s notion of *being tectonically composed*, sc. that of an overall structure whose composition is so constrained that it, as a whole, is ‘held up’.

§3.6.7 CONCLUSION TO VITRUVIUS ON *FIRMITAS*

This concludes our inquiries into the cognates of *firmitas*, based from their starting point in Lewis & Short. They all confirm that the term’s (range of) meaning flatly falls within the synchronic reading, ruling out the diachronic reading as the defining one. On most readings, the term expresses how things are ‘firmly connected’, especially on ARGUMENT 1’s sense of *compactness* – specifically, physical compactness of bodies and buildings. Such senses of connectedness and compositionality go beyond a blunt mereological sense of heaping things together. A proper composition is one where things support (or ‘prop’) each other, so as to compose a meaningful unit that enjoys both continuity and identity, as identified in §3.4.1. This, finally, is where the diachronic reading and the synchronic reading do find a point of contact. As we observed from the outset, *firmitas* grounds the longevity of a building, and enables a building to remain standing, remain erect, and thus survive the onslaught of time. But *firmitas* at no point actually *means* durability itself – it connotes the forces necessary to accomplish it, which comprise something significantly richer than solidity and imperishability on their own. Contemporary scholars appear to frequently confuse the quality Vitruvius denotes with ‘firmitas’ for its effect, that is, confuse the quality’s diachronic implications for its synchronic base. A glass’s molecular structure grounds its brittleness but is not (semantically or metaphysically) equivalent to it. Analogously, the *firmitas* of an edifice grounds its longevity without being identical to it.

§3.7 VITRUVIUS ON ARCHITECTURAL BEAUTY

In this section I contest some misunderstandings of Vitruvius’ aesthetics having to do with his term for beauty, *venustas*. I first focus on an argument by Roger Scruton to the effect that that aesthetics is fundamentally mistaken, because it misconstrues beauty as a primary rather than secondary property (in Locke’s parlance). This occasions me to engage the analysis of *venustas* in Indra McEwen’s work, an analysis that involves multiple misconceptions of the term; among them, the claim that it applies to corporeal entities only, and that it has gendered connotations of a particular variety. The first of these claims, if true, would help substantiate my RECIPROCITY THESIS (as regards the close connection of *venustas* and *firmitas*), but cannot be allowed to stand on philological grounds. Even so, we shall see, some of our inquiries into *venustas* will substantiate the RECIPROCITY THESIS.

²⁹⁶ Chantraine (ibid., 443).

²⁹⁷ Monier-Williams (1899), s.v. धृ. I owe this reference to Maarten Franssen.

²⁹⁸ Cf. Juret (1942, 174), s.v. ‘firmitas’: ‘fort, ferme, solide; [...] fr. *La Ferté*, nom de ville: “fortessere”?’.

§3.7.1 VENUSTAS AS A SECONDARY PROPERTY

According to Roger Scruton, the notion of ‘the (architecturally) appropriate’ is an *entirely aesthetic* one in Renaissance architecture thinkers like Alberti and Palladio.²⁹⁹ He speaks of

the sense, implicit in all Renaissance thought, of the primacy of aesthetic values [...] Alberti, in his repeated emphasis on what is appropriate, fitting, ordered and proportionable, is placing aesthetic considerations at the heart of the builder’s activity. (1979, 24)

Scruton’s argument against this position is, not so much to *disagree* with it as to fault the Classical tradition with a *mistaken understanding* of ‘the aesthetic’. In particular, its understanding is too impoverished by attending only to the object (and objectual features) *eliciting* an aesthetic response, such as finding a building beautiful, but not attending sufficiently to the subjective factors that are crucial for the elicited response to qualify as (appropriately) ‘aesthetic’. Such factors include among others the role of the imagination.

The first task of aesthetics must lie in the correct understanding of certain mental capacities – capacities for experience and judgement. I shall therefore be discussing questions on the philosophy of mind, and my concern will be to understand the nature and value of our interest in architecture. (1979, 1)

Scruton in particular challenges the Classicist idea (which we get in Vitruvius, Alberti, and Palladio) that correct proportions, which are a matter of a building’s *primary* qualities (to use Locke’s parlance), *suffice* for the ascription of architectural beauty; he challenges that because, on his rival account, response-dependent (if also object-rooted) properties, or *secondary* properties, are vital for that ascription (1979, 58-70). Let me first explain Locke’s distinction. In Ayers’ exposition,

primary qualities are primary just because they are qualities that must be ascribed to bodies generally, including the ‘insensible parts’ of bodies, and secondary qualities are secondary because the physical causality involved in our perception of them [...] can, or even must, be explained entirely in terms of the primary qualities of those insensible parts [...]. Secondary qualities are therefore simply powers the bodies possess to cause certain ideas or sensations in us – powers they possess in virtue of their structure or ‘texture’[.].³⁰⁰

Translated to architecture, the implication is clear: a building’s surface texture or its underlying structure by themselves cannot, on this account, suffice the building the type of aesthetic quality required for it to qualify as ‘architecture’. Returning to Ayers’ analysis, we can add that canonical examples since Boyle, for primary qualities, are ‘solidity, extension, figure, mobility (motion or rest), and sometimes ‘texture’, whereas colours, sounds, tastes and smells are canonical secondary qualities (ibid.). As in §3.6, primary qualities can be categorical (like figure) or dispositional (like solidity), but they are in any case explanatorily foundational to secondary ones in that their ‘texture’ grounds the perceptive effect of bodies in perceiving subjects. Hume’s argument, then, is that architectural beauty – tied, as it is, to mental capacities and human sentiment – is not a primary quality, but either a secondary one or (worse) the causal upshot of one. He writes,

Attend to Palladio and Perrault, while they explain all the parts and proportions of a pillar: They talk of the cornice and frieze and base and entablature and architrave; and give the description and position of each of these members. But should you ask the description and position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not in any of the parts or members of the pillars, but results from the whole, when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind, susceptible to those finer sensations. Till such a spectator appear, there is nothing but a

²⁹⁹ Scruton (1979).

³⁰⁰ Ayers (2006, 137).

figure of such particular dimensions and proportions: From this sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty.³⁰¹

Scruton's argument (1979, 58-70) is essentially a variation on Hume's, retaining the general steps of the argument. To begin with, it is important to classify the properties Scruton alleges Classical aesthetics to overlook as *secondary properties* in Locke's parlance. Scruton claims Classical aesthetics is mistaken because it erroneously categorizes the aesthetically relevant features of architecture as primary rather than secondary, when they are obviously secondary. One way of answering this objection would be to challenge the claim that aesthetic properties of architecture are secondary. Another one would be to challenge Scruton's characterization of Classicist aesthetics of architecture, and to hold that Vitruvius and Alberti in fact provide the type of account Scruton himself favours. The latter type of answer is incidentally contained in the work of Indra McEwen.³⁰² I will argue in the remainder of §3.7 that McEwen's account is wrong on several levels, and most fundamentally offers a multiply mistaken account of what 'venustas' means in Vitruvius. This means that a defense of Vitruvius' aesthetics from Scruton's charge cannot possibly pursue the line suggested in her work. To what extent the material in §3.7 affords us a rejoinder to Scruton along the other line remains to be seen. I defer a full answer to a proper aesthetics of architecture on which the decisive properties are primary, or at least the dispositional foundation of sensory effects rather than their causal upshot, to §7.5. By the end of CHAPTER 7 we will have probed Kant's and Schopenhauer's aesthetics of architecture, critical discussion of which helps us reach such a position, and dispatch Scruton's misgivings over the Classical tradition more firmly.

§3.7.2 VENUSTAS AS SPECIES; VENUSTAS AS GENDERED

McEwen's key claim in this regard occurs in this passage, with a crucial footnote attached:

For Vitruvius eurythmy, the appearance of beauty in architecture, is not *pulchritudinis species* but *venustatis species*. (For Vitruvius, *venustas* is invariably a question of appearance: I.2.3, 1.3.2, 2.3.4, 3.3.6 (twice), 3.3.11, 3.3.13, 3.5.11, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 5.1.10, 6.3.11. The highest concentration of occurrences (7 out of 12) is in the two books (3 and 4) on temples.) (2003, 211, with 380n.227)

There are several problems with McEwen's handling of the textual evidence. For starters, she misconstrues the scope of relevant textual evidence by focusing on the noun alone. Yet surely passages that employ the cognate adjective ought to be admitted too – especially when, as in the comparison of types of masonry bonds in II.8§1 (discussed in my §3.6.3), the cognate adjective comes juxtaposed to cognate adjectives of other elements in the triad (*ex his venustius est reticulatum... incerta vero... sed firmiorem*).

Second, even if we solely focus on the evidence McEwen adduces for her thesis, that evidence would still underscore the exact opposite of her thesis. For if Vitruvius' noun for beauty (*venustas*) already meant 'beautiful appearance', then its juxtaposition to qualifying nouns like 'appearance of' (*species*) would be a pleonasm – like speaking of male bachelors, wet water, or nauseating nausea. But there is no impression that Vitruvius engages in pleonasms at such points in his text. And that means his word '*venustas*' means beauty, and not the appearance thereof.³⁰³ The textual evidence then, at the very least, is compatible with construing '*venustas*' as a feature of objects rather than how they appear to us – that is, as primary rather than secondary features.

³⁰¹ Hume (1998, 162). Cf. Hume (2011, 832-833).

³⁰² McEwen (2003).

³⁰³ This point is clearly recognized in Fischer (2009, 146-147). Fischer argues that Vitruvius will sometimes *replace* his familiar triad with another one, and will replace '*venustas*' with '*species*'. But that, so Fischer, is no argument that the two terms are co-extensive, just as '*firmitas*' is not co-extensive with '*decorum*' when Vitruvius replaces it towards the end of chapter VI.8 (*et venustate et usu et decoro*). As Fischer puts the point regarding III.3,

wo es um die besonders empfehlenswerte Proportion des 'Eustylos' geht, erscheint in | der Aufzählung anstelle der *venustas* auf einmal die *species*, das '(schöne) Aussehen' (*et ad usum et ad speciem et ad firmitatem rationes habeat*). Es zeigen sich also durchaus Spielräume in der kategorialen Festsetzung. (2009, 146-7)

McEwen's other argument to construe Vitruvius' notion of beauty as an inherently subjective (and thus, secondary) feature is equally weak. She relies on two points from Pollit's work on Pliny the Elder, according to which

- (P1) *venustas* likely translates *χάρτις* – which is tied to appearances and 'anchors architectural beauty in the world of the senses.' (2003, 200), whereas
- (P2) *pulchritudo* is 'equivalent to the Greek [το καλόν] (invisible, ideal Platonic Beauty)' and Vitruvius 'never uses it, nor the related adjective *pulcher*' (2003, 200).

For P1 to be true, *species* would have to be a pleonastic qualifier of *venustas*. But as just saw, it is not. So P1 is false, Pliny the Elder notwithstanding. P2 is more interesting, not least because McEwen all of a sudden allows 'related adjective[s]', whereas her previous note ruled them out as textually irrelevant. This certainly signals an inconsistency in her own methodology. In any case, P2 is given the lie by attending to Plato's most prolonged inquiry of το καλόν in the *Symposium*. As is clear from even cursory inspection of the dialogue, its interlocutors can disagree on what beauty (το καλόν) is, while only one of them (Socrates, referencing Diotima) at all pursues what might be recognized as a transcendental view of beauty. This indicates that McEwen overinterprets the textual evidence in favour of a philosophical position she cannot sustain independently.

For, again, if το καλόν (concomitantly, *pulchritudo*) already meant 'transcendental beauty, unrelated to the senses', as she claims it does, Plato's transcendentalist answer in the *Symposium* to 'What is beauty?' should be resolved, as it were, by simply consulting the term's lexical meaning. But of course it isn't, and Plato doesn't. He is no 'ordinary language philosopher'. He engages in substantive metaphysical inquiry, one of whose starting points is the observed, and uncontested, claim that we apply the predicate 'is beautiful' indiscriminately to the (transcendental, non-empirical) form of beauty, as much as to the empirical instances of that form, like a beautiful girl or statue.³⁰⁴ But this contrast does not require that that form is itself wholly separate from, and never instantiated in, the empirical world.³⁰⁵ I mention this because McEwen's (cryptic) characterization of Plato's use of το καλόν is doubtful on philosophical grounds too.

McEwen's own texts does not discuss these points – rather, it unwittingly confirms them. For, the examples she adduces, in Greek and Latin, of her thesis that *venustas* expresses *visible* beauty (rather than beauty *simpliciter*) are, firstly, Diogenes Laertius' phrase *δια κάλλος εμφανιζόμενον*, which she renders as 'due to visible beauty appearing' (2003, 211), and secondly, Cicero's translation thereof, which she renders 'inspired by the appearance of beauty (*ex pulchritudinis species*)'. Her insertion of the term 'visible' into Diogenes Laertius' Greek is utterly gratuitous, and the consequent 'visible [noun] appearing' is pleonastic.

What is more, however, by discussing here (p. 211) το καλόν rather than *χάρτις*, and adducing points she thinks are relevant to Vitruvius, she actually engages the very terms she told us, eleven pages earlier, are totally irrelevant to Vitruvius and *venustas*. That is why, having concluded her points on το καλόν and *pulchritudo*, she has to change gear once again, and remind us that,

For Vitruvius [...], the appearance of beauty in architecture, is not *pulchritudinis species* but *venustatis species*. (2003, 2011)

³⁰⁴ *Republic* 479a, *Hippias Major* 287c-e. For discussion see Crombie (1963, 278-279)

278-9, who points out that Plato contrasts the form, not with a specific instance, like Helen of Troy, but rather a sub-type: Plato 'gives the type – a beautiful girl – rather than the token – Helen' (278n.1). On that same distinction, of (form and) subtype vs. token in Plato's discussion of beauty, see also Woodruff (1981). McEwen's own exegesis to the contrary proceeds unaware of this body of literature, or of Fine's work on Plato's metaphysics (see next fn.).

³⁰⁵ Gail Fine's scholarship on Plato's 'separation' of the forms from empirical reality amply confirms that Plato does not construe it as a wholesale *metaphysical separation* from the sensible, empirical world, but rather connotes (for instance) the individuation of norms that *hold independently of* specifics in that world. Many of Fine's key essays are collected in her (2003, esp. 252-300).

McEwen’s argument cannot have it both ways. It cannot uphold both that there *is* a deep philosophical difference between these Latin terms for beauty and their respective Greek cognates – a difference that goes to the heart of aesthetics (is beauty transcendental or tied to sensual appearances?) – and at the same time maintain that the very same difference is inessential enough to allow her to extract important philosophical points about one of the terms from observing how the other one is used. As before in her handling of (the selection of) textual evidence, McEwen’s position is not even internally consistent.

§3.7.3 VENUSTAS AND χάρις

There are two further reasons to cast doubt on both P1 and P2, the key premises McEwen needs to defend her thesis that ‘*pulchritudo* vs. *venustas*’ expresses a sharp contrast. First, the fact that Pliny the Elder was born a hundred years after Vitruvius renders it somewhat unclear what sort of authority he is on Vitruvius’ Latin. Here is Pliny the Elder’s *Nat.* 35.79, in the rendition of Brian Kostenko:

praecipua eius <sc. Apellis Coi> in arte uenustas fuit, cum eadem aetate maximi pictures essent, quorum opera cum admiraretur, omnibus conlaudatis deesse illam suam uenerem dicebat, quam Graeci χάριτα uocant[.]

The *venustas* of Apelles of Cos was outstanding, even in a time when there were other outstanding painters; he admired and praised all their work but said they lacked the quality that distinguished his own work, attractiveness (*uenus*), which the Greeks call χάρις[.]³⁰⁶

Kostenko goes on to discuss the equivalence thesis itself (P1), commenting ‘the relationship between the Latin and the Greek is by no means one of simple equivalence’ (2001, 107). In particular,

The use of *uenust(us)* in the Latin rhetorical tradition may have been inspired by the χάρις of Greek rhetorical terminology, but the native semantics of *uenust(us)* and their connection to ‘attractive gestures,’ have not been suborned by it. [...] In the case of *uenust(us)* (1), which refers to gestures, it is not even possible to determine the underlying Greek, if any.’ (2001, 108)

Finally, and this is the clincher against McEwen’s case, it is only with Quintilian (born 35 A.D.) that the term *uenust(us)* gets explicitly ‘equat[ed] with *gratia*, which is a later common equivalent for χάρις. (*uenustatem esse cum gratia quadam et uenere dicatur apparet, ‘Whatever is said with a certain grace (*gratia*) and charm (*uenus*) appears to be *uenustum*’ 6.3.18).)’ (Kostenko 2001, 108). The truth of the equivalence claim, McEwen’s P1, comes too late for Vitruvius, who was writing in B.C. 31 to 21.*

For all these reasons, P1 is philosophically and philologically dubious.

Second, later writers in the Vitruvian tradition like Alberti and Palladio are equally happy to use *pulcher/pulchritudo* to make Vitruvius’ points on *venustas*. As Rykwert et al. point out, Alberti’s Latin is not consistent when discussing the Vitruvian triad, as he sometimes ‘uses the terms *commoda... firmitatem... gratiam et amoenitatem* [I.2 (p.5)]; elsewhere (II.9, p.14), *utilitatis, dignitatis, amoenitatisque.*’ (1987, 426) *Premise 2* of the argument by Alberti discussed in my §2.7 already indicated as much. This suggests that for Alberti the terms *venustas* and *pulchritudo* are sufficiently close at a conceptual level, even if they diverge etymologically and other finer nuances, to be employed to express the same points.³⁰⁷ If so, we should not expect Vitruvius to make a finer distinction, let alone a distinction of the type McEwen suggests. – But things are considerably more complicated than that. Here is Alberti, in the *Praefatio* to his *De Re Aedificatoria* (1486),

Distinximus ea de re adificiorum genera, in quibus quidem cum habere plurimum momenti uideremus, cohesionem modumque linearum inter se: ex quo praecipua pulchritudinis effectio emanarit. De pulchritudine idcirco capimus disquirere, quidnam esset, & qualis cuique deberetur.

³⁰⁶ Kostenko (2001, 107n.54). I return to this point below, with corroborating evidence from Fantham (2004).

³⁰⁷ I have in mind here Frege’s semantic distinction of coloration (*Färbung*) and sense (*Sinn*), on which see Neale (1999).

We therefore distinguished the various types of buildings and noted the importance of the connection of their lines and their relationship to each other, as the principal sources of beauty; we began therefore to inquire further into the nature of beauty – of what kind it should be, and what is appropriate in each case.³⁰⁸

What, according to Alberti, forms the most foundational aspect of architectural composition, the ‘lines’ (*lineamenta*), not only accounts for a variety of uses and types of buildings. The same multiplicity, he says, ought to occasion an inquiry into the nature of architectural beauty, so we know what kind of beauty would be ‘appropriate in each case’, i.e. for each type of building.

Alberti, in other words, asks for a differentiation of the abstract noun ‘beauty’ (*pulchritudo*) into several, type-specific subkinds. This would mandate a more nuanced aesthetic vocabulary, afforded to him by the range of expressions Rykwert et al. suggest he is conflating – *gratia*, *amoenitas*, and *dignitas*. I shall ignore *amoenitas* here, and focus on the other two terms. To begin with, we may concede that ‘venustas’, if not in the Ciceronian or Augustan age, then certainly in the (post-)Quintilian Latin usage like Alberti’s, may express ‘grace’, in Greek *χάρις*. If so, it is likely Alberti uses *gratia* as a stand in for *venustas* here.³⁰⁹ We would then need to ask how the three terms *pulchritudo*, *dignitas*, and *venustas/gratia* relate.

The explanation of that lies, perhaps unsurprisingly, in Cicero. For Alberti, like Vitruvius, is an accomplished master of Ciceronian Latin, with Alberti incontrovertibly the greater stylist. And Ciceronian Latin uses the trio of *pulchritudo*, *dignitas*, and *venustas/gratia* precisely to mark distinctions relevant to Vitruvius and Alberti. What is more, it does so in ways that do not flout common sense or philosophical robustness.

§3.7.4 VENUSTAS AND DIGNITAS

In Ciceronian Latin, *venustas* is synonymous to *pulchritudo* (Lewis & Short, s.v. ‘venustas’). Cicero used the terms interchangeably in such passages as *De Officiis* I.95, which relates the (to Vitruvius, critical) notion of *decorum* to virtue:

Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, decorum, et ita pertinet, ut non recondita quadam ratione cernatur, sed sit in promptu. est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod deceat; quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari. ut venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a valitudine, sic hoc, de quo loquimur, decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute confusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.

This <propriety, sc. *decorum*>, therefore, of which I am speaking belongs to each division of moral rectitude [*honestas*]; and its <sc. *honestas*> relation to *decorum* is so close, that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require any abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For there is a certain element of propriety perceptible in every act of moral rectitude [*in omni virtuti*]; and this can be separated from virtue theoretically better than it can be practically. As comeliness and beauty of person are inseparable from the notion of health [*ut venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a valitudine*], so this propriety [*decorum*] of which we are speaking, while in fact completely blended with virtue [*cum virtute confusum*], is mentally and theoretically distinguishable from it.³¹⁰

The conjunction of both terms with ‘body’ (*venustas et pulchritudo corporis*) further refutes McEwen’s contention that the term *pulchritudo* is not felicitously applied to bodies or corporeal entities like buildings, let alone that its application differs critically from that of *venustas* on that point.

³⁰⁸ Text: 1541 edition by Jacob Cammerlander (here p. 10). Translation: Alberti (1486/1989, 5).

³⁰⁹ In that regard cf. Palladio (1570, 6), ‘*La bellezza risulterà dalla bella forma e dalla corrispondenza del tutto alle parti?*’, ‘Beauty will derive from a graceful shape and the relationship of whole to the parts’ (tr. Tavernor and Schofield 1997, 7). I discuss a similar view of Alberti’s in §2.7.

³¹⁰ Translation Miller (1913), with corrections.

Nor is it true that Cicero reserves *pulchritudo*, as opposed to *venustas*, for male beauty. In his *Orator ad Brutum* I.3.8-9, he applies *pulchritudo* to the image (*species*) of Zeus or Athena, discussing the archetype either could constitute for a statue of Phidias. While that passage goes on, in I.3.10, to link that ‘image’ to Platonic archetypes or ἰδέαι, the overall effect is the opposite McEwen claims to regulate Vitruvian usage of *pulchritudo*. Cicero’s point is precisely that *we can speak of all three of* (a) transcendental archetypes, (b) their images or likenesses, and finally (c) statues built on those images or likenesses in the real world, *as beautiful*. The question for Plato, as for Cicero, is rather how we nuance that usage. Contemporary scholarship now agreed that Plato does not defend a homonymous usage of ‘is beautiful’ applied in cases (a) to (c) comparable to ‘is a bank’ applied to a savings building and a park bench.³¹¹

Much more important to our understanding of Latin aesthetic terms than any passage in Pliny, or exegetically dubious claims about the use of το καλόν in Plato, is again Cicero. And, as before, the crucial evidence occurs in a passage from *De Officiis*. For there, at I.130, we find the clearest explanation yet of how *pulchritudo* relates to *venustas*:

Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem.

While there are two kinds of beauty (*pulchritudinis*), in one of which grace (*venustas*), in the other dignity (*dignitas*), predominates, we ought to regard grace as belonging to woman, dignity to man.³¹²

To have even a modicum of plausibility, then, McEwen’s thesis of gendered beauty nouns has to be revised accordingly, such that *pulchritudo* is the genus, and *venustas* and *dignitas* are its (gendered) species. But this alters the textual question entirely. Instead of asking (with P2) whether Vitruvius ever uses *pulcher/pulchritudo* to speak of architectural beauty, we need to ask: does Vitruvius apply *venustas* to architecture at the exclusion of *dignitas*?

And this thesis stands up poorly to textual scrutiny. Already in *De Oratore* III.180, the very passages that stood patron for *De Architectura*’ introduction of *venustas* in I.3.§2, Cicero applies both *dignitatis* and *venustas* to the Capitolium,

Columnae templa et porticus sustinent; tamen habent non plus utilitatis quam dignitatis: Capitoli fastigium illud et ceterarum aedium non venustas, sed necessitas ipsa fabricata est. (translated in §3.6.1)

This invites the idea that different elements in one and the same buildings may exhibit different types of beauty – or, as Alberti suggested, that different building types exhibit different types of beauty. Cicero makes the same point already at *De Officiis* III.178, again using both species of *pulchritudo*,

Sed ut in plerisque rebus incredibiliter hoc natura est ipsa fabricata, sic in oratione, ut ea, quae maximam utilitatem in se continerent, plurimum eadem haberent vel dignitatis vel saepe etiam venustatis. (tr. in §3.6.2)

While *dignitatis* and *venustas* are gendered aesthetic terms for Cicero, they do not function in the way English demarcates ‘handsome’ from ‘beautiful’ when applied to men as opposed to women.³¹³ That is not to deny the gendered connotations of the terms, specifically that of *venustas*, given its etymological link to Venus, goddess of love and seduction. As Callebaut observes, a propos the term’s use in Vitruvius VI.8.§1,

S’agissant des pages précédentes consacrées à la maison urbaine, à la maison grecque, Vitruve situe l’axe directeur de son étude sur une double approche: perception ‘visuelle’ (cf. Ferri 1960, 242) de l’ouvrage en

³¹¹ Nehamas (1975), a work that successfully demolished the received wisdom of earlier generations of Plato scholars.

³¹² Translation by Reid (1885).

³¹³ This is, incidentally, why Cicero is happy to juxtapose *gratia*, not (only) with *venustas*, but also with *dignitas* (Cicero, *Brut.* 262, Kostenko 2009, 109). In P1, McEwen supposed *gratia* to be synonymous with χαρις and *venustas*, at the exclusion of ‘male beauty’ – a concept we now know to be expressed, in Cicero, by *dignitas*. In later usage, writers no longer hesitate to attribute *venustas* to male bodies (e.g. Nep. *Eumenes* XI.9), and even to the body of Augustus in Sueton (*Aug.* 79): see Kostenko (2009, 110-111n.65).

tant qu'object d'elegantia, de séduction (*venustas*); description d'une fonctionnalité porteuse de beauté par sa 'nécessité', sa 'convenance' (*decor*).³¹⁴

Callebat's juxtaposition of *venustas* with 'séduction' picks up an ancient motif, the seduction (and lulling to sleep) of Mars' martial prowess by Venus' allure, widely known (also to Vitruvius) from Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* (I.31-36), and variously depicted in Roman frescos (see fig. 3*.2, overleaf), and later celebrated in Botticelli's *Mars and Venus*. The invitation to architects, by Vitruvius, to strive for a similarly enticing quality in their buildings has of course intrigued and challenged architects ever since.

If *venustas*, then, its connotations notwithstanding, does not exclusively apply to women in Cicero, Vitruvius can be shown to hold the same view – except ramping up the nuance even more. Instead of thinking, with Cicero, that different elements in one and the same buildings may exhibit different types of beauty, Vitruvius allows ascribing *venustas* and *dignitas* to one and the same compositional element:

Nonnulli antiqui architecti negaverunt dorico genere aedes sacras oportere fieri, quod mendosae et disconvenientes in his symmetriae conficiebantur. Itaque negavit Arcesius, item Pythius, non minus Hermogenes. Nam is cum paratam habuisset marmoris copiam in doricae aedis perfectionem, commutavit ex eadem copia eam ionicam Libero Patri fecit. Sed tamen non quod invenusta est species aut genus aut formae dignitas, sed quod impedita est distributio et incommoda in opere triglyphorum et lacunariorum distributione.

Some architects denied that temples should be built with the Doric order because false and unpleasant modular systems were generated in such buildings. This is what Tharcesius said [i.e., he was among those who 'denied' the point], but also Pytheos, and especially Hermogenes. Hermogenes, in fact, after collecting a supply of marble for the construction of a Doric temple, changed the project and, using the same materials, built an Ionic temple to Father Liber instead: not because the general appearance, order or shape is unattractive or lacks dignity [*invenusta est species aut genus aut formae dignitas*], but because during construction the distribution of triglyphs and coffers is restricting and incommensurable. (IV.3.§1, tr. Schofield 2009, 98)

Fig. 3*.2 *The seduction of Mars by Venus*. First century A.D. fresco from Pompeii, displayed in Naples' Museo Archeologico Nazionale.

Among other things, the passage seems to challenge the gendered description sometimes bestowed on the classical column orders by later writers.³¹⁵ More generally, it proves beyond doubt that Vitruvius happily applies *dignitas* – a male epithet – to buildings, or parts thereof.

Vitruvius also reminds us that a temple may further the fame and prestige (*dignitas*) of a deity (I.2.§7), as a house may further that of its owner (I.2.§9). He thinks unfair competition from colleagues may deprive an architect's own status or *dignitas* (III.Pref.§2), but that philosophy helps him to uphold it (I.1.§7). On

³¹⁴ Callebat (2004, 236). Callebat elaborates his views on the Vitruvian triad in his (1994).

³¹⁵ E.g. Summerson (1963/1980, 15), 'the Corinthian has always been regarded as female and the Doric as male, with the Ionic in between as something rather unsexed'.



occasion he even commends other architects for their dignified looks and bodies (*facie dignitateque corporis*, II.1.§4).

Looks, for Cicero too, had a lot to do with having, or lacking, *dignitas*. That is why, in *De Officiis* III.130 he says that a speaker's attire should be fit for the job – which meant, wearing a toga, as opposed to a more neutral or even womanly attire. Let us again attend to the passage, this time in full.

Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem. Ergo et a forma remoeatur omnis viro non dignus orantus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur. Ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus ornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur. Nam et palaestrici motus sunt saepe odiosiores et histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non vacant, et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et simplicia laudantur. Formae autem dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis. Adhibenda praeterea munditia est non odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam negligentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.

While there are two kinds of beauty (*pulchritudinis*), in one of which grace (*venustas*), in the other dignity (*dignitas*), predominates, we ought to regard grace as belonging to woman, dignity to man. Therefore a man should both remove from his person every unworthy apparel or adornment, and also be wary of comparable faults in his gestures and movements. For the movements taught in the *palaestra* are often somewhat distasteful, and some of the gestures used by actors are not free from affectation. In either case [or, in the entire carriage of the body] what is upright and straightforward is praised. Furthermore, the *dignitas* of one's appearance must be preserved by fine colouring [or, healthiness of complexion], and colouring[/complexion, is to be maintained] by exercising the body. One should also | add a neatness that is neither distasteful nor over-fussy, but just enough to avoid boorish and uncivilized neglectfulness. A similar rationale should be applied in the matter of dress: here, as in most things, the intermediate course is the best.³¹⁶

The strong degree to which *venustas* is associated with body language, gesture and (in *De Off.* I.131) gait, should remind us of Kostenko's point how the term is associated with body movement, a connotation that the original Greek *χάρτις* did not have. For that reason, *χάρτις* cannot, *pace* McEwen, be cognate with *venustas* in contexts that require that connotation, be they Cicero's or, where he adopts Ciceronian usage, Vitruvius'. Elaine Fantham makes the same point when she writes, a propos *De Oratore* III.177,

The orator is like a sculptor who works with a wax model: he can use words to achieve diction at every level from solemnity to simplicity and his style will go through changes to delight the listeners' ears and heart [...]. The source of this exciting power lies in Nature, which has contrived that whatever conduces to survival also has beauty, in both its manifestations, as grandeur (*dignitas*) and as charm (*venustas*). (We should note that *venustas*, introduced at [III].30 as a quality of the theatre (*scaenica* . . . *venustate*) becomes in [III].178 an ideal in nature and then in art (cf. *venustas* and *venustus* in [III.]179, 180, and 199 and the comparison of the figures to the poses and gestures of combat at [III.]200 and 206).³¹⁷

And as for the term '*palaestra*' in *De Off.* I.130, it denotes

A Greek word meaning 'place of exercise'. There the correct movements and stance for various physical activities were taught. C[icero] distinguishes gestures appropriate there and on the stage from those suitable to ordinary life.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ Except for the opening line and subsequent interpolations (retained from Reid 1885), this gives the translation by Griffith and Atkins, Cambridge (1991, 50-51).

³¹⁷ Fantham (2004, 277 with 277n.18). Surprisingly, she goes on to conclude (ibid., n.18), '*Venustas* has much in common with *lepos*, and probably stands for the Greek *charis* rather than e.g. *to kalon* (τὸ καλόν), corresponding to a number of the surviving recommendations of Theophrastus.'

³¹⁸ Griffith and Atkin (1991, 50n.2). Reid (1885 *ad loc.*) has 'wrestling place' for *palaestra* – presumably, *gymnasia*.

This recalls Kostenko's claim, quoted earlier, that *venustas*, unlike *χάρις*, has a strong connection to body language, 'attractive gestures', and physicality as such. In a similar vein, Fantham observes how

Cicero repeatedly presents Roscius in *De Oratore* as the model for physical performance, in the perfection of his movements and their beauty which both charmed and moved all his audience. The great actor stands for the aesthetic component in public speaking: for beauty (*venustas*) and consummate gesture, achieved by practice until something is impeccable. Roscius is made the embodiment of *decere*, grace and elegance. For Roscius, grace was the essence of art, and the one thing that could not be created by art itself: *caput esse artis decere, quod tamen unum id esse quod tradi arte non possit* ([II].132). The stress placed by Cicero[, in relation to *venustas*,] on skill in performance—*actio*, which will not be discussed until the very end of the dialogue—is something unparalleled in the Greek rhetorical tradition until after Demosthenes[.]³¹⁹

We should note that *venustas*, introduced at [*De Oratore* III].30 as a quality of the theatre (*scaenica... venustate*) becomes in [III].178 an ideal in nature and then in art (cf. *venustas* and *venustus* in [III].179, 180, and 199 and the comparison of the figures to the poses and gestures of combat at [III].200 and 206).³²⁰

On the last point see also Fantham (2004, 282-3), forging a relation of wrestling 'figures' to 'forms' (i.e. figures) of speech:

In Greek [rhetoric] theory, notably in Isocrates, figures were seen as schemata, postures in wrestling. Now, without alluding to the Greek image, [Cicero's] Crassus substitutes a different kind of imagery taken from the body in armed combat. The links in thought seem to be first the analogy between speech and the human body, and secondly the preservation of *venustas*, in the motions of combat as in the manly body at rest. So Crassus introduces the idea of performing offensive and defensive moves in agonistic oratory with the same elegance (to gloss *venustas*) as in sword-fighting or wrestling. | The dominant term, however, is not *figere* or *figura*. In *De Oratore* from [III].200, *formare*, *conformare*, and their derivatives cover first the orator himself, *conformandus verbis et sententiis*, then the modeling of language and thought in the figures.

Given this emphasis, in *De Oratore*, of physical combat and physical gesture to explain *venustas*, we can now see why Cicero glosses *venustas* in *De Officiis* III.130 the way he does, referring to a 'wrestling place', and distinguishing the physical manners needed there from those needed in the republic assembly. In either arena, one's performance is on public display, and it matters a great deal whether one puts up a fair fight or a disgraceful one – as shown, centrally, by how one carries one's body.

Indeed, that emphasis on *attire* worn for public performance, finally, also contextualizes the significance of *venustas* for architecture in Vitruvius. If, as before, *firmitas* expresses the structural frame which holds up or props up a building – and keeps it stably put together thanks to solid composition, rendering the building 'compact' – then *venustas* is a quality of the building's exterior skin hung on that frame, like skin on a human skeleton or cladding on a human body: Cicero's link of *venustas* to *vestitus* (attire) anticipates Semper and Loos on (*Be*)*kleidung* we will explore in CHAPTER 8 (§8.3.3). And, Cicero reminds us, how we are perceived is greatly a matter of how we carry ourselves – carry our bodies. There is only so much an attire can conceal, before the actual beauty or deformity of our frame and stature are revealed, and with it our character, to the public eye.

Perhaps it is no surprise that the Romans should have had the same word, 'actor', for both a prosecutor and a performer on a stage. Socially, the gulf between the two of them was vast, but in terms of technique there was often little to choose. Rome's leading orator in the decade following Sulla's death, Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, was notorious for aping the gestures of a mime-artist.

³¹⁹ Fantham (2004, 84).

³²⁰ Fantham (2004, 277n.18), already quoted *supra*.

Like Caesar, he was a celebrated fop, who ‘would arrange the folds of his toga with great care and exactness’, then use his hands and the sweep of his arms as extensions of his voice. He did this with such grace that the starts of the Roman stage would stand in the audience whenever he spoke, studying and copying his every gesture.³²¹

This, finally, allows us to solve the puzzle on whether or not *venustas* is a primary or secondary quality. As the parallel in Cicero *De Off.* I.130 brings out, *venustas* is very much a visible quality, having to do with public display and public visibility. But what matters is the quality seen, not its seeing. This is a fine distinction, to be sure, but it demarcates the objective from the subjective.

A building’s appearance (*species*) arises from its primary qualities, specifically the properties of its skin. Those properties ground the appearance and perceived dignity of the building, but are not themselves subjective qualities or ‘secondary’ in Locke’s classification. That is, the properties accounting for a building’s *venustas* are physical properties, explained in Vitruvius by such further qualities as *symmetry* and *decorum* (on which see above on *De Off.* I.95) – features rightly categorized by Scruton as primary ones.

§3.8 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 3*

As I have now extensively documented for *firmitas* (§3.6.7) and *venustas*, contemporary scholars have confused Vitruvius’ qualities for their effects – have confused these qualities’ dispositional implications for their categorical base. A glass’s molecular structure (a categorical property) grounds its brittleness (a dispositional property) but is not semantically equivalent to it. Just so, the *firmitas* of an edifice grounds its longevity without being synonymous with it, and its *venustas* explains the building’s visible aesthetic features without being synonymous with them. As before, we must not confuse the categorical with the dispositional, lest we confuse surface effects for the real thing, a thing with a core as much as an outer shell. Its art form or *Kunstform*, Boetticher will demand, must be diaphanous so to speak, in that it ‘shows through’ to its *Kernform* or core form, as grounded in its *firmitas*.

In either case – *venustas* or *firmitas* – Vitruvius grounds these core qualities of buildings in their primary properties, properties he believes are not grounded in human subjectivity (although I have not documented the same for *utilitas*, where divorcing the content of properties falling under the ‘quality’ from all human concerns seems rather far fetched). This is, of course, what opens up the analysis of buildings to objectivity, because it grounds that analysis in building’s objectuality. The ‘tectonic’ tradition of Boetticher and Semper in nineteenth century Germany, we shall see in the remainder of the present work (particularly CHAPTER 8), fully exploits this point. It exploits Vitruvius’ emphasis on objectuality and objectivity precisely so as to create a more respectable aesthetics of architecture than the Kantian tradition with its preoccupation of human cognition, and especially its obsession with the ‘imaginative play’ of surface forms, would ever allow. (I return to the many errors that accrue from this in CHAPTER 5.)

Of central importance in all that, both to the tectonic tradition, and our understanding (consequently, appreciation) of architecture as such, is the distinction between frame and skin, and the concomitant reflections on façade and cladding (*Bekleidung*). That distinction, we have seen in this chapter, is contained in Vitruvius’ technical vocabulary for firmness and beauty. For these reasons, and others to be unearthed in CHAPTER 4 and onward, the tectonic tradition must be regarded as Vitruvius’ true heir, and reminds us that German neo-Classicism carries the torch of antiquity in more regards than stylistic concerns for surface effects. It shows that, with ruptures and intermissions, there is a continuity of moral outlook across twenty centuries of architectural production in the West, the temporal distances between them notwithstanding.

³²¹ Holland (2003, 126-127), quoting Aulus Gellius, *The Attic Nights*, I.5.

CHAPTER 4

THE TECTONIC TRADITION

My efforts to lay bare and clarify the content of this chapter [Vitruvius §I.2] were in vain. All I saw was a heap of debris amassed without design, debris belonging to a building derelict long since, namely the canon of an ancient theory of beauty in the arts. But not only the workpieces of this building are lost to us – the rest is deprived of its context and structure, and piled up into an amorphous mass [...], so much so that a restoration of this ancient building from those remnants will be difficult, if not impossible [for us].

Gottfried Semper (1803-1879)³²²

§4.1 INTRODUCTION

Earlier chapters of this thesis argued for the correctness of a particular ethics of architecture. Among the core tenets of that ethics, the reciprocity of the values in the ‘Vitruvian triad’ in *De Architectura* §I.2 was central. That is, beauty, utility, and firmness do not represent three *mutually unconstrained* values but instead *reciprocally condition* each other(s application). I called this the RECIPROCITY THESIS (§3.3). §3.3.1 already indicated that the RECIPROCITY THESIS enjoys a sort of after life among prominent Renaissance architects including Alberti and Palladio, and I hinted at further architects in nineteenth century Germany subscribing to it too, particularly Semper and Schinkel. The present chapter re-examines this last point, and situates it in its historical context to facilitate our appreciation of its philosophical significance. For their subscribing to the RECIPROCITY THESIS enabled these architects to powerfully argue against tendencies emerging in academic philosophy at the time, over a subject no less than the nature and essence of architecture itself.

More specifically, as we saw in CHAPTER 3, critique of Vitruvius in our own time is premised on the idea that Vitruvius’ TRIAD VALUES come with the ‘built in quandary’ of giving rise to value conflicts, or that, ‘architecture is necessarily complex and contradictory in its very inclusion of the traditional Vitruvian elements of commodity, firmness, and delight.’³²³ Such claims presuppose that architectural beauty and utility in architecture are defined *independently*, which appears to misunderstand the Vitruvian position rather than critique it. Exactly these type of claims were propagated by philosophers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century too, and it was left to architects to rectify the matter. It is perhaps unsurprising, given the nature of the debate, that close attention to Vitruvius’ own text was highly instrumental for those architects’ cause and the rectification they argued for in their built and written work. At the centre of this ‘rectification’ stands a body of thought I will label ‘the tectonic tradition’. §4.2 showcases the key thinkers within that tradition and outlines their major contribution to the aforementioned debate. This prepares the stage for later chapters dealing with the *gigantomachia* between architects and philosophers at greater length. §4.3 provides one final preliminary to this discussion, namely a brief foray into the various meanings of the term ‘tectonics’ (pursued again at greater length in §8.2 and §10.3), to forestall a false sense of intellectual unity or homogeneity among proponents of that ‘tradition’.

§4.2 RECLAIMING ARCHITECTURE FROM PHILOSOPHY

³²² Gottfried Semper (1850/1884, 202): ‘Meine Anstrengungen, mir den Inhalt dieses Kapitels [Vitruv §I.2] zurecht zu legen und klar zu machen, waren vergeblich; nur erkannte ich vor mir einen planlos zusammenkonstruierten Haufen von Trümmern, die einem längst verfallenen Baue, nämlich dem Kanon einer antiken Theorie des Schönen in den Künsten angehörten; aber nicht nur die einzelnen Werkstücke dieses Baues sind zum Teil abhanden gekommen, das übrige seines Zusammenhanges beraubt und zu einem formlosen Wüste zusammengetürmt, auch die charakteristischsten Werkzeichen der Ordnung, denen die übriggebliebenen Bruchstücke angehörten, (gleichsam die Profile und Gliederungen) sind unter dem Spitzhammer barbarischer Routine so verstümmelt, daß eine Restauration des alten Baues aus ihnen sehr schwierig, wenn nicht unmöglich ist.’

³²³ Spector (2001, 35-36). Venturi (1977, 16). For discussion, see §3.3.2 above.

Tectonics, in its various guises, connotes how things are ‘put together’ or ‘conjoined’, from the Greek verb *tektainomai*.³²⁴ In nineteenth century German architectural thought the term comes to assume, not just how things are conjoined, but how they are conjoined so as to make a building ‘stand up’ and support itself. Whence the close connection of tectonics with structure, frame, support, the interest to look at the difference between non- and load-bearing compositional elements (such as ‘Wand’ versus ‘Mauer’, §8.4), and so on. This already makes ‘tectonics’ the modern heirs to Vitruvius’ understanding of firmness (*firmitas*), and of its centrality to an understanding of architectural value explored at great length in earlier chapters, particularly §3.1-§3.4 and §3.6.

But the connection to Vitruvius of this segment of the German architectural tradition – one, for ease of reference rather than historical veracity I shall label ‘the tectonic tradition’ – runs much deeper. Writers in the tectonic tradition rebelled against the separation of constructional concerns from aesthetic ones. This constituted a revolution in architectural aesthetics, in that it challenged Kant’s aesthetics of architecture which had upheld an opposition (or value conflict) between utility and beauty. As Heinz Quitsch puts it,

What reduces architecture’s value as art, for Kant, is its being tied to [utilitarian] purpose – because, for him, only pure form, bereft of utilitarian influences is the mark of true aesthetic quality. Thus, architecture only displays characteristics of ‘dependent beauty’, in contrast to free beauty [sc., ‘free from utilitarian purposes’], because it is subsumed under concepts of particular purposes. [...] The entire aesthetic theory of Kant underestimated the significance of purpose, utility, and function for the analysis of art – it proclaimed an antagonism between purposiveness and beauty. [...] As late as Schelling, in 1802-1803, we find the sentence, ‘As long as architecture serves mere needs and is merely useful, it can only be this but never at the same time beautiful.’³²⁵

In full, the passage from Schelling reads,

As long as architecture serves mere need and is only useful, it is *only* this and cannot be beautiful at the same time. This it can become only when it becomes independent of such need. But since it cannot become absolutely independent, since finally, by its nature, it again and again borders on this need, it becomes beautiful only when it becomes at the same time independent of *itself*, becomes so to speak, the *potentiation* and the free representation of *itself*.³²⁶

Commentators have not been slow to realize how

radically [Schelling] depart[s] from the Vitruvian paradigm: instead of combining utility and beauty, architecture must demote utility to a mere [pre-]condition of its beauty, not a goal in its own right, and beauty in turn is understood as something intellectual [that is, non-material].³²⁷

Harries, discussing the aforementioned excerpt from Schelling likewise adds,

For, as Kant observed, by its very nature architecture serves needs that have nothing to do with what beauty requires. If it is to raise itself to the level of art, architecture therefore has to distance itself from functional building, even as it must remain such building.³²⁸

For Kant, as CHAPTER 5 shall argue, architecture’s essence is inherently functional (*zweckmäßig*), in that any aesthetic or epistemic attention bestowed on a building has to be mediated by (our understanding of) what the building ‘ought to be’. What a building ought to be arises purely from its typology – its being a church as opposed to a palace, and so on. And these features, Kant alleges, are not the upshot of or otherwise conducive to its beauty – rather, they compromise it. This is what his theory of ‘adherent

³²⁴ See Liddel-Scott-Jones (1999), s.v. τεκταίνωμαι. Alleged etymological connections of tectonics to the Greek for ‘craft’ and ‘to give birth to’ are frequent in the architectural literature ever since Heidegger, but not solidly attested.

³²⁵ Quitsch (1996), discussing Kant (1791, §§16-17 and §§51-53), and Schelling (1960, 578); my translation.

³²⁶ Schelling (1858, §107; 1960, 578). Translation by Karsten Harries (1998, 119).

³²⁷ Guyer (2011, 12-13).

³²⁸ Harries (1998, 119).

beauty’ attests. For Kant, we may conclude, beauty and functionality stand in opposition.³²⁹ We may also observe, in passing, that he nowhere engages the third value of the Vitruvian triad – *firmitas*. And this omission is philosophically significant.

For, by contrast to Kant’s and Schelling’s opposition of beauty and functionality, the tectonic tradition upholds their reciprocal unity because it ties both of them to a third value: *firmitas*. Firmness, in turn, is construed as *tectonic composition*, a notion first explored in §3.4 and which we shall hear more of in §4.3 and later. Richard Streiter lauds Carl Boetticher’s 1844 *Die Tektonik der Hellenen*, particularly its opening section on ‘the philosophy of tectonic form’, on exactly this score – for having rescued architecture aesthetics from the Kantians and, in particular, for having reinstated *concerns for utility* as enhancing rather than contradicting *aesthetic concerns* in architecture.³³⁰ This requires, among other things, a complete reappraisal of just what, precisely, aesthetic value in architecture is and where, in particular, the notion Kant inherited from British sentimentalism will not do. Thus architect Gottfried Semper (cf. CHAPTERS 8-9) writes in 1834 how a religious or cultic significance is indispensable to all the arts, and that their being stripped of such significance – as we find in the idea that beauty is there only ‘for the refined stimuli of the senses’ – is fatal. Much rather, Semper suggests, ‘representation of beauty shall never be the *purpose* of a work of art – beauty is a *necessary characteristic* of an art work, like extension is of body’.³³¹ Such revisionary understandings of beauty and purposiveness, along with a renewed appreciation of *firmitas*, are also present in Karl Friedrich Schinkel’s handbook for architecture, in passages composed in the 1830s. Schinkel writes,

To render beautiful something [that is] useable, useful, and purposive – that is architecture’s task.

[To be beautiful], a building has to render visible all the essentials of its own construction.

In architecture everything has to be true – all masking, disclosure of construction is a mistake.

The actual task is to make out every constructional part beautiful, as [dictated by] its character.³³²

Elsewhere Schinkel goes so far as to define ‘the principle of art in architecture’, or of ‘building’ (verb), as, ‘bringing diverse materials into a single (and purposively unified) whole’, from which he concludes that,

purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) is the foundational principle of all building[.]³³³

The key point for Schinkel, however, at this juncture is to *broaden* purposiveness to include the entire Vitruvian triad, and not just *utilitas*. He writes (ibid.),

The purposiveness of a building can be considered in three main points of view, which are (A) purposiveness of distributions of rooms, of plan, (B) purposiveness of construction or, combination of materials in accordance with the plan, (C) purposiveness of ornament or decoration.

In just this way, Aloys Hirt (1809) had already declared the Vitruvian triad to define the essence of architecture – but only if we understood its components values to be reciprocally conditioned. Both Hirt and Schinkel pick up Kant’s notion of ‘purposiveness’ (*Zweckmäßigkeit*) and radically re-define the term to meet their own, profoundly un-Kantian agenda. Thus for Hirt it is axiomatic

that architecture’s final purpose is threefold: firstly, to lead every building to its most permanent and firmest, secondly, to structure and furnish every building in the most commodious manner, according to its [typological] determination, and thirdly, to give every building outwardly and

³²⁹ What is more, for Kant aesthetics and ethics are mutually irreducible, for a multitude of reasons, all of which depend on his criteria as to how one rationally ought to arrive at ethical and aesthetic value judgements. I document these arguments more fully in my (2013, 62-67), where I also show them to be inconclusive.

³³⁰ Streiter (1896, 32-33).

³³¹ Semper (1834/1884, 226, italics mine).

³³² Schinkel (1979, 58, 148, and 114); my translation.

³³³ Schinkel (1862, 208); my translation.

inwardly an appearance that is pleasing to the eye, that is, beautiful. The art of building [*Baukunst*] seeks to meet this threefold purpose by just as many means [...], and this is what defines the essence of the art of building.

Building something that is purposive means nothing other than building firmly, fit to needs, and pleasing to the eye. An architect meeting these three conditions creates what is possible. All principles and precepts erected by architectural Reason have to meet this threefold purpose. The principles and precepts have to be rooted in and return to this central point from whence they emerge.³³⁴

The most explicit instance of an architect enlisting Kant's vocabulary and philosophical ideas to mount a philosophical position on architecture directly at odds with Kant's own is Carl Albert Rosenthal. In his 1844 essay, 'What does architecture actually want?', he defines the goal or *telos* of building, that which architecture *aims* at, to be beauty. However, as that beauty is of an empirical thing, moreover of a very specific variety, Rosenthal argues that the beauty in question consists in perfection as transpires in appearance, or, to the senses. Pulling that definition into two subcomponents, 'perfection' and 'transpires to the senses', Rosenthal decomposes (1) the notion of 'perfection' as the 'congruity (*Übereinstimmung*)' of an object's 'inner being or essence' (*Wesen*) with its purpose (*Zweck*) and (2) 'transpires to the senses' as a type of empirical perfection that is discerned by feeling (*Gefühl*), as feeling is the organ or faculty for perceiving or sensing beauty of an empirical variety.

Now, (1) is Kant's definition of aesthetic perfection in the third *Critique*, and (2) is very much how Kant defines 'the aesthetic', as we shall see in CHAPTER 5. Unlike Kant, however, Rosenthal has just reunited beauty and functionality, by putting Kant's definition of perfection to a new use – in architecture. As a final step, Rosenthal argues that architecture's canonical *way* and *means* of realizing that 'goal' or aim – that of beauty, enriched by purposiveness – its composition and construction, understood in terms of *tectonic composition*, such as the notion that a building's overall compositional goal is 'balance', or *Gleichgewicht* (see §3.4 and §8.2).³³⁵ Crucially, those 'means' are not causally or definitionally separate from that goal, but co-constitutive of it. (Otherwise Rosenthal would re-instate instead of challenge a view like Kant's.)

The upshot of all this is the RECIPROCITY THESIS which ties beauty to functionality (in the broadest sense) and firmness alike, undercutting the core tenets of Kant's own understanding of architecture. We shall return to Rosenthal's dialectics of architecture's 'goals' with its 'means' in CHAPTERS 8-9, but the interdefinition of *venustas* with *firmitas* in his 1830 'On the origin and meaning of the Greek architectonic forms' is worth replicating here:

Wenn die Form aus der Construction entstanden ist, und wenn sie eben darum schön genannt wird, so folgt auch, daß sie sich zugleich mit ihr ausbilden muß, und daß, wenn sich die Construction ändert, auch die Form sich neu gestalten muß[.]³³⁶

Rosenthal (*ibid.*, 6n.1) credits Hübsch's 'On Greek Architecture' (1828) with the point, but he also anticipates later writings from Carl Boetticher to Otto Wagner here, all of whom recognize the interdependence of *venustas* with *firmitas* as integral to a proper philosophical understanding of architecture.

We thus have to acknowledge a new recognition among nineteenth century German architects that a philosophical, aesthetic understanding of architecture at the hands of Kant and his followers was radically defective, in that it misconstrued how the terms of the Vitruvian triad (the TRIAD VALUES) interrelated –

³³⁴ Hirt (1809, 5), my translation.

³³⁵ Rosenthal (1844); the major points on architecture's 'goal' occur in paragraphs 1-10 of the essay, and of the 'means' in paragraphs 12-15 and especially 19.

³³⁶ Rosenthal (1830, 6). That Rosenthal argued for this view already in 1830 is nothing short of a historical sensation, and merits revising our understanding of the period. Wolfgang Herrmann's presentation of Rosenthal in his anthology his (1992) omits the 1830 essay, and fails to situate the profound significance of the position therein in the broader philosophical landscape of the time. – I thank Patrick Healy for gifting me an original, uncut copy of Rosenthal's 1830 text on the occasion of my finishing my dissertation.

and that a true appreciation of value in architecture would only come about when that specific point was rectified, in practice as much as our understanding of it. Hence, as we can see, there is a subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS from Hirt (1809) to Streiter (1896) that informs the tectonic tradition – and it does so to this day. Thus architect Hans Kollhoff could write as late as 1993,

The concept of tectonics unites, in architecture, the apparently antagonistic spheres of art and technology. Thereby the concept expresses their union which appeared previously lost, for since the middle of the nineteenth century we can observe a progressive erosion of the complementary union of technology and art, of building art [*Baukunst*]. Today we observe [...] that the one-sidedly optimized facets of construction have as catastrophic an effect on our culture of building as design interests that one-sidedly aim at fictional forms. We increasingly face a world populated by things which are technologically perfect but insult the eye, or are superficially beautiful but of doubtful utility.³³⁷

Kollhoff goes on to describe in some detail instances in contemporary architectural practice of utility without beauty, and utility without beauty.³³⁸ And as Schinkel, Rosenthal, Boetticher, and Streiter before him Kollhoff thinks that this divide can only be overcome by rooting both notions – utility and beauty – in tectonics, *firmitas*. Indeed, his diagnosis of the aforementioned failures to reconcile beauty and utility focuses on their poor understanding of tectonics.

It is thus important to recognize writers in the tectonic tradition as heirs to the Vitruvian ethics outlined in earlier chapters of this thesis, by virtue of their shared subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS and the recognition of *firmitas* as central to the triad. This signals to us the *longue durée* of Vitruvian ethics, its aptitude to reshape and readapt its core tenets to architecture's innovative forces in modern times. The tectonic tradition, if nothing else, serves to elevate Vitruvius' strictures to contemporary relevance, and reminds us that his ethical core insights are, if not exactly timeless, then certainly not confined to a bygone era either.

On the other hand the value framework shared with Vitruvius also sheds light on the tectonic tradition itself, as one that already comes equipped with an ethics, a nuance recent commentators in the tectonic tradition have been slow to realize. Instead, writers like Kenneth Frampton or Gevork Hartoonian opt to marry tectonics to a Heideggerian ethos, which focuses on such notions as 'dwelling' or '*poësis*' – the latter, for Heidegger, the disclosure of truth as much as an act of making – and in the consequence elevate tectonics to a 'poetry of construction', as the subtitle to Frampton's book would have it.³³⁹

To not confine tectonics to the crudest sort of materialism but elevate it to a 'cultural' notion (whatever that amounts to later on), is all and good as far as it goes. At a deeper level, however, Heideggerian borrowings appear to present an anachronism to tectonics, a superimposition of something foreign from elsewhere (*ou-topos*) on it. And they likely open the tectonic tradition to philosophical objections it would have never faced on its own terms. It seems the only added value Heidegger affords the tectonic tradition is a fanciful way of expressing itself – a new language, a different and more high flowing way to garb one's insight, without fundamentally altering the underlying substance.³⁴⁰ If so, we may wonder whether the tectonic tradition contains materials for philosophical reflections on architecture all by itself. Hirt and Hübscher, for instance, kept critiquing each other for what they saw fit to call their opponent's 'philosophical views'. If such views are no longer regarded as 'philosophical', or worth the attention of philosophers, that perhaps says more about our own philosophical culture than theirs, and could invite a

³³⁷ Kollhoff (1993, 7); my translation.

³³⁸ Kollhoff (1993, 9-13).

³³⁹ Frampton (1995), Hartoonian (1994).

³⁴⁰ As elsewhere in philosophy, it is useful to employ a substitution test: suppose we take a sentence about architecture clothed in Heideggerian prose and replace the Heideggerian terms with their ordinary language counterpart (where available). Does the resulting sentence still convey a profound insight? Does it contain an insight that could not be attained except by delving into Heidegger's thought?

reconsideration of which thinkers and texts we consider worth including in a canon of the philosophy of architecture. For we may fruitfully reflect on what views like Hirt's and Hübscher's are, and how they came about in the first place. To that end, I submit to the reader's judgement a series of studies in tectonic ethics, aiming to bring out the inherent ethical potential writers in the tectonic tradition attribute to tectonic composition itself. Much historical material is delivered in CHAPTERS 8-9 on Semper, Schinkel, and Boetticher, and much future work remains to be done on other figures in the tectonic tradition, particularly Rosenthal and Otto Wagner, the latter a transition figure on the eve of modernism itself. Indeed, as I shall argue in CHAPTER 10, some of the tectonic tradition's core precepts emerge in the work of twentieth century architect Mies van der Rohe, and that any proper appreciation of his achievements rely on, in a rather nuanced manner, a proper understanding of the tectonic. This, too, may call for a revision of how to canonize and periodize architecture and the philosophy thereof.

Before we get to these figures, however, I shall focus on the contrasting and competing philosophies by Kant and Schopenhauer, the first profoundly anti-tectonic in his thought, and the latter paving the way for the ethical spirit of tectonics, in CHAPTERS 5 and 7 respectively.

The remainder of the current chapter addresses two lesser issues – one, the recent fad of 'digital tectonics', and two, a broad categorization in §4.3 of the term 'tectonic'. On the first point, there has recently occurred another strange marriage of tectonics with Heidegger. I have in mind Neal Leach's work which shares with others the uncritical acceptance of Heidegger's (largely erroneous) etymologies on tectonics:

Not only does architecture allow for the possibility of dwelling, but it is also precisely part of that dwelling. To dwell authentically, for Heidegger, is to dwell poetically, since poetry is a manifestation of truth restored to its artistic dimension. Architecture becomes a setting into work of 'truth', and a means of making the 'world' visible. Fundamental to this process is the ancient Greek term *techne*, linked in Heidegger's mind to the term *tikto* – 'to bring forth or to produce' – a concept to be distinguished from the modern term 'technology' in which *techne* remains 'resolutely concealed'.³⁴¹

This poor understanding of the theoretic base of tectonics bodes ill for a movement Leach did much to propagate – 'digital tectonics', an attempt to port over constructional tectonics into architecture's 'digital era'.³⁴² To begin with, it is not clear how far this initiative ever goes beyond simply equivocating on the term 'tectonics' itself, a term it largely leaves undefined. As Anna Marie Due Schmidt puts it,

When the authors on digital tectonics introduce the computer technology as an aspect influencing the tectonic tradition, it is however, not tectonics as a build [built?] edifice but tectonics as a practice that they are focusing on.³⁴³

One wonders what is left behind, once 'tectonics as a built edifice' is left out. Not surprisingly, the 'practice' Schmidt mentions is defined, not architecturally, but by a heavy dose of philosophy.³⁴⁴ For instance, we get Deleuze's understanding (such as it is) of 'the Gothic', showing up in discussions by Manuel DeLanda and Lars Spuybroek³⁴⁵ – authors, topics, and sources very far removed from traditional tectonic ones, and not once connected to them. Most crucially, Leach et al. proclaim that only the digital will help reconcile a 'rift' in the tectonic tradition between aesthetics and construction (ibid., p. 11, 149, and *passim*). This makes it abundantly clear that these authors were more keen to 'add' to the tectonic tradition than to actually engage with its theoretic foundation. Did we not hear, time and again, that the tectonic tradition is *defined* by its stance on interdefining aesthetic and constructional features?

³⁴¹ Leach (1997, 94).

³⁴² Leach et al. (2004).

³⁴³ Schmidt (2007, 14).

³⁴⁴ As a reviewer of Leach et al. (2004) put it, 'When did philosophy and architecture become so entangled? I don't know, but the end result is that books like this, which are aimed at showcasing new technologies in architecture, also end up showcasing a good deal of philosophy.' (*apud* Amazon UK, retrieved September 12, 2013)

³⁴⁵ Both in Leach *et al.* 2004.

It should be also clear how the two theses of ‘digital tectonics’ condition one another. Once we write ‘tectonics as a built edifice’ or *firmitas* out of the picture, as digital tectonics proclaims, we then have a gap to fill – the gap to reconcile the other two elements in the triad. As we saw earlier, the tectonic tradition upholds the reciprocal unity of utility and beauty because it ties both of them to construction, tectonics, or *firmitas*. Schinkel, Boetticher, Streiter, and Kollhoff all showed how the divide between beauty and utility could only be overcome by rooting both notions in tectonics, *firmitas*. All that Leach et. al. do, is to replace the notion of *firmitas* in this argument by an appeal to ‘the digital’, a term that is then given meaning by a philosophy of ‘new materiality’ drawing on the work of Deleuze, DeLanda, and others. This argument is simply a *repetition* of the old one, in the unflattering sense of giving us more of the same instead of delivering something genuinely different. To add to, engage with, or challenge the tectonic tradition, considerably more is required. This is thus the last readers shall hear of ‘digital tectonics’ in this thesis.

§4.3 VARIETIES OF TECTONICS

In this section I will discuss two different understandings of tectonics. They differ in their relation to the process of construction. (On tectonic composition see further §3.4.1, §8.2, and §10.3.)

To begin with, suppose we posit the primacy of *building* as what defines architecture. If this supposition cannot be (a) backed by *a priori* considerations or (b) empirically verified, it can only be posited. But as we saw in §2.6 on *The Essentialist Stance*, attaching a ‘cannot’ to ‘(a) or (b)’ is not a reasonable assumption.

On this understanding, anything to do with architecture that does not directly deal with the process of construction – of translating a design into a physical structure, something that can actually be built (erected, edified) – is architecture in a derivative sense only. Take a concept sketch of a building project that leaves the mode of composition, the manner of construction and detailing, and the physical viability or ‘realizability’ of the envisaged building with respect to (for instance) statics, undefined. (Most concept sketches do.) Such a sketch is architectural, or architectonic, only in a derivative sense – in a preliminary sense, perhaps.³⁴⁶ On the contrary view, the drawing is assigned *primacy*, given how it is the only *object* which (most) architects directly touch – the building they touch only derivatively.³⁴⁷ This seems to elevate a necessity (for some) to a virtue (for all), and inverts what is philosophically the more plausible relation between drawing and object. As Peter Buchanan observed a propos a recent work on Le Corbusier:

[A]rchitectural drawings, which were once humble working documents, mere means towards the final art work ends (the buildings), are [now] treated as final ends in themselves, reproduced to show the current condition of the total sheet, discoloration, tears and all. Quite apart from elevating such documents to the status of art works being ultimately a problematic form of consumerist commodification, they tend to be reproduced here far too small; the result is that many are pretty much inscrutable. This, together with the lack of the conventional plans, sections and so on – such as found in the *Oeuvre Complète* – included in the book, makes it difficult for the reader to follow the description and argument of some texts.³⁴⁸

The point is an old one, going back to Berlage’s complaint that the use of architectural drawings in architecture exhibitions elevates them to works of art, and undercuts their role as instruments to help the public better understand *the buildings* these are drawings *of*. An architectural drawing, no matter how beautiful, writes Berlage, ‘cannot compete with the building, and at any rate it should not. If it did, that

³⁴⁶ See Owen (1961) on *focal meaning* in Aristotle, e.g. with respect to ‘is healthy’ having a core usage in terms of which derivative uses are defined. A diet or exercise are healthy if they are *conducive* to man’s health, where ‘man’s health’ need not be defined derivatively in a similar manner, and so constitutes the central meaning of ‘is healthy’.

³⁴⁷ See Vidler (2000, 7) discussing Evans (1997, 156) on the primacy of drawing. Vidler (*ibid.*, italics in original) gives Walter Benjamin’s remark that architectural drawings could not be said to ‘re-produce architecture.’ Rather, he observed, ‘They produce it in the first place’ [...].’

³⁴⁸ Buchanan (2013).

would be as if one tried invite a public audience to an exhibition of musical compositions and then tried to render the latter in beautiful notations' rather than having the compositions *performed*.³⁴⁹

For these reasons, we may reasonably prefer a view on which (as before) 'a concept sketch of a building project that leaves the mode of composition, the manner of construction and detailing, and the physical viability or 'realizability' of the envisaged building with respect to (for instance) statics, undefined' qualifies as architectural in a derivative or preliminary sense only. What is more, if such a sketch design cannot, by however complicated and multiply staged a process, be 'translated' or transitioned into physical realization, then (on the supposition here put forward), the drawing is not architectural, or one of (an) architecture. Suppose on the other hand that the transition or translation is possible – in that case, the drawing would (still on the same supposition) be termed pre-architectural. Let us call such a drawing, which is viable (at least, in the long run) to guide (in some sense or other) a construction process, the visual blueprint of an architectonic design.

The main question then is how *tight* the relation of such a blueprint – and the design thinking it expresses or documents – to actual construction has to be, to qualify as (archi)tectonic. On a very demanding understanding, it has to be very tight, such that the drawing was composed – or can be retroactively justified – with respect to actual construction considerations. A tectonic design, on this understanding, is one either informed by or at least in keeping with construction considerations. Let us call this tight tectonics. On a looser sense, the design can still qualify as tectonic if, adding further considerations (none of which require us to forego the main tenets of that design), we can 'transition' over the design to realization in the aforementioned sense – let us call that a looser notion of tectonics, or simply 'loose tectonics'. It is perhaps a moot question which of these two notions is *the* correct sense of tectonics, but it is important to realize that writers and thinkers in architecture may have different things in mind when talking of 'the tectonic'.³⁵⁰

Even those who agree to a strict reading (that is, a strict stance on what it normatively takes to qualify as 'tectonic') have to make a further distinction, between (archi)tectonics as (B2) state or subject, and one of it that is (B3) process-dependent, or, what I shall call 'aetiologically sensitive'. The former is expressed by Mitchell Schwarzer's analysis of Boetticher which likens the tectonic (post-and-lintel'esque) construction of a building to its 'substance', and the non-tectonic elements to the buildings outer skin.³⁵¹ Somewhat confusingly, Schwarzer maps onto this distinction that of 'ontology' and 'representation' respectively, but since that's more confusing than helpful (especially once the actual philosophical concepts behind these come in, as they will in later parts of my work), I will go for the more descriptive terms of 'frame' and 'skin'. On Schwarzer's Boetticher, then, the tectonic elements of a design would be those that comprise the building's frame, what 'holds it up', irrespective of material choice (e.g. wood, stone, iron, steel, or reinforced concrete). Insofar the frame has to 'hold up' the entire building, this notion is sometimes linked to that of statics, of what helps a building 'carry itself' (Kollhoff, Wölfflin). The static forces define what the frame is meant to do, but they are not *definitive* of the notion of tectonics itself but rather act as a constraint on what qualifies as a 'frame' in the first place (see again §3.4.1). It is then a normative prescription of 'tectonics' – in the tight sense, but as a 'state sense' (B2) rather than a 'process sense' (B3) – that it 'exhibit' its frame structure on the skin, on the façade. This is sometimes called the public (because, to the observant outside visible) 'legibility' of the building, sc. of its construction frame. While §10.2 will discuss this notion of discernibility or 'legibility' at greater length, for now two examples shall suffice to accord the term more precision and content.

³⁴⁹ Berlage (1908, 10); my translation.

³⁵⁰ On the looser notion, design is somewhat divorced from tectonics. This allows, for instance, design to involved subtractive steps instead of only additive ones. Compare Stefan Polónyi (in Kollhoff 1993, 26), 'Die Tektonik wird als die Lehre von der Zusammenfügung starrer Teile definiert. Im Entwurfsvorgang ist das Fügen jedoch sekundär. Die erste Frage [im Entwurfsvorgang] ist: Wie ist die Gesamtform des Bauwerkes, das aus den verfügbaren Teilen zusammengefügt wird?'

³⁵¹ Cf. further Kenneth Frampton's (1995) analysis of 'tectonics', discussed in §10.3.

Example 1. According to Panofsky, Gothic architecture pursued a ‘principle of transparency’ and would,

delimit interior volume from exterior space yet insist that it project itself, as it were, through the encompassing structure; so that, for example, the cross section of the nave can be read off from the facade.³⁵²

For Panofsky, this contrasts Romanesque architecture which had erected ‘an impervious barrier’ between in- and outside, had ‘convey[ed] the impression of a space determinate and impenetrable, whether we find ourselves inside or outside the edifice.’³⁵³

Example 2, and closer to the era of architectural production associated with the tectonic tradition, is Schinkel’s 1831 *Bauakademie* of which Riemann has written,

Die außen ablesbare Gliederung wächst ganz aus der inneren Struktur des Baues. Diese Einheit von innerem Gerüst und Fassade ist der wesentliche Grundstil in Schinkels Spätstil. Zum konstruktiven Gerüst der Bauschule und ihren füllenden Backsteinwänden führt der Weg folgerichtig weiter. [...] Der in den Pfeilerstrukturen aufgelöste Baublock öffnet den Innenraum ganz nach außen. Das konstruktive Konzept entspricht der englischen industriellen Bauweise der Zeit, wo das Prinzip eines eisernen Strukturgerüsts mit ausfüllender Backsteinmauerung Anwendung fand. Schinkel verwendet allerdings ausschließlich eine Ziegelbauweise, weil gußeiserne Säulen in Preußen noch zu kostspielig waren. [...] Außer der „gerüsthafte“ Bauweise ist die zweite entscheidende Neuerung eine die Grundstrukturen des Baues sichtbar machende Art der Backsteinanwendung[.]³⁵⁴

So much for tectonic legibility, and its underlying sense of structure. As stated, I return to these points in §10.2, where they – and the example of Schinkel’s *Bauakademie* in particular – disclose central elements to a deeper understanding of the tectonic character of Mies van der Rohe’s buildings.

Now, on another notion of tectonics, the building has to exhibit not simply the interior frame that ‘holds up’ the building – this is sometimes called ‘constructional truth’ – but has to actually narrate that frame’s (and accordingly, the entire building’s) way of being assembled. Michael Wilkens calls this a ‘script’ (see CHAPTER 8). For a building to be tectonic, in that sense, is for its script of composition to be ‘legible’ on the outside, on its skin – or, for that skin to merge with a frame which is narrative in that sense. On this very specific understanding of tectonics – tight, but process- not state-oriented – we get the idea that tectonics essentially involves addition, the addition or assemblage of individual components; further, that the assembly of those components is documented (narrated, and thus legible) in the *joints*. We can call this ‘tectonics as addition’, or ‘joint oriented tectonics’. Examples of this would be Greg Lynn’s understanding or Kenneth Frampton’s (discussed in §8.2.1 and §10.3), or Fritz Neumeyer’s when he writes:

Bauen ist Addition, nicht Subtraktion. Diese schlichte Wahrheit der Architektur ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, daß Bauen immer noch durch das Aufrichten und Zusammenfügen von festen Teilen zu einem stabilen Ganzen und nicht im Modellieren einer kontinuierlichen, beliebig formbaren plastischen Masse besteht, auch wenn fließende Formen Letzteres suggerieren möchten. Was für die körperhafte Seite der Architektur gilt, gilt erst recht für die räumliche: Architektur ist die Addition von Räumen, vom kleinen Maßstab des Wohnens über die Verknüpfung privater Innenräume bis hin zur städtebaulichen Verknüpfung öffentlicher Räume wie Straße und Platz.³⁵⁵

So we have a variety of factors that determine whether or not something qualifies as tectonic, to wit:

³⁵² Panofsky (1957, 44) The example given is the west facade (now destroyed) on *St.-Nivaise* at Reims (ca. 1230-1263), engraved by N. De Son in 1625 and depicted in Panofsky (1957, 142).

³⁵³ Panofsky (1957, 43). The example is the *Abtei Maria Laach* (1093-1156), depicted in Panofsky (1957, 118).

³⁵⁴ Riemann (2006, 20 and 20-21).

³⁵⁵ Neumeyer (2010, 22).

- (1) What is the relation of design to construction: loose (A) or tight (B)?
- (2) If it is 'tight', is it strongly tied to static forces? (If yes: B1).
- (3) If it is 'tight', is it defined in terms of (B2) a state (substance, frame), or in terms of (B3) a process (script, narration, joint-oriented, 'additive')?

In sum, we get the following varieties (fig. 4.1).




Fig. 4.1 Some contemporary varieties of tectonics.

Later chapters, specifically §8.2 and §10.3, will discuss further varieties and discuss their historical and philosophical relevance more fully, with Chapter 8 focusing on the narrative and quasi-textual nature of tectonics that surfaces at juncture B3.

First, however, we must address more fully the understanding of architecture that 'the tectonic tradition' – its internal differences notwithstanding – uniformly opposed. And that brings us to the philosophy of Kant, to which we turn next.

CHAPTER 5

EXPRESSING MORAL IDEAS: KANT ON ARCHITECTURE

At one blow the concept which was fundamental to Classical Greek thought and which conceived of the beautiful and the purposeful as one thing (to kalon) was split into two elements which were then conceived to be in competition with each other. This particular blasphemy against classical values also did violence to another tenet which was equally fundamental to Greek culture – namely the distinction between a Fine Art, that served only itself, and a Practical Art that served an end other than itself[.] – Colin St John Wilson on Kant’s Third Critique³⁵⁶

Schelling found satisfaction in a pantheistic interpretation of the world. For him, nature was not chaotic and senseless, but directed towards a higher goal. It was moved by a spiritual force, which strove to organize it into higher and higher forms, from stones to plants to animals, until it reached perfection in the mind of man. By exploring his own consciousness, therefore, man might come to understand the workings of this spiritual force in nature. Here the artist came into his own. For art was the means of expressing this spiritual dimension of the world [...]. Coleridge [...] was impressed by Schelling’s pantheism. But his sense of wonder before nature was not unshakeable, and he wrote that when he observed nature, its message to him of the world beyond was less important than the meaning that his own feelings imposed on it. – Robert Gildea³⁵⁷

§5.1. INTRODUCTION

The present work defends a very specific formal model for the moral appraisal of architecture. The core of that model is a correlation of buildings to moral evaluative terms by way of buildings’ compositional properties (Π). The moral appraisal thus attaches, not to architecture in general, or buildings as undifferentiated individuals, but to buildings in regard to the very specific compositional properties that individuate them (see CHAPTER 2).

The validation of this model, not least if it is offered (as suggested in §1.2) as an ‘inference to the best explanation’, has to proceed by concrete architectural instances. But philosophically speaking, there is resistance to this model in more than one regard – not least if the explanatory goal that, I submit, my model meets best, is itself deemed to be poorly motivated in the first place. By analogy, if we have independent reasons to doubt the existence of phlogiston, then belief in a theory is not warranted by an inference to (that theory’s offering) the best explanation for the existence of phlogiston. What could warrant similar skepticism on the explanatory ambition fuelling the model in CHAPTER 2?

Recall from CHAPTER 1 the resistance, in much contemporary research on architectural ethics, to detailed attention to building specifics. I suggested in passing that such attention may seem to run counter to the explanatory ambitions philosophers customarily attach to their theories, theories that usually aspire to a full level of generality, whence philosophy’s ‘craving for generality’.³⁵⁸ A model like mine, by contrast, might be suspected of either failing this ambition outright or meeting it by a tacit appeal to particularism, that is, to a tacit commitment in the *normative priority* of particulars over general principles³⁵⁹ with general normative claims derived (quasi-inductively, as it were) from empirical particulars. Neither suspicion, however, is correct, in that my model still caters to a ‘craving for generality’, except not at the level of theoretic commitments to highly specific views on what architecture is and ought to be, and what moral appraisals (\mathcal{M}) we should privilege. Rather, universalist explanatory ambitions attach to systematically spelling out proper constraints on the *relation* of Π to \mathcal{M} , an ambition that the present work certainly does too little to address more satisfactorily, though I shall address the issue recurrently (e.g., §8.1 and §9.6).

Even then, however, readers may have doubts as to the theoretical enterprise began in CHAPTER 2. For, ‘metaphilosophical’ disagreements on the proper explanatory ambitions for an ethics of architecture apart,

³⁵⁶ St John Wilson (1995, 16). See §6.6.1.

³⁵⁷ Gildea (1996, 127 and 129).

³⁵⁸ Wittgenstein (1969, 17).

³⁵⁹ See Irwin (2000).

philosophical reservations towards my model can emerge elsewhere too, particularly in the delineation of the compositional properties Π deemed salient to moral appraisal. In this chapter and the next, I examine the philosophical cogency of such reservations by scrutinizing two seminal thinkers that arguably continue to exert a significant influence on a philosophical understanding of architecture today.

In that vein, CHAPTER 5 chapter examines how Kant rejects, on the basis of his aesthetics of architecture, an individuation of Π that privileges *firmitas* alongside *utilitas* and *venustas*. Kant's systematic omission of *firmitas*, I allege, has consequences – for how would we then have to individuate architectural beauty, and architectural value (more broadly speaking)? Second, the aesthetics and ethics of architecture that emerges from Kant's reflection entails that we *ought to suppress* detailed attention to buildings of the variety the CHAPTER 2 model requires, so as to issue in moral verdicts of buildings. Both reasons, and the continuing status exerted by Kant's writing, therefore provide a very powerful challenge to the framework this thesis argues for, a challenge that cannot be ignored or delegated to history's reject bin. More than that, if the continuing hold of Kant's views on contemporary aesthetics is any indicator – in that (for instance) his very notion of pleasant if 'disinterested' contemplation of artworks is still widely held to *define* philosophical engagement with art – this may also *historically* explain why some of the commitments my framework incurs have been out of fashion for so long. For these commitments, as just explained, sit rather ill within a Kantian understanding of art and aesthetic experience.

For related reasons, CHAPTER 6 looks to Le Corbusier's views on architecture, views that likewise diverge sharply from earlier chapters' views on (a) how to understand morally salient compositional properties of buildings, and (b) where to locate the moral dimension of architecture. As with Kant, Le Corbusier deserves sustained attention because his views challenge the premises of the theoretic enterprise begun in earlier chapters. Moreover, I will also suggest that in some respects the views of Le Corbusier betray considerable sympathy to views expressed by Kant, and that our understanding of these two thinkers' remarks on architecture is well served by illuminating them jointly. In that regard, CHAPTERS 5 and 6 form a natural duo. Both chapters, however, contain many points that certainly do not hold of two historical (or even, historically extremely influential) individuals alone. The authors in question provide me with an opportunity to discuss, and where necessary dislodge, some of the most deeply rooted sentiments that inform philosophical reflection on architecture to this day, specifically among aesthetic philosophers. Since Kant and Le Corbusier provide such a formidable challenge to some of the present work's most crucial theoretic commitments, readers can look forward to, not simply an exegesis and critique of Kant and Le Corbusier, but also to a series of refinements on points earlier chapters left rather vague.

Before I proceed to Kant's views directly, there is a major issue I need to address. It appears that Kant's views discussed here solely arise from his *aesthetics* of architecture. That leaves it in principle open that Kant may well have views on the *ethics* of architecture, views not constrained by his aesthetic principles. While this raises a valid point, it does not apply in Kant's case. First, Kant's ethical writings do not address architecture in any sense. (They use architectural talk figuratively, but that is hardly the same.) Second, it is more natural to construe Kant's views on architecture, views he discusses *in the course of* developing his overall aesthetics in the *Third Critique*, as presenting his *philosophical* views on architecture as such. A great deal in the *Third Critique*, we shall see, is precisely concerned with how to *fit* architecture, on Kant's own philosophical understanding thereof, into his aesthetic framework. Kant for instance believes, we shall see, that (*U*) our view of what architecture is (and what it ought to be) should be *inescapably* shaped by what architecture does, in terms of a purpose or utilitarian function. But *U* totally contravenes what he holds dear in aesthetics. It seems implausible in the extreme to suggest that Kant here overlooked a golden opportunity to simply sidestep *U* and then develop a *purely aesthetic* understanding of architecture independently, as if the latter were all that mattered to Kant in the *Third Critique* in the first place. It much rather seems that, as suggested, he develops a *philosophical* view on what architecture is and should be, namely an art form tied to a highly peculiar set of constraints such as *U*, and to then see how well it fits with his overall aesthetic principles. Finally, in suggesting that that is how we should view Kant's

aesthetics of architecture, as the major (indeed sole) locus of where he develops his *philosophical* views on architecture, I merely follow the entire contemporary literature on Kant and architecture. Paul Guyer's latest paper is entitled, 'Kant on the Philosophy of Architecture' (and not simply 'Kant on the Aesthetics of Architecture') for a reason, and his paper slips rather easily from 'aesthetic quality' to 'the intrinsic values of a building' *tout court* (see §5.4). If readers, then, think that my way of handling Kant's views on architecture betrays a fundamental category mistake and rests on a misattribution of intent, I would ask them to take it up with the rest of the literature, and then tell us what they think Kant would have said about moral statements about buildings.

This out of the way, onto Kant's (philosophical!) views on architecture. As stated, these emerge from his 1791 *Critique of the Power of Judgment* ('*CPJ*'), and his core argument proceeds in three steps. In STEP 1, Kant gives us a general account of beauty (*CPJ* §1). STEP 2 nuances that account by distinguishing two broad types of beauty, 'pure' and 'adherent' (*CPJ* §16). In STEP 3, Kant proposes that the aesthetic appreciation of architecture is of adherent beauty only, and is thus inextricably linked to (what we would call) architectural typology (*CPJ* §51). Before §5.3 embarks on a detailed, textual exposition of these argumentative steps, §5.2 gives an advance understanding of Kant's emerging overall view. This matters not only to better understand the overall dialectic 'drift' of Kant's arguments, but also helps explain more fully why his work presents such a strong challenge to the base tenets of earlier chapters. Only when that is fully understood, and Kant's arguments have been explored at the level of detail they merit and require, can §5.4 conclude the current chapter by answering the questions raised here in §5.1. A textual appendix detailing the original German of passages discussed in §5.3 can be found in the APPENDIX A.1.

§5.2. OVERVIEW AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF KANT'S VIEWS ON ARCHITECTURE

For Kant, the primary task of philosophy is to scrutinize the principles that constrain the faculty of human reason (*Verstand*), especially in its role of enabling human cognition of the world. Kant calls this task 'critique'. When he critiques human reason exercised on its own, independently of sensory input, Kant speaks of a critique 'of pure reason'. Among the principles he discusses are those that condition the very possibility of experiential uptake – space and time. Space and time are neither the *sum total* of individual objects (Leibniz), nor a *container* for those objects (Newton). Rather, space and time are *a priori* synthetic principles human reason itself uses to impose structure on human experience. Space and time, contrary to Newton and Leibniz, are not in the world 'out there'.³⁶⁰ Kant labels this shift from world to subject a 'Copernican revolt' in metaphysics. It is a shift we will see in other domains of his thought too.

For human reason plays roles other than cognition, and these too require philosophical scrutiny or 'critique'. For instance, reason plays a *practical* role in guiding human action, so we need to know the preconditions of making action rational and morally praiseworthy. Kant calls this a critique of practical reason (*Vernunft*). Thirdly and lastly, feelings of pleasure and displeasure play a central role in the appetitive life of humans. It is the power of judgment (*Urteilkraft*) that prescribes a priori principles on those feelings. Again, a philosophical 'critique' is needed to probe the possibility and limits of those principles, and that is the task the *Kritik der Urteilkraft* sets itself (*CPJ* Introduction, V:167-168).

Moreover, this is where philosophical aesthetics comes in. For Kant believes that aesthetics fundamentally consists in judgments of beauty – of beauty in general, and of art works in particular. It is 'taste', according to Kant, that is responsible for the power (or faculty, or ability) to judge things beautiful. Aesthetic judgments are, thereby, judgments of taste, and these are judgments of beauty.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ Hatfield (2006, 62-63).

³⁶¹ Kant, *CPJ* §1 (1791, V:201 with 201n.1) He will later at *CPJ* §48 (V:313) add the important point that taste (at least, by itself) is only responsible for aesthetic *reception*, not aesthetic *production* i.e. the production of art works. See below.

Such judgments, Kant alleges, inextricably involve the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as occasioned by sensory uptake.³⁶² In this, Kant follows the sentimentalist tradition in aesthetics inaugurated by British philosophers from Shaftesbury to Hume. That tradition (1) defines aesthetics by a peculiar type of *response* to beautiful things, specifically art works, and (2) characterizes that response as essentially an *affective* one, be it a feeling of elation, harmony, or related affective states. Jointly, we may call these two claims the *centrality of affective response* thesis.

Moreover, the sentimentalist tradition focuses its analysis of beauty, *not* on the features of objects which elicit that affective response, but on the response itself. In contemporary jargon, this yields a ‘response dependent’ account.³⁶³ For instance, it is deemed pretty hopeless to enumerate features in the world (‘objective’ features) that humans find humorous, and do so in a way that does not presuppose either the *definiens* (or near synonyms) or the response these features are supposed to elicit, such as being hilarious, being funny, or causing laughter. Instead, the argument continues, we can identify humorous features only indirectly, as it were, as being *that set of features that elicits the (aforementioned) response* of being deemed funny. Because the elicited response identifies the feature, the overall account is classified as a ‘response dependent’ one. Applied to aesthetic features, a response dependent account displays parallels to the ‘Copernican’ revolution Kant had claimed for areas of philosophy outside aesthetics. As before, we rescind from object-driven analyses in favour of subjective ones. But do we thereby also lapse into *subjectivist* accounts?

For, one immediate problem with a response dependent account is that it opens the floodgates to relativism. To illustrate, a response dependent account of ‘witch’ seems descriptively adequate – people seem to have used the term at near whim, and were under little illusion that the term would stand up to the type of scrutiny we expose natural kind terms to.³⁶⁴ As a result, if someone calls someone else a witch, it is hard to see how that claim is open to challenge by others. This becomes a problem as soon as two or more people disagree on a particular instance of a ‘witch attribution’.

In other words, response dependent accounts seem to leave no room for genuine inter-subjective disagreement – a sure symptom that we are in the vicinity of relativism. In order to escape relativism and more successfully account for intersubjective disagreement,³⁶⁵ proponents of response dependent accounts typically try to amend their story. Typically, a qualifier is attached to ‘response’ such that only the ‘appropriate’ type(s) of response is (are) allowed to define the concept in question. As D’Arms and Jacobson (2000, 722) put it (and I italicize the relevant part),

to think that an object X has an evaluative property Φ is to think it *appropriate (or merited or rational)* to feel some associated sentiment F in response to X. For instance, to judge some act of yours shameful is to think that it is appropriate for you to be ashamed, and for others to disdain you, for having done it.

This is the challenge Hume faced for aesthetic judgments in his 1757 essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. As Levinson puts it,

³⁶² In his 1800 categorization of the pleasures, Kant will mark off the pleasures of the imagination – which will play a key role in his aesthetics – from both sensory and intellectual ones, to signal that the pleasures of the imagination are not to be assimilated to either. See Kant (1800, 168).

³⁶³ Cf. Mackie (1977) or D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), and see §1.3. The distinction goes back, at least in modern philosophy, to Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities, explored in §3.7.

³⁶⁴ As brought out with customary humour by Monty Python, in their 1975 *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*.

³⁶⁵ Both on the assumption that these are, even if not downright errors, still better avoided in one’s philosophy. On the contrary stance we have Mill (*On Liberty*, 1859), who famously demarcated ‘the aesthetic’ as that domain of values disagreement over which is faultless, and agreement over which cannot be coerced by rational or legitimate political means (see Ryan 1991). That there should be no (meaningful) disputes on matters of taste (*de gustibus non est disputandum*) is somewhat inconsistent with Mill’s own distinction in his 1861 *Utilitarianism*, derived from German romanticism, of pleasures into objectively higher and lower ones – to wit, the pleasures of a pig versus the intellectual thrills of a Socrates. The point is also challenged by Hume and Kant, as I go on to show now.

Hume is seeking a principle to which disputes about taste, understood as judgments about the relative beauty or artistic worth of works of art, can be referred so as to settle such disputes, pronouncing one judgment correct and others incorrect.³⁶⁶

Kant, too, aims to address the challenge, by demarcating the aforementioned ‘feeling of pleasure and displeasure’ in marked contrast to purely personal inclinations that cannot be generalized across a community of rational subjects.³⁶⁷ While he thinks judgments of taste can never be cognitive – pick out real features (or, as he calls them, ‘concepts’) of the world – they should be such that they can, in principle, receive the universal assent of other rational subjects, so as to avoid a relapse into relativist subjectivism. Kant meets the demand of objectivity and universality by offering intersubjective validity. Pleasure and displeasure, then, are to be distinguished from personal fancies, whims, and idiosyncratic likes and dislikes. Any account of aesthetics (or worse, Kant’s aesthetics) that failed to uphold that would *ipso facto* collapse into relativism. Excusing ‘situated’ phenomenological analyses of buildings from intersubjective validation and scrutiny, by contrast, is justificatory solipsism in disguise (which risks circularity, sc. ‘(my belief in) *p* is justified because I believe that *p*’).³⁶⁸ As such, they are philosophically problematic and arguably un-Kantian in sentiment once we heed Kant’s intersubjective strictures on self-legislating (auto-‘nomous’) subjects.

The thesis that affective response is central to the analysis of (and not just to the phenomenon itself of) aesthetic judgment emphasizes Kant’s decided *non-objectualism* in aesthetics, to coin an unlovely phrase. To repeat, Kant, like the sentimentalists before him, largely abstracts from what objects or features *in the world* elicit the appropriate type of affective response. That is because, to repeat, what makes features relevant to aesthetic appraisal is defined by affective response and not *vice versa*.

This, however, creates difficulties for his aesthetics of *architecture*, an inquiry that traditionally – and to this day – is interested in hearing *which architecture* is good and bad, aesthetically speaking. The problem with Kant’s account, right away, is that he deliberately abstracts from an informative response to that question.³⁶⁹

Already at the opening page of his *CPJ* he makes the point, far from innocent, that aesthetic or cognitive appreciation of architecture can proceed on a ‘confused concept’ of the object of appraisal:

Ein regelmäßiges, zweckmäßiges Gebäude mit seinem Erkenntnisvermögen (es sei in deutlicher oder verworrener Vorstellungsart) zu befassen, ist etwas ganz anderes, als sich dieser Vorstellung mit der Empfindung des Wohlgefallens bewusst zu sein.

To grasp a regular, purposive structure [or building – SK] with one’s faculty of cognition (whether the manner of representation be distinct or confused) is something entirely different from being conscious of this representation with the sensation of satisfaction. (§1, V:204)³⁷⁰

³⁶⁶ Hume (1987, 226-249); Levinson (2002, 227). Levinson goes on to challenge this characterization of Hume’s essay, locating its core agenda elsewhere.

³⁶⁷ Guyer suggests ‘that it can be illuminating to read much in the third *Critique* as a protracted argument with Hume’, specifically that Kant’s argument for ‘the universal validity of judgments of taste’ is a response to Hume (Guyer 2006a, 539). For the argument behind this claim, see Guyer (2006a, 556-568).

³⁶⁸ For recent instances of this, see Kunze (2013) and August (2013).

³⁶⁹ As before (see n.365 above on Mill), this difficulty is only created if we already assume that relativism in aesthetics is a bad thing, philosophically speaking. Otherwise, the conclusion to draw at this point is that a difficulty is created for those who expect, erroneously, that architecture aesthetics should license *objective*, informative judgments of architecture into ‘good’ and ‘bad’.

³⁷⁰ For the text of Kant’s (1791) *CPJ* I rely on Klemme (2001), for its translation on Guyer and Matthews (2000). Two important qualifications. First, on a less charitable reading of the passage its contrast of aesthetic to cognitive relations to buildings is meant to convey that the latter requires *not even* confused concepts, as something even less articulate will do. I ignore this reading. Second, I urge us to construe ‘Gebäude’ in *CPJ* §1 as ‘building’ and not (as on the Cambridge translation) as ‘structure’, given how, in passages reminiscent of the lines in §1, Kant uses ‘Gebäude’ to clearly talk about a building. See in particular *CPJ* §7 (V:212, ‘das Gebäude, was wir sehen, das Kleid was jener

Kant has in mind here Leibniz' distinction between distinct and confused concepts, as brought out by the English translation.³⁷¹ While the terms of that distinction go back to Descartes' *Meditations* if not earlier, it was Leibniz who defined it as the distinction between two types of mentally picking out, or individuating, objects in the world. And it was from Leibniz, not Descartes, that German aesthetics beginning with Christian Wolff imported the notion of 'confused concepts' into their analysis of art works. So, what does the notion mean, specifically for aesthetics?

According to Leibniz's and Wolff's terminology, a confused representation is opposed to a distinct representation. A distinct representation is one where I not only can recognize a thing and distinguish it from others, but where I can also further enumerate and analyze each of its distinguishing features. A confused representation is one where I cannot enumerate or analyze each of its distinguishing features but where they are all thought together.³⁷²

Thus, on the one hand, we have recourse to concepts that contain an enumeration of descriptive features, the joint satisfaction of which then picks out or individuates a specific object. Suppose someone makes a reference to 'that thing on the table', and we have no idea what he means. If he goes on to say he means the thing that is yellow, round(ish), solid, and sour, we can pick out the lemon. That, on Leibniz' terms, would be a distinct concept. Suppose, on the other hand, he didn't have a clear verbal or conceptual grasp of the sortal term 'lemon', as expressed in the aforementioned descriptive factors, and instead simply pointed to the desk and said, 'I mean that thing'. Here the concept of a lemon is not really employed, except obliquely or obscurely. That is what Leibniz means by (employing) 'confused' concepts.³⁷³

Kant not only accepted Leibniz' and Wolff's understanding of the distinction 'confused' vs. 'distinct'; he specifically employs the distinction with respect to architecture, and not only in *CPJ* §1, but also in section five of the 1800 *Jäsche Logik* (see APPENDIX A.1, 'J1' and 'J2'). In light of such passages, we can safely assert that Kant, in *CPJ* §1, says right out of the gate that the aesthetic appreciation of architecture does *not* require a distinct concept of the object being appreciated – a confused one will do, to elicit the affective response that suffices for that appreciation. This is where I suspect Kant's notion of 'reflective judgment' (*CPJ*, 'Introduction') enters his theory of aesthetic judgment (*CPJ* §§1-40). A reflective judgment precisely leaves it indeterminate under which general concept, if any, we subsume the object of our aesthetic appreciation. This contrasts the case of cognitive judgments which operate by subsuming objects under determinate concepts or 'universals'.³⁷⁴

This resistance to conceptualized content blocks, right away, the normative demand that the aesthetic appraisal of architecture operates on a clear understanding of architectural objects, one that is attentive to the object's compositional features and detailing, choices on materials and construction techniques informing its composition, and so on. Such features are relevant, if at all, only to the degree that they elicit the right ('appropriate') response. And once that response is elicited, *its being elicited* is all we need to know, to show our 'good taste' when talking about architecture.

trägt, das Konzert was wir hören, das Gedicht,... ') and *CPJ* §16 (V:230): 'die Schönheit [...] eines Gebäudes (als Kirche, Palast, Arsenal oder Gartenhaus) setzt einen Begriff vom Zweck voraus [...]. Man würde vieles unmittelbar in der Anschauung Gefallende an einem Gebäude anbringen können, wenn es nur nicht eine Kirche sein soll'. Other passages such as *CPJ* §8 (V:216) where Kant makes similar points explicitly use 'Haus' (house) in place of 'Gebäude'.

³⁷¹ The distinction also surfaces in passages K8-K10 discussed in §5.3, and is thus quite central to Kant's argument.

³⁷² Beiser (2010, 127). Of special interest is the philosophical aesthetics of Christian Wolff which, pre-dating Kant's, likewise tapped into Leibniz' distinction but held that the 'paradigmatic art' in aesthetics 'was not poetry but architecture.' (Beiser 2010, 47) See Beiser's (2010, 47-50) discussion of Wolff (1738).

³⁷³ See further Wiggins (2000, 80-85).

³⁷⁴ Guyer appears to have recently recanted his earlier exegesis on that very point, now allowing that 'aesthetic judgment could be counted as a case of reflecting judgment after all, as long as the conception of the universal that is to be sought is broad enough to include the intersubjective agreement itself that we seek to realize in a successful aesthetic judgment.' (Guyer 2006a, 582n.31). On the exegetical controversy on how to square Kant's categorization of aesthetic judgements as 'reflective' with his demand that such judgements are open to intersubjective validation, see Hannah Ginsborg's work, including her (1990), (2006), and (2008).

To some extent, this view presents a real philosophical problem. It makes it hard, in particular, to intelligibly talk of architecture, as appreciated aesthetically. The problem with Kant's account, it seems, is his willingness to compromise how 'articulated' aesthetics of architecture really is, to preserve his more general aesthetic stance.

This is also clear when Kant goes on to say later (*CPJ* §51) that an awareness of *typology* is inextricably linked to an aesthetic appreciation of architectural objects. To appraise things aesthetically, he says, you need to know what they are supposed to be, or should be. If a building is a church, then it is meant to function as one. In this regard, Kant says, there is no difference between a temple and a garden tool. Indeed, he frequently lumps together horticulture with other 'fine arts'.³⁷⁵ Kant here taps into his distinction of 'pure' and 'adherent' beauty (of which more in §5.3.2), on which the aesthetic enjoyment of some things requires us to know what they are for, though that tampers with the aesthetic enjoyment of these objects, and so makes it somewhat 'impure'. Given that architecture, like garden tools or even designed gardens, certainly are 'for' something, their aesthetic enjoyment taps into 'adherent' beauty where the aesthetically pleasing factors attach to or 'adhere in' a certain purpose or function. The question is, however, how differentiated one's understanding, and Kant's in particular, of such functionality is.

Horticulture for instance means to shape and arrange natural objects so as to create an overall pleasing scenographic effect. If, however, one were to select the 'shaping of surface forms for scenographic effect' as the lowest common denominator of, not just horticulture and architecture but of, what is relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of either, then (as before) architectural appreciation will not require and, in fact, better exclude attention to constructional and tectonic detail, to features which have no analogue in garden design. This is why, for all his insistence on the indispensability of type to architectural appreciation, Kant does not intertwine considerations of typology with considerations of construction.³⁷⁶ Indeed, he does not seem to intertwine typology all that much with anything, other than a very broad understanding of functionality: no mention of floor plans, spatial organization, or building program. All that matters is that a temple is a space for worship and 'assembly', just as all that matters to grasp a garden spade is knowing that it is for digging earth, irrespective of its composition and the selection of materials that went into its construction (beyond its being able to perform the stated function, of course).³⁷⁷

Kant's aesthetics of architecture, then, deliberately omits and erases the type of detail that, say, an architectural historian would deem important to communicate about a work of the past, or an architectural practitioner of the present would deem important to communicate to her client, and consider when executing and maintaining a building. Kant would not press for a wholesale elimination of these factors from our conceptual repertoire. But he expressly deems them irrelevant to our *aesthetic* appreciation of architecture, and that raises grave questions. For one, he entirely divorces the appreciation of architecture from its production, a consequence he arguably anticipated. For if aesthetics is tied to taste, the capacity for judgment, it is thereby divorced from any capacity for producing art works.³⁷⁸ Subsequent aesthetic philosophy has only been too willing to embrace that consequence, in regarding (attention to) constructional detail as irrelevant for its purposes. On the other hand, architecture theorists have tried to show how problematic a purely scenographic approach to architecture and its concomitant elision of tectonic detail is, but their criticism seems to have escaped the attention of philosophers sympathetic to Kant.³⁷⁹

A contrary voice is offered by Maria Hellström, who enlists Kant to the view that architecture can go beyond eliciting a response of harmony, and may instead invoke 'the sublime', here: a response that can

³⁷⁵ And was ridiculed for that by Nietzsche, 'Malerei und Gartenkunst zueinandergesellt.' (Nietzsche, *Kritische Studienausgabe* XII:267, a propos *CPJ* §§51, 53)

³⁷⁶ This appears to be one of many points on which Schopenhauer will later follow him. See CHAPTER 7.

³⁷⁷ This is one of many points borne out by the textual analysis in §5.3.

³⁷⁸ 'Geschmack ist aber bloß ein Beurteilungs-, nicht ein produktives Vermögen' (*CPJ* V:313).

³⁷⁹ See Frampton (1988/2002).

include, for instance, terror of ‘otherness’.³⁸⁰ Whatever the correct analysis of ‘the sublime’ in Kant, a point on which Hellström enlists Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Nouvel (ibid., 20-21) rather than standard commentaries, she fails to realize that Kant’s own account of architecture, as being inextricably type-oriented, precludes it from instantiating ‘the sublime’: it is no coincidence that Kant’s discussion of the pyramids (in §25) omits all typological allusion. Accordingly, arguing alongside these French writers in favour of ‘sublime architecture’ requires us *to abandon Kant’s own views on architecture*. Whatever else, Hellström’s paper fails to defend Kant’s aesthetics of architecture from the charge of its being scenographic.

Even so, Kant scholars have tried to rescue Kant’s aesthetics from some of these more problematic consequences, especially as regards the fine arts. Paul Guyer, for instance, tries to escape the verdict that Kant’s aesthetics of fine art is inescapably formalist in that it attends to a very narrow set of features only, those visible on the surface, and individuates them in abstraction from moral, societal, and other implications.³⁸¹ Against this, Guyer alleges that Kant sees architecture, as much as other art forms, as capable of ‘expressing’ more general ideas, including ideas in the moral realm:

Kant, as Carroll notes but hardly stresses, in fact emphasized the presence of ‘aesthetic ideas in art’ [...], which means that for Kant art paradigmatically has moral content[.]³⁸²

Against this, I would allege that it is both unclear whether Kant would ascribe these moral features *to* the art work – so that art itself ‘has moral content’ as Guyer here claims –, or whether it is not rather (as Guyer’s own analysis appears to have it in the final instance) from the aforementioned *elicited response* that those moral features emerge. For instance, experiencing natural beauty may remind us of our freedom as human beings, or make us feel small and humble towards the cosmos (in contemporary parlance, make us ecologically more mindful). But these are not exactly features of the objects beheld but features of the subject, causally triggered by her beholding a natural landscape. Yes, we should make natural and built landscapes capable of eliciting (‘triggering’) such responses, but it is the response, not its causal antecedent, that accounts for the presence of aesthetic and ethical values here.³⁸³ Similarly, if our aesthetic experience of architecture gives rise to certain moral and other sentiments, it smacks of projectivism to then ‘spread’ our sentiments back onto the world, to use Hume’s phrase. Whatever morality etc. of architecture we get here, it is not a morality of buildings – it is a morality of experiencing buildings and, as such, it would not be hard to construct ‘an ethics’ (of and for humans) on such a basis, for instance along the following lines.

Architecture exerts a quiet but constant influence on our feelings. The choices that we make daily in designing our environment manifest aesthetic preferences. We ask for the instruments and material that we employ in daily life [...] to be not merely functional but designed in ways we find agreeable. Plausibly, the ability to respond to the world aesthetically is necessary for full or normal personal development, and the opportunity to appreciate art is a necessary component of human well-being.³⁸⁴

The shift from an ethics of architecture to *an ethics of the impact of architecture on humans* marks an important difference, and while it should not prevent us from appreciating the fullness and profoundness of Kant’s views of architectural experience, we must insist that, as before, these are views *of architecture* only in a highly indirect sense, and fail to relate strongly to an understanding *of buildings*. The insistence of much of subsequent ‘phenomenological’ work on architecture that any difference between these two views is illusory, highlights this failure instead of addressing it, and elevates what is a necessary *consequence* of the

³⁸⁰ Hellström (2010).

³⁸¹ For the verdict, see Carroll (2001, 20-62 with 396-402).

³⁸² Guyer (2006b, 30). Guyer elaborates this point in Guyer (2011).

³⁸³ See further §5.3.4 on Kant’s resistance to morally rejecting buildings whose construction would be premised on morally problematic practice (like slave labour).

³⁸⁴ Gardner (1995, 585).

view into a virtue. If closer analysis of the points occasioning these reflections must be deferred to §5.3 (not least, Kant's claim that architecture can 'express moral ideas'), such reservations to the *type* of account Kant offers must be noted before we embark on details.

Secondly, the type of moral features that are in the offing here – ascribed rightly or wrongly to the buildings, as opposed to subjects that find themselves in their vicinity – are not only suspiciously vague and unspecific (so that, again, we can ask why *this* rather than that building occasioned them). It is, as before, that the features are not rooted in precise concepts and features of architectural works. And, thirdly, to the extent they *are* rooted in architecture, in buildings, nothing Guyer says changes the fact that, for Kant, the only features that are even *remotely* relevant to any of this are those of buildings' surfaces. That much, at least, appears to be inescapably formalist in Kant's aesthetics.

For these reasons I conclude that Kant's aesthetics entirely focuses on buildings' surface features – features on facades that cause warm (or not so warm) feelings when we look at them –, inadequately pays attention to type or *utilitas*, and completely ignores *firmitas* or tectonics. It is perhaps clear to most that *utilitas* and *firmitas* are not aesthetic features as such. But it is already much less clear that *utilitas* and *firmitas* are entirely irrelevant to, where they do not interfere with, our aesthetic appreciation of architecture. We have to see just how tendentious Kant's delineation of 'the aesthetic' really is in such matters.³⁸⁵

It is small wonder, then, that subsequent writers in the tectonic tradition felt they had a far superior aesthetics of architecture at their disposal, by virtue of paying adequate attention to the entire Vitruvian triad. Like Schinkel and Hirt, such writers would continue to employ Kantian language, but they would henceforth do so to completely undermine Kant's impoverished view of what architecture, and especially good architecture is (see §4.2).

§5.3 KANT'S VIEWS ON ARCHITECTURE: A DETAILED EXEGESIS

The previous section issued in a rather unfavourable verdict of the comparative merits of Kant's views on architecture. Statements of merit can always be attacked in their own right. This section, however, queries the basis on which Kant reached this views in the first place. Long passages from Kant will be numbered K1, ..., Kn, with the corresponding English and German featuring in APPENDIX A.1.

Kant's views on architecture emerge from his 1791 *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (henceforth '*CPJ*'). His core argument proceeds in three steps. In the first step, Kant gives us a general account of beauty (*CPJ* §1). He nuances that account, in step two, by distinguishing two broad types of beauty, 'pure' and 'adherent' (*CPJ* §16). Third and finally, Kant proposes that the aesthetic appreciation of architecture is of adherent beauty only, and is thus inextricably linked to architectural typology (*CPJ* §51). I will now document the details behind each of these three steps, and spell out some of their further ramifications.

§5.3.1 'STEP 1': A GENERAL ACCOUNT OF BEAUTY

We begin, at *CPJ* §1, with a general account of aesthetic judgments (K1). The central features of this account are, according to Guyer's helpful summary,

[1] aesthetic judgments concern the relation of objects to the human subject rather than properties of the objects themselves, that [2] feelings of pleasure and displeasure express this relation, and that [3] aesthetic judgments therefore concern the pleasure or displeasure that the

³⁸⁵ See again Gardner (1995, 585): aesthetics revolves around states of a certain mood and around art, and where architecture is (perhaps) not art it is still aesthetically relevant (only) in that it influences our *moods*. For a contemporary attempt to dislodge Kant's proclivities as continuing to set the stage for contemporary aesthetics, see again Carroll's discussion of Kant's formalist undercurrents (Carroll 2001, 401n.14). Cf. his discussion of the tendency among aesthetic philosophers to (still) predominantly use 'aesthetic' 'as an adjective, modifying nouns that clearly refer to the audience's share.' (Carroll 1999, 156-157)

perception of objects produce in us is the [...] logical starting point of Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgments[.]³⁸⁶

Hence, to judge an object beautiful, we attend to the quality of (dis)pleasure as it arises, for the respective subject, from the *representation* of the object, a notion Kant defines in K2. Like K1, K2 affirms that aesthetic appreciation is once removed from the 'object' whose aesthetic features are to be appraised, an important contrast to the object-oriented aesthetics of architecture defended in the remainder of this thesis. We meet architecture early on, in that same *CPJ* §1, at K3 (already discussed at §5.2), on which one can engage one and the same object – here, a building – with different ends in view: knowledge or aesthetic enjoyment. But one will engage different mental faculties in doing so, and Kant insists from the get go that the faculties, and what they give rise to, are distinct. Observe also the qualifier *purposive* ('zweckmäßig') he attaches to *building* ('Gebäude'). This becomes all important in his aesthetics of architecture in (what I label) STEPS 2 and 3 of his overall argument.

So representations play a central role in Kant's aesthetics, but only once they interact with our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Once that feeling is engaged, these representations are disqualified from playing a cognitive role,³⁸⁷ and 'don't connote anything in the object' (§1). But for representations to qualify as aesthetic, they need to interact with feeling in the right manner too, so as to set them apart from relating us, not to beauty, but to (moral) goodness on the one hand, and what is merely pleasant (or 'agreeable') on the other (*CPJ* §5, V:209-10).³⁸⁸ Kant kicks out from his account of beauty both the pleasant (as what is subjectively stimulating) and 'goodness' dependent on general interests, because he wants an account of generally valid judgments of beauty (*ibid.*).

§5.3.2 'STEP 2': TWO TYPES OF BEAUTY, OR, FROM PURPOSE TO MORAL IDEAS

The second step in Kant's argument focuses on two types of beauty judgements, sc. the distinction of pure vs. adherent (or dependent) beauty in passage K4. Adherent beauty is 'conditioned beauty', because the ascription of beauty to the thing in question is conditional on the thing's being subsumed under a sortal concept that designates its type. The type in turn is designed by the term's purpose. Kant importantly correlates, in K4, a thing's purpose (*Zweck*) with an objective concept of what such a thing 'ought to be'. Both 'purpose' and 'ought to be' are elusive in Kant.

Kant on 'Zweck'

It is unclear from Kant's writing how to best render his notion of 'Zweck' in *CPJ*. On the whole, we would do well to render it as 'end', so as to retain the term's connection to Kant's use of it in his ethical writings, to designate a moral end or goal. The related notion of *Zweckmäßigkeit* would then be whatever serves that end – and so can be rendered as 'purposiveness' or as 'goal-directness'.³⁸⁹ Importantly, in Kant the two notions come apart, as per his idea that, in aesthetic judgments of pure beauty, we have 'purposiveness without purpose', meaning,

in finding an object beautiful or sublime, our *experience* of the object is purposive or satisfies a goal of our own even though we do not think of the object itself as having been designed for a purpose (Kant calls this "purposiveness without a purpose"); in teleological judgment, we think of an organism or even the whole of nature *as if* it were designed for a purpose, a conception of nature which is supposed to have heuristic value for us even though we do not and cannot *know* that anything in nature has been designed for a purpose.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁶ Guyer (2000, 366n.2)

³⁸⁷ See *CPJ* 'Vorrede' (V:167) on cognition taking place 'unter Ausschluß des Gefühls der Lust und Unlust'.

³⁸⁸ Kant discusses 'the pleasant' ('das Angenehme') further in *CPJ* §3 (V:205-7).

³⁸⁹ See respectively Guyer and Matthews 2000 (*passim*) and Guyer (2006c).

³⁹⁰ Guyer (2006c, 308).

Kant on 'what a thing ought to be'

A similar unclarity attaches to his (related) notion of what a thing 'ought to be'. The phrase has caused much puzzlement among commentators, even though its general import is elaborated earlier in *CPJ* §15 (see K5). Kant scholars have offered a wide variety of what Kant could have intended with the ominous phrase 'what a thing ought to be' that, according to him, determines judgments of adherent beauty, thus of architecture. I here bypass an enormous range of scholarship by Henry Allison, Eva Schaper, and Christine Koorgard to focus mostly on Paul Guyer's account.³⁹¹ That account resonates with Allison's, in that Allison writes (2001, 298),

Kant is here effectively saying that the beauty of works of architecture is merely adherent because their expression of aesthetic ideas is subservient to their functions as places of worship, residences, monuments, and the like. In other words, the aesthetic evaluation of a work of architecture is subject to extra-aesthetic constraints, stemming from its intended function, while that of a piece of sculpture is not (or should not be).

More or less the same position emerges in Paul Guyer. Focusing on Kant's architectural examples for 'the beauty [...] of a building (such as a church, a palace, an arsenal, or a garden house)' (*CPJ* V:230), he too glosses the phrase as 'intended use', since

in many cases of adherent beauty, the concept of the end or what the thought ought to be that is presupposed by the judgment of its beauty is clearly a concept of its intended use and of the features necessary for it to serve that intended use.³⁹²

Now, for a thing to be designated a palace, it must not simply be intended, or be commonly regarded by others, to be one – it better also be of a such a variety, materially and compositionally speaking, that it *excel* at (providing) that functionality. More generally, the slip (in translation and exegesis) from 'what a thing is *meant* (or supposed) to be', which is a descriptive notion with normative ramifications, and 'what a thing *ought* to be', which is flatly normative, does not help attaining clarity on Kant. Two things exacerbate this lack of clarity on such a central element of Kant's aesthetics of architecture.

First, it is left entirely unclear on what or who the *normative authority* on a thing's 'being meant or intended to be one thing rather than another' (*was es sein soll*) is. Is it the audience or the artist/architect? An aesthetics of architecture, resting on Kantian foundations, would differ wildly depending on the answer to this question – we might classify architecture as successful if it serves the wild ambitions of a lone artist like Le Corbusier or Peter Eisenman, or we might deem (some of) the projects of such architects to be unsuccessful in face of their abject failure to meet their audiences (tenants') expectations as to which purpose, if any, such artistic flights of fancy serve. I return to this shortly. Second, if it is unclear on who or what the normative authority on artistic success – and its component idea of what an artistic object 'is meant to be' – is intended to be in Kant (is it the artist or her audience?), it is also unclear what kind of artistic 'success' we are talking about in Kant anyway. As we already saw, he divorces the notion of taste, which is central to his aesthetics, from artistic production, and Guyer's elaboration of this claim (quoted above) has nothing but cemented that divide. One succeeds, then, at successfully making a tasteful judgment about architecture, as regards its reception, and doing so 'in the proper way' requires attending to some as opposed to other features of the architectural object. This is how Allison glosses 'what a thing ought to be' in Kant's aesthetics, as indicating 'the kind of work that it must be seen as being, if one is properly to assess its beauty.' (2001, 295). Artistic success, from the artist's point of view and as regards artistic production rather than reception, seems to be ultimately a rather remote concern to Kant's aesthetics.

³⁹¹ Allison (2001, 295-296). Schaper (1979/2003, 114-115). On Christine Koorgard, see §2.6.3.

³⁹² Guyer (2000, 443). However, Kant not once alerts us, or demands us to attend, to those 'features' in greater detail.

So on whose normative authority does artistic success rest, according to Kant – is it the artist or her audience? At times Guyer strongly suggests that the authority goes to the recipient, not the producer of works of fine art:

aesthetically satisfying objects are purposive in the specific sense of satisfying purposes in the responder [which include moral and cognitive ‘purposes’], not the producer. [...] the satisfaction of our underlying purpose must be felt to be contingent, and they cannot be ascribed to the intentional activity of any producer.³⁹³

At other times, as we shall see, Guyer seems to push for the opposite thesis, on which the producer, not the recipient, is privileged. But independently of where we accord such emphasis or priority, the difficulty of having to choose *between* them (recipient vs. producer) should not even arise in principle, given how on Kant’s view aesthetic judgements – in some as yet mysterious sense – can receive universal, that is, intersubjective validity. Whether or not (and how exactly) this was Kant’s considered view, it does not seem he can appeal to it at this point to escape the present quandary – at least not if Paul Guyer is correct when he writes,

Although Kant’s initial analysis of the *judgment of taste* might well focus on the experience and the epistemological position of the spectator and the critic, his *theory of fine art* is couched in the form of a theory of creative genius rather than that of a theory of the spectator’s response. And this is not just a *façon de parler*: his emphasis on the free play of the artist’s imagination with his ideas and his materials, and he suggests, almost just in passing, that the artist must communicate his own experience in creating [the art object] to the spectator, who must then to some extent recreate for himself an experience like the artist’s, but not exactly the artist’s experience – for then his experience would not be one of free play. In other words, it seems fair to say that Kant bases his conception of the spectator’s experience of beauty on his conception of the artist’s experience of it, rather than the converse.³⁹⁴

This reverses the emphasis we observed in the earlier passage, and leaves it somewhat unclear which of the two readings is the more authoritative (and most pressingly, if there is an as yet overlooked way to reconcile them). In any case, the core contention in the present passage is this: the spectator must create an experience that is, literally, ‘like the artist’s, but not exactly the artist’s experience’. And Guyer argues that this is mandated by the ineliminable role Kant claims is played by imagination’s ‘free play’ in aesthetic creation and judgment. While Guyer’s language leaves it entirely unclear what the precise degree of un-/likeness between the two (types of) experience(s) is, it is clear that a perfect *congruity of content* is ruled out, and this extends to congruity on aesthetic and functional (‘what a thing should be’) ideas and concepts. Indeed, such a congruity of content would require (as it does in Fregean semantics) identity of *concepts* employed, but Kant’s aesthetics precisely disallows that determinate concepts – of functionality, for instance – are at play in aesthetic creation and experience. This is not only dictated by the *epistemology* of aesthetic judgment in Kant, but also by the *moral role* he intends for such judgments. As Guyer puts it,

The experience of beauty is a symbol of morality precisely because it is an experience of the freedom of the imagination from any constraint by concepts [...]. To the extent that the form of any object would appear to be constrained by an antecedent interest in intentionally illustrating a concept [...], neither [that concept] nor the experience of it could be a symbol of morality; so even where art does have a moral concept as its content, [this] is not compatible with the beauty of art, [...] for this moral content [would then] dictate the form of the work of art.³⁹⁵

I suppose ‘concepts’ in ‘freedom from any constraint by concepts’ include determinate ideas of artistic, aesthetic, and functional success or perfection that, we saw earlier, co-define Kant’s notion of ‘what a

³⁹³ Guyer (1993, 273).

³⁹⁴ Guyer (2009, 23, italics in original).

³⁹⁵ Guyer (2005, 239).

thing should be'. Art's (by instantiation, architecture's) *de facto* or *de jure* inability to express and represent specific moral and other *concepts* does not render it inherently amoral for Guyer, however:

But this by no means entails that the production of art is autonomous in the sense of being immune from moral constraints altogether. On the contrary, Kant assumes that although the form of any successful work of art must not appear to be dictated by any moral concept, the production of works of art, like any other human practice, is always subject to the most general constraints of compatibility with the fundamental demands of morality.³⁹⁶

What this means, I suppose, is that (G1), a normative account of the *proper content* of a work of art is causally and explanatorily driven by (the activity of) artistic 'genius' and not by aesthetic judgment on a spectator's behalf, (G2) the activity of artistic 'genius' is centrally concerned with the 'expression of ideas', and (G3) the creation and contemplation of art works teleologically serves the goal of human freedom; art works thereby further freedom 'as a moral idea' and create an 'experience of freedom'. Guyer himself explains G3 more fully elsewhere,

[T]he heart of Kant's connection between aesthetics and morality is the view that it is only by preserving its freedom from direct constraint by concepts, even didactic concepts of morality itself, that the experience of beauty can serve the purpose of giving us a palpable experience of freedom, which is its deepest service to the needs of morality.³⁹⁷

And as for G2, Guyer touches on the 'expression of ideas' in relation to architecture elsewhere,³⁹⁸ but his main point (it seems) is not that Kant provides a very full explanation as to *which* ideas architecture can express and *how* it can do so, but rather, that Kant's remarks to that effect provoked more in-depth contributions by later aesthetic philosophers like Schopenhauer. (I return to this point in my own discussion of Schopenhauer in CHAPTER 7). If then, I recast Guyer's argument as follows, I want readers to bear in mind that the first premise (G2) is never adequately spelled out by Kant. Besides, the difficulty for Guyer's reconstruction of Kant's argument is that (what I label) G2 and G3 have to avoid artistic content or creation being 'dictated by any moral concept'.

Premise 1 Architecture can 'express' moral *ideas*, but this is at odds with its expressing or incorporating determinate *concepts* (moral or otherwise).

Premise 2 Architecture, like any artistic or (more generally) human enterprise, is morally *constrained*, but not morally *determined* in regard to the individual formal choices that go into architectonic composition.

Hence,

Conclusion 1 Architecture is moral(ly appraisable). (From *Premise 1*, *Premise 2*)

Conclusion 2 Individual architectural elements – and the architect's choices eliciting them – are *not* morally appraisable. (From *Premise 1*, *Premise 2*)

Thus, no detailed exegetical-analytical ethics of architecture is possible. (Here we will have to contrast Schopenhauer who rejects *Conclusion 2* and thinks one reject Gothic window and roof construction on grounds that are at least partly moral: see CHAPTER 7). Certainly the major culprit is Kant's *Premise 1*, specifically his insistence (in *CPJ* §49) that the 'ideas' that figure in the 'representation of aesthetic ideas' in artworks can never be adequately captured with 'concepts'; consequently, 'no language can completely reach and make intelligible' such ideas (V:314). In the absence of intelligibility, however, the 'ideas'-related content architecture allegedly expresses remains ineffable. Such ineffability, while in line with Kant's views on architecture touched on earlier, runs counter to architecture's moral appraisal in any definite, articulate

³⁹⁶ Guyer (2005, 240).

³⁹⁷ Guyer (1993, 18); Guyer elaborates on this in an exegesis of *CPJ* §42 and related passages (ibid., 107-113).

³⁹⁸ Guyer (2011). While I find Kant's text extremely evasive and elusive on that point (certainly in its precise connection to architecture), I am happy to defer to Guyer's greater exegetical expertise here.

way. Even Guyer himself, who defends *Premise 1* vis-à-vis a very definite moral value, that of human freedom, emphasizes that the *idea* of freedom expressed in (some of) the fine arts (it is unclear architecture is, for Kant or Guyer, really among these) is *not* synonymous with the concept of moral freedom:

Kant never allows that the kind of freedom manifested in works of art – especially in the audience’s *response* to works of art, which is what he has in mind most of the time – is *identical* to moral autonomy [for Kant, ‘the highest good’]. On the contrary, he explicitly claims that it is only analogous to it, since moral autonomy, unlike aesthetic freedom of the imagination, can only be achieved through the use of a concept or principle – the moral law itself – which is what is specifically excluded in the case of the aesthetic.³⁹⁹

Secondly, Kant’s own discussion of what it means for one thing to be ‘a symbol’ of another makes it abundantly clear that the *semantic relation* itself is rather woolly. Kant helpfully demarcates the relation from instantiation (a dog may *instantiate* the empirical concept ‘dog’) and schematization (temporal succession may schematize causation), but in symbolization the empirical content (‘intuition’)

is an indirect representation of a [general] concept ‘which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate,’ and which therefore cannot really be said to ‘verify’ the concept. Examples of the symbolic representation of ideas are the use of a living organism to symbolize a constitutional monarchy and of a handmill to symbolize an absolute monarchy. Neither an organism nor an handmill is an example – an instance – of a kind of government, obviously [...]. Instead, these objects serve as symbols of analogies between themselves and what they symbolize.⁴⁰⁰

If these examples are meant to give content to the symbolization relation, it seems the relation relies on the subject’s ability to conjure up associative meanings, analogous to how ‘a man seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect[s] a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect[s] Cebes’, as Plato once suggested for general ‘ideas’ (forms) and how these relate to empirical particulars.⁴⁰¹ If that is the correct reading of ‘x symbolizes y’, symbolization is clearly an instance of *extrinsic* connotation, and as such falls prey to the objections of §1.6.1. To wit, the symbolic content of a specific lyre or handmill will only occur to a person for whom the object *already has* a certain value or significance antecedently, in virtue of something else’s or someone else’s significance to her, such as the lyre being her lover’s. As a result, neither the object’s ability to conjure up this association nor the value it thereby acquires are strictly the object’s own, and certainly not an intrinsic feature of it. Henry Allison’s discussion of beauty (in art and nature) symbolizing the moral good, in Kant, climaxes in exactly such a claim when he writes,

beauty symbolizes the morally good because reflection on the former may be viewed as a sensuously directed analogue of reflection on the latter.⁴⁰²

The explanatory gloss (‘because’) emphasizes how it is not so much the beauty of an architectural artwork that bears a direct relation to moral goodness. Rather, our *reflection* on, or attention to, the artwork may *occasion* us to reflect on the moral good. And that, as indicated before (§5.2), yields not an ethics of architecture, but (at best) an ethics of experiencing architecture.

§5.3.3 INSTRUMENTAL GOODNESS AND CONFUSED IDEAS OF ARCHITECTURE

If Kant elsewhere in *CPJ* discusses goodness in general, and Guyer (2006, 311) is at times justified to gloss that as a generic moral notion, the moment Kant turns to architecture, I allege, his notion of goodness is

³⁹⁹ Guyer (19973, 273).

⁴⁰⁰ Guyer (1979, 374-375). See also Allison (2001, 255).

⁴⁰¹ Plato, *Phaedo* 73e, on which see Sedley (2007).

⁴⁰² See Allison in Guyer and Allison (2006, 135-136).

flatly an instrumental one.⁴⁰³ Nothing else, from genre to artistic intent, explains the centrality of ‘use’ (*Gebrauch*) in Kant’s remarks of architecture, in a central passage at §51 I look at in great detail when discussing STEP 3 of his argument. Much earlier than §51, we can observe how already Kant’s term ‘end’ (*Zweck*) is decisive in that regard, given how, ‘as regards goodness we can always ask if it is merely instrumentally good [as means] or intrinsically good (if [in other words] utilitarian or inherently good)’ (§4, V:207). Precisely because instrumental goodness explains, for Kant, ‘what a thing ought to be’, he conjoins both notions to that of *interest* (in a thing’s possession or consumption by the judging subject), a notion he earlier deemed to interfere with aesthetic appreciation. See K6. This also explains why, to the extent that individual architectures can be attributed a Platonic *ergon* or utilitarian purpose, our recognition of such purposes arouses our interest in their possession, and thus interferes with our aesthetic appreciation of buildings. That is why Kant insists in K7 and K8 that aesthetic appreciation of things serving a purpose most *not* operate on too clear or ‘determinate’ a conception of the ‘end’ the building (etc.) serves. A closely related paragraph (K8*a*) invokes, as before, talk of determinate ends, and recalls the Leibnizian distinction of confused versus clear ideas in *CPJ* §1 (see §5.3.1 above), a point Kant himself stresses later in *CPJ* §15 several times over (K9, K10). Observe how K9, other than ending on ‘confusedly’, employs the contested notion of ‘utility’ which Kant will, by §16, tie to non-‘pure’ judgments of beauty, including architectural beauty. Given how ‘external’ objective purposiveness – ‘utility’ – is out, Kant pursues its internal sense, perfection, which (as before) lands us with ‘what a thing ought to be’ (‘in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of *what sort of thing it is supposed to be* must come first’, V:227).⁴⁰⁴ On either sense, however, the designated function of a building,

does damage to its purity. One would be able to add much to a building that would be pleasing in the intuition of it if only it were not supposed to be a church; (§16, V:230)

The second clue to non-pure judgements is provided by the role of concepts in pure judgements of beauty. Kant helpfully (and, for our purposes, importantly) illustrates this concept of ‘disinterest’ with an architectural example, while not providing a single architectonic detail (a telling point I shall exploit later):

K10*a* If someone asks me whether I find the palace that I see before me beautiful, I may well say that I don’t like that sort of thing, which is made merely to be gaped at [...]; in true *Rousseauesque* style I might even vilify the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of the people on such superfluous things. [...] All of this might be conceded to me and approved; but that is not what is at issue here. One only wants to know whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied with satisfaction in me, however indifferent I might be with regard to the existence of the object of this representation. (*CPJ* §2, V:205, tr. Guyer)

The ‘mere representation’, and a feeling of ‘satisfaction’: these are the core components of Kant’s aesthetics, and they importantly exclude a great deal besides, as Kant is at pains to emphasize here. In Wicks’ explanation,

Suppose we have an image of a palace before us. To deny that the palace is beautiful because it took an excessive amount of money and human labor to build it, would confuse the cause of the building with how the building looks.⁴⁰⁵

Imagine you see a postcard of the pyramids in Giza (or, even luckier, you have the privilege of standing right in front of them), and deem them beautiful. You are not supposed to withhold your initial aesthetic appraisal once you are told how many slaves probably had to die to build these monuments. And the reason for that relates to the first ‘feature’ we enumerated in Kant’s account, according to which one

⁴⁰³ As before, I here touch on the tricky subject that *instrumental* value seems to be at odds with moral value, certainly with *inherent* moral value. As I put it in §1.1, if instrumental value of *x* suffices to develop ‘an ethics of *x*’, the point overgenerates to any *x* with instrumental value, and we now have an ethics of contact lenses and much else besides.

⁴⁰⁴ As explained in §4.2, this is the sense of ‘perfection’ later architectural writers like Rosenthal use in their writings.

⁴⁰⁵ Wicks (2007, 21-22).

exclusively attends to a thing's surface appearance to you, its sensual 'representation'. You attend to how it looks and are supposed to ignore all the background story and background knowledge you may have about the thing, when you assess it aesthetically. For that 'background story' concerns the art work's *aetiology*, and that aetiology or causal history is deemed to be irrelevant to the appraisal of the art work's *content*. I leave it to readers to decide whether or not this is itself a sound philosophical move.

In giving this example, I diverge from Kant's own use of it in *CPJ* §25, as illustrating 'the sublime'. It is part and parcel of his understanding of the pyramids that we have to attend to *fewer* of their features, not more of them, to elevate them from beautiful objects to sublime ones. Any attention to function (its being a tomb), however cursory, is by now out of the window. As Sean Keller puts it,

Kant tells us that the sublime effect of an Egyptian pyramid comes not from its sheer size, but from our inability to comprehend the great number of blocks from which it constructed – an inability best provoked by middle-distance viewing.⁴⁰⁶

In any case, it seems doubtful that an art work's causal history is ruled out as irrelevant to the appraisal of the art work's *content*. I have in mind here work by John McDowell and Derek Parfit on other mental states, specifically perception and memory, where the state's causal history is invoked to individuate the state's very content to differentiate it from qualitatively similar states, specifically perceptual illusions and 'quasi'-memories. In just this way, Noel Carroll (2001, *op. cit.*) has argued that knowledge of an artwork's history or sociocultural context and ancestry can precisely, and most likely ought to, fuel our understanding and aesthetic appreciation of it, as for instance, in beholding a Maori quilt or Maasai robe.

As before, Kant's formalism generates the type of results that have been enlisted in its favour – here, the insulation of aesthetic enjoyment from morally problematic factors. But whether or not aesthetic enjoyment should be so isolated is very much a question in its own right, as is of course the correctness of aesthetic formalism. Because these issues are unresolved, focus on the aetiology of aesthetic states claimed to co-define architectural success will re-emerge in CHAPTER 6's discussion of Le Corbusier. To insulate from our aesthetic appreciation of architecture all such aetiological factors – for instance, how a building is composed under its exterior veneer – narrows that appreciation to a very specific set of features. But that narrowing seems rather poorly motivated.

A third clue is provided by Kant's idea that aesthetic appreciation, even of architecture, ideally proceed by 'purposiveness without (a determinate concept of the thing's) purpose'. This phrase is explained in great detail in K11. In brief, the 'end' (purpose or *Zweck*) of an object \mathcal{O} is defined as seeing a concept c as the cause of \mathcal{O} , as seeing c as the 'real ground' of \mathcal{O} 's possibility. 'Purposiveness', meaning *Zweckmäßigkeit*, relates to a thing's *forma finalis* or 'purposive form' (Guyer 2000, 105n.a) and concerns the causality of a concept c in relation to its (c 's) object \mathcal{O} . The concept here is the cause (*Ursache*) of an object, the 'real ground or foundation' of its 'possibility'. One thinks (of) an end, when some object \mathcal{O} itself, its very form or existence (and not merely, the cognition of \mathcal{O}), is only possibly as causal effect of a concept c .

Finally, the idea of 'purposiveness without purpose' (*Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck*, §10, V:220) is, to think of \mathcal{O} in this way, and assume there is such a c (as specified previously), without concretely knowing what c is: to think \mathcal{O} with an indefinite reference to some c or other. Jesus, as the son of Joseph, is only thinkable as a son. That is a *de dicto* necessity claim, and he can only exist, *qua son*, as the causal effect of his father (among other causal antecedents). Suppose, however, we don't know whose son Jesus is. We can then

⁴⁰⁶ Keller (2012, 46). Keller's paper tries to see the advent of 'digital tectonics', with work by Greg Lynn and others, as absolving us from Kant's dichotomy of utility versus beauty: 'In conclusion, I want to suggest that an antinomic architecture that utilized computational tools [...] would enact the full complexity of Kant's aesthetics. Such an architecture would resist collapsing this antinomy to either singularity: either techno-naturalism or functional-conventionalism.' (ibid., 51). This repeats Neal Leach's mistake of, first ignoring *firmitas* and constructional detail, to then position 'the digital' as the saviour that will either resolve, or celebrate, the 'antinomy' of beauty versus utility (see §4.2). Keller also borders on repeating Hellström's (2010) error of allowing for 'sublime architecture' (see §5.2), without realizing that this gives up the type-dependency of Kant's aesthetics of architecture.

view him as the son of someone or other, and as causally conditioned by his being born to someone or other, without knowing whose son he is. The concept ‘son of’ is still applicable to him, if confusedly. That, in a nutshell, is how Kant recommends us to look at art works⁴⁰⁷ which have an underhanded reference to some purpose/end or other – the idea is, we cannot and ought not suppress such knowledge, but we better let it drift off, and think of the relevant concept (here, ‘son’) only hazily, because a too firm grasp or remembrance of it would at once arouse our personal interests and stakes in the object under appreciation, and interfere with that appreciation. (This claim obviously enjoys greater plausibility when we replace ‘son’ by terms outright connoting or implying personal interests.)

A fourth and final ‘clue’ to Kant’s views on architecture are provided in his gloss on ‘what a thing ought to be’ in terms of a building’s *typology*, in K12. At a general level, this passage indicates a point Kant makes elsewhere, namely ‘that beauty must be distinguished from usefulness but must also be compatible with the usefulness of an object.’⁴⁰⁸

Further, the passage spells out the notion ‘what a thing ought to be’, introduced in §15, in terms of ‘a concept of its (sc. thing’s) perfection’ or *Vollkommenheit*. Allison (2001, 296) is surely right that the passage goes so far as to *define* perfection as ‘the agreement of a thing with its purpose’, except that I would add that ‘agreement with’ is not an accurate rendition of *Angemessenheit*, and the stronger ‘(perfect) fit with’ is more appropriate, especially once we turn to Kant’s remarks on architecture. For there, in Kant’s longest remarks about *Baukunst*, we get clarification on a number of points, including ‘Angemessenheit’ and, most importantly, an unequivocal affirmation that, for Kant, aesthetic appreciation of architecture is mediated by (attending to its) typology. This presents the third (and last) step in our exposition of his aesthetics of architecture, in K13. The core lines are,

Indeed, all domestic furnishings (the work of the carpenter and the like things for use) can be counted as belonging to the latter, because the appropriateness of the product to a certain use is essential in a **work of architecture** (*Bauwerk*s)[.] (CPJ §51, V:323)

This is Guyer’s translation. However, the correct translation is,

[...] because the *perfect fit* of the product to a certain use is *what is essential* in a **work of architecture**.

As regards architecture, being tailor made to fit or suit (in German ‘*angemessen*,’ as in a tailor made suit or *Massanzug*) a given function is, moreover, not just *one of many* architecture’s essential features as Guyer’s translation would have us believe. Rather, it is architecture’s essence itself, whence Kant’s use of the definite article – ‘the essential’, *das Wesentliche*, as in Bernard’s (1914, 210) translation (‘is the essential thing in an architectural work’).

K13 and K14 categorize architecture against the backdrop of the other arts, and seeks to ‘rank’ them. Architecture fares rather poorly, both for its cognitive value and how much aesthetic enjoyment it bestows (cf. K15). Instructively, in K13 Kant compares the works of architecture to ‘domestic furnishings’ (‘Hausgeräthe’) or tools for keeping one’s household in tact, including lamps and kitchen gear. Given that Kant likens architecture to domestic furnishings, a term that is fairly well defined,⁴⁰⁹ there is not much elbow room to reconstrue his remarks on architectural functionality in anything but an incredibly narrow, utilitarian sense. There appears to be less room than recent exegetical forays on Kant’s behalf have led us to believe, on how to construe ‘what a thing should be’ when it comes to buildings. I conclude that Kant’s notion of ‘function’ is fairly narrow, and does not neatly extend to all sorts of ‘artistic intent’.

⁴⁰⁷ In CPJ §11 (V:221) Kant uses the §10 framework of objects and their ends as causal grounds, to say that neither (a) the feeling of (dis)pleasure nor (b) a determinate concept can be the ‘ground’ (causal or rational, i.e. cause or anterior reason) for (c) aesthetic judgements, since (a) and (c) are not causally distinct and (b) is extrinsic to (c).

⁴⁰⁸ Guyer (2000, 372n.38).

⁴⁰⁹ See for instance the Grimms’ dictionary on ‘Hausrat’ as ‘utensile’ and ‘*nl. huysraed, utensilia, supplex, bona mobilia*’.

§5.4 CONCLUSION: KANT'S CHALLENGE?

This chapter traced the origins of Kant's rejection of many presuppositions informing the theoretic model developed in CHAPTER 2. In specific, we saw how Kant's rejection is premised on a particular *aesthetics* of architecture that (1) involves an irremediable opposition of *utilitas* to *venustas* and (2) demands that a properly aesthetic contemplation of architecture proceeds unperturbed by determinate utilitarian or moral concepts. The direct result of (2) is that architecture, to be of aesthetic value, cannot have determinate moral value except in a very indirect and instrumental way. Architecture serves contemplation of a 'disinterested' variety, and that contemplation provides humans a vehicle to experience freedom of agency, for Kant a prerequisite of human morality (focused, as it is for him, on the goodness of the will). The net result of this is that architecture is bereft of *intrinsic* moral value, and that individual buildings cannot earn *divergent* moral appraisals owing to their compositional features, except where these features *heighten* or *hinder* disinterested contemplation, a point Kant's own discussion of architecture barely touches on.

All of this runs counter to the core tenets of the ethics of architecture formally outlined in CHAPTER 2. Which view, however, is correct? While, as before, a validation of my theoretic alternative to Kant will largely depend on how it fares in practice, there are a couple of points on which a rejoinder to Kant can proceed rather straightforwardly. Six objections, in particular, appear to me to undermine the Kantian challenge to the framework of CHAPTER 2, with the most decisive one mentioned first.

First, the systematic exclusion of *firmitas* from Kant's discussion is not well argued and comes across as an oversight in his thought rather than a deliberate and adequately rationalized choice. Maybe Kant has good reasons to ignore *firmitas*, but if so, we can only guess at what they are. (Here we will get much more to chew on when attending to Le Corbusier in CHAPTER 6.) Matters are certainly not helped by the short shrift accorded by Kant's recent defenders to 'the Vitruvian paradigm' (a paradigm they rightly see Kant as undermining), particularly as regards Vitruvius' understanding of *firmitas*. Thus Paul Guyer writes,

Firmitas or durability is not an aesthetic quality or merit, but a physical and historical quality of a building and its other properties: it is what allows a building with its *utilitas* or convenience and *venustas* or beauty to endure and be enjoyed over time. So it is not a value in its own right but rather an instrumental condition for the continued enjoyment of the intrinsic values of a building, convenience and beauty.⁴¹⁰

This commits the mistake, diagnosed in CHAPTER 3, of confusing a categorical for a dispositional property. *Firmitas* relates to a host of constructional and compositional properties that underwrite, not just the diachronic endurance of a building, but make up the very compositional properties that inform a building's synchronic beauty and functionality. Once *firmitas* is understood in this way, its categorization at Guyer's hand as a mere 'instrumental [pre-]condition' for architectural values already looks shaky. Consider in that vein Guyer's own take on

perceptible proportions among the shape, size, and number of the members of a building, features of [a building's] form that contribute to its beauty; arrangement concerns the layout or 'groundplan' of the building, which contributes to its utility as well as to its beauty, and also the elevation of the building, which might be thought to contribute more to its beauty than to its convenience. (2011, 8)

On the view proposed in CHAPTER 3, these features are inseparably defined in terms of *firmitas*. Guyer himself here seems to concede that such features, far from presenting a quasi-causal 'precondition' of a building's beauty, are directly constitutive of it. As a result, if Guyer were to recognize that these features belong to *firmitas* as much as *venustas* – and recognize, moreover, that the two are reciprocally conditioned in their application – he would likely revoke his verdict that *firmitas* is a mere precondition of architectural value.

⁴¹⁰ Guyer (2011, 8).

Equally striking is Guyer's attempt to fold the following features into the domain of *utilitas*.

[Christian] Wolff gives equal time to considerations of utility, beginning with a (Vitruvian) discussion of the correct use of building materials, continuing through discussions of structural matters, such as that lower stories of columns must be heavier than higher ones because they carry more weight and that the pitch of roofs must be determined by balancing the need to shed rain and snow (which points toward a steeper pitch) with the weight of the roof itself (which would argue for less pitch), and concluding with discussions of such matters as (once again) the proper sizing of windows for both illumination and the human pleasure of looking out on the passing scene, the location of staircases for proper circulation, and the construction of privies with proper ventilation and seats that can remain clean. Our overall pleasure in a building, in other words, depends on both its beauty and utility.⁴¹¹

Again, Guyer's (likely unaware) suppression of a synchronic understanding of *firmitas* is total, even when he touches on features that the Vitruvian tradition recognizes as pertaining to *firmitas*. Guyer's use of Wolff as an ally on this point is open to scholarly doubt as well. Attention to the text reveals that Wolff clearly recognizes the synchronic dimension of *firmitas*; the alleged absorption of such features into *utilitas* appears to be likewise absent from his text. And, what is more, Wolff clearly recognizes that (what are) the term's synchronic and diachronic dimensions are intertwined in proper architectonic composition.⁴¹²

What is more, Guyer's own marginalization of *firmitas* enables him to conclude, even before he gets to Kant, that Vitruvius himself cannot have been all that concerned with *firmitas* in the first place, going so far as to write the famous 'triad' out of the picture entirely, in favour of two remaining 'fundamental values':

This Vitruvian emphasis on utility and beauty as the two fundamental values of architecture remained prevalent in eighteenth-century philosophy of architecture prior to Kant. (ibid.)

Such statements do not contain a persuasive challenge to the centrality accorded to *firmitas* in the present work and by Vitruvius, but rather display a misunderstanding thereof. In this regard, Guyer most likely gives us as accurate a Kantian understanding of *firmitas* as we are ever likely to receive. Arguably, his study precisely serves that purpose. As a challenge to Vitruvius and what Guyer calls 'the Vitruvian paradigm', however, his article leaves things to be desired.

Second, Kant's own discussion of (what Vitruvius terms) *utilitas* has Kant assimilate buildings' functionality to their type, a simplification that we saw in §1.7.2 and §3.6.3.1, is philosophically problematic, to say the least. If an impoverished or dubious understanding of *utilitas* informs Kant's statements about architectural functionality, not least its alleged 'opposition' to architectural beauty, we must wonder how defensible those statements are, given basic principles of semantic compositionality.⁴¹³

Third, if the opposition of *utilitas* to *venustas* appears dubious, we should bear in mind that even Kant's most sympathetic exegetes of late have seen fit to avoid the impression that 'adherent beauty' (which mixes utility and beauty) is, contrary to appearances, a 'second rate' beauty for Kant.⁴¹⁴ A more convincing account of how architectural artefacts are 'adherently beautiful', then, is still in the works.

Fourth, Kant's delineation of architectural beauty appears to be motivated in a somewhat odd fashion, as having to either solely do with contemplation, or as being the somewhat uncontrollable result of the work of artistic genius. Either alternative looks rather problematic, and as we saw earlier, the two alternatives do

⁴¹¹ Guyer (2011, 9).

⁴¹² See Wolff (1713/1797, esp. 809, 820, 825 and 827): *convenientia* (or, *utilitas*) primarily relates to the inner refurbishing of the building, where *firmitas* saw to its outer fitting and construction. These two domains are on a par to directly account for a building's functional and aesthetic value.

⁴¹³ See Frege's proposal to regard the 'semantic power' of an expression to be 'the power to affect the truth-value of the sentences in which it occurs.' (Evans 1982, 8)

⁴¹⁴ Guyer (2002).

not synchronize neatly in Kant, in that the very content of contemplation is deemed to operate somewhat ‘freely’ from artistic intent. This adds to the confusion of Kant’s claim that architecture ‘expresses moral ideas’. It remains entirely unclear which ideas it can express, and how it expresses them. Kant’s aesthetics of architecture remains strangely elusive on the very points that, contemporary exegetes tell us, form the corner stones of his overall view, certainly as regards the morality of architecture.

Fifth, attempts of later thinkers to elaborate the ‘two alternatives’ just mentioned bring out how difficult it is to make either one of them philosophically respectable. I shall argue, in CHAPTER 6, that a Kantian-inspired account of architectural experience and beauty we find in Le Corbusier fails to provide an adequate aetiology of either, and that without that aetiology the normative place allocated to Kantian understandings thereof remains a blunt assertion in search of an argument.

Sixth, as we shall see in CHAPTER 7, Schopenhauer takes on board many an idea of Kant’s, including the view of architecture serving ‘disinterested contemplation’ and this, in turn, enabling architecture to be complicit in humans’ moral concerns. However, Schopenhauer outlines an argument that undercuts most of Kant’s other commitments, including most importantly, (1) the rejection of *firmitas*’ relevance and (2) the systematic avoidance of detailed moral appraisals of buildings and building styles. Schopenhauer therefore highlights that Kant’s combination of views is an ‘uneasy package’ from which individual strands can be harmlessly extracted to generate, or help co-generate, an ethics of architecture that is recognizably similar to the one I develop in CHAPTER 2, and at any rate, considerably closer to the tectonic tradition’s than to Kant’s own.

In sum, I allege that Kant’s individual claims about architecture fall into two groups, (A) those which are either not (clearly) worth adopting, and (B) those which are easily re-appropriated for the very variety of an ‘ethics of architecture’ Kant’s views were earlier deemed to challenge (§5.1). The challenge from Kant’s views, then, is harmless to the ambition and core tenets of the present work. Where Kant’s views do not permit appropriation for a more precise and detailed ethics of architecture, they often serve as reminders of how *not* to approach architecture philosophically.

What may Kant, or a contemporary Kantian, say in response to these charges? First, I suppose, she could highlight that my alternative account, as just stated, incorporates a good many of Kant’s own claims, so the distance between the two accounts, or my apparent lack of appreciating their commonalities, should not be overstated to polemical effect. Second, she may point out how the very readers who find the alleged *results* of my framework dubious (in particular, say, the framework’s ambition to deliver and assess specific moral appraisals of buildings) will welcome the opportunity to relapse, as it were, into a theoretic mold on which morality remains where it belongs – with the agency and will of human beings. Certainly Kant delivers on this score. And did we not see at great length in CHAPTER 1 just how pervasive resistance towards ‘taking moral appraisal of buildings at face value’ is? If so, Kant’s aesthetics of architecture offers us a way of assigning to architecture a complicity of sorts with morality, without foisting moral values on inanimate entities that seemingly resist moral evaluation.

We seem to be at a cross roads that, I hope, is becoming increasingly familiar to readers. We appear to be faced with two stances on how and where to locate the morality of architecture, and regardless of how either stance is worked out, there are attractions and drawbacks on either side. The comparative evaluation of the two stances seems difficult, since no agreed aggregation of ‘attractions and drawbacks’ is forthcoming. If the Kantian view, for instance, has fewer drawbacks than CHAPTER 2’s un-Kantian alternative, it may still face more profound problems than the other. In particular, I would argue, Kant’s views on function and beauty in architecture seem to be ill borne out by attention to actual buildings (the type of attention Kant himself, or later thinkers in the Kantian tradition, have never adequately bestowed on buildings). The challenge for contemporary Kantians, then, seems to reside in part on making good on this lacuna, and develop more robust accounts of architectural functionality and beauty, accounts that enable sustained, detailed attention to buildings, while preserving the core claims of Kant’s aesthetics of architecture.

Another part of the challenge for contemporary Kantians might reside in having to answer some of the concerns raised in this chapter at a more exegetical level, and re-open investigation of what these ‘core claims’ actually contain and amount to, and how successful the present chapters has been in isolating them adequately. Perhaps we have not yet heard the last of what ‘what a thing ought to be’ or what ‘purpose’ mean in Kant’s aesthetics, and perhaps we have to one day revise our understanding of what these terms mean when specifically applied to buildings. In this vein, the current chapter is less likely a decisive knock against Kant’s aesthetics to architecture than a ‘check list’ of things that need answering before Kant’s views can command greater respect from contemporary philosophers of architecture.

CHAPTER 6

ANTI-TECTONICS? LE CORBUSIER AND THE REJECTION OF *FIRMITAS*

*It is the plan that reconciles all the program's demands; it is the plan that contains the creative thought of the architect; is it the plan that is the criterion by which specific individuals first judge the real value of the composition.*⁴¹⁵

*[M]issing from all plans [in this book] are north points and indications of scale. Most serious of all is the lack of sections, so crucial to understanding the internal volumes and experience of the buildings, and which could usefully have included a human figure for scale, or an indication of the human eye level.*⁴¹⁶

§6.1 INTRODUCTION

As explained more fully in §5.1, Le Corbusier's (1887-1965) revolutionary understanding of architecture can in some regards be considered to be the 'executor' of Kant's will (and views) on the aesthetics of architecture. A preoccupation with formalist concerns over functional and constructional ones, an appreciation for a heightened sense of aesthetic pleasure, delight in the senses, and so on, are all elements we find in his thinking (see further §6.7.1 for comparisons to Kant). At the same time, as a practising architect and a thinker trained in the French architectural tradition, Le Corbusier is far more articulate and detailed on how to realize such a vision in the building of new houses, where Kant's account (we learnt) leaves out such specifics and, more generally, displayed a fairly poor and vague understanding of architecture. In that regard, Le Corbusier promises a far more powerful challenge to an understanding of architecture focused on buildings' solidity, their *firmitas* and *tectonic composition* as explained in CHAPTERS 3 and 4. Most importantly, Le Corbusier seems to offer us not just one but several moral visions for architecture – that is, for his understanding of architecture, one that (like Kant's) is characterized by its rejection of the RECIPROCITY THESIS and of the centrality of *firmitas* as an essential component to value in architecture. As such, his thought presents a formidable challenge to the inferential movement of previous chapters, what §3.3.2 referred to as 'the dominos falling' from a recognition to architecture being moralizable at all to (ultimately) a subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS. If Le Corbusier is right, this train of thought can be interrupted, as there are hitherto unacknowledged forks along that road. There are, then, strong philosophical and historical reasons to attend to this thought very closely, certainly at the very junctures where it presents this challenge to an ethics of architecture based on (all of) the TRIAD VALUES.

As an architect and thinker, Le Corbusier's mental cosmos is too large to address satisfactorily within the confines of a single chapter. Instead, I shall focus on a very narrow slice of his thought, one contained in his famous book *Vers une architecture* of 1923. Even then, I shall take a largely cavalier attitude to the work's historical context. For instance, I leave mostly unaddressed the precise extent to which Le Corbusier's thought in *Vers une architecture* can (and perhaps should be) seen against the French *Beaux-Arts* tradition; although I will discuss at length that tradition's influence on Le Corbusier on one highly specific detail, and only because it is relevant to the very narrow purpose of this chapter. Nor do I pursue the clear verbal and conceptual parallels of *Vers une architecture* to Durand's writing, given how Durand like Le Corbusier assigns formal primacy to the primary volumes of Plato's *Timaeus*, the 'Platonic solids'. Such elements, while undoubtedly fascinating and deserving of study in their own right, are of limited relevance to current purposes.

Instead, and as already indicated, I shall attend to one strand in Le Corbusier's thought only: his rejection of *firmitas* as grounding a (morally) proper understanding of architecture. Without much fanfare, it comes towards the end of *Vers une architecture*, when he explains that in his vision for architecture,

⁴¹⁵ *Dictionnaire de l'Académie des beaux-arts* (1884). See §6.3 below.

⁴¹⁶ Buchanan (2013).

The house will no longer be a squat thing that pretends to defy the centuries and that is an opulent object manifesting wealth [...]. The house will no longer be an archaic entity heavily rooted in the ground by deep foundations, built ‘solid’, and to which the cult of family, bloodline etc. has so long been devoted.⁴¹⁷

The verbal echoes of ‘heavily rooted in the ground by deep foundations, built ‘solid’,’ to Vitruvius’ definition of *firmitas* in *De Architectura* I.2§2 are very pronounced:

Firmitas erit habita ratio cum fuerit fundamentorum ad solidum depression, copiarum sine avaritia diligens electio[.]

Durability will be catered for when the foundations have been sunk down to solid ground and the building materials carefully selected from the available resources without cutting corners[.]⁴¹⁸

Besides, Le Corbusier interestingly conjoins his rejection of *firmitas* to ‘the cult of family’. This, I submit, is a rejection of building for the *pater familias*, the ostentation of whose prestige Vitruvius links to his notions of *distributio* and *decorum* in I.2.§9 – a passage that differentiates buildings by use and client, for instance by ‘whether they are intended for the use by the heads of families’. Without pursuing this parallel further, it adds textual support to claim that one of Le Corbusier’s targets in the passage above is indeed Vitruvius.

If his rejection of *firmitas* is (one of) the end point(s) of *Vers une architecture*, how does Le Corbusier arrive at it? This is the route of argumentation to be unearthed and scrutinized in the current chapter. One aim is to take him seriously as a thinker who marshals *reasons* for his audience to abandon some of its most dearly held convictions and prejudices about architecture. As such, while I single-mindedly focus on his rejection of *firmitas*, I will also touch on his attitude towards the Vitruvian triad, the RECIPROCITY THESIS, and some other elements of Vitruvius’ ethics of architecture. §6.2 provides the exposition of Le Corbusier’s main and strongest arguments for this ‘rejection’, summarized in §6.2.1. §6.3 then provides the necessary historical background to fully appreciate the strength and flexibility of those arguments; much space is taken up by an in-depth discussion of *Beaux Arts* principles of architectonic composition, as these mount some of the most enduring and compelling challenge to what CHAPTER 4 called ‘the tectonic tradition’ in nineteenth century German thought. §6.4-§6.5 then provide refutations of the arguments in §6.2, with §6.6 providing a further refutation of these arguments’ recent defense by contemporary architecture scholars. §6.7 presents the central philosophical confrontation of Le Corbusier with the ethical framework of earlier chapters (specifically CHAPTERS 2 to 3), and argues that Le Corbusier fails to adequately challenge that framework’s core contentions. §6.8 then queries whether, irrespective of that failure, Le Corbusier presents us with an ethics of architecture attractive in its own right, and concludes that it does not. §6.8 also returns us to the rejection of *firmitas* that presents the fulcrum of this chapter’s inquiry. Readers exclusively interested in the philosophical core argument should focus on §6.2.1 and §6.5-§6.7.

Let us begin, then, with unraveling the grand argument of *Vers une architecture*.

§6.2 LE CORBUSIER’S ARGUMENTS FOR REJECTING *FIRMITAS*: EXPOSITION

The current section, and further ones up to §6.7, pertain to a particular *normativity*, namely that of design, or, of how a building *ought to be* designed. As we saw earlier (§1.1, §2.3.6), this normativity should not be assimilated to aesthetic normativity. What is at stake in Le Corbusier’s work (as in Vitruvius’) is ‘proper architecture’, that is, a normative understanding of architecture itself, codified into *criteria* any built work has to meet to qualify as ‘architecture’ (meeting these criteria significantly beyond a level that is called for, falls in the supererogatory, and could be called ‘(outstandingly) good architecture’). As suggested in §3.2, we might view this in Davidsonian terms, as offering a ‘constitutive ideal’ for architecture; or in Kripkean

⁴¹⁷ Le Corbusier (2008, 259). Throughout I use Goodman’s translation of Le Corbusier (1923) which retains the typographical idiosyncracies of the original, such as CAPITALIZATION (as in passages below).

⁴¹⁸ Text: Fleury (1990, 20), translation: Schofield (2009, 19). I discussed this passage in §3.4.1.3.

terms, as rigidly fixing the essence of ‘architecture’ analogous to the semantic fixation of natural kind terms familiar from semantics elsewhere (cf. also §2.6.2). To mount this view, we need a substantive theory that explains the normative weight of the criteria underlying the *semantic normativity* of (the applicability of) ‘architecture’. The current chapter examines Le Corbusier’s *criteria* for ‘architecture’ as well as the arguments he marshals in favour of these criteria. And this is where our exposition must begin.

The first step in Le Corbusier’s ‘grand argument’ is to define architecture itself. He does so as follows.

ARCHITECTURE is an artistic fact, an emotional phenomenon that is outside questions of construction, beyond them. Construction: THAT’S FOR MAKING THINGS HOLD TOGETHER; Architecture: THAT’S FOR STIRRING EMOTION. Architectural emotion: that’s when the work resounds inside us in tune with a universe whose laws we are subject to, recognize, and admire. When certain relationships are achieved, we are apprehended by the work. (2008, 97)

Le Corbusier defines architecture by its evocative power, its ability to invoke an emotional or affective response in the recipient. (He frequently equates that to a response of the viewer, which appears to compromise the other sensual qualities of architecture such as tactile ones, which presents perhaps one of many points of contact to Kant’s aesthetics of architecture we explored in CHAPTER 5.)

This view animates a great many other passages too. Already at the book’s opening page we learn that,

The architect, through the ordonnance of forms, realizes an order that is a pure creation of his mind; through forms, he affects our senses intensely, by provoking plastic emotions; through the relationships he creates he stirs in us deep resonances, he gives us the measure of an order that we sense to be in accord with that world, he determines the diverse movements of our minds and our hearts; it is then that we experience beauty. (2008, 92)

The passage is multiply unclear. Perhaps ‘*plastic emotions*’ connote emotions triggered by the plasticity of architecture, a plasticity Le Corbusier will later define in terms of volume rather than mass, and which he will link to the plastic arts, or sculpture (2008, 247); perhaps we are invited to expand ‘*through the relationships he creates*’ to ‘through the relationships the architect creates among elements in his architectural composition’. And in view to the earlier passage, ‘*the diverse movements of our minds and our hearts*’ likely connote the inner motions or affections of our mental life (cf. *pathé* in Aristotle, ‘passions’ i.e. passive affections in Spinoza, etc.). The intent of the passage, give or take a few such additions, is reasonably clear, its message in line with the earlier one.

The *centrality of affective response* (to use a philosophical term first introduced in my discussion of Kant, §5.2) re-emerges in the following passage, which likewise features a return to ‘plastic emotions’:

Architecture, which is a thing of plastic emotion, should, in its domain, [...] USE ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF STRIKING OUR SENSES, of satisfying the visual desires, and arrange them in such a way THAT HE SIGHT OF THEM CLEARLY AFFECTS US through finesse or brutality, tumult or serenity [...]. These elements are plastic elements, forms that our eyes see clearly [...]. These forms [...] act on | our senses physiologically (sphere, cone, cylinder, horizontal, vertical, oblique, etc.) and shake them up. Being affected, we are able to perceive beyond raw sensation; then certain relations will come into being that act on our consciousness and put us in a state of bliss (consonance with the laws of the universe that govern us and to which all of our acts are subject)[.] (2008, 95-96)

As before, affective response defines what (good) architecture is, and as before, this is defined via the visual sense (‘satisfying the visual desires’, ‘forms that our eyes see clearly’) at the expense of the olfactory, tactile, and auditory dimensions of experiencing architecture. Indeed, in a later passage Le Corbusier will go so far as to say, ‘Architecture is when there is poetic emotions. Architecture is a plastic thing. Plasticity is what we see and what we | measure with our eyes.’ (2008, 243-4), elevating the exclusion of the non-visual from the implied to the explicit.

Now, even when one omits some of the more problematic elements in the passage just quoted from pp. 95-96 (as I have tried), much of what remains appears elusive on a number of key points. The passage invokes some notion of psychophysical interactionism and a distinction of sensible versus rational. Such features would require serious attention and elaboration before they can be deployed to provide a clear case of what exactly characterizes (the aetiologically and phenomenologically appropriate type of) affective response, and why that response should define architecture itself and afford a normative understanding thereof (an understanding of what good architecture consists in or accomplishes). Both the thesis of psychophysical interactionism and the sensible/rational distinction require elaboration inside a properly worked out epistemology of architectural experience. I return to this in CHAPTER 7 (§7.5) where I address the compatibility of the ‘centrality of affect as defining architecture’ thesis with subscription to the primacy of tectonic composition, such that the former does not necessitate (much less entail) the negation of the latter. Any claim to the contrary, intended or not by Le Corbusier, would be undermined. But we are getting ahead of ourselves, and shall have to return to both lines of thought (*pro* and *contra*) later on.

The centrality of affective response in defining architecture also shines through Le Corbusier’s three ‘rappels’ to the architect that occupy Le Corbusier for much of *Vers une architecture*, and are first outlined in this passage:

For the architect, we wrote “THREE REMINDERS”. VOLUME, which is the element through which our senses perceive and measure and are fully affected. SURFACE, which is the envelope of the volume and which can annihilate sensation or amplify it. PLAN, which is the generator of volume and surface and irrevocably determines everything.⁴¹⁹

Given the centrality of affective response to architecture, this individuation of architecture’s three core elements is reasonably clear. Volume is central as the *site* of transaction, of bringing about that response, surface is a *modifier* of that response by way of amplification or dampening, and the plan is seen as a *determinant* of volume and, indirectly, of affective response and the surface that modulates volume.

It is this last thesis in particular that separates Le Corbusier’s thinking, if not his buildings, from the tectonic tradition. For Le Corbusier’s thesis (in 2008, 95) of the plan’s being the ‘generator’ of the building’s physical shape or ‘volume’ must be read in the tradition of the French Academic tradition of architecture, the *Beaux Arts*. The validity of this claim is brought out by Le Corbusier’s use of Choisy’s axonometric drawings (2008, 118), and other passages discussed in Rayner Banham’s close reading of *Vers une architecture*, both which I turn to shortly.⁴²⁰

But in contrast to Choisy, Le Corbusier does not (claim to) see the elevation and section (both invoked in axonometric representation) as equally generative of form as the plan, this being one of the points on which Banham critiques him. And this is significant, in that the section in particular is expressive of construction (tectonics, *firmitas*) in a way that the plan, by virtue of its flatness cannot be.⁴²¹ (In making

⁴¹⁹ Le Corbusier (2008, 95). The material first appeared as Le Corbusier (1921).

⁴²⁰ Banham (1980, 220-246).

⁴²¹ This is *not* to say the textual evidence on ‘the plan’ is entirely clear cut:

From the outset, the plan implies the methods of construction; the architect is first of all an engineer. But let us confine ourselves to the question of architecture, this thing that endures over time. (2008, 216)

Also, the concluding pages argue for the liberation of construction from conventional means, due to the invention of steel and concrete, which

have completely transformed the organization of building as hitherto known [...] first because of their success, then because of their look, which recalls natural phenomena[.] (2008, 304)

To the extent that selection of materials goes into *firmitas*, it is hard to square these lines with a rejection thereof. If, on the other hand, the idea is for these factors to be fully *expressed* at the building’s skin, it becomes again understandable how Le Corbusier rejects *firmitas* as generative of design. I resume this point below. Banham of course concluded that passages like the two just quoted indicate that the overall project of *Vers une architecture* is internally incoherent, torn as it is between an ‘academic’ and ‘technological’ part with opposed agendas – respectively, the subconscious defense of antiquated (classical, even) design principles, versus the new ‘ethos’ of the engineer and the machine. This, too, is a thesis I return to below.

this point, I assume that when Le Corbusier uses the word ‘plan’ in his 1923 text, he does not (yet) mean ‘plan libre’, as the latter *would* be generative of three dimensional space in a sense that a flat floor plan would not. Thus Jacques Lucan distinguishes three uses of the word ‘plan’ in Le Corbusier: ‘plan: Le dictateur’, ‘plan: Le générateur’ and ‘plan libre’. The middle usage is under discussion here.⁴²²)

When Le Corbusier regards the plan as ‘the generator of volume’ and as ‘irrevocably determin[ing] everything’ (see above), how ambitious is the intended scope of ‘everything’? Cohen alleges that


If the plan is a ‘generator,’ [...] then that of a single edifice – the tower – would generate the entire city. (2008, 10)

The claim that the plan generates everything is apparently applicable as an urbanist principle. While we may wonder how this could be so – which properties of ‘the entire city’ for instance Cohen has in mind –, Le Corbusier appears to address such a possibility in the following passage.

A unitary code distributes the same set of essential volumes through all parts of the city and determines the spaces in ways consistent with needs of a practical order and with the promptings of a poetic sense that is the architect’s own. Reserving all judgment about the coordination of the zones of this industrial city, we are here subject to the beneficial | consequences of order. Where order reigns, well-being is born. Through the happy invention of a system of lot division, even the quarters of workers’ housing take on a high architectural significance. Such are the consequences of the plan. (2008, 121-122)

The question then is, how can one single design principle, ‘the plan’, have such vast ‘consequences’? We already mentioned Le Corbusier’s use of Choisy’s drawing in his very ‘Rappel’ on the plan, and Le Corbusier indeed uses that example to explain the generative power of the plan, perhaps not for an entire city (yet), but for an entire building, from top to finish. He writes (and I insert his choice of illustration),

The entire structure arises from the base and develops according to a rule that is written on the ground in the plan: beautiful forms, variety of forms, unity of geometric principle. A profound transmission of harmony: it is architecture.



HAGIA SOFIA AT CONSTANTINOPLE. The plan is active throughout the structure: its geometric laws and their modular combinations unfold through all its parts.

⁴²² Lucan (1987, 308). In more recent work, Lucan (2012, 268-371) situates the development of ‘plan libre’ in Le Corbusier’s statement for the 1927 Weissenhofsiedlung exhibition in Germany, and a 1929 article in *L’Architecture vivante*, both postdating the 1923 *Vers une*. Further discussions of ‘plan libre’ can be found Oechslin (1987a, 1987b, 1999), and Risselada (1988).

The plan is the basis. Without a plan, there is neither grandeur of intention and expression nor rhythm, nor volume, nor coherence. Without a plan there's that sensation, unbearable to man, of forcelessness, of something mean, disordered, arbitrary.

A plan demands the most active imagination. It also demands the most severe discipline. The plan determines everything; it is the decisive moment. (2008, 118)

This extract features the return of the earlier claim, 'The plan determines everything', and it eminently rests on the illustration from Choisy at its core. But how is that illustration intended?

Le Corbusier's utilization of Choisy's axonometric drawings can be (and has been) interpreted in different ways. Maybe Banham is right and Le Corbusier, unlike Choisy, does not regard the elevation and section in axonometric representation as equally generative of form as the plan. But this assumes a certain understanding of the implications of Choisy's use of axonometric representation, when other interpreters urge more nuanced readings. Thus we have Cohen,

The axonometric projections taken [by Le Corbusier] from the history of architecture published in 1899 by Choisy – one of the many sources of *Vers une architecture* – represent he illustrated buildings *simultaneously* in plan, section, and elevation, thereby making it possible to *connect* the 'generator' [sc. the plan] with the volumes [displayed in the section and elevation].⁴²³

The italicized phrases leave the precise relation between plan, section, and elevation actually unclear. Max Risselada has instead suggested a (tempered) primacy of the plan vis-à-vis section and elevation in Choisy too, so that Le Corbusier's use of Choisy's axonometric representation does not conflict with a view that regards the plan as the (sole) generator or otherwise 'predominant' in design.

The horizontal section dominates all other dimensions, while the vertical section [in the Domino frame] seems to go unnoticed. This is paradoxical if we observe that the chapter devoted to the plan in ['Three Rappels'] is illustrated with axonometrics from Choisy[...]. These demonstrate the very unity of plan, section, and elevation as elements that *define one another*. These axonometrics are, however, drawn in *a definite order*: *first* the plan, *after which* sections and elevations could be measured out. In the work of Le Corbusier the distance between floors seems no longer of importance; only by way of stairs and ramps can the vertical dimensions be realised. What is striking, then, is the negligible number of sections illustrated in the [sc. Le Corbusier's] *Oeuvre Complète*, as if there is little more between the floors than that already deductible [sic] from the plans.⁴²⁴

So much for interpreting the illustration from Choisy by itself. Le Corbusier's intent, however, is further indicated by the very caption underneath it, to wit:

HAGIA SOFIA AT CONSTANTINOPLE. The plan is active throughout the structure: its geometric laws and their modular combinations unfold through all its parts.

This alerts us to further elements of 'the plan', namely, 'geometric laws' and 'modular combinations' being operative throughout the entire building i.e. all of its 'parts' (or *parti*, a term to be explored shortly). Le Corbusier spells out these notions in his section on 'Regulating Lines', which immediately follows that of the third Rappel, on the plan. That section attends to the façade. As I said a propos an earlier passage about Le Corbusier's three central elements to architectural design, 'Volume is central as the *site* of transaction, of bringing about that response, surface is a *modifier* of that response by way of amplification or dampening, and the plan is seen as a *determinant* of volume and, indirectly, of affective response and the surface that modulates volume.' We already touched on the plan, and its atectonic character in Le Corbusier, given the separation of plan from section. At the other end point of architectural experience, that of the specific emotion or affective response that is to characterize architecture itself, we again are

⁴²³ Cohen (2008, 10, emphases added).

⁴²⁴ Risselada (1988b, 55), emphases added.

dealing only in surface effects operating independently of underlying structural considerations. For such effects are portrayed perhaps in the elevation of the façade, but never the section. Again, construction is entirely removed from the overall account. This comes out even more strongly once we attend to Le Corbusier's considerations on sculptural 'contour modulation' as determining what he takes to canonically define architecture, namely 'the magnificent play of volumes in light' (2008, 245-246). More importantly, however, is the aforementioned section on 'Regulating Lines', attending to the façade itself. In that section,

The principle of order enabled by the plan is in a sense reshuffled onto the vertical plane [...] Berlage had objected to the absence of any mention of his writings in the [book's] first edition [given his own claim, in a letter to Le Corbusier, that many architects before Le Corbusier, including himself, had already begun] to design their plans and façades in accordance with [one set of] regulatory lines[.] (Cohen 2008, 11)

I have here inserted the crucial modification 'one set of', given that the French reads *alors à dessiner leurs plans et façades d'après un tracé régulateur* (apud Cohen 2008, 64n.53). Without the unity (homogeneity, or even 'monolithicity') of the regulatory lines, Cohen's thesis of the plan's ordering being 'reshuffled onto the vertical plane' (sc., the façade) would not even get off ground.

This is borne out by Le Corbusier's own remarks in the section on 'Regulating Lines', remarks that also explain (perhaps clearer than any other part of the book) his take on the Vitruvian triad, and testify to the remoteness of Le Corbusier from the tectonic tradition's RECIPROCITY THESIS on the matter, given that Le Corbusier assigns primacy to *venustas*, and delegates *utilitas* and (as we already saw earlier) *firmitas* a secondary and (as I shall conclude later) preliminary role, subservient to the real 'determinants' of architectural form and beauty. To see this, readers should bear in mind Vitruvius' definition of *venustas* as

Fig. 6.1. From the 1923 text of *Vers une architecture*. – Source: Jacques Lucan, *Encyclopédie* (1987, 21).


venustatis vero cum fuerit operis species grata et elegans membrorumque commensu iustas habeat symmetriarum ratiocinationes.

Beauty will be achieved when the appearance of a building is pleasing and elegant and the commensurability of its components is correctly related to the system of modules.⁴²⁵

This in place, we can approach Le Corbusier on the Regulating Lines.

Notice in these plans how a primary mathematics governs them. There are measurements here. In order to build well and distribute the labor properly, so as to assure the solidity and utility of the work, *measurements* condition the whole. The builder has taken as his measure what was easiest for him, most consistent, the tool that he was least likely to lose: his pace, his foot, his forearm, his finger. |

To build well and distribute his labor, to guarantee the solidity and utility of the work, he took measurements, he introduced a module, *he regulated his labor*, he introduced order. [...]



⁴²⁵ Text: Fleury (1990, 20), translation: Schofield (2009, 19).

He established order by measuring. In order to measure he took his pace, his foot, his forearm, or his finger. By imposing the order of his foot or his arm, he created a module that regulates the entire work; and his work is to his scale, for his convenience, for his comfort, *to his measure*. It is to the human *scale*. (2008, 133-134)

This passage is the entry point for Le Corbusier's ruminations on man's and his architecture's harmonizing with the entire cosmos, all of cosmic order – an arch-Vitruvian theme familiar from §3.5 I shall delegate to the conclusion of this chapter. There is a peripheral textual element, 'distribution', which in the Beaux Arts academy meant the distribution of rooms in a building according to use (*utilitas*) (Lucan 2012, ch.1), and is likely far from Le Corbusier's mind in the passage here.

What is more central, however, are the vast claims that '*measurements* condition the whole', and that man 'created a module [a single measurement unit] that regulates the entire work', both of which resonate with Vitruvius' very definition of *venustas* as the 'commensurability' of all of a building's components being 'correctly related to the system of [a] module'. This textual allusion, fairly suggestive at this point, is made maximally explicit a couple of pages later.

The regulating line is a satisfaction of a spiritual order that leads to a search for ingenious relationships and for harmonious relationships. It imbues the work with eurhythmy. The regulating line brings forth the sensory mathematics that produces a beneficent perception of order. [...] Here are some regulating lines that served to make some very beautiful things and are the cause whereby these things are very beautiful[.] (2008, 137)

Beauty is mentioned explicitly, as are several of *venustas*' core ingredients in Vitruvius (§3.7), namely harmony and eurhythmy.

At the level of concrete detail, we get passages like these:

The façade of the Arsenal in Piraeus was determined by several simple divisions that make the base proportional to the height, that determine the position and dimensions of the door in close coordination with the proportions of the façade. (2008, 138)

The work, conceived in its site, and whose enveloping mass has | been coordinated with the surrounding volume and space, collects, concentrates, and unifies itself, expresses the same law throughout, becomes compact. (2008, 139-140)

Here we are, having the basic 'regulating lines' emerge from the plan, and regulating as well as determining the entire rest of the building, with the façade chief among that it. There is a parting mention of the design's compactness, a term we saw in §3.6.4 to be related to structural integrity, tectonic compactness, but here meaning a largely *pre-material* consistency in a design's execution. A phrase in the vicinity invoking the 'carpenters, and joiners' is surely coincidental too (2008, 136, to be discussed at greater length at §6.7.2). For Le Corbusier pursues a squarely anti-tectonic program. Or does he?

§6.2.1 LE CORBUSIER'S ARGUMENTS FOR REJECTING *FIRMITAS*: SUMMARY

In the previous section I claimed that the central elements in Le Corbusier's account of architectural design are radically anti-tectonic. In specific, I attended to (1) his claim of the floor plan as generative of the entire design, and itself divorced from the section, and to (2) his discussion of the affective response that, to him, defines the essence of architecture, a response (I argued) triggered by visual elements at most discernible in the elevation of the façade, but never the section. Again, construction is entirely removed from the overall account, and a core value of the tectonic tradition – the structural integrity of the section – is systematically repressed.

Here is a formal presentation of the arguments that arise from these considerations (1-2) of Le Corbusier's. It is only once we so formally present them, that Le Corbusier's considerations merit the

honorific title of ‘arguments’. But we do need to so present them, since only then can we begin to appraise them for their soundness and validity.

ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME:

- P1 A building *b*'s plan is ‘generative’ of *b*'s volume (of *b* in its three-dimensional entirety).
- P2 The formal features *F* of *b*'s plan are not reciprocally conditioned (individuated) by formal features that primarily accrue from the section – we can specify *F* independently.
- P3 Considerations of *firmitas* accrue predominantly, if not solely, from the section.
- C1 Considerations of *firmitas* play no role in the generation of *b*'s formal features *F*.
- C2 Considerations of *firmitas* play no role in the generation of *b*'s volume or overall design.

ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE:

- P1’ A building *b*'s being *aesthetically pleasing* is entirely due to the affective response *R* it triggers.
- P2’ *b*'s triggering *R* arises solely from *b*'s surface features *S* visible in (mostly) its façade.
- P3’ *b*'s surface features *S* are individuated without regard to properties of *b* that accrue from *b*'s being *solidly built* (from *b*'s *firmitas*).
- C’ The truth conditions for ‘*b* is *aesthetic pleasing*’ need not mention or bring in (properties accruing from) *b*'s being *solidly built* – they only need to explain how *R* and *S* are related.

The net effect of either argument is the rejection of the RECIPROCITY THESIS, on which the individuation of *b*'s compositional properties Π and *b*'s being *aesthetically pleasing* make essential (ineliminable) reference to *b*'s synchronic firmness, that is, to *b*'s being *solidly built* and *b*'s being *tectonically composed* (§3.3-§3.4).

I have respectively labeled the arguments arising from (1)-(2) as the ‘ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME’ and the ‘ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE’, though I will ambiguously use the labels to sometimes designate the arguments’ respective opening premise alone. It is the opening premises that most explicitly occur in Le Corbusier’s own text, and as a result most of our critical efforts have to focus on them. Moreover, for Le Corbusier himself the considerations that launch these two arguments are interrelated, given how (as we saw earlier) the ‘plan’ and the ‘affective response’ are interrelated. Indeed, when Le Corbusier complained that a building *not* designed with the plan as its sole generator would create a ‘sensation, unbearable to man’ (2008, 118, quoted above), he links the sensory surface effect *R* triggered by the façade to its origin in a(n, as it were, disorderly) plan. This is why Le Corbusier can say a bit later, and with some truncation, that

The plan carries within it the very essence of the sensation. (2008, 120)⁴²⁶

Presumably, the idea is that the building’s ‘surface features’ in P2’ fall within the purview of *b*'s ‘volume’ mentioned in P1, or are at any rate generated by it. But this depends, of course, on the generative power of the plan itself, a point on which we still need much clarification – and which §6.3 will provide in full.

Le Corbusier’s joint commitment to the ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME and the ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE sufficiently explain why he could claim, as we saw earlier, that architecture is ‘an emotional phenomenon that is outside questions of construction’: it is so ‘outside’ because construction is ‘for making things hold together’ whereas architecture is ‘for stirring emotion’ (2008, 97). Tying affective response to volumes, then, is crucial for Le Corbusier’s implied arguments against tectonics. It also accounts for the definition of architecture he is most well known for (2008, 109),

⁴²⁶ Contrast the section ‘Illusion of the Plan’, which says, ‘Thus did he [the man of antiquity] create volumes, the foundation of architectural sensation, of sensory sensation.’ (2008, 220)

Architecture is the masterful, correct, and magnificent play of volumes brought together in light.

Though canonical, this is too cryptic and truncated if we had not arrived at that statement by way of the other passages; indeed, Le Corbusier himself so arrives at it. By arguments like these, Le Corbusier's thought presents a clear challenge to the tectonic tradition.⁴²⁷

At the same time, his arguments are certainly open to challenge. The ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME can be rejected by undermining the claim that the (atectonic) plan is the sole generative principle of volume (~P1); the other argument contains equally vulnerable premises. I am, then, in the end only concerned with assessing the soundness of the arguments (that is, the truth value of their premises), and not with their validity. Since the arguments for the greater part are my own reconstruction of premises I think we can reasonably ascribe to Le Corbusier, to claim that the arguments fail on grounds of invalidity (the premises are consistent with the negation of their conclusions) would be open to the charge of misrepresenting Le Corbusier's considered views. However, in order to avoid a similar charge of interpretative uncharity regarding the soundness of the arguments, I will be maximally explicit on the content and flexibility of Le Corbusier's premises in the two arguments. Most of all, I will look at the premises that surface in Le Corbusier's argument in their historical context – and that is, the *Beaux Arts*' basic design tenets of composition, which assigned the plan a central role in architectonic composition.

Before we move on, however, a remark on methodology is in order. As I said in the PREFACE, analytic philosophers, so far from aiding our need to clarify what is going on in moralizations of architecture, have sometimes simply 'added fuel to the bonfire'. Their handling of Le Corbusier's writings is a case in point. It is of course easier to focus one's critical energies on an isolated provocative line from Le Corbusier than to engage with his writings in a more serious manner or attend to his concrete buildings.

Consider for instance Roger Scruton, who does not see fit to do either when he writes,

It is regrettable that [Alberti's] treatise is now read mainly by historians, and that students of architecture are encouraged to derive what little aesthetic education is required from them not from these mature and circumspect reflections but from the naïve propaganda of Le Corbusier and the Modern Movement.⁴²⁸

No attempt is made to validate this harsh comparison. In fact, mention of the 'Modern Movement' disappears entirely until, towards the end of the chapter, we read (*ibid.*, 95),

Used as we are to the megalomaniac rantings of the Modern Movement, to the scornful moralism of its theorists, and crushing totalitarianism of its practitioners, the mildness and modesty of Alberti's discourse must strike us as truly astounding.

Certainly Scruton's own prose does little here to astound us by its mildness and modesty.

Scruton's writings never suggest that underlying Le Corbusier's 'naïve propaganda' is a body of considerations containing plenty to afford arguments commanding philosophical interest and attention.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ For more on Le Corbusier's notion of 'volume', see Cohen (2008, 49) and Mallgrave (2005, 302). Both point out how the term's mistranslation into 'mass' impacted Le Corbusier's reception in the English speaking world, beginning with Etchells' 1927 translation but also in the 'International Style' exhibition curated by Philip Johnson and Henry Russell Hitchcock in the early 1930s.

⁴²⁸ Scruton (1994, 86). See also the insightful review by Stecker (1996).

⁴²⁹ Neither is the statement an isolated occurrence, nor one Scruton ever revokes later. As recent as 2012 he writes: '[I]n comparison to what has been written in recent times concerning the theory of architecture, the academic study of musicology has been one of the intellectual success stories in the humanities, with cogent and interesting theories produced on every side.' (Scruton 2012, 7) There is no suggestion that the failure to discern anything of 'cogency and interest' in recent architecture theory could ever be due (if only in part) to outsiders engaging the material in question in a particular way, or that philosophers could engage such material in more than one way, let alone a respectful one. At a 1998 architecture conference, reports Winters (1999, 1), Scruton 'surmised that there never was a 'Le Corbusier', for no architect could draw so badly. Rather, he supposed, the works attributed to the Swiss modernist were really a hoax perpetrated by some wit'.

Labelling *Vers une architecture* a ‘megalomaniac ranting’ silences one of the most powerful contributions to modern philosophy of architecture, and encourages a trench warfare between two disciplines that stand to gain more by engaging each other fairly, and charitably.⁴³⁰ Unless analytic philosophy proves its ability to successfully engage architecture as a discipline with a history and tradition, its appeal to and merit in the eyes of architects will remain as limited as they currently are – and justifiably so.

§6.3 THE BEAUX ARTS AND LE CORBUSIER ON THE CENTRALITY OF THE PLAN

As §6.2.1 stated, the ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME can be rejected by undermining its opening premise – the claim that the (atectonic) plan is the sole generative principle of volume. This is what Banham effectively does, when he begins to outline the *Beaux Arts* principles regarding axiality and the centrality of the plan.⁴³¹ Banham’s goal is in part polemical here, in that Le Corbusier explicitly disavowed intellectual debts to the *Beaux Arts* tradition. More specifically, after a visit to Italy in 1921, ‘Beaux-Arts plans are subsequently identified as the enemy by Le Corbusier’ in his writings (Cohen 2008, 20).

Banham’s own exegesis of the *École des Beaux Arts* design principles – that is, the institute in Paris where these design principles were taught –, however, must now be considered dated and scholarly incomplete, in light of Jacques Lucan’s more recent work.⁴³² I therefore assign more attention to Lucan’s than Banham’s analysis, even when attempting to accord proper weight to either. The point of the exercise, as explained previously in §6.2.1, is to provide maximal charity when interpreting Le Corbusier’s key premises (P1, P1’) prior to scrutinizing them for their soundness or lack thereof. Hence the need for a substantial inquiry into the historical context that informs those key ideas of *Vers une architecture*.

Of direct relevance to current purposes is Lucan’s documentation of the ‘predominance of the plan’ (2012, 185) in the *École des Beaux Arts*. Lucan kicks off his discussion with the school’s 1884 *Dictionnaire de l’Académie des beaux-arts* entry on ‘Composition’.

It is the plan that reconciles all the program’s demands; it is the plan that contains the creative thought of the architect; is it the plan that is the criterion by which specific individuals first judge the real value of the composition. Yet this judgement is almost instinctive; it is made outside, so to speak, a specific examination of each of the plan’s parts.⁴³³

This passage displays (perhaps beyond Banham’s wildest ambitions) how many elements of Le Corbusier’s core thoughts on architecture, over and above the centrality of the plan, are lifted entirely from his declared ‘enemy’. And, the mention of ‘parts’ in the third line intends the technical term *parti*, used by the Beaux Arts to talk about (the arrangement of) a plan’s compositional elements. Apart from the term’s usage in Durand and Guadet, its canonical definition regarding architecture likely occurs in Quatremère de Quincy’s 1832 *Dictionnaire historique d’architecture*.

Concerning the plan of an edifice, its elevation and all that depends on the disposition of the premises, the choice of ordonnance, and the system of ornamentation, it will be said that an

⁴³⁰ The situation has not been helped by outliers of architectural research regarding the added precision trained philosophers bring to questions raised in architecture as territorial intrusions. ‘Perhaps in response to the new encroachment of philosophers [...] on the intellectual territory staked out by architects, a number of recent conferences have attempted to reclaim the history of architectural phenomenology as a movement led by architects. The 2001 symposium ‘Architectural Observations’ [...] which took place at TU Eindhoven [...] is representative of this trend.’ (Otero-Pailos 2012, 150) It is apparently part of that ‘trend’ to avow interdisciplinary interest, if that symposium’s proceedings are any indication (see *OASE* 58 (2002), 10).

⁴³¹ Banham (1980, 14-43).

⁴³² Lucan 2009/2012, specifically ch. 8, ‘The Beaux-Arts System Architectural Theory’, and ch. 9, ‘Implicit Principles’.

⁴³³ *Apud* Lucan (2012, 185).

architect has chosen a good *parti* in the arrangement of distributions, a handsome *parti* for the ensemble of the masses, and a felicitous *parti* for the decoration.⁴³⁴

Tellingly, the façade is not even mentioned here, and is silently grouped into the category of things determined by the compositional unit of the floor plan, the *parti*. This belief in the plan's determining potential to generate the façade certainly was shared by de Quincy's contemporary Labrouste. Discussing Labrouste's 1838-1850 *Bibliothèque Ste-Geneviève*, Bergdoll puts it as follows.

A master of academic composition, Labrouste believed that a building's plan should feature a clear hierarchy and progression in relation to its purpose and, in turn, generate its exterior forms [on *inter alia* the façade] as a legible expression of that spatial clarity.⁴³⁵

More outspoken than de Quincy, if historically inapplicable to our understanding of Le Corbusier, is Umbdenstock's (1930) definition of *parti*:

The *parti*. The general disposition of a plan – its broad lines and its masses – is what we call a *parti*. We say: 'a symmetrical *parti*?' or 'an asymmetrical *parti*?'. In a way, it is hence both the *silhouette* of the plan and a diagram enabling us to answer the demands of the program.⁴³⁶

Most important for the *parti* was the choice of a 'dominant element' in the plan around which the remaining elements (further rooms, halls, corridors) would be arranged (Lucan 2012, 184). More often than not, this would determine, or be determined by, the *axial orientation* of a building. Think of a cathedral's entrance hall with exterior stairs, leading to a main room with an altar at the end – all compositional elements are arranged around a single axis, with one dominant entry point, and one visual end point. Such a building does not simply *have* an axial orientation – its orientation *organizes* the entire plan, and it can only do so by having a *dominant* orientation, i.e. a principle of axuality that dominates the entire *rest* of the floor plan i.e. the arrangements of rooms and volumes (cf. Le Corbusier 2008, 221-223).

As elsewhere, the significance of this design principle is more easily appreciated in light of its later rejection, for instance by Dutch structuralism as in Aldo van Eyck's *Orphanage* (Amsterdam, 1955) or Herman Hertzberger's *Montessori School* (Delft, 1966-1970), neither of which have a dominant axial orientation; both architects regard that rejection as integral to the *program* of their buildings, and attribute to their projects the function to serve the upbringing and education of children free from domination (here, dominant points and spaces). Michael Wilkens, to whom I owe this use of the example of van Eyck, describes the contrary view point as 'centralism'. Centralism occurs

when, in designing, we create a sort of centre, and arrange our area, our plan, our quarter around a single point, when we only design one access way, one main chamber, one central hall, etc.⁴³⁷

The contrast is very visible once we attend to examples (see figs. 6.2 and 6.3, with 6.3a overleaf.).

Bracketing the extent to which one could characterize some of Le Corbusier's designs of the 1920s as more centralist than decentralized (relatedly, as hewing closer to a dominant axis than not), it is the Academic notion of the *parti* that is of both direct and indirect relevance to our understanding of Le Corbusier's ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME and its viability.



⁴³⁴ Quatremère de Quincy (1832 II, 203), tr. Lucan (2012, 181).

⁴³⁵ Bergdoll (2000, 91).

⁴³⁶ Umbdenstock (1930 II, 631), tr. Lucan (2012, 183).

⁴³⁷ Wilkens (2000, 99): 'wenn wir beim Entwerfen eine Art Zentrum bilden, unsere Anlage, unser Grundriss, unser Quartier sich um einen Punkt herum gliedert, wenn wir nur eine Zufahrt zeichnen, einen Hauptraum, eine zentrale Halle, usw.'. On the contrast to van Eyck, see Wilkens (2000, 105).

Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3. Floorplans of *Cathédrale Notre-Dame de Tournai* (1255) and van Eyck's *Orphanage* (1955); *not to the same scale.* – Sources: Georg Dezio, *Kirchliche Baukunst des Abendlandes*. Verlag der Cotta'schen Buchhandlung: Stuttgart (1887-1901, Plate No. 83); Vincent Ligtelijn (ed.), *Aldo van Eyck. Works*, Birkhäuser: London (1999, 95). **Fig. 6.3a (below)** Aldo van Eyck, *Amsterdam Orphanage* (1955). Model commissioned for 1989 retrospective / Aldo van Eyck Archive NG-2012-29. Photo by Author.



The notion's direct bearing is brought out, again, in Lucan's discussion of Guadet and Umbdenstock.

In determining a *parti* and then developing a project, the preparatory study for the plan was essential. Umbdenstock would insist, somewhat excessively in fact, on this being the condition for the other parameters defining a building to be valid: 'From the detailed study of plans there emerges the following principle that can well be taken as an axiom: 'a good plan always makes for a handsome façade,' or, 'The edifice does nothing more than transform into volume what the plan was expressing in surface; it will therefore amplify both its qualities and its defects: It can be said that a good plan will always make for good façades.' In the elaboration of the plan, determining the axes was crucial, first, in order to position the dominant [element], and then in order to establish the hierarchies between the parts [*parti*]. Guadet saw determining the axes as *the* decisive operation: 'The word *axis* often comes up in your studies; the axis is the key to the drawing and will be the key to the composition.' He added: 'It is therefore necessary, in an architectural drawing, to begin with the axes.'⁴³⁸

⁴³⁸ Lucan (2012, 187-188).

Lucan quotes here from Umbdenstock's later *Cours* (II.627, 630) and, more importantly to current purposes, from Julien Guadet's (1901) *Éléments et Théories de l'Architecture. cours professé à l'École nationale et spéciale des beaux-arts*, specifically pp. 40-41. Since Lucan is brief on this note, I expand his references.⁴³⁹

I should also like to preface these remarks by a reminder, from Banham, on the relative design stance of Guadet (himself the teacher of Le Corbusier's own teacher, Auguste Perret) vis-à-vis Auguste Choisy. Guadet clarifies right away (*Tome I*, chapter 3) that he understands architectural design as *geometric* design, that is, architecture in its pre-material mode (cf. §4.3). Thus he writes (*Tome I*, 1901/1910, 35),

Les dessin d'architecture est le dessin géométral;

Banham (1960/1980, 15) suggests the strong influence of *painterly* didactic material on the Beaux Arts training of architects as decisive in such matters. But this obfuscates a key distinction, brought out by Heinrich Wölfflin's work on 'the painterly' and picturesque in architecture. For Wölfflin distinguishes, among the category of 'the painterly', 'the picturesque' versus 'the linear', where the latter is defined in terms of (a) medium, sc. pen or hard pencil as opposed to charcoal or brush, and (b) emphasis of representation, sc. *contours* being sharply as opposed to fleetingly circumscribed).⁴⁴⁰ As Podro puts it,

What Wölfflin is picking out with his notion of linearity is, first of all, a *relation* between medium and object: it is not a matter of drawn lines or of edges, but a correspondence, a use of one to pick out the other. And it is not merely a certain kind of equivalence between object and medium, but one with a particular purpose: to achieve clarity in the spatial separation and relation of objects. This notion of a lucid outline therefore implies that figures or forms must be presented to the eye in a position from which they are readily intelligible.⁴⁴¹

Now given Guadet's emphasis on geometry and lines, it is fairly clear where on Wölfflin's spectrum he sits, as is further confirmed by Guadet elsewhere – his writing,

You do not compose the picturesque; it composes itself all alone by the work of the greatest artist of all – time.' (*Tome I.2*, p. 130; tr. Lucan 2012, 170)

That is, for Guadet it is 'pointless' for architects to actually *pursue* the picturesque as it lies 'outside the realm of composition' (Lucan 2012, 170); at the same time, there is a tacit belief that picturesque qualities would be consequent upon proper composition, i.e. that the picturesque (*das Malerische*, for Wölfflin) would 'take care of itself, look after itself'. This goes to show just how controversial Guadet's design stance was, and how consequential that stance's primacy of the geometric was. Indeed, on this point too, he seems to have anticipated many theses of Le Corbusier – not least, the generative power of rational numbers, regular linearity, and proportionality to form a determinist base of visual harmony, without ever having to attend to visual harmony directly or it in its own terms.

By contrast to Guadet's focus on geometric (pre-material) and linear composition, Choisy sits for Banham at the opposite end of that spectrum, focussing (like his teacher Labrouste before him) on *construction*.⁴⁴² Quoting from Durand's *Partie Graphique*, 'Any complete building whatever is not, and cannot be, anything but the result of the assembly and putting together (composition) of a greater or lesser number of parts.' (Paris 1821, 6), Banham comments (and I draw attention to the fairly explicit invocation of what §2.6 calls *The Essentialist Stance*),

⁴³⁹ Lucan (2012, 155-171) discusses much of Guadet's thought in its own right, but does not directly address the major points of contact with Le Corbusier that are of interest here.

⁴⁴⁰ Wölfflin (1917).

⁴⁴¹ Podro (1982, 118; earlier, Podro had translated 'the linear' as 'the draughtsmanly' 1982, 101). The passage itself, specifically its talk of 'separation', recalls Schopenhauer's principle of *Aussonderung* – of visibly rendering, as clearly separate, distinct compositional elements, so as to aid architecture's disinterested contemplation. I attend to this more fully in CHAPTER 7.

⁴⁴² I briefly return to Labrouste's remarks on construction below.

the specific mode of putting the parts together is something that Guadet barely discusses [...]. The fact was, simply, that the symmetrical disposition of the parts of a building about one or more axes was so unquestionably the master-discipline of academic architecture that there was no need for him to discuss it[.] [...] It was under his [Guadet's] professorship that the *Beaux-Arts* training became almost completely focused on the elaboration of multi-axially symmetrical plan patterns of abstract, but unfunctional elegance. Elevational design became so secondary that Ferran, for instance, feels no need to illustrate anything but the plans and leaves the reader to infer the elevations from the columniation, etc. shown on them[.] (Banham 1960/1980, 16, 19)

Wasmuth's translation brings out the full implications of the first sentence: '...the elaboration of [...] plan patterns of abstract elegance but *devoid of tectonic function*'.⁴⁴³ By contrast, on Choisy Banham writes,

His book is history, but it is history with a single theme - Form as the logical consequence of Technique [...]. For Guadet, composition was the perennial theme, for Choisy it was construction. [...] An engineer by training, he took a down-to-earth, practical-minded view of architecture which remained for him, as for Henry Labrouste, *L'Art de Bâtir* [*Baukunst*, building-art]. For him, the essence of good architecture, was always construction, the business of the good architect was always this: to make a correct appraisal of the problem before him, after which the building | would follow logically from the technical means at his disposal. (Banham 1960/1980, 23-24)

Now, this general difference in orientation – (non-material) composition vs. (tectonic) construction – has direct repercussions for how Guadet defines the – to our purposes, central – notions of 'plan', 'axes', and 'façade'. He writes:

Le plan est une coupe ou section d'un édifice faite à une hauteur variable par un plan horizontal qui coupe les murs, piliers, coillons, etc. On suppose ce plan passant à une hauteur convenable | pour faire voir toutes les particularités de la construction, les murs, les portes et fenêtres, piliers, colonnes ou pilastres, les cheminées, etc. Vous pouvez considérer le plan comme une empreinte à plat qui serait prise sur la construction en cours, arrivée à un même niveau dans la hauteur d'un étage. (1901/1910, 37-38)

L'élevation ou *façade* est la projection de l'édifice sur un plan vertical extérieur. Elle peut comprendre des parties très éloignées les unes de autres, par exemple la facade principale d'une église, et plus loin les bras de la croix ou transept. (1901/1910, 39)

The plan, we later learn, is actually a horizontal section through the building at a level that suitably indicates the placement of columns, pedestals, and so on:

Le plan, pris à une hauteur qui permette de montrer les colonnes en section, fait voir par moitié les socles, piédestaux, bases, etc. et par moitié les voûtes et entablements. (1910, 39)

The aforementioned principle of (dominant) axes or *axe principale* is called '*Dessin par le axes*' (40), meaning, the axes are the 'key to architectural design and composition', 'l'axe est la clef du dessin et sera celle de la composition.' (1910, 40). It is therefore paramount that in planning a church, for instance, to compose the axes with utmost precision, for these determine the entire *plan*: 'Et si vous avez à dessiner le plan de cette église, c'est en plaçant d'abord et avant tout ces divers axes avec toute la précision possible que vous arriverez à construire votre plan.' (1910, 41)

This concludes our in-depth review of the centrality of the plan to the understanding of architecture in the Beaux-Arts. How does the material amassed impact our verdict on Le Corbusier's grand argument?

⁴⁴³ '...Ausarbeitung von multi-axialen symmetrischen Planmustern von abstrakter Eleganz, *doch ohne tectonische Funktion*.' (Wasmuth 1964, 13, emphasis added)

§6.4 LE CORBUSIER'S ARGUMENTS: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Lucan amasses the evidence from Guadet we just discussed as a lead in to a discussion of Le Corbusier, as Lucan aligns Le Corbusier with Georges Gromort (1870-1961) and others within the École as considering '[t]he predominance of the plan [...] excessive and harmful' (2012, 188). In particular, Gromort

rose up against such a conception and pointed out that architecture should be seen in three dimensions – in volume – which called for the *simultaneous* examination of the plan, the section, and the elevation, while necessitating an effort to 'conceive an edifice picturing it as a scale model'.⁴⁴⁴

But unlike Gromort, who protested the *predominance* of the plan, Le Corbusier it seems merely rejected the Beaux-Arts' *understanding* of the plan, as a device of graphic presentation that had lost its generative power, without rejecting the generative power of the plan as such; as he says at one point, he generally sought 'a new realization with new means.' (2008, 279) And indeed, his 1922 appeal can be read as holding on to the Beaux-Arts' *predominance* of the plan, while rejecting its graphic conventions surrounding the plan:

In a great public institution, the École des Beaux-Arts, the principles of the good plan have been studied, then, over the years, dogmas, formulas, and tricks have become fixed. An education that was useful at first has become a perilous practice. The inner idea has been made into a few hallowed exterior signs and appearances. The plan, a cluster of ideas and an intention integral to that cluster of ideas, has become a sheet of paper on which black marks that are walls and lines that are axes play at being mosaics and decorative panels, make diagrams with dazzling stars. Create optical illusions. The most beautiful star becomes the Prix de Rome. But the plan is the generator, 'the plan determines everything, it is an austere abstraction[?].'⁴⁴⁵

Lucan (2012, 368) draws our attention to various passages in *Vers une architecture* attributing to 'the plan' a key role in the 'aesthetic revolution' of architecture (albeit a role that is conditioned by the availability of new materials and construction techniques – the latter do not *shape* the plan, they merely make new plans *possible*), supporting the same contention as before.

Construction with reinforced concrete has caused a revolution in the aesthetics of building. By eliminating the pitched roof and replacing it with terraces, reinforced concrete leads to a new, hitherto unknown aesthetic of the plan. [...] This is a crucial change in the aesthetic [of the plan]; it has yet to make itself felt; it will be useful to think about it now in projects to expand cities [.] (2008, 129)

In architecture, the old constructional foundations are dead. There will be no rediscovery of the truths of architecture until new foundations have become the logical support for all architectural manifestations. The next twenty years will be taken up with creating these foundations. A period of great problems, a period of analysis and experimentation, also a period of great aesthetic upheavals, a period of the elaboration of a new aesthetic. It is the *plan* that must be studied, the key to this evolution. (2008, 130).

Now arguably Le Corbusier comes to reject the plan's *predominance* as well at a later stage – say, by 1933, when (as Lucan 2012, 189 surmises) he had been exposed to the mixed influence of such Beaux Arts principles on *American* architecture schools. Such schools apparently adopted European modernism's *formalism minus its societal program* or 'ethos'.⁴⁴⁶ If so, one can readily see why Le Corbusier in 1933 might have reiterated his 1920 misgivings about the École, having detected its harmful effects in a different

⁴⁴⁴ Lucan (2012, 188, emphasis added), quoting from Gromort's later (1942, 393). The passage recalls Risselada's point quoted in §6.2.

⁴⁴⁵ Le Corbusier (1922, 1768), tr. Lucan (2012, 188 and 368) who omits the final sentence; complete passage in Le Corbusier (2008, 215).

⁴⁴⁶ See Rowe (1972/2000).

geographic setting. A rejection of the plan's predominance, while not inconsistent with such earlier misgivings, could now well go beyond them.

All the same, when composing *Vers une architecture* from his *L'Esprit nouveau* articles from the early 1920s (like the one just quoted), it is more likely Le Corbusier holds on to the plan's *predominance*, but chooses to revise our *understanding* of the plan. In that regard, his 1921-1923 use of the terms 'plan' and 'parts', sc. *parti*, when speaking of the Hagia Sophia can be readily deciphered in (that is, as complicit with) their programmatic intent reserved for them by the Beaux Arts.

The plan is active throughout the structure: its geometric laws and their modular combinations unfold through all its parts.⁴⁴⁷

And these, as we saw earlier in §6.2, are the very lines he later worked into the caption to Choisy's axonometric drawing of the Hagia Sophia in *Vers une*.

As I wrote earlier, the Academic notion of the *parti* is of both direct and indirect relevance to our understanding of Le Corbusier's ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME and its viability. Having dealt with the notion's direct bearing, let us turn to its indirect one. For, indirectly, the definitions of *parti* we explored in §6.3 directly account for the close connection of axiality and floor plan composition in the Beaux Arts. And that connection forms the key element in Banham's counterargument to the ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME. For, as mentioned earlier, Banham's starting point for that counterargument are the *Beaux Arts* principles regarding axiality and the centrality of the plan. One of Banham's core contentions about modernist pioneers like Le Corbusier is that,

The attitude of those who were to become the masters of Modern architecture to [earlier traditions like the *Beaux-Arts*] was apt to be equivocal. [...] The Rationalist attitude was held in high regard, yet effectively repudiated by most of them, and the academic tradition was generally vilified, yet many of the ideas it embodied were taken over by them.⁴⁴⁸

As an instance of this allegation, we could observe how Le Corbusier holds on to the Beaux Arts law of the plan's *predominance* – which in the ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME becomes the idea of the plan as 'generator' – but chooses to revise the Beaux Arts *understanding* of 'the plan', a claim substantiated by his use of the notions 'plan' and *parti* when talking about the Hagia Sophia. For Banham, two of the core principles of the Beaux Arts concern the plan and axiality, and he alleges that the very same principles are intertwined in Le Corbusier too, for

it is clear that when he [Le Corbusier] says *plan* what he usually means is a sequence of interior volumes as the visitor actually experiences them, and when he says *axis*, he means the route by which the [interior volumes or 'rooms'] are traversed, or a vista along which they can be seen[.]⁴⁴⁹

As with other notions before, Le Corbusier's notion of plan is an inherently *experiential* one, as is that of related notions like axiality. Thus Le Corbusier writes,

In reality, axes are not perceived in the bird's-eye views shown in plans on the drawing board, but from the ground, by a man standing erect and looking before him. (2008, 221)

Such an experiential account of the axiality governing the plan conflicts with a different understanding of the plan, the logic of which eludes the professionally untrained.⁴⁵⁰ Banham alleges this is in the offing of

⁴⁴⁷ Le Corbusier (1921, 459), tr. Lucan (2012, 367).

⁴⁴⁸ Banham (1960/1980, 14).

⁴⁴⁹ Banham (1980, 227). Wagnmuth's translation (1964, 198) helpfully replaces Banham's vagaries with precise architectural concepts, e.g. 'vista' with 'Fluchtlinie' and 'volumes' with 'Raumbezirke' ('[Grundriss bedeutet] eine Folge von inneren Raumbezirken, wie sie sich dem Besucher darbieten, und wenn er sagt 'Achse' dann meint er die Linie, von der sie durchkreuzt werden, oder die Fluchtlinie, entlang deren sie gesehen werden können.').

⁴⁵⁰ This was also the case in Palladio, as Wittkower observed. The precise proportions and governing principles that would govern the floor plan of his villas were inaccessible to a person taking them in visually, by walking through the

Le Corbusier (1980, 229-230). If it is, plan is divorced from, or at least not always accessible by, the very experiential dimension that according to Le Corbusier defines it and, with it, architecture. Thus Le Corbusier fails to make such ‘academic’ Beaux Art principles internally coherent, which (Banham alleges) makes it all the harder to later conjoin them to more modernistic or ‘mechanistic’ elements of theory we shall briefly attend to in §6.7.3.

§6.5 LE CORBUSIER’S ARGUMENTS: AN UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

Christine Boyer has tried to rescue Le Corbusier from such a devastating verdict and defend *Vers une architecture* as a work that *is* internally coherent, in its parts and overall execution.⁴⁵¹ But her retort, that Le Corbusier’s overall argument succeeds because (among other things) it ‘appl[ies] a semantics of poetry’ (2011, 327), does not go far enough to undermine the details brought out by Banham’s analysis; in fact, her account omits most of these details, and seems unaware of Lucan’s (2009) work on the subject.

And while as charitable readers we may permit Le Corbusier poetic license, doing so interferes with taking his arguments seriously for what they are: attempts to convince a readership *by rational means* to rethink their most treasured convictions and prejudices of what architecture is and should be. If the articles the book is based on ‘employed a deliberate strategy of seduction-by-image’, as can be seen by Le Corbusier’s manipulation of the very photographic evidence he adduces for illustrative purposes, it is also a work very much ‘aimed to seduce a ‘serious’ audience’, in Cohen’s words (2008, 3).⁴⁵²

Also, it is somewhat surprising that as spirited a defense of *Vers une architecture* as Boyer’s should rest on the text’s dated 1927 translation by Etchells (Boyer 2011, 729n.2) – given that ‘Etchells compounded his mere modifications [of the text] and improprieties with outright mutilations’ (Cohen 2008, 49). Cohen’s (2008) study, which dutifully documents these textual corruptions, the most egregious of which is Etchells’ mistranslation of ‘volume(s)’ as ‘mass(es)’, appears to have escaped Boyer’s notice. For these reasons, she fails to settle the exegetical details more conclusively in her favour. The counter argument to Le Corbusier’s ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME (inspired by Banham) thus remains unscathed.

Le Corbusier’s other major argument in favor of atectonic architecture, the ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE, is likewise open to reasonable doubt. He defines architecture by an affective response to surface effects, specifically visual ones, evoked by a building. The idea, then, would be to tie these effects to a building’s façade, without reference to underlying structure or tectonic composition. As before, we have to ask whether this is (or rather, ought to be) undeniably the case – for much of the ‘aesthetic revolution’ Le Corbusier urges for seems to hinge on it.

For there is a host of argumentation in the tectonic tradition that tries to reconcile a building’s skin with its frame, and argues that the former ought to be expressive of the latter. If so, an appeal to the skin or façade will fall short of having the effect of negating the importance of tectonics, even if we retain Le Corbusier’s definition of architecture. This is because, on the alternative view sketched here, for an affective response to be of the correct sort, it ought to be triggered by the correct type of object – here,

building. They would only disclose intellectually, by looking at a drawing. This poses a strong supporting consideration for those who, contrary to the stance taken in the present work, take the drawing as prior to the building, in defining the essence of architecture. They also render the visible/rational contrast much more intelligible than Le Corbusier’s offhand use of it in the passage we looked at earlier. Cf. also above on Wölfflin and ‘the linear’.

⁴⁵¹ Boyer (2011, 302-328).

⁴⁵² Cohen powerfully documents these distortions and manipulations by comparing the original photos, from archival material, with the material Le Corbusier published (whence the need, among other things, for a contemporary English edition that was maximally faithful to the original, not just in text, but visual re-production). Compare Cohen (2008), 36 fig. 18 with p. 201 for a striking visual example, and his discussion on South American grain silos on (2008, 8). Cohen’s ultimate conclusion is focussed (as is the current chapter) on ‘Le Corbusier’s argument’, and regards the book (*pace* Banham) as ‘an attempt to transcend the split between the values of the industrial age and those of classical culture, [an attempt] that only a rhetorician as skillful as Le Corbusier could bring off.’ (2008, 58).

the façade, which in turn is defined normatively by its relation to the underlying frame or structure.⁴⁵³ The same holds for a view of ‘volume’ on which it ought to be generated, not just by the plan, but as much by the section. Here it is especially clear how easy it is to reject, or at least argue with, Le Corbusier’s premises. And that is because, as regards both the affective response and the related notion of volumetric space, Le Corbusier obfuscates on a key point – the aetiology of these notions. Already in §6.2 we saw how, to repeat, ‘what exactly characterizes (the aetiologically and phenomenologically appropriate type of) affective response’ is left unclear. Pending such a characterization, any premises built on ‘affective response’ are provisory and (too) easily dismissed. (I return to the larger issues here in §7.5.)

This, however, is premised on the claim that a building’s skin *ought to be* expressive of its frame, a claim Le Corbusier thinks he can reject, taking a leaf from Ruskin’s *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*:

The Architect is not *bound* to exhibit structure; nor are we to complain of him for concealing it, any more than we should regret that the outer surfaces of a human frame conceal much of its anatomy[.]⁴⁵⁴

Yet to some extent the human frame very much *indicates* the underlying skeleton (think of a strong jaw line, pointed shoulders, etc.).⁴⁵⁵ I doubt that Semper or Wagner would require tectonic legibility to go significantly beyond this, provided they saw any merit in Ruskin’s analogy in the first place. Loos certainly did, by dissolving the sharp separation of clothing and the body to be clothed, as Kollhoff points out, a propos Loos’ dictum ‘Man is clothed with a skin, as a tree is with a bark’:

Clothing as skin is part of [its] body and thus beyond the reach of designerly caprice or arbitrariness. Skin stands in a delicate relation to construction. Construction is not on display, nor covered up. Construction ‘shines through’ [is translucent], literally and figuratively. The goal is not the visualization of construction as such, but that which reminds [us] of construction. [...] When Adolf Loos speaks of construction, he means the appearance of construction, entirely independently of the (f)actual constructional state of affairs.⁴⁵⁶

By contrast, it is clear Le Corbusier found merit in an analogy like Ruskin’s. Several passages in *Vers une architecture* explicitly militate against ‘showing construction’ on the grounds given by Ruskin.⁴⁵⁷ In Ed Ford’s (II.166-167) words,

⁴⁵³ On the force of ‘normatively’ here, see the opening remarks in §6.2 and §2.6, which should sufficiently ward off any suspicion that an ‘is/ought’ conflation is in the offing here.

⁴⁵⁴ Ruskin, quoted *apud* Ford (1997, 3) and discussed by Ford (1997, 125).

⁴⁵⁵ Cases like androids (anthropomorphic robots) or clay statues, i.e. cases in which no ‘human skeleton’ lies underneath the exterior ‘skin’, are certainly possible, but degenerate. They are also parasitic on our understanding of human shapes, as witness the qualifier ‘anthropomorphic’ just used. While not conclusive, this remark is intended to echo Strawson (1959, 87-110): the human ‘person’ is prior to our concepts of either the human (mental) self or the human body. As before, this a claim about the relative priority and ‘parasitic-ness’ of related concepts.

⁴⁵⁶ Kollhoff (1993, 15); my translation. Cf. also Kollhoff (1993, 11), a likely stab at Renzo Piano and Richard Roger’s 1977 *Centre Georges Pompidou*, ‘As [man’s] entrails and his skeleton are garbed by flesh and skin, so that the body may enter into [the realm of] appearance and become a person, so man demands of a house that it won’t appear to him as a heap of constructional segments or that he encounters it as an heap of plumbing pipes, however meaningful such things are taken in isolation. What do I care as beholder and [building] user how a building is held together and how it is to be trashed! The modern dictum of constructional sincerity would be exaggerated and perverted in such instances.’

⁴⁵⁷ See for instance Le Corbusier (2008, 243-245), which repeats many of the above points on ‘plastic emotions’, and reaffirms that ‘architecture is not construction’ (243). The passage reads, in so many words, like a counter-manifesto to Wagner (1903, chapter 3). One wonders if things had gone otherwise had Le Corbusier managed to learn more from the architecture of Wagner, Loos, and Hoffmann upon his visit to Vienna in 1907: ‘As for secessionist architecture in Vienna, he had eyes that did not see.[...] He made no serious effort to study these buildings during more than four months in Vienna and made no known sketches or watercolors of what little he may have seen. He did see Wagner’s Postal Savings Bank, which he did not like.’ (Brooks (1997, 119) Brooks (1997, 120 with 120n.3) documents Le Corbusier’s similarly unsympathetic, not to say un-comprehending, reaction to Wagner’s *Kirche am Steinhof* (1904-1907), which he especially disparaged for being ‘the work of an engineer rather than an architect’ – terms that the later 1923 book would fully contextualize. These terms, too, by the way show interesting analogies to

Le Corbusier here [sc., in *Vers une architecture*, 243-245] uses an old argument for the concealment of structure, that the human body does the same. The anthropomorphic argument was more than an expedient; it confirmed a Corbusian preconception as to the nature of modern | building, that it consisted of skin and bones. Le Corbusier had determined through his analysis of concrete construction that modern buildings must be constructed of frames and curtain walls of thin or transparent materials.

To the extent Le Corbusier's argument relies on similar thoughts in Ruskin, and these thoughts as we saw are open to doubt, his ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE cannot be rescued from an objection resting on the claim, defended more fully in §4.2-§4.3 and §10.2, that skin ought to be expressive of frame.

In sum, Le Corbusier's thought clearly falls outside the tectonic tradition, in that the arguments emerging from his text press for anti-tectonic conclusions (§6.2.1). It is not clear his thought gives others compelling reasons to do likewise, because these arguments fail. Others might still do so, and have good reasons for doing so. But their reasons, whatever they would be, should be more developed than Le Corbusier's, or of a different sort altogether, because his arguments fail for reasons that previous pages developed in great detail, and which we can summarize as follows (see table on next page). Moreover, recalling the dialectics of this section would hopefully aid other thinkers in coming up with reasons of a more robust variety.

Stage 1: Le Corbusier's argument(s)

Conclusion to be secured: Architectonic composition is (ought to be) atectonic.

Premises that suffice, individually or jointly, to defend the truth of this conclusion:
(A1) the ARGUMENT FROM VOLUME, and/or (A2) the ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE.

Stage 2: Attacking the premises of Le Corbusier's argument(s)

Counter argument 1 (C1): A1 fails, because plan is not solely generative of built form, let alone of its experiential dimension (Banham).

Counter argument 2 (C2): A2 fails, because (C2-lemma) façade or skin 'ought to be expressive of' tectonic composition and so cannot be divorced from it.

Stage 3: Defending the Premises (thus defending Le Corbusier's argument) against the Stage 2 Counter Arguments

Counter argument to C1: A1 does not fail, because Le Corbusier 'applies a semantics of poetry' (Boyer). – Verdict: Boyer has not refuted Banham, C1 remains and A1 fails.

Counter argument to C2: C2-lemma is false, given Ruskin's anthropomorphic analogy of human skeleton to a buildings' skeletons. – Verdict: Ruskin's analogy is inconclusive, C2 remains and A2 fails.


In any case, by comparison to his writings, it is much less clear to what extent Le Corbusier's buildings constitute a similar challenge to the tectonic tradition. The general observation that a schizophrenic divide pertains between Le Corbusier's built and written works seems to hold here.⁴⁵⁸ Too much in Le Corbusier's architecture, even of that period, remains indebted to a very astute understanding of tectonic construction.

thoughts in Ruskin and other English 'Gothic revivalists' like Pugin, who despaired of Paxton's Crystal Palace, regarding which 'the conviction... has grown upon us, that it is not architecture; it is engineering of the highest merit – but it is not architecture.' (Ruskin, *The Ecclesiologist*; apud Bergdoll 2000, 212).

⁴⁵⁸ See e.g. Ford (1997, 233, 247), and Baker (1996, 273-280), the latter discussed by Boyer (2011, 327).

Banham himself observes this, when discussing Le Corbusier's 1912 concrete villa in Chaux-de-Fonds (see figs. 6.4 to 6.6) as

being the first concrete-framed villa in Europe, and its mode of construction was of the greatest technical interest. The frame and roof-slabs were put up between the end of August and the onset of the winter's snows, at which point building-work in Chaux-de-Fonds normally ceased, but with the roofs already up, it was possible to proceed with building right through the winter – albeit at the cost of warmed bricks and anti-freeze [put] in the mortar.⁴⁵⁹



Figs. 6.4 and 6.5. Le Corbusier, *Maison Blanche*, La Chaux-de-Fonds, Switzerland. Floorplan from <http://www.maisonblanche.ch>, photo from Lorenzo Hurtado, *ARQ* (2012).



Fig. 6.6. Le Corbusier, *Maison Blanche*. Contemporary photo. Source: Jean-Louis Cohen, *An Atlas of Modern Landscapes* (MoMa: New York 2013, plate 1).

For these and other reasons, Le Corbusier's precise relation to the tectonic tradition must remain contested.⁴⁶⁰ Even so, undeniable points of departure from the tectonic tradition exist, and it would be dishonest to deny them. It is unclear how Le Corbusier's architecture, like anyone else's, could escape or

⁴⁵⁹ Banham (1980, 221). Wagnmuth's (1964, 190-191) translation has 'Außenmauern' for 'frame', 'steinerne Dachplatten' for 'roof-slabs'.

⁴⁶⁰ See further Frampton (1995, 343-347). As we will see in §8.2 and §10.3, Frampton's work is premised on a fairly broad understanding of 'the tectonic' that arguably leaves few architect(ure)s excluded from the term's domain.

avoid tectonic considerations altogether. Perhaps the fairest view to take on his stance of *construction* vis-à-vis *architecture* in 1923 would be as follows. For Le Corbusier, construction is ultimately an indispensable *preliminary* to, but not ever a *determinant* of, architectural form.

As Le Corbusier expresses it,

To formulate the work clearly and animate it with unity, to give it a basic attitude or character: pure creation of the mind.

This is generally accepted when it comes to painting and music, but architecture is reduced to its utilitarian causes: boudoirs, water closets, radiators, reinforced concrete, barrel vaults or pointed arches, etc. etc. These pertain to construction, which is not architecture. Architecture is when there is poetic emotion. Architecture is a plastic thing. Plasticity is what we need and what we | measure with our eyes. It goes without saying that if the roof leaked, if the heating didn't work, if the walls cracked, the joys of architecture would be greatly hindered [...]

Almost all periods of architecture have been linked to structural investigations. The conclusion has often been drawn: architecture is construction. Architects may well have largely channeled their efforts into the constructional problems of the day, but this is | no reason to confuse the two. It is clear the architect ought to have mastered this construction at least as precisely as the thinker has mastered his grammar. But construction being, in other respects, a science more difficult and complex more difficult and complex than grammar, the efforts of the architect long remain tied up with it; he ought not to be brought to a standstill by it. (2008, 243-245)

Some of these remarks echo, perhaps deliberately so, contrary sentiments voiced by Labrouste in 1840. For where Le Corbusier protests against architecture *being* construction, and does not want to 'confuse' or conflate 'the two', Labrouste regarded it an error to think 'that architecture [and construction] are two different things that can be studied separately.'⁴⁶¹

Now, if we take Le Corbusier to regard construction as 'an indispensable *preliminary* to, but not ever a *determinant* of architectural form' (as I suggested earlier), this would again demonstrate the proximity of his thought to Ruskin's, given how, for Ruskin,

mechanical ingenuity is not the essence of either painting or architecture [...]. There is assuredly as much ingenuity required to build a screw frigate, or a tubular bridge as a hall of glass; – all these are works characteristic of the age; and all, in their several ways, deserve our highest admiration; but not admiration of the kind that is rendered to poetry or art.⁴⁶²

Finally, having Le Corbusier regard construction as a non-determinant preliminary to architectural form would place him very much in the vicinity of Kant's and Schelling's anti-tectonic aesthetics of architecture discussed in §4.2 and §5.2. For there is now, in Le Corbusier, a strong structural parallel to Kant's and Schelling's rejection of utility (by extension, firmness) as an ingredient or co-determinant of architectural beauty we observed earlier. In Paul Guyer's summary (cf. also §5.4),

in order to count as an art at all, architecture must de-emphasize its own materiality and emphasize the ideal, or intellectual content. Schelling puts this point by radically departing from the Vitruvian paradigm: instead of combining utility and beauty, architecture must | demote utility to a mere [pre-]*condition* of its beauty, not a goal in its own right, and beauty in turn is understood as something intellectual [i.e., non-material.] [... On Schelling's view we have] functionality being at most a *necessary condition but not part* of the achievement of the goal of the [architectural] art[.]⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ Labroust (1840), tr. Lucan (2012, 86). (quoted and translated *apud* Lacan 2012, 86). Cf. also Viollet-le-Duc 'with his precept that 'any form which is not determined by the structure must be rejected'' (Cohen 1996, 8).

⁴⁶² Ruskin, *Stones of Venice* (*apud* Bergdoll 2000, 212). Ruskin's details allude to Paxton's *Crystal Palace* of 1851.

⁴⁶³ Guyer 2011, 10-11 and 13, emphases added.

And this is enough to distance Le Corbusier's stance, like Schelling's, from the tectonic tradition, as regards both the centrality of *firmitas* and the RECIPROCITY THESIS. And finally, by having Le Corbusier regard constructional concerns (broadly construed) as a non-determinant preliminary to architectural form, and form as the sole determinant of architectural beauty, we no longer render Le Corbusier's decisions in the execution of his built works (like those at La Chaux-de-Fonds) inconsistent with his architectural thought discussed in previous sections.

§6.6 LE CORBUSIER VERSUS THE ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE

Le Corbusier's thought might be anti-tectonic, but is it inherently anti-ethical, perhaps even amoral? And even if it is, is there nevertheless something we still stand to gain from his work for the larger aims of this thesis, namely the edification of a consistent and insightful ethics of architecture?

There is a stronger and a weaker claim one can make at this point.⁴⁶⁴ On the stronger one, Le Corbusier's rejection of the RECIPROCITY THESIS renders his own architecture – if it is actually and not just apparently premised on that rejection – either amoral, or possibly moral but not discernibly so. This type of consequence accrues from what happens when, as §3.3.2 put it, the dominos begin to fall. A commitment to outright moralizations of architecture has to obey adequacy constraints (the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT and the DISQUOTATION CONSTRAINT) uniquely guaranteed by the FACE VALUE TREATMENT. But that treatment is premised on the TRIAD VALUES and the RECIPROCITY THESIS, claims flatly incompatible with Le Corbusier's non-moral beliefs about architecture. As a result, the latter beliefs can only be internally consistent if he rejects the moral appraisability of his own architecture. This, in a nutshell, was the route left open to Venturi back in §3.3.2. We are now at the same crossroads again because we are faced with yet another architect thinking he can afford to forego subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS and commitment to an essentialism about 'architecture' centred on tectonic composition. That, so far, is the stronger response to our lead question.

On a weaker response, all we may have to (or even should) claim is that Le Corbusier's architecture fails to subscribe to *particular* moral beliefs (about architecture) – viz. those upheld by Vitruvius and/or informed by the RECIPROCITY THESIS – but not to moral beliefs (about architecture) as such. This would leave it open for Le Corbusier's architecture to still be morally appraisable, even morally commendable except on radically un-Vitruvian grounds, in non-conformity to a Vitruvian ethics of architecture. How does this line of thought fare?

Not particularly well: it opens the floodgates to moral relativism where neither the Vitruvian-inspired framework nor Le Corbusier's own permits one, given their shared commitment to an *Essentialist Stance* about architecture (§2.6.2). Both frameworks are intended to apply in full generality to anything that is worth the honorific title of 'architecture'. A restriction of the framework's scope of application does not just narrow the normative force of this claim – it effaces it. Arguably our *choice* between the two frameworks is relative to the design principles that pertain to either one of them – in that we pick a culture of design that aligns with either the tectonic tradition or the *Beaux Arts*, and in that such a choice of culture, once made, has moral consequences. That, indeed, is a major lesson of the present work. But relativity is not the same as relativism, and what our choice of framework is relative *to* is at any rate not morality. (See further CHAPTER 11.)

Furthermore, that Le Corbusier's framework is intended to apply in full generality to anything that is worth the honorific 'architecture' also provides a critical corrective to some remarks three paragraphs ago. Le Corbusier's remarks are not meant to primarily let alone exclusively apply to *his own* buildings but to any building as such. Hence, the issue is not whether *his* buildings are morally appraisable if they are composed in a certain way (though I shall explore such a line of thought vis-à-vis Zaha Hadid in §C.5). The question is rather whether *Le Corbusier's moral thought about architecture* yields a satisfactory ethics of

⁴⁶⁴ Thanks to Maarten Franssen for pointing this out.

architecture, whether applied to his own building or anyone else's. Recall, all that CHAPTER 6 has shown so far is that arguments unearthed from Le Corbusier's thought are not sufficiently compelling to dislodge the moral framework developed in CHAPTERS 2 and 3. Now we want to know whether, irrespective of its potential to provide compelling counterarguments to *other* moral frameworks, Le Corbusier's thought affords us a moral framework defensible and attractive *in its own right*.

In that regard, readers may be thrilled to learn that *Vers une architecture* is so rich as to offer us, not just one ethical model, but three. And as before we have to see if Le Corbusier's different strands of thought can be reconciled to one another or rather pull in contrary directions.

§6.7 LE CORBUSIER'S OWN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE

Vers une architecture offers us three lines of inquiry that seemingly culminate in an ethics of architecture: (A) a MACHINE ETHICS, (B) an ETHICS OF PLEASURE AND CULTIVATION, and (C) a COSMOLOGICAL ETHICS, the last one broadly in line with what we attributed to Vitruvius in §3.5. Whereas (A) introduces the book as such, both (B) and (C) are introduced jointly in a passage we looked at earlier, namely

Architecture: THAT'S FOR STIRRING EMOTION. Architectural emotion: that's when the work resounds inside us in tune with a universe whose laws we are subject to, recognize, and admire. (2008, 97)

Let us begin with (B).

§6.7.1 PLEASURE AND CULTIVATION (B): KANT AND LE CORBUSIER

As we saw earlier, Le Corbusier's aesthetics of architecture leaves unclear what exactly characterizes (the aetiologically and phenomenologically appropriate type of) affective response that (co-)defines architecture itself. Pending such a characterization, any premises built on (or around) 'affective response' are provisory and easily dismissed. For instance, much in Le Corbusier's thought classifies the prerequisite affective response as 'uplifting', and the passage just quoted speaks of 'stirring emotion'. Passages like these create a potentially fruitful point of contact with some passages in Kant's third *Critique*, for instance

However, in all beautiful art what is essential consists in the form [*in der Form*], which is purposive for our observation and judging, where the pleasure is at the same time civilizing [*Cultur*] and disposes the spirit to ideas [...].⁴⁶⁵

We could then go on from here to query the remainder of Kant's epistemology of aesthetic judgment, and use that as a working basis to fill in the lacunas in Le Corbusier's own account. I here defer readers to CHAPTER 5's material on Kant, specifically to the 'play with surface effect' i.e. the 'free play' of the imagination caused largely by purely formal features of an object – mental states occasioned by the subject's necessarily inarticulate (ineffable) and conceptually indeterminate ('confused') reference to the built object occasioning that effect.

Such elements are reminiscent of Le Corbusier's ARGUMENT FROM FAÇADE, as recent commentators have not been slow to realize. Laurence Holland has alleged that a passage in Le Corbusier like the following,

We say that a face is beautiful when the precision of the modeling and the disposition of the features reveal proportions that we sense as harmonious because at our core, beyond our sense, they give rise to a resonance, to a kind of sounding board that is set vibrating. (2008, 233),

picks up

not only on Kant's idea [V:219] of the harmony of the cognitive faculties (with an uncannily similar metaphor), but also the way in which, on Kant's view, experiences of the beautiful put us

⁴⁶⁵ Kant *CPJ* §52, V:325-6 (tr. Wicks 2007, 137).

in touch with our supersensible selves, that is, what we might in a narrowly religious mood call our souls.⁴⁶⁶

Be that as it may, Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment links such sensations to a state of pleasure. And that (associated) notion of 'pleasure' is sufficiently nuanced to separate it from cruder types of affective response, and separates his notion from the one of Epicurus, who

maintained that everything reduces to sense-gratification, that sense-gratification is an animal function, and that all gratification aims to support bodily well-being and health. (Wicks 2007, 142)

Importantly, Kant's notion of pleasure really is one of affective *response*, it is not simply an impulse. Moreover, it is a response that in ideal circumstances leads to the cultivation of its subject (Heiner Klemme 2006, lxvii). If so, an 'architecture of pleasure' could serve more enlightened goals than its label lets on, in marked contrast to the 'libidinal economy' and 'desire satisfaction' machines Lavin detects in the architecture of Richard Neutra.⁴⁶⁷ At even one more step up, we could bring in Guyer's thesis of Kant having art objects like buildings serve as 'symbols of morality', that is, serve as objects occasioning a subject to experience a freedom *from* the world of cause and effect, means-ends relations, and utilitarian purposes,⁴⁶⁸ and at the same time a *positive* freedom that is the foundation of all free moral action.

All this, to be sure, is a lot to be packed into Le Corbusier's vague references to 'stirring emotions', and pleasing sensations, the type of affective responses that, for him, centrally define what architecture itself is (sc., architecture is *whatever* is able to conjure up such responses). And yet, there are resonances of Kant's 'symbols of morality' thesis with Le Corbusier. At one point he writes,

Art is poetry: emotion of the senses, the joy of a mind that measures and appreciates, the recognition of an axial principle that affects the core of our being. Art is this pure creation of the mind that shows us, at certain heights, the height of a *creation* to which man can attain. And man experiences great happiness *on feeling himself create*. (2008, 249)

That passage also succeeds in tying together several separate strands of thought – to wit, axuality, the plan, the stirring of emotions, and a certain state of bliss or happiness that unites them.

Even so, we need to ask if the Kantian package fits the Corbusian receptacle. Based on textual parallels such as the one alleged by Holland above, Holland concludes that

Whether or not Le Corbusier was explicitly influenced by the *Critique of Judgment*, we seem here to have evidence for [Colin St] Wilson's claim that Kant's ideas have had an abiding influence on modern architecture.⁴⁶⁹

This is all fine and good, until we realize that the passage in Wilson that Holland (2013, §1) focuses on 'characterizes Kant's [aesthetic] theory as advocating "the pursuit of the 'purposeless,'" and accuses him of dividing architecture into "'architecture' (fine art) and 'building' (utility)". Wilson brings out this thesis in the following passage.

At one blow the concept which was fundamental to Classical Greek thought and which conceived of the beautiful and the purposeful as one thing (to *kalon*) was split into two elements which were then conceived to be in competition with each other. This particular blasphemy against classical values also did violence to another tenet which was equally fundamental to Greek culture—namely the distinction between a Fine Art 'that served only itself, and a Practical Art' that served an end other than itself[.]⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁶ Holland (2013, §2).

⁴⁶⁷ Lavin (2007).

⁴⁶⁸ See CHAPTER 5. We will encounter a similar thesis in Schopenhauer (CHAPTER 7).

⁴⁶⁹ Holland (2013, §2).

⁴⁷⁰ St John Wilson (1995).

While CHAPTER 5 demonstrates that, indeed, Kant sets utility and beauty in antagonism, Wilson's idea that Kant ever distinguished between architecture as a fine art and 'building' (for which he had a separate term) is an anachronism.⁴⁷¹ The same applies to Holland's claim (2013, §1) that Kant's distinction of pure and adherent beauty maps onto a distinction of mechanical vs. fine arts, with the creation of furniture and household tools (lumped together by Kant with architecture) among the former, and fine art having 'no purpose except the provocation of our faculties into harmonious free play', and thus able to exhibit instances of pure beauty. As Kant lumps architecture together with the former, sc. the (non-artistic) creation of purposive household tools, Holland (2013, §3) concludes that, for Kant, architecture is not a fine art. This is simply false since, as we saw in CHAPTER 5, Kant explicitly includes architecture (*Baukunst*) in his discussion of the fine arts (*CPJ* §51, §53, e.g. V:322 where Kant introduces his idea of the 'Plastic Arts', with sculpture and architecture among them).

A further error is Wilson's (1995, 16) claim that Kant's aesthetics pursues 'the purposeless'. Rather, as we saw in CHAPTER 5, Kant has aesthetic judgments home in on 'purposiveness without a purpose', and while that term required quite some exegetical unpacking, it certainly does not render architecture devoid of functionality – quite the contrary.

Wilson's allegation that Kant influenced modern architects like Le Corbusier thus rests too heavily on misconstruing Kant's aesthetics on two central points to provide a convincing argument. While a Kantian ethics of architecture, focusing on such notions as the 'symbol of morality' (§5.3.2), may not be downright incompatible with Le Corbusier's thought, it is a historical and philosophical stretch to see the two thinkers as sharing a similar outlook. Let us therefore focus on other strands of Le Corbusier's ethical thought.

§6.7.2 COSMOLOGICAL ETHICS (C)

When discussing Le Corbusier's notion of 'Regulating Lines' in §6.2, we came across the following passage.

He [man] established order by measuring. In order to measure he took his pace, his foot, his forearm, or his finger. By imposing the order of his foot or his arm, he created a module that regulates the entire work; and his work is to his scale, for his convenience, for his comfort, *to his measure*. It is to the human *scale*. (2008, 134)

This passage is the entry point for Le Corbusier's ruminations on man's and his architecture's harmonizing with the entire cosmos, all of cosmic order – an arch-Vitruvian theme (§3.5) we can finally address head on. That theme is brought out in two follow-up passages.

[A]ren't we convinced that architects are inhuman beings, outside of order, far from our own being and who perhaps do their work for another planet? |That is because they have been taught a bizarre craft that consists in making others – masons, carpenters, and joiners – achieve miracles of perseverance, care, and skill by erecting and sticking together elements (roofs, walls, windows, doors, etc.) hat no longer have anything in common with one another and no longer have as their goal, their real result, the serving of some useful purpose. (2008, 135-136)

The final clause should underline just how remote Le Corbusier's aesthetics of architecture is from a frankly non-utilitarian stance, e.g. the stance alleged by recent writers likening Le Corbusier to Kant we encountered in §6.7.1. More than that, the passage reminds us of the compositional unity of the entire building to be accomplished by one set of regulating lines, one measure, on measuring unit i.e. 'module'. And, the passage is a first hint at the full cosmological significance Le Corbusier assigns to these notions. For, as he says soon later (2008, 136),

⁴⁷¹ It would *not* be an anachronism in Schopenhauer, who distinguishes utilitarian buildings from 'the fine art of architecture' (*die schöne Baukunst*): see CHAPTER 7.

Architecture is the first manifestation of man creating his universe, creating it in the image of nature, subscribing to the laws of nature, to the laws that govern our nature, our universe. The laws of gravity, statics, and dynamics impose themselves through a *reductio ad absurdum*: stand up or fall down.

A sovereign determinism clarifies natural creation for our eyes and gives us the certainty of something balanced and reasonably made, of something infinitely modulated, evolved, varied, and unitary.

The primordial physical laws are simple and few. The laws of morality are simple and few.

Morality and its laws are explicitly mentioned. As with physical laws, or laws of nature, what matters is that they are finitely many, and so can (in principle, that is) be comprehended by a finite creature like man. The very juxtaposition of moral precepts with physical/physiological laws itself recalls Vitruvius' bipartite characterization of philosophy in *De Architectura* I.1.§7 (see §3.5).

But there is an essential point of departure for Le Corbusier not borrowed from Vitruvius. For, as we already saw, for Le Corbusier the architect '*realizes an order that is a pure creation of his mind*' (2008, 92), whereas in the Vitruvian tradition the architect is meant to fit his work into an order that predates him and his work (see again §3.5). As in previous instances, exegetes have tried to contest such a reading of Le Corbusier, so this requires some elaboration. For Richard Padovan, Le Corbusier sides *with* Vitruvius in seeing architectural proportion as externally given, as already existing by an order that antedates the architect's individual creativity. This, Padovan adds, is in contrast with an architect who regards herself to impose proportions on the world of her own making.⁴⁷² On that very point, however, it seems to me that Padovan's characterization of Le Corbusier can be challenged, given the passage just quoted, sc. the architect '*realizes an order that is a pure creation of his mind*' (2008, 92), and passages from (2008, 135-136). At the same time, we encounter passages that as frequently invoke an externally given order, be it in the earlier '*consonance with the laws of the universe that govern us and to which all of our acts are subject*' (2008, 96) or here:

Not pursuing an architectural idea, but simply guided by the results of calculations (derived from the principles that govern our universe), [...] make use of the primary elements and, coordinating them according to rules, stir in us architectural emotions, thus making the work of humanity resonate with the universal order. (2008, 106, italics in original)

Certainly, some facets to these lines remain unclear as to their original intent – first, whether the 'rules' correspond to the 'principles that govern our universe' and so express 'universal order', and secondly, what these 'rules' are in their own right, a point on which Le Corbusier's work remains frustratingly silent.⁴⁷³ In that regard, mapping Le Corbusier's suggestive cosmological remarks onto a core Vitruvian thesis – the need for architecture to harmonize not only with the (needs of the) human world, but resonate with the natural world at large (§3.5) – requires premises that are textually underdetermined by his recorded train of thought.

As before with Le Corbusier's alleged relation to Kant, what echoes there are to Vitruvius are underdetermined in Le Corbusier and sometimes even contradict further elements in his own thinking. It is thus high time we turn to the type of ethics most peculiar to him.

⁴⁷² Padovan (1999, 26-32). esp. pp. 26-32.

⁴⁷³ As pointed out by Banham (1980), cf. Wagnmuth (1964, 195).

§6.7.3 MACHINE ETHICS (A)

I finally turn to the ethics in Le Corbusier that earned him the greatest attention (at times, even ire) from moral philosophers. Not surprisingly, that ethics occurs at the beginning of the work, and has led quite a few readers to believe it is the only ethical model available in *Vers un architecture*.

A question of morality. Lying is intolerable. We perish by lying.

Architecture is one of the most urgent needs of man, since the house has always been the indispensable and first tool that he forged for himself. The tools of man mark the stages of civilization [...]. Tools advance by successive improvements [...]. Tools are direct and immediate expressions of progress; tools are necessary helpmates; they are liberators, too. We throw old tools onto the scrap heap: the blunderbuss, the culverin, the carriage, and the old locomotive. This gesture is a manifestation of health, of | moral health, also of morality; we do not have the right to produce badly because of bad tools; we do not have the right to use up our strength, our health and our courage because of bad tools; we throw out, we replace. [...]

We are unhappy living in unworthy houses because they ruin our health and our morale. [...] The house eats away at us [...] We are unhappy. Our houses disgust us; we flee from them [...]. We become demoralized. (2008, 93-94)

Central to this line of thought are the twin correlations of physical with moral health, and of moral health with morality itself. Such correlations (or, equations) enable him to argue later for the moral propriety of mass produced housing, as these are ‘healthy (morally too) and beautiful from the aesthetic of the work tools that accompany our existence’ (2008, 254). (I shall not pause here to comment and dispose of this brazen reduction of the ethics of architecture to an aesthetics thereof, having written about the matter extensively elsewhere; see Koller (2013).)

Equally important to Le Corbusier’s argument, here, is the correlation of moral health with personal well being, with happiness – a state Le Corbusier sees jeopardized by buildings that are out of tune with modern mankind’s actual needs, and consequently have a ‘demoraliz[ing]’ effect (2008, 94). As he says much closer to the end of the book,

Everywhere, the family is ruined and minds are demoralized by being tied like slaves to anachronistic things. (2008, 296)

Now, maybe we do not agree with (perhaps even vehemently disagree with) Le Corbusier’s suggested remedy, of mass produced housing for the working classes. But his underlying reasoning has nothing to do, *per se*, with either mass production or an ungrounded belief in progressivism rendering every one of yesteryear’s products ‘anachronistic’.⁴⁷⁴

Rather, there is a strong belief at work that, alongside changing the compositional rules and principles of architectural design, architects have to revise and ‘bring up to date’ their understanding of the forms of life, and the concomitant needs, of people utilizing their homes, especially people of the working class. This vision, especially its correlation of architectural design with forms of life, has certainly nothing of the totalitarian consequences or inhumane housing designs that critics of Le Corbusier from Jencks to Scruton have detected in such statements.⁴⁷⁵ As elsewhere in philosophy, we have to differentiate sharply between a ‘functional role’ and a material token (here: building) ‘realizing’ that role, and understand that certain roles and goals are multiply realizable. If we find Le Corbusier’s own houses ‘dehumanizing’ (and that would be a moral judgement in need of justification), that pertains to the realizer, not the role of his broader moral vision. Indeed, the relation between the two is so broad as to leave unclear just what *is*

⁴⁷⁴ On the relation of (a)tectonic composition to mass production, see Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi (2002, ch. 4).

⁴⁷⁵ See Jencks (1973/1980, 141-164) on Le Corbusier’s building failures and alleged totalitarian (‘megalomaniac’) ambitions. As for Scruton, see §6.2.1 above.

mandated by accepting the ‘machine ethics’. (I return to this in §6.8). One vital clue, however, appears in a passage we looked at earlier, namely,

Through the happy invention of a system of lot division, even the quarters of workers’ housing take on a high architectural significance. Such are the consequences of the plan. (2008, 121-122)

Corbusier himself, then, thinks that his own ethics arises from the centrality of ‘the plan’. On the more precise relation of the two, however, he leaves us in the dark. A textually scrupulous inquiry into (A), then, has to conclude at this point, and any search in answer to ‘What might an *atectonic* ethics of architecture look like?’, is disappointingly cut short by Le Corbusier’s failure to provide a more direct answer.

§6.8 EVALUATION OF LE CORBUSIER’S OWN ETHICS, AND: FIRMNESS REJECTED?

If Le Corbusier’s own oeuvre sometimes leaves things to be desired regarding the realization of his ethical vision, his three-fold ethics of architecture – beginning from (B) the cultivation of pleasure and its subject, touching on (C) man’s cosmological belonging and obligation, and ending in (A) a social vision that seeks the betterment of the underprivileged segments of society by means both achievable by and affordable to them – must be acknowledged as a powerful vision, even if the precise relation between these three folds remains frustratingly unclear, and will predictably continue to exercise exegetes for many decades to come.

Given the complexity of each fold, not to mention of their relation to one another, Le Corbusier’s moral vision for architecture also goes to show that many of the core Vitruvian tenets (such as the two just mentioned) need not be shared literally, or even strongly. Other Vitruvian tenets may be rejected and dismantled in their entirety, such as (a) recognizing construction and *firmitas* as central to any ethically defensible architectural design, and (b) the RECIPROCITY THESIS of the triad’s core values. But it then remains rather unclear on what basis we can hold onto certain Vitruvian insights, specifically the cosmological undercurrent which we so far found the least promising of the Vitruvian framework.

This means Le Corbusier’s ethics (C) is, in its current shape, simply not indefensible and borrows, where it does not corroborate, the metaphysical indefensibility of the Vitruvian original (cosmic harmony, metaphysical laws of order). Le Corbusier’s variation on Kant’s ethics of ‘pleasure’ (B), we saw, likewise inherits the problems of its prototype without remedying sufficiently many of that prototype’s weaknesses. As we saw in §6.6 and §6.7.2, Le Corbusier, like Kant before him, leaves the proper *aetiology* and *content specification* of the crucial explanatory elements in an ethics of pleasure and architectonic contemplation in an entirely rudimentary state. We will return to these difficulties more generally in our discussion of Schopenhauer in §7.5, but that discussion will precisely show that an ethics of architecture grounded in a particular theory of architectural contemplation and the moral value *it* affords has to revert to a groundedness in the architectonic object, and one that is tectonically composed. So if we pursue that line of thought to its end, a satisfactorily worked out version of an ethics of architecture based on Kantian beginnings does not ultimately rescue Le Corbusier from commitment to the RECIPROCITY THESIS, but rather forces it on him. The present chapter could have made such a point historically as well, pointing out how the very Beaux Arts teachers like Guadet, whose belief in the centrality of the plan Le Corbusier shared, precisely connected the ‘pleasure’ attendant on experiencing architecture to clarity of solid construction.

It is a superior beauty, that which results from the construction itself, that is the architecture itself, and does not require further decoration[.]

In art, admiration is a sense of well being, the satisfaction of total repose, while astonishment does not occur without anxiety. Thus apparent solidity, incontestable, captures the spirit more than the tour de force[.]⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁶ Guadet (1904, I.214 and I.116), quoted *apud* Ford (1997, 5).

This leaves us with Le Corbusier's broad ethics of the house as a 'machine for living in'. This ethics, of course, is the hardest to assess, because its generic drift is just that – generic. While Le Corbusier's examples (mostly in images) to showcase prototypes of modern housing, it is simply unclear what compositional constraints, if any, are ultimately exerted by so broad a specification. Certainly much subsequent architectural production in the twentieth century owes much to Le Corbusier's thinking, not least when it comes to mass housing. However, any attempt to closely correlate the two – as commanded by the challenge to calibrate the moral ends \mathcal{M} of an architecture with the compositional means Π at its disposal, as required by my CHAPTER 2 framework (what I call the CALIBRATION CHALLENGE) – looks less than certain. What is more, it is not even clear that the type of mass housing we canonically associate with high modernism presupposes an evasion of the RECIPROCITY THESIS, as our exploration of *Lafayette Park* in CHAPTER 10 will demonstrate – buildings that certainly share many characteristics with classical Le Corbusian buildings (even if they also diverge from them in other regards). And this underscores, yet again, that Le Corbusier's own moral beliefs about architecture, where they do not fall short of offering (at least rudiments for) a satisfactory ethics of architecture, do not in the least necessitate a departure from the core tenets developed in CHAPTERS 2 and 3.

On that note, let me explore one final thought on Le Corbusier's 'machine ethics' (B). If earlier discussions showed Le Corbusier's willingness to have aesthetic pleasure (what in the TRIAD VALUES corresponds to *venustas*) as the ultimate value trumping the other two players in the triad, his inaugural appeal to the lot of the working classes will certainly exert a much needed corrective, not just to the potential narrowness of (a purely aesthetic) vision, but to contemporary readiness to ascribe such a narrow vision to Le Corbusier in the first place. If, at the close of our laborious journey across one segment in Le Corbusier's mental cosmos, we now return to his rejection of *firmitas*, we can see how much else goes on in these lines:

The house will no longer be a squat thing that pretends to defy the centuries and that is an opulent object manifesting wealth [...]. The house will no longer be an archaic entity heavily rooted in the ground by deep foundations, built 'solid', and to which the cult of family, bloodline etc. has so long been devoted. (2008, 259)

These lines express a *rejection*, but they are motivated by something positive to put in its place. Le Corbusier likely has his use of *pilotis* in mind – light columns that lift a house above the earth, a design principle he intends to apply not only to individual buildings, but entire cities. 'Pilotis-Cities' he calls them, and the caption to their illustration explains how the entire city

is raised 4 to 5 meters on pilotis, which serve as foundations for the houses. The city floor is a kind of foundation grid, the streets and their sidewalks bridges of a kind. Under this slab and directly accessible are all the organs that up to now have been buried in the ground and inaccessible: water, gas, electricity, telephone, pneumatic tubes, neighborhood heating, etc. (2008, 127)

Thus, the *pilotis* are the re-envisaged 'foundations' and firmness on which the city of the future rests, no longer 'heavily rooted in the ground by deep foundations' or (as expressed here) 'buried in the ground'.

Further, as we see here Le Corbusier's intent is to have *pilotis* for everyone, for the entire city. That is why he rejects the 'cult of the family' and its implied hierarchical society of a *pater familias* reigning supreme (see §6.1). This rejection, finally, explains Le Corbusier's overarching ethical vision in *Vers une architecture* – an architectural program that is available to everyman, not just an aesthetic privilege for the affluent few. Le Corbusier's captions to the illustrations of Tony Garnier's *Quartier d' Habitation* speak a very clear language, as does a caption to *Bordeaux-Pessae*, which perhaps best sums up Le Corbusier's overarching vision.

Perhaps for the first time in France, [...] the present architectural problem is resolved in a spirit consistent with the new era. Economy, sociology, aesthetics: it's a new realization with new means. (2008, 279)

For all its noble intent, that ‘overarching vision’ is increasingly obscured in, perhaps even compromised by, Le Corbusier’s own later work. Already his essay on the ‘Five Points’ of 1927 elevate the *pilotis* to an aesthetic principle for modernist architecture, and, as a contemporary audience, we are more accustomed to think of *pilotis* as an aesthetic principle in the context of avant-garde buildings available only to the privileged few. The commodification of *pilotis* has not resulted in mass production across the board, but in the ‘elevation’ of aesthetic privilege, literally and figuratively.

That the built reality of Le Corbusier’s subsequent work – white villas, resplendent art objects housing their affluent patrons – often contravenes the egalitarian vision in *Vers une architecture* – to bring true, aesthetic architecture within the reach of everyone, factory workers included, so as to prevent the ‘ruin of the family’ – marks perhaps the deepest moral conflict in Le Corbusier’s work and its enduring legacy.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁷ This conflict clearly emerges, and is addressed with mixed success, in Le Corbusier’s later (1947) *Unité d’Habitation* in Marseille, France, but that project – and his copious writing around the same year – are beyond the confines of this thesis.

CHAPTER 7

SCHOPENHAUER ON ARCHITECTURE: EXPRESSIVE AUSTERITY AND THE ETHICS OF FIRMITAS

Die Materie ist schwer, sie drängt abwärts, will formlos am Boden sich ausbreiten. Wir kennen die Gewalt der Schwere von unserem eigenen Körper. Was hält uns aufrecht, hemmt ein formloses Zusammenfallen? Die gegenwirkende Kraft, die wir als Wille, Leben oder wie immer bezeichnen mögen. Ich nenne sie Formkraft. Der Gegensatz von Stoff und Formkraft, der die gesamte organische Welt bewegt, ist das Grundthema der Architektur. Die ästhetische Anschauung überträgt diese intimste Erfahrung unseres Körpers auch auf die leblose Natur. In jedem Ding nehmen wir einen Willen an, der zur Form sich durchzuringen versucht und den Widerstand eines formlosen Stoffes zu überwinden hat. Mit dieser Erkenntnis haben wir den entscheidenden Schritt gethan, um sowohl die formale Ästhetik durch lebensvollere Sätze zu ergänzen, wie auch um den architektonischen Eindruck einen reicheren Inhalt zu sichern, als ihm z. B. Schopenhauers viel bewunderte Theorie zugestehen will. Glücklicherweise läßt sich niemand den Genuss von der Philosophie trüben und Schopenhauer selbst hatte wohl zu viel Kunstgefühl, um an seinen Satz zu glauben: Schwere und Starrheit seien der einzige Gegenstand der Baukunst.

– Heinrich Wölfflin⁴⁷⁸

§7.1. INTRODUCTION

The majority of material presented in the previous two chapters challenged the ethics of architecture introduced in CHAPTER 2, an ethics focused on buildings' compositional properties, particularly those constrained by and belonging to what Vitruvius calls *firmitas* or 'firmness'. Close attention to arguments in Kant and Le Corbusier brought to light many fascinating theses about architecture and its morality, though most of them, it turned out, would need better argumentative support than provided by their authors. Kant, in particular, bequeathed to subsequent work in philosophical aesthetics on architecture a number of claims or ideas that seem to be somewhat tentative or incomplete. For instance, as we learnt by the end of CHAPTER 5, for Kant architecture (or perhaps only *good* architecture?) expresses moral ideas while remaining free from determinate conceptual content, including determination by utilitarian or prudential concerns. Only then, Kant alleged, could architecture provide the type of disinterested contemplation that helps humans experience the preconditions of moral agency, namely freedom from utilitarian constraints. But it is fair to say that Kant provides a first shot at these ideas rather than a comprehensive defense of them.

Many of these ideas would be preserved by subsequent writers comfortable rejecting Kant's suppression of *firmitas* as a core value of architecture. The current chapter looks to one such writer, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Most of Schopenhauer's core ideas are, or at least look as if they are, lifted directly from Kant's third *Critique*. Like Kant, Schopenhauer locates architecture's moral role less in its conceptual content (in the manner that, say, a socioculturally critical novel like *Uncle Tom's Cabin* can challenge the moral presumptions of its readership) than in a contemplation of 'ideas' communicated by architecture. Schopenhauer tries to clarify the distinction (which in Kant had remained elusive, to say the least) of 'concepts' and 'ideas' to make good on this claim. And he tries to explain more fully the content of 'ideas' relevant to architecture and its moral role. Finally, he attempts to explain why contemplation of such ideas is of relevance to morality, by situating the need for contemplation in a world of suffering, with contemplation providing one of the few avenues to alleviate that suffering. These attempts all constitute, or can profitably be seen as constituting, responses to elements in Kant's philosophy of architecture that CHAPTER 5 found wanting. Most importantly, what enables Schopenhauer to make headway on Kant's problems is a rehabilitation of *firmitas* as a core element to any proper philosophical understanding of architecture. Schopenhauer's key move here is to allocate the type of considerations that in Vitruvius

⁴⁷⁸ Wölfflin (1886), opening of section 'II. Der Gegenstand der Architektur'.

would be brought under the mantle of *firmitas* a central role in explaining and constraining architecture's expressive and moral roles. In Schopenhauer, these considerations pertain to what later writers are going to call 'tectonic composition', a term first introduced in CHAPTER 3 and to be further developed in this chapter and the next.

Schopenhauer's work, then, presents an important stepping stone in bringing a fairly classical understanding of architectonic values – one oriented on *firmitas*, but also *venustas* and *utilitas* – into an era that directly precedes and shapes modernist architecture, an era in which tectonic composition is with increasing frequency regarded as decisive to our understanding of the values that inform architectural design. Schopenhauer bequeaths a vocabulary and set of philosophical concepts on nineteenth century architectural discourse that helps that discourse both reflect on its classical heritage and push forward towards a renewed appreciation for construction and materials (and more so, fuels the latter in an era when innovations in construction and materials were multiplying quickly). While it is unlikely Schopenhauer was widely read by architects, or that his works directly influenced individual periods of architectural production, his thought at the very least provides a heuristic to overcome a certain architectural dichotomy, of the classical versus the modern, that otherwise blocks our appreciation of either.⁴⁷⁹

The current chapter's interest in Schopenhauer, then, serves two roles in the context of the present work. First, it looks in detail at one philosopher's defense of a highly distinct *variant* of the type of ethics outlined in CHAPTER 2. In particular, it inquires how Schopenhauer will actually *start* from a set of philosophical (in part, ethical) views to *derive* constraints on architectural design. Schopenhauer, then, provides us with sample material to refine and test the base tenets of the CHAPTER 2 framework, and to defend at least some of those tenets. Such a defense is supplementary to one on grounds of providing an 'inference to the best explanation' provided in earlier chapters. (That is, provided we can take some moral appraisals of buildings at face value, my framework best explains how we are to understand and justify doing that.) Schopenhauer's views, then, present a fairly rare attempt in modern philosophy to juxtapose moral concerns with architecture, and that alone merits giving his views a proper hearing in the context of the present work; even if and where subsequent work will have to reject, revise, or supplement his views (as I similarly suggested for Kant). The direction, however, we shall see, is a bit reversed from what we saw in CHAPTER 2. That is, Schopenhauer extrapolates strong views on how buildings are to be composed (Π) from moral views on what buildings should do, and do at a moral level (\mathcal{M}). As I will suggest in CHAPTER 8, however, the direction of fit is not as important as the question how well calibrated Π and \mathcal{M} are for one another. A 'direction of fit', so to speak, has to run both ways. In Schopenhauer's case, actually, the 'fit' is rather tenuous, I shall suggest, and his views on Π are valid for my research independently of his views on \mathcal{M} . What is more, where Schopenhauer's views afford a fairly broad 'juxtaposition' of philosophical (partly ethical) views with constraints on architectonic composition, they of course fall short of the type of systematic demands that CHAPTERS 1-2 level at anyone purporting to offer an ethics of architecture. In that sense too, Schopenhauer's project and mine are certainly not as continuous as one might wish.

Second, the chapter looks to Schopenhauer's views because they form part of a larger narrative or genealogy. They equip readers with concepts and terms indispensable to properly analyse and appraise subsequent philosophical reflection on architecture in the nineteenth and twentieth century period in

⁴⁷⁹ There are of course alternative sources and historical allegations readers may prefer. For instance, it cannot be ruled out Schopenhauer picked up his architectural views from architecture literature of the time. If so, this would have to be ascertained by current Schopenhauer scholarship (which has left the issue untouched). Alternatively, as I show in CHAPTER 8, other writers from within architecture like Ledoux and Viollet-le-Duc were more influential in the development of reflection on architecture than philosophers, even when – as in the case of Boetticher – they borrow from Schopenhauer quite heavily. As I said in §4.2, my main aim is to unearth the tectonic tradition's *own* philosophy.

Germany. In that vein, CHAPTERS 8 to 10 look at the writings and (where applicable) buildings of Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Carl Boetticher, Gottfried Semper, and Mies van der Rohe. No analysis of their written or built work can proceed, this thesis argues, without the type of considerations I bring to the fore in my CHAPTER 2 framework. Some of these considerations emerge in particularly stark form in Schopenhauer's reflections on architecture – and that is, considerations on tectonic composition that specifically focuses on relations of bear and load (§7.2.5).⁴⁸⁰ Such considerations, CHAPTERS 7 to 10 argue, inform the core of architectonic composition as such, certainly in the period under review, and for the architects in question. If so, such considerations must accordingly present a core subset of, and a constraint on the intensional and extensional delineation of, the properties Π which CHAPTER 2 claimed a moral appraisal \mathcal{M} of buildings has to be mediated by. CHAPTERS 5 and 6 looked to delineations of Π from which *firmitas* and tectonic composition were mostly absent, and queried the moral ramifications for architecture on such delineations of Π . CHAPTERS 7 to 10 now look to the positive consequences, for a prospect to developing an ethics of architecture, of acknowledging *firmitas* as a major determinant of Π .

There are a couple of subthemes this chapter will explore in service of fleshing out these two topics or roles further. First, of course, I offer a substantive inquiry into Schopenhauer's understanding of what in Vitruvius is called 'firmness'. Second, I look at Schopenhauer's recorded attitudes towards the classical tradition in architecture, and assess in specific his views on the component terms of the Vitruvian triad. As part of this, we will see that Schopenhauer's views on architectural beauty, contrary to recent exegetical allegations, frequently operate rather closely to (instead of revising) Vitruvius'. Three, I look at recent claims as to the pervasive role Schopenhauer is alleged to have played in the formation of modernist architectural thought, claims like the one quoted at the chapter opening. While my chapter (as per its second 'role') is in principle sympathetic to such claims, I will argue that recent work along those lines risks distorting, not just Schopenhauer's thought, but also the base tenets of modernist structuralism, that is, an aesthetic stance in modernist architectonic composition that privileges the display of tectonic composition (specifically the revelation of a building's underlying structure). As a consequence, we still require a historically *and* philosophically more sensitive understanding of the specifics of what Schopenhauer bequeathed to a modern understanding of architecture, and secondarily, to a moral understanding of architecture. Without getting such details right, the larger claims offered under the chapter's two lead topics (or 'roles') would fail to command serious consideration. As in previous chapters, considerations of exegetical and philosophical adequacy are mutually reinforcing, indispensably so, just as my CHAPTER 2 model showed how a proper understanding of Π , one that only adequate work on (and in) architectural *history* and contemporary analysis affords us, is indispensable to a *philosophically* adequate ethics of architecture. However, for reasons that will transpire in §7.2.1, my exegetical efforts have been curtailed by appreciation of (the limits of) what and how much in Schopenhauer is ultimately of direct value to the present project.

Thus, in contrast to Kant, I will not separate my presentations and preliminary assessments of the main theses that emerge from Schopenhauer's works, to only then proceed to a detailed textual analysis in support of attributing to Schopenhauer those theses in the first place. Rather, beginning with §7.2 I look at Schopenhauer's main theses of relevance to the present work, one by one, and assess them as we go along documenting their textual evidence. I jointly query the consequences (moral and otherwise) that accrue *if* Schopenhauer's views are correct, and offer exegetical discussion in support of properly appraising *whether*

⁴⁸⁰ Given the centrality of bear and load, let me briefly reference a contemporary understanding of those notions in architecture. Broadly speaking, contemporary research distinguishes types of loads in terms of their *causal origin* (for instance, snow or wind), the *direction of force* exerted on the building (horizontal or vertical), the *combination* of forces (isolated, collinear, nonconcurrent), their *entry point* (roof loads, e.g.), and the *causal impact* to be avoided by a building's structure (tension, compression, shear, bending). The key question for this thesis, of course, is (1) how this impacts architectonic composition elsewhere and as a whole, and (2) how much, if any, of this should be expressed aesthetically in a building's look. For discussion and references, see §3.4.1.1 above.

his views are correct. As in my discussion of Kant, I rarely include lengthy excerpts from Schopenhauer's writings. Rather, I sample such excerpts in the original German in a textual appendix to this chapter in APPENDIX A.2, with passages enumerated as S1, ..., S*n* to enable easy cross reference, and I quote these excerpts in the main text of §7.2-§7.4 only when strictly necessary. In closing, §7.5 raises what appears to me the most decisive objection to Schopenhauer's core claims on the morality of architecture – namely that his account seems to leave no room for such morality. I conclude the chapter by querying what can be salvaged from Schopenhauer's account if we are to make room for architecture being moral. Readers wanting to bypass the largely exegetical parts, and not immediately be concerned with how Schopenhauer's thought fits into a wider genealogy of reflection on tectonic composition, are recommended to read only sections §7.2.1 and §7.5, as these sections contain all the philosophical elements crucial for developing the main argument of the present work. Readers interested in contemporary positions on aesthetic value are encouraged to pay special attention to §7.5.1, where I discuss these more fully and resume a discussion strand on architectural beauty (*venustas*) started in §3.7.

§7.2. SCHOPENHAUER'S VIEWS IN DETAIL

§7.2.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTEMPLATION

Schopenhauer's views on architecture emerge from his 1818 *World as Will and Representation* ('*WWR*') and his 1851 *Parerga and Paralipomena* ('*PP*').⁴⁸¹ As with Kant, Schopenhauer's views on architecture emerge as the last steps in a multi-step argument leading up to them. In Schopenhauer's case, we begin with the principle (**P1**) that aesthetics is contemplative, sc. that beauty serves contemplation; one added claim Schopenhauer appends to P1 is (**L1**) that works of art function and serve as the *expression* of general or 'Platonic' ideas, as per passages S1 and S2. As this expression is non-mimetic, Schopenhauer's theory of artworks is, certainly as regards architecture, a non-representational one.

In particular, architecture is not to *imitate* the works of nature in its forms – or, for that matter, any forms that are non-architectural to begin with (we may recognize here an alleged formal autonomy of architecture) – but is to imitate nature only in the 'spirit' in which nature composes things. More specifically, Schopenhauer alleges, nature avoids devising anything devoid of purpose and goal-directedness, and architecture is to follow suit (see §7.2.4). (This claim stretches back to Cicero's craftsman looking to nature for guidance as per *De Oratore* III.178-80 discussed in §3.6.1, and presents one of many principles the tectonic tradition inherits later from the classical tradition and Schopenhauer. Thus Gottfried Semper, whose work will dominate CHAPTERS 8 to 9, likewise insists that architecture, while not imitative of nature's forms and appearances, is to imitate some of its most basic laws or principles:

Die Tektonik ist eine Kunst, deren Vorbild die Natur ist, nicht in ihren konkreten Erscheinungen, sondern in ihrer Gesetzlichkeit und Regel, wonach sie besteht und schafft, wonach sie uns, die wir in ihr existieren, als Inbegriff des Vollkommenen und Vernunftgemässen erscheint.⁴⁸²

Schopenhauer right away relates this to the expression of 'ideas' in organic as well as artificial entities, including architecture as a primary instance. Indeed, even bad buildings cannot but help such general ideas, if clumsily (S3). Before I turn in §7.2.2 to Schopenhauer's ideas on which 'ideas' architecture expresses and how (well) it does so (as this will determine our aesthetic appraisal of it), we need to further contextualize P1 and L1. In (S4), Schopenhauer contextualizes P1 and L1 by a more general principle of contemplation he will later call 'das Princip der Anschaulichkeit und leichten Faßlichkeit' (*WWR* II.§35), a principle of clear and easy comprehensibility, demanding the clear expression of architectonic forms open

⁴⁸¹ I refer to Schopenhauer's works by '*WWR*' or '*PP*', followed by part and paragraph or chapter number. The main passages on architecture are *WWR* I.§41-43 and II.§35, with supplementary remarks in *PP* II.§204-212. I follow the textual edition of Lütkehaus (1988), and for translations Janaway (2010) and Payne (1974).

⁴⁸² Semper, 'Theorie des Formell-Schönen', in: Hermann (1981, 217).

to contemplation. Schopenhauer will use that principle to derive architecture's aesthetic core categories like proportionality and symmetry.

Such a derivation (of which more in §7.2.6), however, only makes sense if we agree with Schopenhauer's starting points themselves, P1 and L1. Before concluding §7.2.1 I will address what readers should think if they cannot bring themselves to accept such starting points. Such readers should, however, at the very least consider Schopenhauer's reasons for offering P1 and L1 in the first place. The rationale behind P1 and L1 is explained by the central notion Schopenhauer accords to the will. According to Schopenhauer, a subject's willing relates to its wants, and thus (for Schopenhauer) to perceived deficiencies or lacks. Awareness of one's deficiencies contributes for Schopenhauer as much to human suffering as does the futile attempt to quell such awareness by attempting to overcome such deficiencies. For, says Schopenhauer, the exercise is self-perpetuating, and there is no end in sight of old deficiencies re-surfacing (think of hunger) or new ones accruing once old ones have been laid to rest (such as acquired tastes for, for instance, ever larger ownings of real estate).⁴⁸³ The ambition to quell desires, for Schopenhauer, arises from the subject's will, with 'human suffering' being diagnosed as slavery to the will. Schopenhauer only permits two ways of escape from that enslavement, compassionate agency and aesthetic contemplation, because they (G1) allow to relieve a suffering subject from its being cognitively confronted with a world of 'presentations', that is, of objects that trigger awareness of wants and deficiencies, and (G2) allow the subject to contemplate contents unrelated to the satisfaction of desires owed to wants.⁴⁸⁴ Hence, if art is to be complicit in these goals, it must provide disinterested contemplation.

If Schopenhauer's theory of the arts is recognizably Kantian regarding the first goal (G1), its originality is owed to its positive thesis under heading G2. For, according to Schopenhauer, art can help human subjects better understand the underlying reality of the world of appearances and 'representations', a reality Schopenhauer (following Plato) relates to 'ideas' (or, 'Ideas', capital 'I'), and (unlike Plato) expresses as different degrees of the 'will's self manifestations'. The two are related in that these degrees, for Schopenhauer, correspond to a ranking of 'Ideas', which in turn results to a ranking of the fine arts depending on the rank of Idea (or, 'grade of the will's self-representation') they express (S5, S6). At the highest point in this ranking of ideas stand the human will and the Platonic Ideas it is capable of grasping – for, in these ideas individuality and generality become one (a Platonic idea is a single entity, but one whose content carries generality). Thus *PP* II. §206 speaks of 'the complete manifestation of the will (as it appears in the contemplated object), a manifestation that is the (Platonic) Idea thereof'.

This, too, is recognizably Kantian, particularly the core thesis that art is capable of expressing (moral) 'ideas' (CHAPTER 5). Schopenhauer, however, succeeds over Kant in better explaining how exactly the arts 'express' such ideas, and what these ideas are.⁴⁸⁵

Before we proceed to these, let me re-emphasize that for Schopenhauer aesthetic experience afforded by art can only meet goals G1 and G2 – and thus alleviate human suffering – *if* the content of that experience can be characterized in a certain way. This is hypothetical in more than one regard, and while I do not have time to assess the premises on which the hypothesis rests, we do well to enumerate them. One: human life is full of suffering, two: perceiving one's deficiencies is a rather self-debilitating affair, three: contemplation of Platonic 'ideas' is a remedy to such self-debilitation, and four: art is perfectly capable of aiding such contemplation. Schopenhauer's thought, then, has a four-fold structure. We begin with these hypothetical claims *H*. These inform his most foundational aesthetic principles, P1 and L1. From there we

⁴⁸³ See also CHAPTER 3 on the psychological dynamics that drive the open-ended nature of greed or acquisitiveness, a dynamics Vitruvius thinks ethical instruction can help the architect to conquer (and thus avoid illicit gain of honour).

⁴⁸⁴ Kenny (2007, 14).

⁴⁸⁵ On the views' relation to Plato, see White (2012). White's views on the nature and number of Plato's 'Ideas' are quite dubious in light of work by Burnyeat (1992/1999, 298) and Rowe (2012, 340 with 428-9n.625).

proceed to G1 and G2, so as to finally arrive at Schopenhauer's views on Π , the central ones of which I discuss in §7.2.5, and which (given what was just said), are constrained, at least in part, by moral views.

My own interest arises from how such premises help to fuel a larger claim, and that is, how architecture becomes complicit in a moral goal – the alleviation of suffering. I reserve until the chapter's very end investigation of whether this larger claim falls within the inquiry of the present work in the sense required, namely as aligning (broadly) with CHAPTER 2's FACE VALUE TREATMENT. But it seems to me that even if we think (as I do) that all four claims in *H* are demonstrably false (certainly their defense at Schopenhauer's own hands is rather poor), the end result of his chain of reasoning does not thereby lose all interest. For, we can find his constraints on Π relevant to contemporary work independently of their particularly defense and argumentative background in Schopenhauer. That is certainly the line ultimately taken in the current chapter. My primary interest in the current chapter is really in how (A) Schopenhauer isolates the set of architecture's compositional features Π , and much less so in (B) his particular moral 'story' \mathcal{M} or in (C) the largely feeble basis on which he links the two. Accordingly I devote only little space before §7.5 to the defense of *H*, G1 or G2, which goes with issues (B) and (C). And as indicated before, hasty readers can at this point already skip ahead, to §7.5.

§7.2.2 THE NATURE OF 'IDEAS'

This subsection explores Schopenhauer's views on what 'ideas' are and how they specifically differ from concepts. Sandra Shapshay recently suggested that

Ideas seem to make the most sense within [Schopenhauer's] system as 'abstract objects' – objects that are not spatiotemporal, which do not stand in causal relationship[s] with anything, and which have not been abstracted like a concept, but rather, are the real, objective, essential aspects of the world as representation as perceived by a will-less subject (WWR I, 234, 236). The crucial role that they play in Schopenhauer's system is that they are the objects of *all* aesthetic experience – both of the artist and spectator – and their perception constitutes insight into the essential nature of the phenomenal world.⁴⁸⁶

Shapshay touches on three essential points here regarding Ideas in Schopenhauer's aesthetic. First, Ideas are not concepts or 'abstractions', and secondly, Ideas are somehow related to 'the essential nature of the phenomenal world'. These points are for Schopenhauer closely related. To see this, let us first attend to the first point, expressed more clearly by Janaway, when he writes

Schopenhauer follows Plato in claiming that Ideas exist in reality, independently of the subject. They are not concepts. Concepts are the mental constructs *we* make in order to grasp reality in general terms; but Ideas are parts of nature awaiting discovery. For Schopenhauer, they are not even discovered by conceptual thinking, but by perception and imagination.⁴⁸⁷

Schopenhauer and his exegetes basically regard concepts as subjectivist constructs. In this they diverge from (a) the objective existence that the later (specifically, Fregean) tradition assigns to concepts, an existence in a 'third domain' over and above mental (psychological) and physical reality; and they diverge from (b) the Russelian tradition that regards concepts as propositional 'building blocks' that form part of extra-mental reality.

⁴⁸⁶ Shapshay (2012, §3.2), emphasis added.

⁴⁸⁷ Janaway (2002, 75), emphasis added.

Schopenhauer, however, I would like to suggest, *has* a place for Fregean concepts and Russelian building blocks – he simply calls them ‘Ideas’. And, like Plato, he does not treat these Ideas as essentially mental,⁴⁸⁸ but as building blocks of an extra-mental reality – whether reality extends beyond physical reality or not (this being the core disagreement between Frege and Russell, and the root of classifying some elements of Frege’s thought as roughly Platonist). What matters most, however, is that these ‘building blocks’ are *not* one more object or thing in the world itself. Rather, such Ideas *structure* empirical reality. Now, as before, one can perfectly concede (if only for the purposes of argument) that reality *is* structured in such a way, and still doubt that this structure somehow figures in (is represented or communicated in) aesthetic experience, as Schopenhauer alleges it is. As before, I bracket such concerns that arise from Schopenhauer’s preferred manner of exposition (largely, an exercise in self-assertion), and prefer to instead construe his claims as premised on certain hypothetical claims. The claim here, as before, is that if aesthetic experience is to meet certain goals (G1, G2) then it *ought* to deliver in such and such a way, and that way, for Schopenhauer, pertains to Platonic ideas. As before, attention to the validity of this reasoning, even when its hypothetical nature is observed (or inserted into Schopenhauer’s text), can be bracketed until much later.

For, in according ‘ideas’ such a central role to aesthetic experience, we can see here both Schopenhauer’s debt to Kant (in particular, Kant’s view on space and time being *a priori* forms of intuition, as ‘things’ that are *not directly perceptible*, but factors that structure our experience of everything as spatiotemporally ordered), a nod Schopenhauer acknowledges by identifying the Will as the (only) ‘thing in itself’, as well as Schopenhauer’s foreshadowing of Wittgenstein’s thought in the *Tractatus* (1918), according to which the ‘structure’ of the empirical world cannot be identified or *represented* as ‘yet one more’ state of affairs, as one more fact *in* the world, but can only be ‘shown’ or ‘displayed’ in a specifically metaphysical attention to those worldly facts and states of affairs. All this harkens back to Plato’s likening the most supreme Idea (Form) of all, that of Goodness, to the sun, in *Republic V*. The sun is too bright for our eyes to form a discrete object of vision, but we can cognitively gather a great deal of understanding about the sun indirectly – by attending to the light it sheds on sublunary objects. Analogously, the Form (or Idea) of Goodness structures much of empirical reality, but cannot form yet another object of human cognition (it is, as Plato puts it with some hyperbole, ‘beyond being and knowledge’). As a final parallel to Plato, Dale Jaquette remarks how,

Like the prisoner released from Plato’s cave [in *Republic V*], the philosophical or aesthetic genius [for Schopenhauer], having caught sight of the forms of reality, is compelled to share nonrepresentational knowledge with those still left behind in darkness.⁴⁸⁹

This brings us to the final of three core claim Schopenhauer marshals about ‘Ideas’. For if the first two claims about Ideas are correct, this makes a great difference to a philosophical theory of aesthetic experience’. More precisely, if the *content* of aesthetic experience is correlated to these fundamentals of empirical reality, fundamentals that themselves resist reification (are radically ‘un-thingy’ and ‘un-factual’), then art’s content becomes much more elusive, just as its cognitive and ethical role becomes significantly more ambitious. We can now understand why Shapshay wrote earlier that ideas are for Schopenhauer ‘the objects of all aesthetic experience’, and why their perception (in aesthetic experience) would afford us ‘insight into the essential nature of the phenomenal world’.

Are these three ‘core claims’ mutually consistent? If the first point about ‘Ideas’ – their radically being *non-conceptual* – is correct then, given the third point (of Ideas being essentially the object of aesthetic experience), art has to be radically non-conceptual. Or so some recent exegetes suggest. Janaway points out how, for Schopenhauer, artistic genius has to draw on but also go significantly beyond perception (of

⁴⁸⁸ On this point, see Irwin (1995, ch.10), and contrast the work of Paul Natorp, whose main evidence is a brief passage in Plato’s *Parmenides*, to argue that Platonic forms or ‘ideas’ are essentially mental.

⁴⁸⁹ Jaquette (1996, 9).

empirical particulars), and draw on the imagination. Janaway labels this the (genius') capacity for 'heightened perception', which he describes as follows.

[G]enius, in whichever art form [so, architecture included], may go one better than actual experience: a great work of art may reflect reality all the better when the picture it conveys is a heightened one, having more clarity and definition than is ever contained in ordinary [conceptualized] experience itself. The true province of genius is [thus] imaginative perception, and not conceptual thinking. Art which is structured around some proposition, or worked out on a wholly rational plan, is dead and uninteresting by comparison. One example is where pictorial art turns to a symbolic form of allegory, and can be grasped only by deciphering images according to a code, something alien to art as such, in Schopenhauer's view ([WWR I, tr.] 239). Another is when 'imitators' or 'mannerists' set | themselves to produce according to a formula which they note to have been successful in some other work. The result is offensive: prior deliberation can always be discerned, and the constituent elements they have minced together can always be 'picked out and separated from the mixture'. The concept, 'useful as it is in life, serviceable, necessary, and productive as it is in science, is eternally barren and unproductive in art' ([ibid., tr.] 235).⁴⁹⁰

We may wonder how compelling these conclusions are. If we recall earlier, by 'concept' Schopenhauer means something very specific. His own distinction between concepts and Ideas, echoing similar claims in Frege and Russell, would allow any art form – architecture included – to be rationalist and (broadly speaking) conceptual, as long as the conceptual content pertains to Ideas, and not to 'concepts' in the narrow sense Schopenhauer denigrates. That is, as long as architecture foists its creative energy and attention on mere *abstractions* from empirical reality – say, transparent columns that mimic columns of water, or a curtain wall where glass somehow imitates, and not simply enhances, the effects of the afternoon sun – it will, for Schopenhauer, fail to be art in the highest sense, and simply be a short-lived thrill, in that it typically creates experiences that become repetitive, are shallow, and for both reasons wear off soon in their capacity to excite and elevate the person who views or inhabits such architecture. It is a genuine puzzle how far architecture would have to go, in Schopenhauer's eyes, to become genuinely non-conceptual; and equally difficult to correlate his strictures on the non-conceptual (once these have been adequately delineated) to individual design decisions.

If we are now clearer on what 'ideas' in general are in Schopenhauer's aesthetics, we still need to know more fully *which* of these 'ideas' are (for Schopenhauer) relevant to the arts – in particular, to architecture – and *how* the arts can at all be 'expressive' of them. For these are the problems Kant left inadequately addressed. Let us see if Schopenhauer fares better.

§7.2.3 THE ROLE OF 'IDEAS' FOR THE ARTS

As Schopenhauer suggests, ideas are for him, unlike Plato's ideas (*Republic* X, 601), literally the *objects* of aesthetic content.⁴⁹¹ What is more, these entities stand outside space and time and thus outside the nexus of empirical causality which crucially conditions human desires and sensitivity (*PP* II.§206). This, again, explains why, for Schopenhauer (if not necessarily for us), their contemplation is singularly fit to provide a momentary release of will's suffering, suffering that is inextricably bound up in just this nexus of causes and effects in the empirical world. Platonic Ideas, thus, at once present the apex of the varying 'grades of the objectification of the will', and (as paradigms) account for fundamental features of the remainder of what occurs on lower 'grades' or ranks (S7).

⁴⁹⁰ Janaway 2002, 77-78.

⁴⁹¹ I here ignore a possibility recently explored in Foster (2006, 224 and 239) that 'ideas' serve not so much a content-oriented as an instrumental role of art – to *causally* induce certain states of mind.

Depending on the rank of the Idea which an art expresses, thus enabling the contemplation of the Ideas by human subjects, the better that art fares in the ranking of art forms. This is why Schopenhauer says (quoted in §7.2.1) that the *objet* of supreme art is the human will. Since ‘the will’, in Schopenhauer’s system, comes in degrees, lesser forms of art will depict the will’s lower forms of self-manifestation. It is here that Schopenhauer locates architecture.

S8 Matter as such cannot be the presentation of an Idea. This is because [...] it is causality through and through: its being is nothing but acting. (*WWR* I.§43, tr. 2010, 238)

S9 This applies to even the most general qualities of matter, qualities that it never lacks and whose Ideas are the weakest objecthood of the will. These are: gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, reaction to light, etc. When we consider architecture merely as a fine art, leaving aside its utilitarian function, where it serves the will rather than pure cognition, and is thus no longer art in our sense; then the only intention we can attribute to it is that of bringing some of the Ideas at the lowest levels of the objecthood of the will more clearly into intuition, namely: gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, these universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest and dullest visibilities of the will, the sounds of the ground bass of nature; and then, alongside these, light, which is in many respects their opposite. (*WWR* I.§43, tr. 2010, 239)

Now irrespective of whether we grant the existence of Platonic Ideas, let alone whether we can entertain a ranking of art forms in accordance with the ‘rank’ such Platonic Ideas enjoy vis-à-vis one another, to mention two issues that Schopenhauer never quite addresses, even he himself isolates some steep reservations when it comes to the ‘Idea’ associated with architecture. For, as we can see in S9, matter (or materiality) as such cannot be the *objet* of a Platonic Idea, for matter is inextricably bound up with the causal nexus of empirical reality. The same applies to matter’s properties, such as weight, cohesion, rigidity (*Starrheit*, also solidity), fluidity, reflection of light and so on. But these properties, at least, express the will’s ‘lowest manifestation’ in some way, for instance, express the inner conflict between forces at work in the things which have those properties – things like stones. Architecture, understood as a *built thing*, a material concretion, rather than simply design in the abstract, shares these features with stones, and thus lends itself to depicting the conflicts that are at work in the material world, as pertains the aforementioned properties of materiality (S10).

The notion of gravity, of load, is architecture’s first property expressed, a point at which it does not really go beyond (displaying) the ‘innate forces of raw (unworked) masses of stone’. At this point, however, a second force enters for architecture, that of lifting this gravity up – of bearing things, making them stand up. For the matter of architecture, only if ‘left alone’ (or, to its own devices, as in brute nature), would simply pose a brute lump of matter (‘Die ganze Masse des Gebäudes würde, ihrer ursprünglichen Neigung überlassen, einen bloßen Klumpen darstellen’). It is in this conflict, of load and bear, that Schopenhauer locates architecture’s purely aesthetic purpose (‘der rein ästhetische Zweck der Baukunst’, S10), in S11.

In displaying this conflict between bear and load lies ‘the sole aesthetic matter of architecture as fine art’ (S11); and by ‘displaying’ Schopenhauer would intend, rendering open to contemplation.⁴⁹² To do that, architecture must delay the dissolution of the conflict(ing forces), just as in tragedy we have to have a retardation until *katharsis* can take place in the final act. Schopenhauer also sees this at work in chromatic composition in music:

S12 The effect of the suspension also deserves to be considered here. It is a dissonance delaying the final consonance that is with certainty awaited; in this way the longing for it is strengthened, and

⁴⁹² Again, S11: ‘zu deutlicher Anschaulichkeit zu bringen’, ‘vollkommen deutlich hervortreten’.

its appearance affords the greater satisfaction. This is clearly an analogue to the satisfaction of the will which is enhanced through delay.⁴⁹³

If the display of this conflict, and its dissolution in retardation, are the main *sujet* of architectural expression, Schopenhauer also proclaims them to be its only *sujet* – perhaps his most radical thesis so far, as regards architecture (S13). Architecture is not to express *human* purposes or ends, for these would relate to interests. This has both negative and positive consequences, which I scrutinize next.

§7.2.4 NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES

Here is the first of two negative consequences. To the extent that architecture serves (or finds itself serving) functional needs and purposes, it stands compromised as a fine art. Schopenhauer shares this consequence with Kant (S14). Architecture, however, will express *aesthetic purposes*, by displaying the conflict of bear and load. In this regard, Schopenhauer thinks he departs from Kant, who assigned all fine art, including architecture, to display a ‘purposiveness without purpose’ (S15). This purposiveness of architecture, in Schopenhauer, unites *with* definite purposes or ends, be they aesthetic, utilitarian, or constructive ones – whence, for him, the unity of the Vitruvian triad. In particular, he writes, architecture follows nature in avoiding anything devoid of purpose and goal-directedness (S16).

The second consequence is that architecture *cannot* express non-architectural ‘themes’ or any ‘forms’ that derive from the ‘extra-architectural’ (S17, 18). As a consequence, architecture is *not* a representational form of art – at least not insofar representational forms of art like painting can, and should for Schopenhauer, orient or derive their content from motifs ‘thematically’ very remote from them, such as (for instance) representing the facial or physiological features of natural organisms, say, the human body. Architecture, for Schopenhauer, can do no such thing, a proper representation of the human face, for instance, would have to incorporate its form of will – and that is what architecture cannot and at any rate should not even indulge in trying. Since architecture can and should never *express* anything beyond its core ‘theme’, this amounts to a near eliminativist view on what architecture can really *mean*. At least, we get very austere limits here on what architecture can express. For one, architecture is *not* suited, let alone able, to express high floating metaphysical ideas, whole (‘metaphysical’) world views, or anything beyond the conflicts of the will at the level of materiality – meaning, architecture can never be meta- or (as Schopenhauer himself puts it in *WWR* II.35), ‘trans’-physical. Any ‘deeper meanings’ are out (S19).

Whatever architecture expresses at the level of meaning, and whatever functions or ends it serves, must be ultimately rooted in its constructional theme. Anything not so rooted is *ipso facto* not architecture, or a bogus claim to or about it.⁴⁹⁴ Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of architecture, then, has radically eliminativist consequences at the levels of metaphysics (what architecture can *be*), semantics (what architecture can *express*), and ethics (what values architecture can *embody* or be *responsive to*). Such excess semantic baggage, where it occurs, accrues for Schopenhauer not from architecture itself (for that would have to be rooted in its constructional affairs) but from our propensity to project all sorts of meanings and desires onto physical structures, a propensity that Schopenhauer detects in the excessive ornamentation of Gothic architecture, the contemplative ‘exegesis’ of which can only proceed by triggering a chain of associations in the contemplating subject, associations that, for Schopenhauer, have nothing to do with the actual architecture (S20).

I will bracket here the accuracy of Schopenhauer’s views of Gothic architecture, especially since later writers (like Viollet-le-Duc) will discern in Gothic structures the very ‘load and bear’ relations, and (largely)

⁴⁹³ *WWR* II, tr. P. 455-456, quoted *apud* Janaway (2002, 85) who comments, ‘Many have found these ideas reflected especially in the composition of Wagner’s *Tristan and Isolde*.’

⁴⁹⁴ Among other things, iconographic meanings (those which require exegesis and historical contextualization) are immediately ‘out’ (cf. Foster 2006, 234, 242).

them alone, as informing their composition. There is arguably a mismatch between Schopenhauer's own aesthetic principles or norms brought towards the Gothic and his (much less persuasive) perception of their absence in Gothic architecture. If we stick to the principles, we can say that the 'associative meanings' Schopenhauer derides confuse their intended with their actual recipient – the associated meanings and desires are the subject's own, and so far from freeing the subject from its suffering (in the eternal chain of frustrated desires), architecture here is complicit with it. This, for Schopenhauer, constitutes a perversion of architecture's true artistic and ethical mission, a subversion of its values, and at root, a mistaken choice of style out of a misunderstood idea of what architecture is supposed to be. For starters, such an architecture fails to obey the first principle, of every building detail being executed – as nature teaches – in strict proportion to needs and static requirements. This utilitarian-functional-constructional principle is flouted in Gothic architecture, as we learn in S21. By talking in S21 about 'a to us unknown end (*Zweck*)' Schopenhauer concludes his departure from Kant, specifically, Kant's notion of architecture serving and expressing a 'purposiveness without (known or definite) purpose', a point he fully elaborates in S22. With that passage, Schopenhauer anticipates Ruskin's ethical demands on 'truth to materials' and 'truth to construction'. However, he is considerably clearer than Ruskin that such demands do not, as such, express demands on *truth*, but on *sincerity*.⁴⁹⁵ That is why Schopenhauer's emphasis in S22 is on appearance, fiction, and deception – not on speaking falsely or lying as such. Schopenhauer's ethics of architecture, then, differs from Ruskin's on this point.

However, to understand the ultimate foundation of Schopenhauer's remarks on the comparative merits of non- and Gothic architecture, and the relative justification of architectural ornament, we need to attend in greater detail to his positive, not just negative, views on architecture.

§7.2.5 POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES: BEAR AND LOAD, AND THE THESIS OF 'SEPARATION'

Since, to repeat from §7.2.3, architecture is not to express *human* purposes or ends, it can only express its own (architectural) ends or themes, and that (as we saw earlier) is the conflict of bear and load. But it has to do that in a certain way.

Firstly, there is the aforementioned demand for displaying the conflict resolution in retardation, and not by the most direct means, as these may risk the impression of clumsiness. At the same time, architecture is (as we saw in the previous section) to follow nature's command, and attain goal-directedness by efficient, fairly direct means (S23). Schopenhauer's somewhat conflicted views on this point, on directness and its avoidance, become clearer once we attend to other positive features of his account (specifically on the Greek column orders).

Second, as per *WWR* I.§43, architecture must display the 'visible purposiveness of each of its parts' ('augenfällige Zweckmäßigkeit jedes Theiles') in each building, a principle that too follows from architecture's mission to 'follow nature' in being through and through purposive and goal-directed. In that such a mission is to be apparent and visible in each of its parts, Schopenhauer values a highly orchestrated form of compositionality very highly (S24). Further, each of these parts must be displayed in its 'ostensive purposiveness' in a manner that is directly proportional to its own end and that of the whole it is a part of (S25) – a claim reminiscent of material first sketched in §3.4 on firmness and beauty. These are the grounds on which we previously saw Schopenhauer dismiss Gothic architecture – its means to meet ends, such as they are, are convoluted and unclear, its compositional detailing not directed by an all-pervasive, unifying purpose. At a more detailed level, the term 'füglich' here (S24) introduces the aesthetic category of 'the appropriate', or 'das Angemessene', which Schopenhauer gets from Kant's philosophy of

⁴⁹⁵ This is a point on which Plato's *Hippias Minor*, with its contrast of Achilles' speaking falsely (*pseudesthai*) to Odysseus' wilyness is rather clear. Similarly, in Socratic irony one does not speak what one believes, yet does not lie either: see Vlastos (1991, ch. 1).

architecture), and which he relates to nature doing nothing in vain in fulfilling its own design intents, goals, and purposes. In both passages that make that point (S26, S27), ‘Angemessenheit’ is related to functionality and purposiveness.

The idea that each part be particulate and proportional gives rise, finally, to Schopenhauer’s thesis of the visible separation of compositional parts, to render it clear to the bystander which parts serve which loadbearing function. He will call this the principle of separation or ‘Aussonderung’ (S28). A colonnade and a simple wall will likewise display architecture’s general ‘theme’, of load versus bear. But between the two there are many intermediate steps (‘sind viele Zwischenstufen’, S28) in how clearly this is displayed. To be clearly displayed, the elements of load and bear have to be separated (‘Denn im Einem wie im Andern ist der Stoff der selbe, und nur aus der *reinen Sonderung* geht der mächtige Unterschied hervor.’ *ibid.*). In a domed roof (one where, we may presume, the vaulting is not exposed), viewed from the interior, the ‘aesthetic effect’ is greatly diminished because ‘bear and load are not *purely separated* yet,’ but are ‘melted into one another, transitioning into one another’ (WWR II, §35).

From the strength of display, of architecture’s only ‘theme’ (the conflict of bear and load), Schopenhauer concludes the superiority of Classical over any other architecture. For only the colonnade, or trabeated architecture more generally, can be compositionally derived, in its entirety, from that theme or motif, which comprises the (sole legitimate) aesthetic goal of architecture (S29). Schopenhauer is willing to extend that thesis to the detailed composition of Greek columns, as per the Greek orders, as we can see in his discussion of the Ionic and Corinthian orders (S30). This suffices, in Schopenhauer’s eyes, to praise Classical architecture and condemn Gothic architecture on grounds that are not only compositional but also moral (S31).

§7.2.6 SCHOPENHAUER ON RATIONALITY AND *VENUSTAS*

Schopenhauer’s argument, up to this point, has rested, first, on the principle that art serves disinterested contemplation (P1) and that only thereby can art rescue us from suffering (L1), an ethical mission architecture mostly fails to serve in Schopenhauer’s appraisal, as architecture (in its mode of being something other than, or its not yet being, a fine art) is at once confined to utilitarian purposes – which pull us back to self-interest and suffering – and can express the motif of will’s escape, by attention to the ideas of the will and its objectification, only imperfectly and at the lowest level only, of matter’s properties such as bear, load, and (a property that we saw assumes much greater importance in Le Corbusier) the reflection of light. Even so, architecture can contribute its little share of this grand ethical mission, and to do so, it must uncompromisingly serve one thing in particular – the principle of clear comprehensibility and articulation. We already saw in the last section how this demand plays out in the core theme of bear versus load. But Schopenhauer extends the demand, first, to a more general demand, of architecture being ‘rational’, and secondly, to his analysis of architecture’s *formal* beauty, irrespective of materialization.

The first point is expressed in (S32).⁴⁹⁶ The second point, on the rational demand having ramifications in the aesthetic realm beyond the theme of bear versus load, arises when Schopenhauer explicitly investigates the non-material aesthetics of architecture. Even in beginning this part of his argumentation, Schopenhauer insists that *any* aesthetic appreciation of architecture relates to its built form. The model or drawing can never supplant, let alone provide the categories for, our aesthetic appreciation. In this, Schopenhauer once again articulates a founding principle of the tectonic tradition, one that stands in contrast to notions that either place the drawing or the exhibition model at the core of architecture aesthetics (see §4.3). This insistence notwithstanding, it is in the same passage that Schopenhauer

⁴⁹⁶ The passage has a later echo in Boetticher’s idea of Greek architecture as supremely rational (see CHAPTER 8). But Boetticher departs from Schopenhauer in one crucial regard, in that he conjoins the rationality demand to a claim of architecture’s being mimetic, in particular, its mimicking nature also in its forms, which contradicts Schopenhauer (see §7.2.4) as well as Boetticher’s own mentor, Schinkel (see also CHAPTER 8).

introduces the core categories of non-material beauty, to wit, ‘regular form, symmetry, and proportionality’ (S33). The concluding line of that passage puts the emphasis squarely on the ‘principle of clear expression and articulation’ – rendering separate elements visible, thus making the overall building legible and intelligible (in line with the rational demand); Schopenhauer continues along these lines shortly later (S34). Given this principle, however, Schopenhauer claims we can directly conclude the correctness and legitimacy of the ‘regular forms’ (i.e., classical figures, Platonic solids) and Classical proportions (S35). Thirdly, and lastly, Schopenhauer concludes from the same principle of ‘clear comprehensibility and articulation’ Classicist strictures on symmetry (S36). Any architecture, as we learn in the final line of S36, is carried by a ‘main thought’, the articulation of which is the role of the work of architecture itself. But we arrived here by the same principles as from the outset, in particular, the demands on architecture being intelligible, rationally, and forming an individual, telic unit, united by a coherent and consistent display of its core theme, the conflict of bear and load.

§7.3 AESTHETICS AND ETHICS?

An integral part of my thesis’ core agenda is to reveal how the domains of ethics and aesthetics are interrelated, and how much reflection on norms in architectural design and composition have been wrongly classified as exclusively aesthetic (when at least some of them are rather ethical in their own right); or, at least their *grounding* in ethical norms deserves to be brought out more strongly than is currently customary. In these regards, Schopenhauer’s views on aesthetics are highly important, for he too believes that the two domains of norms have several mutual repercussions.

We already saw how Schopenhauer aims to arrive at his core claim – that art is to be essentially *contemplative* – partly from an ethical thesis regarding the sorry state of mankind (its suffering), a state from which art (and hardly anything else) is capable of liberating mankind. If this ‘core claim’ concerns an aesthetic issue, attesting to the correlation of aesthetic with ethical matters, the core claim’s own nature is harder to categorize. Should we regard it as a moral or an aesthetic claim? Perhaps it is a bit of both, thus attesting to how closely related the categories are for Schopenhauer. Whether or not this line of thought can be pursued fruitfully, there are many additional avenues of correlation of ethics to aesthetics in his thought.

First, we already saw the key claim that knowledge of Ideas forms for a subject’s true *knowledge* of the world. The first core ethical value of art, architecture included, is thus an immediate consequence of its *cognitive role*. Knowledge of the world is inherently valuable, but also instrumentally so in guiding us to make ethically correct decisions concerning others and their (and our) place in the world.

This, however, is only true of art or architecture *if* either of them follows Schopenhauer’s strictures. And we already noted several avenues where contemporary architects might want to part company with these design strictures – one, in being conceptual rather than anti-conceptual, and two, in being scenographic rather than object-oriented. It is, however, at least partly unclear to what extent one has to agree with Schopenhauer on those details to still accommodate architecture’s ethical role in providing a deeper understanding of the reality humans inhabit. And, as I hinted at before, much in Schopenhauer’s thought about architecture actually *prohibits* that architecture plays a too dominant role in this, given its austere limits of what it can express. We shall return to this shortly.

Shapshay locates one more ethical significance in art, architecture included. Her remarks here presuppose her understanding, of *the sublime* in Schopenhauer, as an experience that (unlike that of beauty) *not only* enables the subject to enter a ‘will less’ state (thus helping to free the subject from the ‘service of the will’) *but has as an additional factor* that the subject is aware of this being so, resulting in a feeling of *Erhebung über den Willen*.⁴⁹⁷ This enables the subject not only to perceive ‘the world in a non-egoistic manner’, itself an

⁴⁹⁷ Shapshay 2012, §4.3, quoting *WWR* I, tr. 233.

indispensable preliminary to ‘taking a compassionate stance on and acting for the benefit of others’, core ingredients of Schopenhauer’s ethics. What is more, she writes,

the experience of the sublime affords a felt recognition not only of a subject's negative but also of her positive freedom, that is, a freedom to release herself from the service of the will to life. Thus, the self-consciousness involved in sublime experience affords a felt recognition of one's ability to *change* one's attitudes and behavior—actively to turn one's attention away from one's egoistic strivings for a time.

The ethical relevance of the sublime is most apparent in Schopenhauer's treatment of tragedy. In tragedy—the highest degree of dynamically sublime feeling—one is both confronted by terrible truths about the world and existence and elevated by the sense that one is not utterly powerless in the face of it. One comes to the felt recognition that one has the power to *do something* in the face of the tragic nature of the world. [...] It was left to Nietzsche and his grappling with tragedy and pessimism, to question whether affirmation might yet be a defensible option. (2012, §7.2)

Given that the fundamental structure of the world is essentially ‘tragic’ (Shapshay writes of ‘the tragic nature of the world’), it is clear that architecture is nowhere near tragedy’s expressive potential to address such ‘deep issues’ in a meaningful and transparent way. This, as already explained, is especially so given Schopenhauer’s austere restrictions on architecture’s expressive potential, as being systematically debarred from having semantic depth. Secondly, in recognition of architecture’s and music’s expressive restrictions, we may view the efforts of Semper and (Richard) Wagner as *marrying* their respective art forms to the civic and the tragic (form of art, like the tragedy), by building a theatre that *hosts* all the arts. I have in mind, of course, Semper’s Dresden theater (later, opera), and the premieres of Wagner’s operas hosted therein, such as that of *Tannhäuser* on 19 October 1845.⁴⁹⁸

This, then, is Semper’s and Wagner’s concession to Schopenhauer: architecture can never *be* more than brute materiality in conflict with natural forces (above all, gravity) – but it can meaningfully *host* the drama of human existence. And what are Semper’s *Hofgalerie* and *Hoftheater* in Dresden (buildings CHAPTERS 8-9 will discuss) other than this – places that *host* paintings, places that *host* operas, and alongside these, the audience experiencing these aesthetically, with the sense of elation and removal from a world of blunt desires and utilitarian interests, just as Schopenhauer envisaged?

Architecture’s own moral potential, however, is more limited. What we see here is not the moral defeat of architecture considered exclusively with a view to what is strictly its own (architecture as ‘autonomous’), but an acknowledgment of architecture’s ethical limitations. A core lesson of Schopenhauer’s own ethics is precisely the need to observe limits, and not transgress the boundaries of sense. For, on the other side of that boundary lies, not greater moral potential, but greater potential for moral charlatanry. In observing its own expressive and aesthetical limitations, architecture has the greatest potential of staying true to its actual ethical role.

§7.4 SCHOPENHAUER IN CONTEXT: CLASSICIST OR EARLY MODERN?

In marked contrast to Kant, the emphasis in much of Schopenhauer’s thought lies with what Vitruvius called *firmitas*. While some tension remains, of *firmitas* with *utilitas*, a point on which the later tectonic tradition would have to improve on, the notions of *firmitas* and *venustas* are now closely intertwined,

⁴⁹⁸ Richard Wagner was an avowed ‘fan’ of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Kenny (2007, 174) goes so far as to say, ‘one person who was willing to declare himself a disciple of Schopenhauer was the Wagner of *Tristan und Isolde*. As we will see in CHAPTER 8, *Tristan und Isolde* is frequently regarded as the clearest illustration of Schopenhauer’s remarks on chromatic dissonance and the intentional delay of its resolution. Wagner intended that opera to premiere at the Vienna *Court Opera house* (*Hofoper*, today *Staatsoper*), but the premiere was cancelled after 70 rehearsals; the building itself was designed by van der Nüll and Siccardsburg, the most formative influences on Otto Wagner other than Semper himself.

without collapsing into one another. This take on the values in the Vitruvian triad has not always been appreciated in the recent literature. According to Korab-Karpowicz' summary,

The Vitruvian triad is in Schopenhauer [1] reduced to one aspect, *firmitas*, interpreted as structure, [2] from which another aspect, *venustas*, is derived. [3] Although he acknowledges that buildings are usually erected to serve some practical ends, and thus acknowledges the validity of *utilitas*, neither the function nor the use of a building is regarded by him as an aesthetic category. [4] He would thus reject the [modern] Functionalist claim that whatever is not functional is not beautiful.⁴⁹⁹

While I am somewhat unsure what, for Korab-Karpowicz – or Schopenhauer, for that matter – qualifies as an ‘aesthetic category’ in [3], we may agree with him insofar Schopenhauer sides with Kant in contrasting *utilitas* with flatly aesthetic considerations of architecture, which he defines in terms of *venustas* and *firmitas*. This renders the opening statement [1] incorrect, a statement that, if true, would pose Schopenhauer in opposition to the tectonic tradition in one crucial respect – its subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS. On that thesis, none of the three values in the Vitruvian triad are ‘reducible’ or eliminable; rather, they pose three substantive if inter-dependent co-variables that stand in a relation of reciprocity. This does not mean, however, as we see in Schopenhauer, that commitment to such values cannot be derived from elsewhere. As long as their derivation is pairwise distinct – for instance, that what is valuable to *venustas*, is not grounded in what is valuable about *firmitas* – the two values are sufficiently distinct. Their derivation may overlap in parts, or there may even be a joint account that explains the derivation of two values in an overall account that assigns an ineliminable, irreducible place to either value.

This, however, is exactly where Korab-Karpowicz offers us a diverging account, his statement [2]. In light of material touched on in §7.2, however, statement [2] is flatly incorrect. Schopenhauer (following Vitruvius) defines *venustas* in terms of form, proportion, and symmetry, but (in contrast to Vitruvius) derives these notions from the principle of ‘Anschaulichkeit and Fasslichkeit’ (let us abbreviate this as PAF). – And, his definition of architecture as (TU) *telic unity* where each of the parts teleologically coheres/harmonizes with (a) each other and (b) the whole these parts form a part of, recalls Alberti's (§2.7) definition of architectural beauty (‘that of which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be taken’) – a formula Schopenhauer also uses (as I did in §3.4.1) for *firmitas* (no excessive load or bear) – so he derives *venustas* and *firmitas* from the (CP) Ciceronian Principle of ‘nature's spirit’ (*De Off.* III.178; see §3.6.2).⁵⁰⁰ In sum, Schopenhauer (1) derives TU from CP, (2) has *utilitas* inform TU, and finally (3) derives *venustas* and *firmitas* from the union of TU and PAF. Schopenhauer's own articulation of TU occurs at the preface of *WWR I*,

the connexion of these parts [of my work] must (...) be organic, i.e. of such a kind that every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported by the whole, a connexion in which no part is first and no part last, in which the whole gains in clearness from every part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood until the whole has first been understood.⁵⁰¹

If Korab-Karpowicz's analysis of Schopenhauer's relation to Vitruvius is somewhat unclear, and at times flatly incorrect, the same appears to hold for Mitchell Schwarzer's study.⁵⁰² Schwarzer states his main claim at the opening,

⁴⁹⁹ Korab- Karpowicz (2012, 187).

⁵⁰⁰ What these interjections to earlier sections (§2.7, §3.4.1, §3.6.2) mean to signal is just how strongly Schopenhauer must be seen as an early philosophical exponent of the combination of views the present work pushes for on behalf of ‘the tectonic tradition’ more widely.

⁵⁰¹ *WWR I*, viii, quoted *apud* Janaway (1999, 4).

⁵⁰² Schwartz (1996).

Schopenhauer's [WWR] marks the boundary between the classical and modern paradigms of architectural knowledge. (1996, 277)

The challenge is to identify what Schwarzer means by these respective 'paradigms' (I ignore the complication that these are allegedly paradigms, not just of architecture, but of its *knowledge*). As regards the classical tradition, Schopenhauer is made out to reject that tradition because (1) he rejects (or at least, significantly revises) the values in the Vitruvian triad, and because (2) he rejects the thesis – claimed by Schwarzer to be essential to classicism – that all art, architecture included, 'imitates nature'. Lastly, Schopenhauer anticipates the moderns because he champions (3) 'structuralism' and (4) the elimination of ornament as sculptural excess. Let us deal with these claims in turn.

Claim (1) is somewhat unclear. In the editorial, Dale Jacquette describes Schwarzer's essay as follows.

In [(1)] defiance of the three traditional Vitruvian categories of durability, convenience, and beauty, Schopenhauer's theory of architecture as a fine art [(3)] led the way for the overt structuralism heralded by Michel de Klerk and Hans Scharoun, and in the twentieth-century Modern Movement of Le Corbusier and Mies van der Rohe. (1996, 30)

Depending on how much significance we attribute to 'led the way', this thesis either attributes to Schopenhauer a historical influence that current scholarship has yet to demonstrate, or boils down to a claim about historical (factual) precedence with no real consequences of one person influencing the work of another – in which case the allegation is largely without interest. I cannot surmise from the context which of these readings Jacquette intended.

In any case, Schwarzer himself speaks of Schopenhauer's 'transmutation of the three Vitruvian categories' (279), for instance, of *venustas*, where Schwarzer claims, Schopenhauer's

aesthetic substituted the perception of active forces – gravity, rigidity, and cohesion which prevail between structural members of a building – for the earlier reliance upon a comparison of qualities of regularity, symmetry, and proportions within immobile objects. (290)

I am unclear how there is a substitution, instead of a shift of emphasis, in that Schopenhauer, we saw in §7.2.6, actually held on to Vitruvius' definition of *venustas* in terms of proportion and the like. This was, after all, exactly the point on which also Korab-Karpowicz's analysis was found wanting a moment ago.

Again, Schwarzer appears to relate (2) to (4), in saying,

Ornament, as an imitative art, could not possibly embody the artistic essence of architecture. Hence, Schopenhauer wrote that all ornamental work on buildings belongs to the plastic arts and not architecture: 'Ornamental work on capitals, etc., belongs to sculpture and not to architecture, and is merely tolerated as an additional embellishment, which might be dispensed with.' This later phrase, in and of itself, establishes the importance of Schopenhauer's contribution on architecture to the later development of anti-ornamentalism in the theories of Loos and other modern architects. (1996, 289)

But Schwarzer ignores that Schopenhauer does not reject architecture as imitative of nature wholesale. Like Schinkel later, Schopenhauer wants architecture to observe the *spirit* of nature – especially as regards the notion of purposive beauty – but not its *forms*. So (2) is false. Schwarzer's elaboration of (4), in the quote just given, makes an odd juxtaposition to Jacquette's claim on how, in the article, the 'Modern Movement' is to be identified. It is puzzling how Scharoun and Le Corbusier – two anti-tectonic thinkers, who privileged sculptural expressiveness over structural integrity (see CHAPTER 6) – can be identified as heirs of Schopenhauer's propagation of 'structuralism' or 'structural rationalism' (whatever *those* labels are meant to capture). Finally, Loos too, while rejecting ornament not integrated with structural or purposive

concerns, did not call for a rejection of imitative or ornamental architecture *tout court*. Again, the idea that Schopenhauer anticipates Loos on that score is mystifying. Only the relation of Schopenhauer to Mies van der Rohe can be perhaps investigated, in light of Schwarzer's allegation that

Schopenhauer's philosophy of architecture contributed to later modern discourses equating architectural beauty with perceptual immediacy and structural overstatement. (1996, 295)

But this has to be tested against a more detailed investigations of Mies' aesthetic views of the variety I provide in CHAPTER 10, where I also highlight how tricky allegations of thinker *A* influencing architect *B* are, and how recent Mies scholarship has been plagued by an unjustified eagerness to detect 'philosophical influences' in the thought of an architect. I would allege, however, that some of Schopenhauer's basic insights into architectonic composition can be seen to be more fully worked out (mostly independently of him) in contemporary work by Viollet-le-Duc and later writers *within* the architectural tradition, and that these insights, once we abstract issues of authorial attribution, can be legitimately seen as 'exerting influence' on later periods. But that of course requires that we get those insights not only right in their original context (here, Schopenhauer), but also properly understand how the insights feature in later periods, possibly in revised forms. On that latter note, we can see that all of Schwarzer's theses (1) to (4) need to be rejected in their unadjusted form. Instead, we would be on safer grounds to instead proceed on the basis of the following estimation of his.

Despite these seemingly clear directives regarding balance, it is worth questioning whether Schopenhauer's aesthetics of loads and supports amounts to a theory of structural rationalism. Or, did the frequent call of the twentieth-century Modern Movement to over-express structure have part of its origins in Schopenhauer's theory of structural tension?

As we have seen, Schopenhauer frequently alternated his stances regarding architecture between the poles of disinterested artistic contemplation and purposive structural actions. In this regard, the theory of loads and supports led Schopenhauer to proclaim that architecture must produce the simples and most honest forms it can. He stated, after all, that architects must avoid double-columns, broken entablatures, and other decorative redundancies. Still, at the same time, Schopenhauer also advocated structural actions which speak to the psychology of aesthetic perception. His vision of revealing the Idea precluded the direct pursuit of clear, ordered, and measurable structural relations. (1996, 294)

These observations arguably pick out elements in Schopenhauer's aesthetics of architecture. However, it seems fair to say that, *pave* Schwarzer, we need *not* see these elements as pulling in opposite or contradictory directions. The governing principle of Schopenhauer's aesthetics, we saw, is to aid the contemplation of Ideas. Sometimes Schopenhauer's emphasizes the demands of 'will-less' (*willenlos*) contemplation with respect to the subjective end – hence, the principles of contemplation and separation (see §7.2) – and at other times with respect to the objective end, or oriented toward the content of architecture's 'Ideas', sc. gravity, bear, and load. The resulting aesthetics has two emphases, but is internally consistent.

Consistent it may be, viewed with considerable abstraction. But is it compelling?

§7.5. THE HARDEST PROBLEM: INTRINSIC MORAL VALUE?

Now that we have concluded our exposition and appraisal of Schopenhauer's individual views, we must query the relevance of the emerging picture for the overall project of the present work. As I pointed out in §7.2.1, Schopenhauer's core claims, that **(P1)** aesthetics is contemplative and that **(L1)** works of art function and serve as the *expression* of general or 'Platonic' idea, revolve on the redemptive role of experiencing architecture aesthetically. That role, in turn, I suggested should be seen as hypothetical on

several premises Schopenhauer never fully gets round defending. Schopenhauer believes (to repeat), that human life is full of suffering, that perceiving one's deficiencies is self-debilitating, that contemplation of Platonic 'ideas' is a remedy to such self-debilitation, and that art is perfectly capable of aiding such contemplation. I so far bracketed querying how well founded these views are, indeed, how successful their defense is in Schopenhauer's own texts. Viewed as empirical claims about psychology, one could wonder about their factual accuracy and alleged factual inalterability. Viewed as philosophical claims, one could wonder how they would ever underscore normative claims, about human or architectural value, without committing a naturalistic fallacy of sorts. Arguably, one could start from premises shared by other philosophical ethics, such as recent work in the utilitarian tradition on the value of avoiding pain (cf. CHAPTER 2). Maybe the existentially tinged understanding of 'suffering' in Schopenhauer can align with how other models in ethics accord to human suffering (if more mundane forms thereof) a central explanatory and normative role.

Even if all these difficulties pertaining to Schopenhauer's premises could be answered, however, there is a further problem that emerges from Schopenhauer's account, one that arises independently of the psychological, normative or metaphysical premises we have enumerated so far. What is worse, if that further problem remains unaddressed, then the remainder of Schopenhauer's views that directly pertain to architecture, and operate independently of his premises, are plainly irrelevant to, and worse, antithetical to, the main tenets of the CHAPTER 2 framework. I dedicate the rest of this section to this problem. What is it?

Given the material explored in §§7.1-7.2, it seems Schopenhauer shares with Kant at least one shortcoming we noted for Kant in §5.4. If architecture's moral role or moral contribution is exhausted by how it figures in a 'contemplation' of sorts, then (1) it is not so much individual buildings but *experiential episodes* in which they feature that are morally valuable, and (2) the moral value of architecture or individual buildings, if any, seems to be purely *instrumental*.

That is, nothing in Schopenhauer's views, just as in Kant's, licenses us to take moral appraisals of architecture at face value – at least not where such appraisals attribute intrinsic moral value to buildings. The most we can concede is the instrumental moral value of architectural, aesthetic experience or 'contemplation'. This worry seems to remain in place even if Schopenhauer, unlike Kant, has a more differentiated and nuanced story to tell about how architecture figures in this larger account and enters morally valuable states of contemplation. (Though I suggested that much of that story's defense would require considerable resourcefulness.) For, architecture figures rather peripherally here, causally prompting experiences that themselves relate only instrumentally to intrinsic moral values (such as, in Kant, freedom of agency and, in Schopenhauer, freedom or alleviation from suffering). This looks eerily reminiscent of what CHAPTER 1 called 'redescriptivism', and (what the INTRODUCTION called) its 'contextual' or 'instrumental' variants. (It also seems to re-instate a sort of misplaced ascription, to architecture, of value and meaning Schopenhauer himself decried elsewhere. See §7.2.4 on 'projective' propensities triggered by 'associative meanings'.) What can be said to answer this worry?

First, it should be noted (and was in part already argued for in §7.2) that Schopenhauer solves one problem left open in Kant's aesthetics of architecture, and that is, he fills in an account of the *proper aetiology* of the 'experiential episodes' in question in which rather specific types of architectonic composition feature as the sole proper objects or contents of such episodes. I will call such content 'e-content(s)'. Thus, unlike Kant for whom the aesthetically and morally crucial features of e-contents are determined by *properties of the experiential subject* whose content they are (such as, the subject's experiencing disinterested pleasure), Schopenhauer individuates e-content (at least partly) in terms of *the properties of architectonic objects* that figure in such contents. As a result, his overall account is more sensitive to the specifics of architectural composition than Kant.

Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that the intrusion of (what Vitruvius calls) *utilitas* or (we may say) of utilitarian concepts hinders architectural contemplation proper, because the subsumption of buildings

under such concepts are linked for him (as they are for Kant) with subject specific ‘interests’ or wants of self-interest, the gratification of which is entertained or anticipated when contemplating the building.⁵⁰³ Schopenhauer’s attention to considerations of *firmitas*, however, allows him to differentiate the objects that figure in e-contents in a manner that avoids considerations of *utilitas* without relapsing (as in Kant) into a largely non-conceptual individuation of e-contents. That is because Schopenhauer recognizes *firmitas* as a conceptual category of sorts where Kant simply ignored it. As a first step towards answering the worry just stated, then, we should point out how the very contents of the experiential episodes that hold moral value for Schopenhauer are, for him, individuated in terms of the properties of buildings. I explained this more fully in §7.2.2, where I likened the concepts (to be later) subsumed under the heading of *firmitas* to ‘building blocks’ of Russellian propositions, which enables us to individuate e-contents as as Russellian propositions.

As a second step to address our major worry, we require that the *moral value* of a subject’s experiencing e-contents is ‘inherited’, in a manner of speaking, from a value that figures in the e-contents itself. It is of course far from trivial how this requirement can be met, given how elsewhere we sharply distinguish the mental states which we appraise for their intrinsic moral worth – such as states of elation we take to co-constitute ‘happiness’ (and morally appraise as such on utilitarian models – from the causal antecedents of such states, such as a banana or some other delicious object capable of generating the happy state in question. What we require, then, is a view of e-contents on which the buildings that e-contents are about, are *not* the causal *antecedent* of experiencing such contents but, as before, constitutively figure *in* e-contents. And, moreover, it is their figuring in e-contents that gives e-contents the specific qualities, experiential, moral, and otherwise, that e-contents have. I cannot, within the confines of this chapter, work out how one would provide such an account in detail, except to gesture that concrete theories recognizably similar to this account exist in the philosophy of perception elsewhere, and that their adoption for (or rather, translation into) a theory of *aesthetic* experience (moreover, of architecture) is not trivial, but need not begin from scratch either.⁵⁰⁴ Moreover, the view that aesthetic experiences can be defined in terms of the *properties* such experiences represent is not new either, and has been repeatedly explored in Noël Carroll’s work, the main point of which is to get us away from (what he calls) the ‘affect-oriented approach’ bequeathed on the tradition in the writings of especially Hume and Kant.⁵⁰⁵ The findings of CHAPTER 5 should cement just how vital it is, for the aesthetics of architecture to make substantive progress, to leave its Kantian leanings largely behind.

The main idea, then, is that one cannot *substitute* one building *x* in an e-content ϵ (where ‘ ϵ ’ expresses the proposition that ‘...*x*...’) by another one *y* that is ‘surface feature indiscernible’ from *x* without changing the very content of ϵ , where two buildings are ‘surface feature indiscernible’ iff they agree in surface features discernible by a viewer untrained in the specifics of (archi)tectonic composition. Rather, a proper selection of *x*’s features (including but going beyond those discernible to an architecturally untrained viewer) determine the properties of ϵ . An account like this would make the individuation of ϵ ‘aetiologically sensitive’ to *x* (where Kant’s and Le Cobusier’s accounts had failed to do so), without delegating *x* to the mere position of a causal antecedent of ϵ .

⁵⁰³ Given how Schopenhauer’s account here and elsewhere requires the separation of *firmitas* from *utilitas*, he would likely militate against (what earlier chapters called) the RECIPROCITY THESIS which links the two. I address this issue below.

⁵⁰⁴ I have in mind here the ‘relational’ as opposed to ‘causal’ theories of perception that have gained so much traction in the last decade. For three representative anthologies that discuss the nuts and bolts (as well as advantages and drawbacks) of such theories, see Gendler and Hawthorne (2006), Roessler (2011), and Haddock and Macpherson (2011). Nanay (forthcoming) attempts to merge the two literatures, but seems to me to err in thinking that when aesthetic philosophers talk about which properties aesthetic experiential episodes ‘represent’ they have the theoretically very demanding notion of ‘representation’ in mind that operates in the philosophy of perception (specifically, the work of Susanna Siegel and Richard Price).

⁵⁰⁵ Carroll (2002, 2006/2012).

That is the first step. The second step, as before, is that the *moral value* that ϵ has (for any subject experiencing ϵ) is owed, not to the affective response created or triggered by ϵ , but to the very content of ϵ itself. And, since that content is owed to x , the moral value is owed to x . Thus, although the account explains the moral value of buildings by placing both of them in an experiential context, what drives the moral evaluation itself is the building and its features, and not any experiential features accrued to ϵ that have nothing to do with how x is composed. If this view can be sustained – and a lot depends here on the basis on which we attribute to ϵ moral value at all, and which value we attribute to it⁵⁰⁶ – then a view of e-content roughly along Schopenhauer’s (as opposed to Kant’s) lines, need not contravene the most basic explanatory ambition of the FACE VALUE TREATMENT isolated in CHAPTER 2.

But this may precisely require that we revise or even reject Schopenhauer’s view as to *which* moral value attaches to e-content, or *how* it so attaches (namely, experiencing such content provides a momentary escape from a world of oretically oppressive ‘appearances’, from our slavery to the will and self-gratification). In that case, the major lesson to be carried forward is how Schopenhauer individuates e-contents, that is, individuates what goes into an aesthetic experience of architecture. But we would reject his moral evaluation of e-content itself. If so, that is perhaps how it should be, in that we appropriate from Schopenhauer the very parts of his views on architecture that depart most decisively from Kant, and reject those parts where his views present at best minor variants of Kant’s views.

If, for instance, the major *moral value* of e-content is closely aligned with its *cognitive dimension*, and the added insight e-content brings to our understanding of the world, we can value that insight intrinsically. For the having of the insight, unlike any escape from ‘suffering’, seems to be an intrinsic rather than a consequential feature of experiencing e-content. And the moral value disclosed in such cognition would be precisely *of the architecture* figuring in e-content. That is, experiencing e-content would both *hold* cognitive value of a morally significant variety, and *disclose* moral value in the things ‘unlocked’ by e-content. That is precisely why a properly analytic, conceptually articulate, understanding of buildings and their compositional features would be directly relevant to both sets of values, cognitive and moral. For e-content would lack either variety of value if it were not informed by such understanding and instead differentiated buildings more coarse-grainedly (up to equivalence in surface feature indiscernibility, for instance). And this would constitute a view of experiencing architecture on which the central tenets of the FACE VALUE TREATMENT are not simply preserved, but figure rather centrally. One could even argue that the central features of the ‘view’ rely largely on getting the properties of buildings right, since it is those properties that indirectly feature in e-content and *explain* why e-content has the direct and indirect moral value it has. So far from pulling in opposite directions, then, a thoroughly revised and re-appropriated version of Schopenhauer’s claims about architectural experience support the FACE VALUE TREATMENT accorded to moral appraisals of buildings in CHAPTER 2. Going forward, we have to see how this combination of views fares when juxtaposed to concrete buildings.

That is, if the past three chapters have displayed a ‘pillage and plunder’ attitude towards some pretty significant thinkers on architecture, the next three chapters will use contemporary analytic and historical work on buildings to refine and test the combination of views now unearthed. Here is one such instance. Among those ‘views now unearthed’, consider again the ‘main idea’:

One cannot *substitute* one building x in an e-content ϵ (where ‘ ϵ ’ expresses the proposition that ‘... x ...’) by another one y that is ‘surface feature indiscernible’ from x without changing the very content of ϵ , where two buildings are ‘surface feature indiscernible’ iff they agree in surface features discernable by a viewer untrained in the specifics of (archi)tectonic composition.

⁵⁰⁶ For instance, the moral value must attach to the e-content of ϵ , and not to a causal consequence attendant to a subject’s experiencing ϵ . I have in mind here Aristotle’s distinction (as per Terence Irwin’s exegetical work) of whether intellectual contemplation and/or phronetic actions are *causally conducive to* or *co-constitutive of* what Aristotle deems to be morally (most and inherently) valuable, namely, the good life.

This contrasts cases where we differentiate buildings more coarse-grainedly, up to equivalence in surface feature indiscernibility. As an example of what falls outside such indiscernibility, we can consider the masonry bonds in Mies van der Rohe's *Haus Lange* studied in CHAPTER 10. How is this relevant? A classic study on the aesthetic discernibility for two *surface feature indiscernible* art objects is provided by Arthur Danto when he discusses a whole series of paintings, each 'not to be told by naked inspection from a bare red expanse of red' of certain proportions (1981, 3). Danto locates the discernibility of such objects in the meaning they accrue from avid interpreters, a meaning that cannot be said to 'inhere' in the object except once we begin to individuate it well beyond its narrow range of intrinsic features (cf. also Danto 1964).

Now, I similarly allege that avid architectural interpreters can locate discernible features where an untrained eye fails to – for instance, by reading off three dimensional properties from masonry bonds and other properties buildings have, with the aforementioned *Haus Lange* being a case in point. This stance, however, differs from the one Danto puts forward in that buildings, unlike paintings, have depth and (spatial as well as constructional) interiors often *legible* from their surface. The features discerned here by architecturally trained viewers' sensory modalities are very much properties *of the building*, not the interpreter. And this underscores that a proper understanding of Π is of central importance to perhaps not only an ethics of architecture, but also an ontology and aesthetics thereof. At the same time, it is important to not get too far ahead of ourselves. As emphasized throughout the thesis, a proper individuation of what goes into Π is *constrained*, in the present work, by considerations that at best only partly relate to aesthetics. What a set of Π looks like that is *solely* constrained by such considerations, then, is one of many tasks left to future work.

§7.5.1 FROM HEDONIC EQUIVALENCE TO OBJECT-DRIVEN AESTHETICS

My claim is that the value of a work of art as a work of art is intrinsic to the work in the sense that it is (determined by) the intrinsic value of the experience the work affords. It should be remembered that the experience a work of art offers is an experience *of the work itself*, and the valuable qualities of a work are qualities *of the work*, not of the experience it offers.⁵⁰⁷

After completing the current chapter I became acquainted with views of Jerrold Levinson and James Shelley that touch on §7.5's core problem – the intrinsic moral (and other) value of aesthetic experience – and a whole body of literature they build on. Broadly, there is the difference of whether to account for the *nature* of 'the aesthetic', and for aesthetic *value*, in terms of (A) the *object* of aesthetic experience, or features of that object (this being the view I favour), *or* whether to account for either in terms of (B) *experiential* features afforded by attending to such objects in a distinct (it is claimed, aesthetic) manner. Various labels abound for those views, and combinations thereof, but 'externalist' and 'objectualist' are common labels for the former, and 'internalist' and 'experientialist' (or even 'empiricist') common for the latter type of view.⁵⁰⁸ For instance, on an experientialist position on both issues, (architectural) art works

are given for appreciation in an experiential encounter with a perceptible entity [...] and artistic value is essentially a matter of the kind of experience elicited in such an experiential encounter.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁷ Budd (1995, 4-5) *m italics in original*. For Budd's more recent views on the issue, see his (2008, 46): 'An aesthetic value – a positive value – of an item is a relation among its elements, or a higher property of it, as realized in the item, is fit to make the perception or imaginative realization of it intrinsically rewarding. An item's overall aesthetic value is its fitness to make the perception or imaginative realization of it intrinsically rewarding in virtue of the ensemble of the relations among its elements, its higher-order properties as realized in, and in the interrelations of these.'

⁵⁰⁸ The key representatives of the objectualist view and experientialist view are respectively Noël Carroll and Jerrold Levinson. See Carroll's (2000) and (2005/2008), and Levinson (2015a, 2015b). An older representative of experientialism is Monroe Beardsley: 'a work of art is [...] an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked aesthetic character', and 'The aesthetic value of *X* is the value that *X* possesses in virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic gratification when correctly experienced.' (1982, 299 and 26).

⁵⁰⁹ Davies (2005, 22).

A systematic inquiry into the internalist/externalist literature is beyond the confines of the present work. Instead, the remainder of CHAPTER 7 will more narrowly focus on specific views of Levinson and Shelley.

Here is how Shelley sets out the issue. On aesthetic value experientialism (or ‘internalism’),

an object has aesthetic value insofar as it affords valuable experience when correctly perceived. This view [...] has come to be called empiricism about aesthetic value, given that it reduces aesthetic value to the value of aesthetic experience [...]. But] there is something odd about the position that combines externalism about aesthetic experience [\sim (I)] with empiricism about aesthetic value [(II)]. Externalism [\sim (I)] locates the features that determine aesthetic character in the object, whereas empiricism [(II)] locates the features that determine aesthetic value in the experience, when one might have thought that the features that determine aesthetic *character* just are the features that determine aesthetic *value*.⁵¹⁰

Instead, Shelley asks us (in line with the sentiment that got us from I to \sim I) ‘to insist on sharply distinguishing between the value of experience and the experience of value’ (ibid.) We get there by asking, and examining standard answers to the question, ‘What makes aesthetic value *value*?’. According to Shelley, most current literature defaults to a hedonism on which ‘the aesthetic value of an object is [the intrinsic] value it has in virtue of some pleasure it gives.’⁵¹¹

More formally, let us refer to the aesthetic object that an experience is about as b , and that experience as ϵ . Let us define the pleasure attendant on ϵ as a phenomenal quality or *qualia* Q , akin to Tom Nagel’s notion of ‘what it is like’ to be in a certain mental state. Then the aesthetic *value* of an aesthetically experienced object b accrues solely from the pleasure Q attendant on ϵ .

HEDONISM. An experiential state’s value to the state’s subject lies *solely* in the pleasure the subject takes in the state. The force of ‘solely’ here is: pleasure is the only *intrinsically* valuable thing there is. Things that *have* or *give* pleasure are *instrumentally* valuable.

AESTHETIC HEDONISM. The aesthetic value of an aesthetic experience ϵ accrues *solely* from Q attendant to experiencing ϵ , and *not from anything else* such as ϵ ’s content or the objects (art works) b that figure in ϵ .

Shelley’s challenge to AESTHETIC HEDONISM requires the introduction of the notion of hedonic equivalence.

HEDONIC EQUIVALENCE. Two states are *hedonically equivalent* if the pleasure Q they give rise to those experiencing them is one and the same.

As stated, this definition means to leave open whether to ‘equivalent’ pleasures are *qualitatively* indiscernible in every respect, or only in ‘how much’ value a subject accords either one of them. I return to this below.

Given the postulate of HEDONIC EQUIVALENCE it follows that, on AESTHETIC HEDONISM, the aesthetic value of any aesthetic experience is defined up to hedonic equivalence. But this means that two experiential states are of the same aesthetic value regardless of (1) whether they are of two otherwise very different objects (say, two buildings with highly divergent compositional properties) or (2) whether only one of them is of an object at all and the other is a ‘phantom experience’, as long as these states are hedonically equivalent. As long as the same Q is involved or triggered, it does not matter if, as in (2), one of the states is induced by a drug. Shelley writes:

If the experience of an artwork is the experience it is because it is of the artwork [...] it may then be granted that nothing other than *that* artwork can afford *that* experience. But from this it does

⁵¹⁰ Shelley (2013c), §2.4.

⁵¹¹ Shelley (2014).

not follow that nothing other than *that* artwork can afford an experience having *that* value. If the experience of the artwork has the value that it has because of its phenomenal character, but is not the experience it is because of its phenomenal character, then there is no reason why some other experience, one afforded by something other than the artwork – a drug, perhaps – cannot have the same phenomenal character and so have the same value. But then the artwork and the drug have the same value and the value is evidently separable from the artwork[.]⁵¹²

Let us call this last claim the DETACHMENT THESIS – it merely restates something implicit in AESTHETIC HEDONISM:

DETACHMENT THESIS. *Q* is ‘separable’ or ‘detachable’ from ϵ and/or ϵ ’s object *b* in that *Q* can be *enjoyed independently* of either of them (causal independence), and/or *Q*’s character or nature can be *defined independently* of either of them (definitional independence).

This is reminiscent of the position we looked at in CHAPTER 5 and §7.5, on which the aesthetic value of buildings is highly coarse-grained, in that it does not differentiate across different buildings or sets of their compositional properties. To avoid this conclusion, as I think an aesthetics of architecture – specifically, an explanation of why buildings have the aesthetic value they do – ought to, the clear minded exposition of Shelley’s argument enables us to discern where exactly we should part company with him to avoid his conclusion. There are several possibilities.

Possibility 1. Whether *Q* and ϵ (or ϵ ’s object *b*) are extrinsically related is not necessarily determined by whether *the value that accrues to Q* is extrinsically related to ϵ (or ϵ ’s object *b*). To infer one from the other appears to be an error in Shelley’s reasoning, as pointed out (in another connection) in Levinson’s attempt to tease apart, albeit fleetingly, instrumental and extrinsic *value*.⁵¹³ For instance, at *Republic* 358b-d, Plato distinguishes goods into three classes, according to how they are ‘(ap)praised’. Some are praised for themselves, others for their consequences, and others yet for both. Whereas many translators render the first class of goods as talking, for instance, of ‘justice in and by itself’, Plato’s Greek at 358d2-3 actually suppresses the noun at that point and attaches the crucial ‘by itself’ qualifier to the verb. Thus, Plato’s character ‘Glaucón’ says, of justice,

(I wish) to hear <it> praised by itself (βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι).

Hence, ‘by itself’ does not qualify the object of praise but the mode of praising it, and while these two in actual practice often coincide, they need not. If I praise Michael at the exclusion of praising all other students in class, that need not mean that I praise Michael for his intrinsic qualities, or vice versa. What is more, justice is to be praised for its own sake, and not for the sake of its attendant causal consequences. Again, this need not mean that Glaucón expects to hear of (all and only of) justice’s intrinsic properties. For, it might be the case that some of the consequences to justice are intrinsic to it, a point we can express in Humean terms, as a rejection of the idea that all of justice’s ‘consequences’ exist distinctly from it, or are externally related to it.⁵¹⁴ And, finally, it may be that some of justice’s non-causal features, relevant to *Rep.* II in that they do not fall under its causal consequences, are actually extrinsic features of justice.

Possibility 2. Redefine *Q* so it is no longer (solely) a phenomenal quality but a subjective preference. As a result, the *value* accruing from ϵ or *b* lies less in the intrinsic quality of either, than in a preference over a phenomenal state. This treatment of pleasure would be analogous to how Parfit treats pain when he writes:

⁵¹² Shelley (2010, 710). For earlier criticisms of the experientialist account of aesthetic value see Sharpe (2000) and Goldman (2006).

⁵¹³ Levinson (2004).

⁵¹⁴ Irwin (1977, 300n.52).

When we are in pain, what is bad is not our sensation but our conscious state of having a sensation that we dislike.⁵¹⁵

This would mean Shelley's *statement* of hedonism is mistaken, and a correct formulation would be:

The aesthetic value of an object *b* to a subject *S* is the value *b* has in virtue of some pleasure *S* takes in *b*.

While this reformulation addresses some further problems – for instance, our ability to derive aesthetic value from objects which do not give us a *pleasant* sensation (rather than one that, for purely personal preferences, happens to be a *pleasing* one to us) – it does not address the key problem of §7.5. If anything, the aesthetic value of *b* is entirely instrumental still, a consequence Parfit himself accepts in full (departing, as he observes, from work in the field that assigns *intrinsic value* to *Q*). Following on his discussion of pain, he states (*ibid.*),

Similar remarks apply, I believe, to many aesthetic experiences. It is sometimes claimed that we have reasons to enjoy, or be thrilled or in other ways moved by, great artistic works. In many cases, I believe, this claim is false. We can have reasons to want to enjoy, or to be thrilled or moved by, these artistic works. But these are not reasons to enjoy, or to be thrilled or moved by, these works.

While a full discussion of this position would take us too far afield (and is, as just stated, irrelevant to §7.5's core concern), I should point out the following. Parfit here employs his very demanding notion of 'responding to a reason', a notion that comes with it that failing to so respond paints the agent as irrational. It then follows instantly that there are no *reasons* to respond aesthetically to works of music or architecture, since failing to so respond to them can never issue in justified charge of irrationality. Since value, for Parfit, is bound up with such *reasons*, such works are devoid of value.

What is unclear is how Parfit's position lines up against other positions in aesthetics that go for a more moderate (more permissive) form of rationalism. John McDowell or Michael Slote, for instance, would not dream of claiming that failing to respond to an aesthetic work in certain ways can ever issue in charges of irrationalism. In fact they claim the opposite, and make room for a notion of an agent's 'being rational' and 'responding to (aesthetic) reasons' that escapes that charge.⁵¹⁶

Possibility 3. Reject the DETACHMENT THESIS. This seems to be Jerrold Levinson's own preferred solution. He postulates that *Q* itself is defined in terms of *b*. For instance, if listening to the second movement of Beethoven's *Eroica* provides 'immersion in grief', then the experienced quality is so specific that no other object could provide it.⁵¹⁷ Levinson writes:

Aesthetic appreciation of art thus always acknowledges the vehicle of the work as essential, and never focuses merely on detachable meanings and effects.⁵¹⁸

A related point emerging from Levinson's work on aesthetic pleasure is to claim that aesthetic experience is more *active* on the experiencing subject's side than consumption. This rules out clause (2) above, but can be bracketed here, as it does not tell against the larger argument for HEDONIC EQUIVALENCE in clause (1). (Formally: the supposition was that if *x*'s aesthetic value accrues from a causal upshot of *x*, sc. *Q*, then the same value could be derived from some *y* that is a duplicate of *x* as regards *x*'s causal profile; and Levinson's rejoinder does not tell against the larger argument, but only against specific instances of *y*.)

The problem with Levinson's response, however, seems to me that it only tells us *at which point* we should resist Shelley's argument, but it does not tell us *why* we can resort to this resisting. That is, Levinson says

⁵¹⁵ Parfit (2011, 54).

⁵¹⁶ For the basic point, see McDowell (1998a, 1998b); for its application to aesthetics, cf. McDowell (1998c).

⁵¹⁷ Levinson (1992, 303-304).

⁵¹⁸ Levinson (2009, 122). The point recalls a passage from Davies that Levinson references in his (1992, 306n.18).

that we ought to reject the DETACHMENT THESIS but does not tell us what licenses him to do so. But the dialectical importance of rejecting the DETACHMENT THESIS was never in doubt: its philosophical feasibility of doing so was. Compare David Davies (2005, 25):

We will also have to tie the [art]work to the [aesthetic] experience in an intimate manner to avoid a purely instrumental conception of artistic value. It would surely be unacceptable to maintain that artistic value consists in some *detachable* experience elicited by a work, which we could imagine being elicited in other ways. The experiences must be properly grounded in experienced qualities of the work, and they must be inseparable from engagement with the work so that a proper characterization of the experience in question cannot be given without referring to details of the work.

Shelley's challenge in effect is to philosophically spell out what 'properly grounded' and 'inseparable from' amount to, as opposed to simply employ them in assertive contexts. How could we begin to do so?

The crux of the problem, as I see it, is that HEDONIC EQUIVALENCE is defined over 'pleasure' as a qualia, and this opens the floodgate to what P. F. Strawson once called 'massive duplication', on which purely descriptive content, no matter how elaborate, true of one corner of the universe (x) could be just as true of another corner y as long as y is qualitatively identical to x . Strawson's own position was to say that some content is not purely descriptive but invokes singular reference to x (or things in x). In the same vein, John Campbell has in recent years urged for a *relational* rather than *representational* view of perceptual experience ϵ on which the object x of ϵ is not only a causal antecedent of ϵ but also a constituent of ϵ 's content.⁵¹⁹ So it seems to me that, to be able to reject Shelley's argument at the juncture he recommends, Levinson would have to revise his individuation of aesthetic pleasure Q . Otherwise Shelley's point still follows, namely that *if* a thing x 's aesthetic value accrues from a causal upshot of x , sc. Q , then the same value could be derived from some y that is a duplicate of x with respect to x 's causal profile.

In response, Levinson has offered the following:

[W]hat I would now say about that issue is something like this: What's distinctive of the experience of a musical piece P is not a pure phenomenological quality of feeling *per se* but the compound experience of something like the emotional feeling conveyed, expressed, or evoked by the music *together with* the very specific perceptual-affective experience of following the music's hearable specific structure, i.e. the way note follows note, chord follows chord, etc. And so the pleasure or satisfaction connected to that compound experience is a totally individual one (leaving aside the idea of indiscernible clones of the piece in question, if that even makes any sense).⁵²⁰

In short, all we need to afford us a rejection of the DETACHMENT THESIS is a negation of its underlying premise – that Q is defined as a purely phenomenal quality. And that seems right to me, in that one can discern its status as an argued premise in Shelley's work more widely.⁵²¹ The net effect is to undermine the argument from HEDONIC EQUIVALENCE, since the object b is now ineliminably *constitutive* of the content experienced ϵ , so that replacing b by a qualitatively (phenomenally, hedonically, or experientially) indiscernible one does not preserve ϵ 's content *salva significatione*. And that was the key move in §7.5, the net result of which is a *prima facie* strong case for adopting an object-driven aesthetics of architecture.

Even so, some problems remain. As Shelley pointed out,⁵²² the precise relation of Q to b has been only broadly categorized, not explained, and the precise relation of either to aesthetic value still remains to be explained. In his estimate, the 'default theory' outlined above could rely on a straight forward explanation

⁵¹⁹ See the references in §7.5, 224n.504.

⁵²⁰ P.c. with author (4 June 2014).

⁵²¹ See Watkins and Shelley (2012, 344) about 'phenomenal character', which also repeats Shelley's (2010) indiscernibility argument from drug-induced experiential states.

⁵²² P.c. with author (11 June 2014).

of *b*'s aesthetic value, by virtue of the intrinsic value pleasure has (or is alleged to have). For all its faults, hedonism provides a straightforward story and explanation of aesthetic value, and by giving up hedonism we also give up some of its explanatory gains. But that, I take, is not a refutation of the object-driven alternative pursued here, only the (justified) call for further work spelling out its presuppositions in greater detail.

And finally we may always allow for (an architectural analogue based on) Hume's argument sketched in §3.7.1, on which compositional properties of buildings do not suffice to yield aesthetic value *unless* supplemented by the attendant pleasure upon experiencing them. That is certainly fine and well, but seems if anything to underscore that such compositional properties can easily be *part* of a bipartite theory of aesthetic value, on which the properties (tied as they are by singular reference to the buildings whose properties they are) are *co-constitutive* of aesthetic value, with pleasure being the other constituent. (As before, the structure of the argument is easily transferable to *moral* value.)

Let us refer to these constituents – properties and pleasure – as respectively (1) and (2). Here is Shelley's latest response, which which I close.

First, to take one step backwards, what is the motive for saying that the object's value is the inseparable comb[ination] of (1) and (2), as opposed to simply (1)? (1) gets you inseparability from the object, which we all agree we need. So what is pushing us to the comb[ination]? That's what I'd like to know. Is it that (as Levinson said during the Q&A of my paper [30 May, 2014]) that (1) just can't be valuable on its own. Why not? What's to stop it? Just what are the metaphysical worries that push us from (1) to the combo?

Focusing simply on (2), what reason have I to prefer a non-detachable pleasure from an equally intense, durable, etc. detachable one? It is here I think Levinson et. al. have no explanation. If the answer is because it's pleasure in something valuable, that just seems to show that the object is already valuable in virtue of (1) so why add (2)? If the answer is that the combo just is valuable in a way that neither (1) or (2) is on their own and *we can't say why*, then I say that's not a value explanation, but the refusal to give one.

To say that [an artwork] *O* is valuable because pleasurable is a perfectly good value explanation. It's just that that value is detachable, and therefore not aesthetic value.

To say that *O* is valuable because beautiful (where *O*'s beauty supervenes on some set of *O*'s non-value properties) is a perfectly good value explanation. And that value is not separable from the object. So why budge from this position?

To say that *O* is somehow valuable because of the combination of *O*'s non-value properties and pleasure is not to give an explanation of value. The *somehow* is precisely what is explained in the other two cases.⁵²³

The penultimate paragraph is exactly the position I pursue, and urge others to adopt, in the present work. While it may require further detailing and substantiation in the future, it is an encouraging sign that, dialectically speaking, pre-eminent aesthetic philosophers offer plenty of encouraging signs that, if anything, such a position will regain currency and status it lost in earlier centuries. As I say in §11.2, there is yet hope that the aesthetics of architecture may move robustly beyond Kantian leanings, and locate the primary values of architecture – cognitive, moral, and aesthetic – in the properties of individual buildings, in line with my two-step model in CHAPTER 2.

⁵²³ P.c. with author (16 June 2014).

§7.5.1.1 HUME AND SHELLEY ON AESTHETIC VALUE

As far as Shelley's own line of reasoning is concerned, two points remain to be made. (I offer them for completeness' sake – my own argument is already over with §7.5.1.)

First, commenting on Hume's claim (more fully quoted in my §3.8) that,

Till such a spectator appear, there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and proportions: From this sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty.⁵²⁴

or similar statements in Hume's essay 'On the Standards of Taste', sc.

Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each imnd perceives ad iffereent beauty. [...] To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter.⁵²⁵

Shelley comments as follows: Hume is 'confused', since 'he lacks a notion of supervenience. The beauty is not in the any of the parts or members nor in the way they are positioned but supervenes on this.' Add to this, says Shelley, 'the bad inference that many early moderns [made] about the nature of secondary properties, i.e., that they do not belong to the object', or that 'the beauty we perceive is not in the object', and there is little reason to be impressed with Hume's argument here; whatever aesthetic views *are* 'worth defending in Hume requires' us not to defend any of these inferences.⁵²⁶

In part, then, Shelley really wants to reject certain readings of Hume, and in fairness, it appears my own reading (begun in CHAPTER 3) seems to be among them. If so, a revised understanding of Hume, especially one where secondary qualities may be said to be *in* and *of* the object, would be more sympathetic to much I say in this thesis.

Second, the position that comes out most favourable among the above three, sc.

To say that *O* is valuable because beautiful (where *O*'s beauty supervenes on some set of *O*'s non-value properties) is a perfectly good value explanation. And that value is not separable from the object.

also transpires from Frank Sibley's work which 'speaks of properties whose tout court attribution to an object implies that the object has value. Such properties – beauty, sublimity, elegance, eloquence, etc. – are (in my terminology) transparently value-making', says Shelley.⁵²⁷ For Shelley, non-moral and non-aesthetic properties of an object on which its aesthetic (or, I would add, moral) value supervene however are not 'transparently' value-making, but only opaquely so.

How would this distinction, provided it is a valid one and categorizes the properties in my variable Π as *opaquely* rather than *transparently* value-making, affect the wider gist of my argument, both here in §7.5 and more generally? It appears I would have to argue that opaque value makers confer intrinsic aesthetic value on their bearers, and that whether a value confers value opaquely or not, is simply a matter of how we *describe* it (intensionally). Shelley's opaque/transparent distinction does not, in my view, pick out a referential distinction in the realm of values, as marking two different sets of values (or of relations of 'conferring value'), just as one and the same mental state may be picked out by physicalist language (C-neurons firing) and phenomenal language (pain). Shelley responds to this challenge as follows:

Suppose my son is about to touch an exposed electrical wire, and I tell him: 'Don't touch that or you'll be in a state in which your C-neurons fire!'. In one sense I have explained to him why he shouldn't touch the wire. In another sense (the one I care about) I haven't explained this to him,

⁵²⁴ Hume (1998, 162); cf. Hume (2011, 832-833)

⁵²⁵ Hume (1757/1999, 248); see Shelley (2011, 2013b).

⁵²⁶ Shelley, p.c. (25 June 2014).

⁵²⁷ Shelley, p.c. with author (16 June 2014), referring to Sibley's 'General Reasons and Criteria in Aesthetics'.

since I haven't explained to him why it is undesirable to be in a state in which your C-neurons fire. It belongs to the nature of the kind of value-explanation I am interested in that it give anyone who understands it a reason to act (in a broad sense of 'act'). So if I tell someone a building is proportioned in such and such a way this by itself gives them no reason to look at it – unless of course I tell her it is proportioned such that it is beautiful. Then - assuming she believes me – she has a reason to look.⁵²⁸

Shelley's example with the electrical helpfully highlights a familiar point about multiply realizable properties more generally, and it had not occurred to me so far to view his distinction in light of it. To quote an observation of John McDowell's which applies to any (however weakly reductionist) variety of property correlation between two property types *F* and *G*, no matter how we terminologically label it and theoretically spell it out ('the *F*s are realized by the *G*s', 'the *F*s are grounded in the *G*s', 'the *F*s supervene on the *G*s'):

However long a list we give of the items to which a supervening term [*F*] applies, described in terms of the level supervened upon [*G*], there may be no way, expressible at the level supervened upon [*G*], of grouping just such [*F*]-items together. [...] Understanding why just those [*F*]-terms belong together may essentially require understanding the supervening term[.]⁵²⁹

Sidney Shoemaker raises a similar point about colours - and the context is a phenomenological individuation of colour properties on which they are, at least partly, individuated in subjective seemings to humans:

The scientific evidence seems to indicate that the microstructural properties associated with particular colors are a highly diverse lot. If we are to identify redness, or some determinate shade of it, with a physical property, that property will have to be a highly disjunctive one. And what gives unity to the disjuncts will not be anything about their intrinsic physical nature that makes them a 'natural kind,' but rather their relation to creatures with perceptual systems like ours. What links all of these various microstructural properties together, as 'realizations' of a single shade of color, is the fact that they are alike in their effects (that is, the effects of their instantiation in appropriate circumstances) on creatures having perceptual apparatus like ours.⁵³⁰

Suppose we replace Shoemaker's reference to 'particular colors' with 'particular aesthetic properties', and 'perceptual systems' with '(human) sentimental nature'. We would then arrive at a position that sounds very close to what Shelley argues for elsewhere,⁵³¹ and would look as follows (this is not an actual quote).

The non-aesthetic properties associated with particular aesthetic values are a highly diverse lot. If we are to identify beauty, or some particular variety of it, with a non-aesthetic property, that property will have to be a highly disjunctive one. And what gives unity to the disjuncts will not be anything about their intrinsic nature that makes them a 'natural kind,' but rather their relation to creatures with a sentimental nature like ours. What links all of these various non-aesthetic properties together, as 'realizations' of a single aesthetic value, is the fact that they are alike in their effects (that is, the effects of their instantiation in appropriate circumstances) on creatures having a sentimental nature like humans.

The advantage such a view, or something roughly like it, has over Shelley's example of the electric wire and its added constraint on aesthetic explanations being *reason-providing*, is that Shelley's example is arguably extraneous to the metaphysics of aesthetic value. So instead of saying that certain non-aesthetic properties are not reason-providing in the demanding sense Shelley pins on the dyadic relation 'transparently explains the value of', he could argue that non-aesthetic properties are too disjunctive to afford helpful explanations of the variety he is after (namely, transparent ones). To appropriate an

⁵²⁸ Shelley, p.c. with author (June 25, 2014).

⁵²⁹ McDowell (1998d, 202).

⁵³⁰ Shoemaker (1996, 105).

⁵³¹ Shelley (2013b, 148-149).

example of David Lewis's, in which we ask, 'why did the Martian wince?', and we answer 'because his C-neurons fired *or* because certain analogues of C-neurons in Martian physique were active *or* ...' (cue another ten disjuncts of physical realizers of pain-states), we will not have really given a good explanation, one that synchs up with pain's functional role.⁵³²

So the point is about the explanatory unsuitability of *disjunctive* properties, not about the unsuitability of the property's being a *physical* one – or (as in the case we are after) the property's being a non-aesthetic one. That said, when Shelley writes (in the last quoted p.c.),

So if I tell someone a building is proportioned in such and such a way this by itself gives them no reason to look at it – unless of course I tell her it is proportioned such that it is beautiful. Then – assuming she believes me – she has a reason to look.

this does not work for someone who *already understands* that being proportioned in a certain way *is* for that building to be beautiful. Shelley's claim is not entirely irrelevant. But it brings in those typical Fregean scenarios where, of two subjects, only one makes the evening star/morning star connection, such that the failure for a volunteered explanation ('this building is proportioned in a certain way') to make its proper impact on one of the two subjects *purely* becomes a matter of (here: aesthetic) ignorance. And as stated previously, that seems (to me) to confuse an issue that at its core is metaphysical with non-metaphysical considerations – unless, that is, what Shelley is after is not a metaphysics of aesthetic value, but, say, a theory of understanding aesthetic value. That is why I think talk of 'explanation' and so on is so opaque (pardon the pun) - and why even those who bring it in, like Shoemaker and McDowell, also clearly state that theirs is a point about (in Quinean terms) ideology and not ontology. As before, I have a nagging feeling that I differ with Shelley on that point simply because him and I might be after different types of theories; alternatively, that we have different theoretic desiderata in mind when wanting to philosophically account for aesthetic value. Just what is required for a volunteered explanation of aesthetic value to be adequate on this view, and to count as intrinsic rather than extraneous, remains an open issue.

⁵³² Lewis (1986).

CHAPTER 8

SEMPER'S MONUMENTAL ARCHITECTURE: THE VERTICAL DRAMA OF STONE

A work of art not striving towards the monumental (nor wanting to do so) is no work of art. By which I mean: there ought to dwell a spirit in a work of art that enlivens other human creatures and lives on with that work of art, for as long as the matter bearing its form holds up. [...]

In any architecture one should [be able to] see at once how (and whence) that work got made, [for] in the ensuing liveliness there grows from within that architecture its character as architecture and its individual character.

Karl Friedrich Schinkel (1781-1841)⁵³³

§8.1 THE CENTRAL PLACE OF SEMPER IN THIS THESIS

The present work argues that we can take some moral appraisals of buildings at face value, and that we can do so by way of buildings' compositional properties Π . Such properties, CHAPTER 2 alleged, are amenable to moral appraisal in that they can be appraised on moral grounds \mathcal{M} . Subsequent chapters sought to refine a proper individuation (in- and extensional) of Π , and explored candidates for \mathcal{M} . For instance, in the previous three chapters we encountered tectonic and atectonic (or even, antitectonic) individuations of Π , and we encountered moralizations \mathcal{M} of buildings invoking the alleviation of human suffering, free agency as a prerequisite to human wellbeing, and morally significant varieties of cognition of Π . Three issues first raised in CHAPTER 2 have stayed with us since then, in that candidate answers to them have been explored but were found wanting: first, what is a proper delineation of Π , second, what are proper candidates for \mathcal{M} , and third, what is the proper relation between Π and \mathcal{M} .

This and the next two chapters raise the same three issues for the built and written work of Gottfried Semper (1803-1879) and Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969). In either case, I argue, the third issue turns out to be the decisive one, since a proper *calibration* of \mathcal{M} to Π has repercussions for how we properly delineate either one of Π and \mathcal{M} . Such calibration is central to an ethics of architecture, since an ethical discussion of architecture has to focus on how means relate to ends – more precisely, how one uses the means to express and attain certain ends. A moral appraisal of architecture, then, can focus on project specific ends, and on an assessment of how well those ends are actually attained, given the concrete means employed by the project. Thus one has to assess a choice of ends, a choice of means, and how well the two choices mesh or are 'calibrated'.⁵³⁴ The present chapter argues how historical figures like Semper and

⁵³³ Schinkel (1863/2006, 601 and 603), my translation.

⁵³⁴ Much criticism of contemporary architecture seems to care little for the third issue, and prefers to operate on pre-established (and poorly argued) premises on the first two. Charles Jencks laments that in Renzo Piano's *Shard* (London 2012), 'the social and cultural differentiation of a vertical town of 10,000 people is given no articulation, no symbolic expression.' Richard Rogers claims, 'The Shard represents the ideals behind the 'vertical village', with live-work and leisure facilities stacked one on top of another.' Patrick Schumacher says, 'the form is insufficiently motivated. The project seems to sacrifice efficiency for the formal purity of the pyramid. It appears like a simple monument rather than a complex building. [Further,] the tower does not communicate itself enough. Although it stacks up many different uses this programmatic richness is not articulated. The uniform envelope abstracts from this internal differentiation. The project also misses the opportunity to express its subsystems like structure, sun protection, circulation, etc, each offering opportunities for articulated, adaptive differentiation. Such large complex buildings are perfect opportunities to test our design capacity to make architecture speak by making the complexity of these rich urban offerings perceptually palpable and semiologically legible.' (All quotes from Jencks et al. 2012). These all express or presuppose normative claims about what architecture is and expresses. Why the *Shard* should comply with any particular of these norms is left unaddressed – and even which norms are in the offing can only be guessed at in some of the statements.

(his contemporary) Boetticher, as well as contemporary commentators on their work like Kenneth Frampton and Greg Lynn, all disagree on what *ought* to be expressed or pursued. That is, they all differ on the means and ends architecture *ought* to pursue, and that normative question itself, I will show, is frequently (though by no means exclusively) aligned with moral considerations. That, indeed, is a major goal I pursue in the present chapter in §8.3.

However, apart from the *metaphysical* issue of properly individuating ends and means, there is the *epistemological* issue as to the justified ascription of (compositional) means and (moral) ends to specific buildings. The present work is thematically organized around the first issue, and consequently tackles the second issue much less systematically. In CHAPTER 10 I critique the methodological grounds on which certain writers attribute to Mies's buildings certain compositional and moral properties. Such a critique directly pertains to the epistemological issue. But it addresses that issue, as it were, by appealing to a carefully developed delineation of the actual properties we can attribute to Mies's architecture, a point developed by focusing on the first issue, the metaphysical one. In this instance, and elsewhere in the thesis, the epistemological issue is tackled indirectly. There is, for instance, no proper development of a point broached at the close of CHAPTER 7, as to the proper individuation of experientially disclosed content pertaining to architecture. That chapter suggested that the crucial features in an account of such content arise from building's compositional elements, and thus suggested, as before, that most of the epistemological issue is resolved once we get clearer on the metaphysical issue. The present chapter resumes this strategy, and focuses on the metaphysics and ethics of architecture at the detriment of a more direct and systematic treatment of its epistemology. We have to see later if such an omission raises sharp issues further down the road for the aforementioned notion of 'calibration', to which I return now.

As stated, a proper *calibration* of \mathcal{M} to Π for a specific architect's work has repercussions for how we properly delineate either one of Π and \mathcal{M} . A successful (meaningful and true) moral evaluation of a building requires that Π and \mathcal{M} align properly. In just this manner, I will argue in CHAPTER 10 that (a proper subset of) buildings b in the oeuvre of Mies's architecture operate on a fairly *sparse* or *austere* delineation of Π , and that *as a consequence*, permissible instances of \mathcal{M} that render b morally appraisable are accordingly limited in aspiration and content. My main goal with CHAPTER 10, indeed, is to show how contemporary architecture historians frequently pin moral appraisals on Mies's architecture that are not borne out by his buildings' compositional properties. As a result, these moral appraisals have to be evaluated as meaningless or false, and (to the extent they contain redeemable content) are likely candidates for reinterpretation as statements better not taken at face value. For instance, one could attempt to see the moral grounds \mathcal{M} on which such appraisals proceed as more properly attaching to (a) b 's architect as a person, perhaps even to (a') some broader, non-architectural, intention the architect had in mind when not designing b , or to (b) the societal context in which b was constructed or to which b 's architect belonged to (in a sense of 'belonging' that would need to be carefully spelled out). But fine-tuning such options as (a) and (b) is a secondary concern to my work, in that I am not primarily interested in rehabilitating moral statements about buildings that, as my framework shows, have no reputable content when taken at face value.

My primary point with such examples is to stress the importance of the calibration of \mathcal{M} with Π , and to stress that Mies's austere compositionism has ramifications for the breadth of moral appraisal we attach to his work. By contrast, Semper's architecture, this and the next chapter will argue, operates under a considerably more inclusive understanding of what goes into Π , and accordingly permits a wider range of \mathcal{M} to issue in meaningful and true moral appraisals of architecture. But the point in either case, Semper or Mies, is that there is, on this approach, no single correct account of what Π or \mathcal{M} are individually. Correctness conditions attach to the calibration between the two, as such conditions are only constrained by whether or not the respective subset of Π and \mathcal{M} suffice to account for a meaningful and true moral appraisal of a building, taken at face value. There may be *independent* considerations for a correct

delineation of either one of Π and \mathcal{M} , but correctness conditions on those will have to arise from a different (and more substantive) set of constraints, for instance, constraints argued for in §3.4 and §4.3. Thus what I earlier called our first of three issues.

Semper's work, I argue, affords us a highly substantive theory on the correct delineation of Π . This affords us, rather indirectly, a correct delineation of \mathcal{M} , given the desideratum of calibration. Semper's own recorded views on \mathcal{M} , by contrast, are by comparison impressionistic. Like Cicero who explained what would become Vitruvius' preferred term for architectural beauty (*venustas*) in terms of dress and posture (§3.4.2, §3.7), Semper believes 'the aesthetic value' of symmetrically ornamented garb is 'increased by the ethical repercussion it exerts on the adorned individual' with respect to said individual's posture, asking for a gait and posture of dignity.⁵³⁵ Or again, a pretty central compositional element of Semper's, the hearth, is called 'the holy centre around which the [architectural] whole is ordered and designed' and 'the first and most important, the *moral* element of building art.' (V, 55) This anticipates remarks by Frank Lloyd Wright (discussed in §1.6.1), who assigned symbolic power to the hearth as an organizational principle of architectonic composition. My own exposition, however, shall not privilege such statements of Semper's but rather address his normative stance on architectonic design itself. What interests me less, for now, are the precise moral appraisals that Semper pins on concrete architectural elements but, rather, Semper's individuation of Π . Only with Semper's elaborate views on Π in place will I return to which moral appraisals are available *to us*, as contemporary visitors of his works, when we experience them. I shall argue that Semper's delineation of Π falls uneasily between a tectonic and an atectonic stance, but that as a consequence our possibilities of legitimate moral appraisal are greatly enlarged. The real success in Semper's architecture in this regard, I shall argue, is that he follows the very severe strictures of the variety Schopenhauer had argued for, namely to accord *firmitas* a central determining constraint on Π and eliminate any compositional properties (and 'meanings' pinned on them) wholly unrelated to *firmitas*, but that he establishes to *connect* that set of Π to something much broader. In the expanded set of Π , Semper's buildings then relate to all sorts of symbolic content and take a stance on societal questions that surfaces, in particular, in the way his buildings take a stance on a proper urban fabric. While I do not mean to deny that other architects, like Le Corbusier or Mies, pay great attention to how their buildings fit an urban fabric, Semper, I argue, offers us a particularly insightful case to understand how a building's core (compositional) features directly relate to these larger contextual questions. Once these larger contextual matters are properly related to Π , the class of legitimate moral appraisals of a building via Π is itself much larger. In this regard, Semper's architecture, and his recorded reflections on it, help us escape from the narrow constraints on compositionality upheld by the tectonic tradition, while also escaping the flights of fancy into a world of ideas and pleasure unrelated (or, at best tangentially related) to architectural composition that we saw in Kant and Le Corbusier. If Semper, as this chapter argues, succeeds to steer through this Scylla and Charybdis, then he opens up the fairly austere constraints of CHAPTER 2's two-step model (Σ^* +LC) to a much wider sphere of application. In this sense, as before, historical analysis of a concrete writer or architect is offered primarily in service of driving the thesis' primary philosophical ambitions and concerns. And here it serves, as explained before, to underscore how a widening of Π has the likely consequence that a *properly calibrated* set of \mathcal{M} is much larger too.

By the end of the chapter, readers will have seen how exactly Semper preserves *some* of the tectonic tradition's core tenets on how to properly individuate Π while subverting others. This raises the question we raised for Le Corbusier in §6.6-§6.7 – what moral consequences accrue from this? For with Π adjusted and expanded, we can expect \mathcal{M} to be expanded in a similar manner, given the CALIBRATION

⁵³⁵ Semper (1856/1884, 311). I abbreviate Semper's works as follows. I quote by volume and page number from the revised edition of *Der Stil* published in 1878, with an optional prefix 'S'; *Kleine Schriften* by 'KS', and *Vier Elemente der Baukunst* by 'V'. Passages are given in full in a textual appendix at the conclusion of this work, APPENDIX A.3, and in their order of appearance in the present chapter.

CHALLENGE, which scales architecture's moral ambitions upwards or downwards, depending on how rich its compositional basis is. This is a point CHAPTER 9 will take up at much greater length. CHAPTER 9 further documents how Semper's individuation of Π expands ever wider from the type of position championed by Schopenhauer and Boetticher. On top of that, both chapters pursue moral inquiries into Semper's architecture in their own right. CHAPTER 8 closes by responding to a recent allegation that Semper's architecture is unavailable for moral appraisal, and CHAPTER 9 answers a particular challenge on which Semper's urban designs cannot accommodate certain moral features. While these two lines of inquiry are separate, both indispensably contribute to a proper moral appraisal of Semper's architecture – where that includes not just Semper's own buildings and urban designs, but applies to any(one else's) architecture that follows his strictures on architectonic composition. This in place, let us begin to unravel Semper's detailed views on Π .

§8.2 SEMPER'S ANTI-TECTONICISM, PART 1: WRITTEN WORK

In this and the next subsection I document Semper's distance to, and tacit challenge to, the tectonic tradition. The points that emerge will furthermore document the extent to which his work *cannot*, contrary to much recent scholarly effort, be construed as a pioneering *predecessor* to architectural modernism, where that modernism is primarily understood in terms of an architecture dominated by the clear expression of structural support. That dominance, we may argue, can be traced back to Schopenhauer's thought, with early expositions in architectural works by the buildings of Labrouste and Schinkel, the latter bordering on and the former embracing the use of the (then) new medium of cast iron frames.⁵³⁶ By comparison, Semper's influence on this dominant – I would argue, essentially *tectonic* – strand in later modernism is very indirect, and at times militates directly against it.⁵³⁷

If later sections in §8.3 will document Semper's *distance* to the tectonic tradition, it is important to first establish the core tenets of that tradition in the very configuration contemporary to Semper's own work. As I explained in CHAPTER 4, the homogeneity and historic continuity among proponents *within* the tradition should not be overstressed. At the same time, it makes sense to isolate some theoretic core concerns that identify the tectonic tradition's stance as Semper encountered it. To that end, I focus on the work of his contemporary Carl Boetticher.

§8.2.1 SEMPER VERSUS BOETTICHER ON THE CENTRALITY OF 'JOINTS'

The core of Boetticher's views on ethics and tectonics emerges from a passage in *B* 25, where he calls the task to bring 'art forms' to the fore in 'core forms' an 'inner ethical motivation (or reason)'.⁵³⁸ What are these two sets of forms, and what, on Boetticher, constitutes their being properly related so as to satisfy this 'ethical reason'. On major hint we get is to construe the two related as 'husk' to 'kernel', with the former 'cladding' the latter (*B* 25), language that occasioned much recent research.⁵³⁹ Personally, I shall pursue a different exegetical avenue, focusing on the second hint we receive, on which the pair of terms is explained in terms of, respectively '*ornamentum/decoratio*' and '*membrum*' (*B* 25). Before doing so, however, I would like to remind readers of a point that was rather controversial back in §2.3.2, and that is, that the

⁵³⁶ Similarly, a generation earlier, Boetticher and Viollet-le-Duc sought to marry the light frames of Gothic architecture to the new building material of iron (cf. Laudel 1991, 137). See especially Boetticher's 1846 essay, 'Das Prinzip der hellenischen und germanischen Bauweise hinsichtlich der Übertragung in die Bauweise unserer Tage', translated with notes and introduction by Herrmann (1992, 147-168).

⁵³⁷ For a careful study of Semper's actual, and largely non-tectonic, influences on the later modern tradition in Europe, see Nerdinger (2004/2012).

⁵³⁸ Boetticher (1874, 25), 'dieser innere ethische Beweggrund'. I quote from the last re-edition of *Die Tektonik* to be published in Semper's own lifetime. Page references are to volume I by page number and prefixed by 'B' (thus 'B 25'). Boetticher's two-volume study originally appeared in 1844, the introductory parts of which were first read by Semper in 1852.

⁵³⁹ See in particular Oechslin (1994/2004).

very attribution of a specific type of architectonic composition – a tectonic one, one that is *firm* on a highly technical understanding thereof – may itself function analogous to the attribution of a thick moral concept. I called this a TYPE 3 predication of ‘is firm’, and Boetticher’s opening statement about tectonics seems to invoke something very close to it.

Leaving TYPE 3 predications aside, and returning to Boetticher’s further line of thought, here is my exegetical hypothesis.⁵⁴⁰ For Boetticher ornaments and *membra* remain uneasily related in that (contrary to first appearances) *both* are ultimately grounded in core forms. That yields the tectonic tradition’s core tenet, of architectural expressivity or *venustas* being inextricably linked to the notion of structural integrity (*firmitas*) for both its *content* and its *constraint*. That is, *firmitas* broadly delineates a theme as to *what* is to be expressed, and *firmitas* poses the limits of what can be legitimately expressed. In both regards, considerations of *firmitas* go beyond being merely a means to good architecture, but shape the goal or ‘end’ thereof.

What I want to show in this section, then, is that Boetticher’s account focuses on the notion of *membrae*, structural components, and that he follows Schopenhauer in putting the articulation of their relations of structural support (bear and load) to the heart of the matter. Once this articulation is in place, ‘art forms’ are superimposed on top, but the basic design decisions have been put into place – and irrevocably and unalterably so. In this, he poses an opposition to Semper who divorces architectural ornamentation from structural concerns, certainly those expressed in (so-called) ‘core forms’, and who accordingly construes the proper ‘ethical relation’ between structure and cladding in a very different way, as we shall see in §8.3. My key hypothesis, then, is that Semper and Boetticher are two profoundly opposed thinkers on key questions of architectonic composition.⁵⁴¹

Here is Boetticher’s Schopenhauer’ian starting point: architecture is to be *clearly* expressed, for it aids the task of contemplation. His book’s opening on the aesthetic attitude of Greek culture draws special attention to his (entirely correct) characterization of Greek philosophy as a cool, laser-sharp process of thought, to combat the human urge for poetic license and otherworldly ‘enthusiasm’ and sentimentality we would find in German Romantic thought (B 3). Starting from this premise, Boetticher alleges that Greek views on art tolerated no straying from rational means of expression, a view he sees first and foremost at work in the craft of the *tektonikê technê* (B 4), the tectonic art of carpentry, that he alleges stood patron to architecture (*archi-tektôn*) more broadly, from which it inherited the *tektôn*’s refusal to separate design from execution (‘[k]eine Trennung zwischen Erfindung und Ausführung’, B 4), even if the architect originally was only involved in the *overseeing* of construction work (executed by contractors, as in modern times), as Boetticher adds, citing as evidence Plato’s *Politicus* 261c (B 5). This line of thought should be familiar to readers from §4.3.

In terms of *content*, Boetticher next (B 4-5) proclaims that he takes as his starting point Greek religious culture, or, ‘cultic practice’ – an assumption that licenses him (as it would Hübsch in his 1847 work) to regard Greek *temples* as the starting point of all that matters in architectural design. And in terms of *method*, Boetticher states that he aims to deduce the ‘art forms’ we find in that domain of artistic self-expression as governed ‘according to static system, work materials and morphogenesis... in terms of the statics and segmentation (*Gliederung*) of masonry construction’ (B 5). The term ‘*Gliederung*’ is decisive to the development of Boetticher’s overall argument. Thus we find, in his discussion of ‘§2. Gliederbau. Schnitt und Fügung der Steinkörper’ (B 8-11), some of his most fundamental views (and, to the tectonic tradition, most influential) on architecture. Greek stone construction, he says, must be understood as a composite or conjoined unit (*Gefüge*, B 8) of bodily things (*Körperlichkeiten*). Every compositional element or *Glied*

⁵⁴⁰ Owed to Quitsch (1981), challenged by Herrmann (1981b); see below, §8.4.

⁵⁴¹ For Quitsch (1996), Semper’s rejection of Boetticher’s claims on art and core forms is just as profound. Acknowledging the unity Boetticher demands for a static core with its decorative husk, Quitsch alleges that the distinction of art from core form destroys ‘the aesthetic unity of the tectonic’, whereas Semper’s outlook reinvents that unity.

(member in a chain of joined things) is to be understood with respect to its role and place in the overall *Gefüge*, accounting for the *morphological* and *static* properties assigned to each element, including, as we are talking of stone, their cut (whence the close connection of ‘tectonics’, broadly understood, to the art form of *stereotomy*, literally, the cutting of stones). This is a view we first encountered in §3.4.1.

The lion share in Boetticher’s individuation of the *Glieder* or (in his preferred Latin usage), *membrae*, is allocated to their static properties, which Boetticher, like Schopenhauer, individuates as dynamic forces (B 8). Strictly speaking, it is the static performance that explains the Greek system of segmentation (*Gliedersystem*), and not the other way round (B 9). The unity or ‘jointness’ of the *membrae* is likewise dictated by its primary static property, *Gleichgewicht* or balance, ensuring the lasting endurance of the overall system (B 9), again referencing a point we already encountered in Schopenhauer.⁵⁴² Emphasis on ‘Gleichgewicht’ has also strong parallels to Viollet-le-Duc (1814-1879) who likewise pursued a ‘logic of construction’ on which construction ‘commands’ form (‘La construction commande la forme’) such that the overall composition was a ‘balanced structure’. (As before, if it is difficult to trace the influence of individual authors on specific architects, the to credit such writings in accumulation with increasingly impacting architectural reflection is a more plausible contention.) To accomplish this overall static balance, Boetticher contends, the architect has to shape and place each of the segments with respect to their two most salient properties, namely their (F1) ‘natural solidity’ and their (F2) ‘dead (barren, inert) heaviness of weight’ (B 9), the latter being divided into two sub-features, namely, (F2a) the segment’s ability to bear the load placed on it, and (F2b) to remain in place without being pushed down or aside (‘Lager- und Standfestigkeit’). Properties F1 and F2 explain the purpose and intent of the whole ‘segmentation’ in creating buildings or ‘static systems’ (B 9). As in Schopenhauer, the argument begins from the properties of unworked stone and sees architecture’s first and central task in the skilful arrangement of segmented stone to display the dynamic forces at work within the material world, but do so in a manner that is both dynamically expressive but remains at rest, at balance.

It is only once all this in place that Boetticher allows the use of such segments to take on added symbolic significance. Indeed, it is by *placing* the ‘Werkformen’ (core or work forms) of such stone segments ‘in (the service of) wholly new ideal (transmaterial) contexts’, that these core forms take on the meaning of *art forms* (B 9-10). Or, as he puts it earlier,

The core-form of each part is the mechanically necessary and statically functional structure; the art-form, on the other hand, is only the characterization by which the mechanical-statical function is made apparent.⁵⁴³

But even in such contexts, yielding (in conducive cases) monumental architecture, Boetticher insists on the foundation of such forms in the properties of solidity and static balance, as these present ‘the essential means’ for architecture to reach such goals (B 10). If this will constitute the sharpest point of departure for Semper – in that, as we shall see in §8.4, for Semper the *monumentality* of architecture essentially relates to the transcending of architecture’s own materiality – it also presents the clearest expression of the tectonic tradition’s core tenet, namely its subscription to the centrality of *firmitas* in architectonic composition.

All that matters for now is this. Semper and Boetticher *both* agree with Schopenhauer’s principle of *Aussonderung*, that is, the clear *articulation* of a building’s individual segments and how they are ‘joined together’ – by a clear demarcation of parts and their joints, which visually explain (render ‘legible’) how the building has been ‘put together’, as per Schinkel’s motto to the current chapter (cf. also §4.3 on ‘B3’).

⁵⁴² Schopenhauer *WWR* I§43, ‘The regularity of the building and its parts is partly produced by the direct adaption of each member to the stability of the whole’ (*apud* Frampton 1995, 396n.26). As Frampton (1995, 82) observes, Boetticher was influenced by Schopenhauer indirectly, via ‘the writings of Christian Weisse’.

⁵⁴³ *Tektonik* (I, xv), the translation *apud* W. Herrmann (1984, 121), discussed by Frampton (1995, 82).

As we shall see (§8.3), in Semper this takes on the articulation of *joints*, of the very elements that *tie* segments together, a point that is particularly visible in his handling of rustication, where ‘the linear design and control of the width and depth’ becomes a ‘trademark of his distinctive personal style’ in his Dresden buildings (Mallgrave 1996, 112). Semper makes a related point on rustication, in that he points out how

the bands of the joints between the bulges acquire a regular ‘beat’, one that has decorative effect because of its rhythm and different surface treatment. The same effect is also achieved by the careful beveling of the joint surfaces.⁵⁴⁴

In Boetticher, by contrast, the joints are not an *expressive* ideal, they much rather dictate the *competent structural handling* of how the building blocks (literally) fit to one another, so as to serve the (for him) highest goals of static balance and ‘remaining in a place’ (their relation *to place*). This, for instance, explains the high value (to him) of how the Greeks worked stone bricks in the absence of the (later, essentially Roman) invention of *mortar*. For, instead of the binding substance being something *separate*, something that can be articulated as such, the Greeks guaranteed the congruence and perfect fit (surface to surface, plane to plane) of individual bricks, as evidenced by the *perfect lining up* of the bricks’ outer seams (*Fugen*). Continuing on monumental architecture’s primary *telos* of total balance, he emphasizes that ‘the monument’ must appear as if, he concludes, it was ‘built from a *single monolith*’ (B 10). This poses a direct contradiction to the *emphasis on joints* we find in Semper’s architecture, an emphasis that many contemporary writers have taken to be what *defines* ‘tectonics’. (I return to the relation of *monolithic* to tectonic composition in §10.3.) Greg Lynn suggests,

Tectonics is really about the fact that we build large objects out of a lot of small parts and pieces – and the tectonic tradition of architecture is that we celebrate the fact that we build objects out of parts and pieces. So when we detail a building, the place where structure and cladding – or the place where different materials come together, that’s where we locate our details, it’s usually what we celebrate in construction and design. Tectonics is about [1] celebrating details [and connections], celebrating parts. [2] It usually involves expressing structure, so structure becomes a very important thing to announce in a building, in its interior and exterior. [3] It’s about [arrangement of discrete components, sc. about] keeping parts discreet, or separating things and celebrating their connections. [4] It usually involves some form of hierarchy [of systems and assembly] and it often involves layering [and superposition]. [...] the important thing is that the pieces are discreet – and [that] connections of the pieces is what’s celebrated. So the details are at the place where discreet elements come together.⁵⁴⁵

Kenneth Frampton likewise emphasizes ‘the cultural priority that Semper gave to textile production and to the knot as the primordial tectonic unit.’, a point Frampton regards as continuous with Boetticher’s ‘envisag[ing] a conceptual *junction*, which came into being through the appropriate interlocking of constructional elements.’⁵⁴⁶ (Frampton’s analysis rests primarily on according the knot an explanatory primacy it does not have in Semper’s own work (*Stil* I, 73), where an attendant footnote (73-4n.) contradicts Frampton’s allegation that Semper subscribes to an etymological connection of knot to need, since he connects the verb ‘nähen’ to necessity (*Notwendigkeit*, also *Folge und Zwang*) and *not* need (*Noth*), even if the Latin *necessitas* for Semper and Wagner at times express either.⁵⁴⁷)

Such views, we can now see, constitute a historic anachronism – more precisely, an uneasy amalgam of two *opposite* design stances, with Boetticher wanting to create a perfect ‘monolith’ or seamless unity, and Semper aiming for a clearly segmented complex articulating its own joints. That is, Boetticher and Semper seem to agree on the individuation of *being tectonically composed* provided in §3.4.1, but they disagree over

⁵⁴⁴ Semper, *Der Stil* (II, 365), translation *apud* Mallgrave (1996, 114). I discuss the passage more fully in §8.4.

⁵⁴⁵ Lynn (2012); insertions stem from Lynn’s own slides.

⁵⁴⁶ Frampton (1990/2002, 100 and 96).

⁵⁴⁷ Contrast Frampton (1995, 82 and 86).

how much of that should be visibly expressed by a building's exterior. This is a crucial regard in which their views on the 'ethical relation' between a building's structural and its visible properties diverge, before we even get to the question of how (divergently) they individuate either set of properties, or think which subsets in either set is the normatively correct one for 'good architecture' in the sense of §2.6 and §6.2.

Boetticher wanting to create a perfect 'monolith' and Semper a clearly segmented complex is not simply an opposition in and of 'theory' – siding with either one of them here makes a huge difference to how an architect handles stone works, and bricks in particular. Most strikingly, the heavy use of rustication in Semper's architecture would be ruled out by the dictates of Boetticher we just cited – arguing, as they do, for the elimination of rough features in stonework contravening their perfect geometric shapes uniquely suited for overall static balance. (I return to the role of rustication in Semper in §8.4.) Second, where Semper's stance licenses the use of separate joints and independent 'binding substances' or *connecting segments*, such as mortar, Boetticher applauds the Greek for being able to do without such cheap tricks, and for relying instead on 'roughing up' the connecting surfaces of bricks by sanding and grinding, this being the apex of architecture, as the resulting friction prevented the segments from sliding out of their declared place in the overall composition (B 11). Such a work of architecture is the more perfect, the better it *conceals* the places where the segments touch each other. Where Semper, following Renaissance rustication techniques, would accentuate the individual bricks composing his walls (see §8.2.3), Boetticher applauds the *Parthenôn's* columns (at the adyton) being so tightly fit that 'one can barely push a knife in', for him the sign of 'perfection' (B 11). One wonders if the good archaeologist verified this in person, by assaulting his cherished 'apex' of architecture with his bare hands, knife in hand. Boetticher's final site visit to the *Parthenôn* in 1862 elicited many new insights, most of which have since then been revealed as fictions, such as the alleged trace of paint on the Theseion columns.⁵⁴⁸

With the foundations of Boetticher's views in place we are now better poised to proceed to Semper's.

§8.2.2 SEMPER ON THE NON-FOUNDATIONAL NATURE OF TECTONICS

If our inquiry will later emphasize how comparatively little attention Semper bestows on the tectonic when it comes to (to his mind) architecture's most fundamental concerns, this will appear doubly so when he begins to discuss the term directly. To that end I turn to volume two of *Der Stil*, where Semper dedicates the entire seventh segment to 'Tectonics (Carpentry)'. He begins by defining tectonics as the 'art of joining rigid, tube-like parts to a stationary system' (S II, 199). Semper, however, rejects the *foundational status* the tectonic tradition (and writers preceding it, like Viollet-le-Duc) accord post-and-lintel construction, in particular, when it (and they) pursue the 'petrification thesis' of stone in wooden forms of construction. Indeed, Semper begins his section on tectonics by making that point right away (S II, 199-200). His two main arguments (*ibid.*) are,

- A1** The origins of monumental tectonics and its art forms lie in mobile domestic furnishings (*Hausrath*), which means alleging (with Vitruvius) the origin of stone architecture in wooden architecture is not far reaching enough.
- A2** The origin of wooden or stone trabeated architecture lies with the 'Pegmen' (*pegmata*), a wooden structure or frame which the true art forms 'clothed'.

Elaborating these obscure points shall help bring out Semper's distance to Boetticher's stance, and thus to the tectonic tradition as such.

Elaborating A1

The Latin term *pegma*, literally meaning (wooden) scaffolding, has a more interesting pre-architectural progeny in the design of *stage props*, as attested in contemporary studies of ancient architecture.⁵⁴⁹ This link

⁵⁴⁸ Michaelis (1903, 151).

⁵⁴⁹ Stieglitz (1801 vol. 2.1, 209-210 with notes *k*, *l* and *m*).

of *pegma* to stage props would certainly be to Semper's liking, as Semper ultimately traces all artistic efforts (in and outside architecture) to the human urge for stage-play (*Schauspiel*) and masquerading (*Fasching*). Semper himself connects *pegmata* to movable stands on which painted carpets depicting battle scenes were hung (I, 273), and to frames holding painted canvases (I, 274), as well as paintings on framed surfaces (I, 274). The perhaps best illustration of a *pegma*, however, comes from work displayed at the Louvre (Figs. 8.1-8.2), at least some of which Semper likely saw on his visits in 1849-1850, visits he keeps referencing throughout the *Stil*.⁵⁵⁰ The art work in question is a funeral 'mobilaire', or in German *Möbel*, being furniture or domestic furnishings of the type that can be moved around (and, thus, are mobile). The museum's contemporary catalogue explicitly likens the building-like character of the artifact, saying how the chest 'imitates the form of a portable chapel'. Similar looking items are on display in Semper's own museum buildings in Vienna today (Fig. 8.2b).⁵⁵¹

Semper himself discusses ornate funeral pyre *chests* in the context of developing his theory of cladding and incrustation (S, tr. 2004, 299). The type of artifact was evidently well suited to unite nearly all strands of his thoughts on the origin of architectural form, to wit, (1) the wooden scaffold or *pegma* from which drapes, carpets, or other painted surfaces and screens are hung, (2) that hung screen(-wall) or (*Ge*)*wand* itself, (3) the mobile character of the domestic furnishings (*Hausrath*) Semper claims to predate and, via its technical 'motifs', ground the forms of architecture, (4) the basic design principle of an enclosed space (here, in miniature) that grounds our sense of domestic rooms.



Fig. 8.1 (left) Hetepimen's Funeral Chest (3rd cent. BC, ca. 57 cm high, painted wood), Louvre. Source: Louvre, online catalogue. **Fig. 8.2 (right)** The displays read, 'Coffret funéraire d'Hor-bik' (left) and 'Coffret à ouchebtis' (right), both dated to 'Ptolemaic period (ca. 332-331 BC)', acquired respectively in 1826 (Achat) and 1857. Photo by author (February 2014).

⁵⁵⁰ See *Der Stil*, tr. Mallgrave (2004, 150, 320-323, 479, 486, 555n15, 880). Semper 'gained access to the private areas of the Louvre' (Mallgrave 2004, 59n.49), and was particularly impressed by 'the ceramic collection there and the Assyrian bas-reliefs' (*ibid.*, 9). Indeed, 'Arguably the most eventful part of his Paris stay in 1849 and 1850 was his examination of the wall panels and other artifacts from Khorsabad, which were just being received and processed at the Louvre.' (*ibid.*, 26) On Semper's take on the Khorsabad tiles, see *ibid.*, 323.

⁵⁵¹ Thanks to Maarten Franssen for the Vienna discovery.



Fig. 8.2b Box for shabti statuettes. Painted wood. Third Intermediate Period, 11th/10th cent. BC. Collection of (and image © by) the *Kunsthistorisches Museum*, Vienna (2001/3007).

Elaborating A2

Semper defines tectonics in terms of mobile domestic furnishings (*Hausrat*), so as to articulate a disagreement with Boetticher on the comparative *developmental* status of implements and monuments. (Recall from CHAPTER 5 that Kant, too, invokes the term ‘Hausrat(h)’ to define his understanding of architecture; though in his case the emphasis is not on the mobility of such instruments, but their having a clearly designated use: they are ‘utensils’.) Boetticher (*B 6*) by contrast claims that the domestic furnishings implementing the same forms as temple architecture – such as (say) the inverted gable observable in pushcarts and hand barrows – are not so much *inspirational* for that architecture, and thus evolutionary or developmentally prior to it as Semper claims, but are in fact *twice removed* in progeny from architecture. For, we first have temple architecture, following its own laws of construction and artistic articulation, *then* we have temple furnishings (and tools of cultic practice) following the same laws, and only *then* are these morphological laws copied by domestic furnishings and those used for *state culture*. This is a complete inversion of Semper’s argument and puts Semper’s argument for the *non-foundational* nature of tectonic construction on its head, as it should be, given how Boetticher is the champion of the tectonic tradition which *grounds* architectural forms and construction principles in something inherent and idiosyncratic to architecture – such as the notions of bear and load, and of wooden post-and-lintel construction – where Semper precisely seeks the origin for these morphologies in the *technical* arts – such as the craft of producing domestic furnishings – whose morphological motifs, according to him, *predate* their analogues in architecture.⁵⁵²

⁵⁵² This appears to be missed by Herrmann (1981, 31-32), who argues that Semper copies Boetticher’s views on *Möbel*.

But Semper's disagreement with Boetticher run deeper than observations on the relative progeny of architectural forms. There is a deeper disagreement on the relative place of constructional concerns in the orientation and shaping of such forms, and this of course goes to the heart of architectural activity – how one should design, what a building should look like, and how firmly (sincerely, 'truthfully') it should display its own mode of construction (and if so, which part thereof in particular). As we saw in earlier chapters, siding with or against the tectonic tradition on its core tenets has arguable consequences as to *what* design ethos an architect adopts.

§8.2.3 SEMPER ON CLADDING

In Semper the (Schopenhauer'ian) principle of *Aussonderung* or 'articulation by separation' takes on a narrative quality it clearly lacks in Boetticher. Following Schinkel's idea that a building ought to 'tell us how it got made' (see Chapter motto), Semper enlists the clear articulation of separate parts to enrich the expressive means of architecture, with an overall result that goes beyond Schopenhauer's wildest dreams of the scope and depth of architectural contemplation.

Semper could be said to exploit (and illustrate) a narrative quality that inheres in the tectonic by virtue of its connection to textuality, as attested in the etymological connection of *τεκταίνουμαι* to the Latin *texere* which later (post-classical) usage employs to communicate how lines of text are interweaved to form a narrative, whether of epic (in architecture, monumental) proportions or not.⁵⁵³ That same narrative potential inheres in the weaving of *textiles*, a point Semper (we shall see) capitalizes on, in his rooting architecture in the textile rather than the tectonic arts. By illustration, consider how the lead protagonist in Somerset Maugham's *Of Human Bondage*,

is given a densely patterned Perisan carpet and assured that in its design lies the solution to the problem of meaning. Naturally, he examines the carpet closely, searching for encrypted messages or hidden pictures. Eventually it dawns on him that the point is not any individual detail but the whole design. One has to weave all the details of one's life into a meaningful pattern.⁵⁵⁴

The concluding figure of speech reminds us of the non-textile meanings of 'weaving', meanings Semper claims quite literally pervade architectural construction imbuing it with the qualities of the narrative and the dramatic. A similar attitude to architectural composition was recently assumed by Michael Wilkens.⁵⁵⁵ Wilkens likens the specific nature of a tectonic process of architectural composition to a step-by-step *script* of constructional execution, a script that remains legible even once the building is fully erected; a point Wilkens develops with reference to Schinkel's furniture designs. (Wilken's antonym of tectonics are forms of composition that proceed 'in one go', as when a building (looks as if it) has been sculpted in a single step, like Mendelsohn's *Einsteinturm*.) In neither Semper's nor Wilken's case does the narrative quality of architecture render it into something metaphorical or iconographic, that is, into the architecture standing (in) for something else. Quite literally, architecture's compositional narratives speak *of themselves*, just as Schinkel had demanded – and, rather similarly, the dramas unfolding on Semper's façades will do the same.

The basic compositional feature of Semper's buildings that explains this at the same time constitutes his most radical point of departure from the tectonic tradition – and that is his so-called principle of 'cladding'. Semper's argument for the normative weight the principle enjoys begins by observing, 'the principle of cladding has exerted great influence on architecture and other arts at all times and for all peoples' (I, 204). Semper has two arguments for this conclusion, I allege, with *A3* developing the

⁵⁵³ West (2007, 38), relying in part on the authority of Chantraine. I owe this reference to Patrick Healy.

⁵⁵⁴ Campbell (1994, 1).

⁵⁵⁵ Wilkens (2000); other than Frampton (1995), the most influential source for the intellectual orientation of this thesis.

connection of the alleged principle to the practice of *polychromy* or painted masonry Semper claims to be operative in ancient architecture, and *A4* focusing on the specifically *textile* qualities that attach to architecture owing to its being dominated by the principle of cladding.

Elaborating A3: Polychromy and Incrustation

Semper thought that investigations of the ancients' use of paint and colour in architecture (*polychromy*) has far reaching consequences for our understanding of architecture's desired qualities – returning us to the morally proper relation of kernel to husk, except reversing (or re-allocating) Boetticher's assignment of priority from kernel to husk. At (I, 204) he makes the connection of polychromy to cladding explicit, in that we are to understand colour less in terms of a *hue* as in terms of *pigment*.⁵⁵⁶ The saturation of a material (*Stoff*) with colour (*Farbstoff*), then, must be understood as a partly *material alteration* to the underlying *substratum* from the go. A similar admixture of qualitative with material alteration pertains to Semper's remarks on *incrustation*, the saturation of a building walls with particular minerals for added aesthetic effect. More precisely, one creates an extra layer (*Überzug*) of geometric or figurative (appropriately thin) stone slabs, usually of *multiple colours*. Etymologically, the term is derived from the Latin, *crustea* (*marmorea*), meaning, a marble husk, and connotes in architecture the use of cladding structural walls of lesser material with polychrome (multi-coloured) marble plates (I, 277-278). The term is thus used for an analogous process observable in the realm of nature, where an organism enriches its outer skin or cell walls with minerals. In the architectural and organic context, the term 'wall' holds a special meaning for Semper, who distinguishes non-load bearing walls (or 'screen-walls') from load bearing walls, by (1) drawing on a terminological distinction (absent from the English) between, respectively, *Wand* and *Mauer*,⁵⁵⁷ and (2) by saying how polychromy and incrustation are alike related to screen-walls (I, 211). Both techniques, then, aesthetically relate, not to the decoration of load-bearing or structural elements in a building's composition (as they would for Boetticher), but to the design of screen-walls and thus pertain to the 'principle of cladding surfaces' (*Flächenbekleidungsprinzip*, I, 211). Semper relates incrustation also talk of *crusta* in relation to paintings on (and inserted into) wood, relating the resulting artifact or *Täfelung* to the term *abacus crusta* (I, 274); the frame holding such paintings he sometimes terms *pegmata* (*ibid.*), which underscores how arguments *A3* and *A2* are for him related (and possibly, how *A3* relates to *A4*).

Elaborating A4: The primacy of the textile

Based on archaeological evidence, Semper claims that the original textile quality of built (if non load bearing) walls was akin to woven fabric, subsequently enriched by *colour saturation*, elevating coloured carpets to wall claddings (I, 213).⁵⁵⁸ This further substantiates his allegation that the *origin* of many architectural art forms or 'formal motifs' lies in the technical arts outside and predating architecture. In this context, a claim of genealogy goes in place of a normative claim. Architectural art forms, for Semper, should express their historic or cultural genealogy. Accordingly, art forms (*de facto* and *de jure*) are constrained by pre-architectural technical arts and their techniques – such as saturation and incrustation – and, *pace* Boetticher, do not originate in (or are thereby normatively governed by) *principles of architectural structure* or *considerations of solidity* ('the kernel', *membrae*). I here abbreviate a long (quasi-)historic argument

⁵⁵⁶ On this philosophically important distinction, see Plato's *Lysis* 218e-219b, where Plato claims that 'colour' or *chrōma* can be separated out from the object it is the colour of. That makes no sense if we construe *chrōma* as 'colour' in the sense of hue. The idea then is that *chrōma*, in this instance, signifies not an accident that qualifies things, but is itself a weird hybrid of substance-accident, a qualified-thing. This would be colour in the sense of 'pigment'. The German language renders the contrast neat, that is, the terms are conveniently expressive of what they denote, in contrasting "Farbstoff" (coloured matter/stuff) to "Farbton" (hue or tone of colour). For discussion, see Prauss (1968), esp. P. 110 for discussion of the crucial *Lysis* passage.

⁵⁵⁷ For this corner stone of Semper's thought, see V, §4; *S* I, 214, 234; KS, 394. Cf. also his remark, 'Die Bekleidung der Mauern war also das Ursprüngliche, seiner räumlichen, architektonischen Bedeutung nach das Wesentliche; die Mauer selbst das Sekundäre.' ('Vergleichende Baulehre', 1850 ms., unpublished, *apud* Laudel 1991, 105).

⁵⁵⁸ On classical Greek techniques of dyeing wool by saturation, see Plato, *Republic* 429d (with the note *ad loc.* in Adam 1903, 229 *ad* l.26), a reference I owe to Winckelmann (1764). Cf. also *Timaeus* 50d-e.

that runs from S I, 206 to 210, and is attested by ancient sources as well as by contemporary archaeological work.⁵⁵⁹ As before, he derives the ‘principle of cladding’ from incrustation and colour saturation.

It is only, however, in section §62 of Semper’s discussion of textile art that we get to his most central claims surrounding the principle of cladding – and, with that, his sharpest points of departure from the tectonic tradition. Already the section’s heading promises as much when it says,

Das ursprünglichste, auf den Begriff *Raum* fussende, formelle Prinzip in der Baukunst, unabhängig von der Konstruktion. Das Maskiren der Realität in den Künsten. (I, 213)

Cladding is here named ‘the *most original* formal principle of building art’, a principle that is and operates irrespective of construction. The emphasis is on genealogy, thus, on normative authority and guidance. Semper’s starting point is the general observation how (I, 213), ‘come what may, the origins of building will always be connected with the origins of *Textrin*’, where ‘*Textrin*’ is Semper’s technical term for the art of *preparing* (*Bereiten*, *Bereitigung*) a screen-wall (II, 355).⁵⁶⁰ This is further attested in Semper’s remarks on ‘das Gebiet des Wandbereitens’ in (V, 69), connected at (V, 67) to polychromy and contrasting the visible display of unadorned walls (*Mauern*) only in the lower segment or massing of a building – a design stance that, §8.4 will demonstrate, informs Semper’s own work. His reasoning explored here, in §8.3, documents his genealogical and normative thinking informing his compositional choices.

Semper’s strongest claim, however, is that, no matter what the *actual* historical truth of the aforementioned claims may be (we may say: *de jure* priority obtains in the absence of *de facto* priority), ‘it still remains certain that the original purpose of woven fabric is a means to create a home, to divide the life taking place in the interior from that of the exterior, and to formally design a spatial idea – and that this purpose *is prior to* the construction of a wall made from masonry and other materials’ (I, 214). Moreover, the very ‘scaffoldings’ that help support a building and constitute its structure have ‘nothing to do with spatiality and spatial enclosure’, and are therefore, Semper concludes, ‘alien to the most principled of architectural ideas’ and ‘constitute no form-giving elements’ (ibid.). As before, this is a rejection of core-forms (*firmitas*, structure) being determinative of architecture’s most principled art-forms.

This is the ultimate core of Semper’s rejection of the tectonic tradition, and Boetticher in particular. Where Boetticher seeks to relate *all* art-form in architecture to structural *core-forms*, an extension of the RECIPROCITY THESIS as concerns the *conditioning* of all architectural appearance and beauty (*venustas*) by architectural structure or *firmitas*, Semper here affirms that, to the contrary, *any* structural notions were not, at least not originally, determinative of form (‘formenbestimmend’). In the context of nineteenth century parlance, with its subscription to the idea that genealogies are the firmest (and often, sole) normative determinant, this literally means – firmness *should not* be determinative of architectural form, either as a *constraint* on architectural content or expression, or as the content of *what* gets expressed itself.

If the emphasis in Semper (but not Boetticher), on load-bearing elements being in the class of ‘rejects’ when it comes to the rooting of architectonic form, was not already obvious from the passage in (I, 214) discussed a moment ago and from the section title that goes with it (‘irrespective of construction’), the

⁵⁵⁹ See in particular Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium* (86.6-7) and Stieglitz (1801 vol. 2.2., 209-210).

⁵⁶⁰ Mallergrave (2004) translates ‘*Textrin*’ (I, 213) as ‘textiles’ (2004, 247), and ‘künstliche Vorbereitung des Stoffes’ as ‘synthetic preparation’ (2004, 248). van Eck (2009, 309) also translates ‘*Textrin*’ as ‘textiles’, and concludes, ‘The origin and essence of architecture [...] is thus intimately linked with weaving or textile, one of the four primitive crafts’. This misses the connection to S II, 355, as well as the passage’s immediate sequel, since (I, 213) ‘Preparing a screen wall’ is certainly how Semper goes on to describe *Textrin* in the immediate sequel at I, 213, features a return of the wall-screen and the phrase ‘...durch künstliche Vorbereitung des Stoffes’. Semper’s language here (*Bereiten*, *Bereitigung*) bears echoes to *Präparierung*, the German term for taxidermy, the technique of *mounting* animal *skins*, intricately related to dermoplastique, the technique of (literally) *sculpting skin* (*derma* is Greek for skin), discussed by Semper in KS, 3-4.

passage's immediate sequel hews into the same spot, where Semper again emphasizes how walls (*Mauern*) built from unworked stone or lime may be used to strengthen and support the upper spatial segments of a building, but do not serve the original purpose of screen-walls, namely spatial enclosure (I, 214). His remark (in KS, 394) to the effect that Greek architects would not exhibit bare (unworked) stone except on the lower, load-bearing segments, cement the same point. Discussing further passages in Semper making similar points, Laudel concludes that for Semper the 'clad wall' was the original motive (or art-form) of all building art, and that, for him, 'the tectonic system of cladding was the signature mark of monumental stone architecture.'⁵⁶¹ I would allege that, based on this, Semper is inclined to compose a 'vertical drama' that unfolds on the façades of his monumental architecture. Semper goes for heavy, rusticated segments below, and opts for lighter, heavily ornamented, and increasingly 'trans-material' segments above. Visually, we may summarize this as a diagrammatic façade (see fig. 8.3).⁵⁶²




Fig 8.3. Diagrammatic representation of the *Mauer-Wand* interaction on Semper's façades.

§8.3 SEMPER'S ANTI-TECTONICISM, PART 2: BUILT WORK

As we saw earlier, Schinkel added a demand for a certain type of *narrativity* to the tectonic tradition's understanding of architecture, specifically, the demand that a building tell the onlooker 'how it got made' or built. The previous section suggested that Semper would be forced to reject that demand, given how he rejects the priority of core forms to architectonic expression and construction. In the present section, however, I want to suggest that Semper holds on to a very nuanced understanding of Schinkel's demand for narrativity; he only diverges from Schinkel and Boetticher on the *means* by which architectural composition is to realize the demand. Later, in §9.3-§9.4, I will suggest how his expansion of the means issues in a revision of the goal itself – and suggest how architecture, owing to its (under Semper) expanded narrative potential can also assume a greater narrative role and greater moral responsibilities accruing from that role.

Semper's revision of architecture's narrative means emerges, first of all, in his design of the lower, *Mauer*-based section of his buildings, where its concentration of massing is highest. The aforementioned 'vertical drama', I allege, arises from his artistic use of rustication.⁵⁶³ To set the stage, I begin with a striking passage from Mallgrave, a passage that, by quoting from Josef Bayer, manages to unite both ideas.

The strength of Semper's work [...] is always in part derived from his gift for detailing, and here the [Dresden] Gallery forms a worthy companion to the nearby theater [both by Semper].

⁵⁶¹ Laudel (1991, 150). I owe the term 'Wanddurchbrechung' to her analysis.

⁵⁶² Frampton's (1995, 85-86 and 186) analyses of Semper and Mies occasionally appears to agree with the base tenets of what I call 'vertical drama', except that he insists on reading the top segment in terms of, not (atectonic) *Wand* but, (a) tectonic 'frames' and (b) an emphasis on 'joints'. Both notions arguably define tectonics for Frampton, much less so for Semper: (a) belongs to the wooden *pegma* on which wall-screens are hung, and on (b) see above. As before, Frampton's text would have us believe that Semper is on agreement with him and Boetticher on such fundamental points, when these actually occasion profound disagreements.

⁵⁶³ My *individual* awareness of the two notions is owed to Summerson (1980, 30-31, 58-59), my *joint* appreciation of them to a site visit to Semper's buildings in Dresden.

Foremost is Semper's mastery of rustication: the linear design and control of the width and depth of joints, which in this and in later buildings became a trademark of his distinctive personal style. 'No modern architect', said the nineteenth century critic Josef Bayer, 'has thought out the actual idea of stone with similar thoroughness, none has applied this artistic motif with an equally exceptional understanding, *from which arises such a powerful intensification of the building upward: from elementary coarseness into variety and splendor.*' (1996, 112, italics added)

Taking a cue from Schopenhauer (§7.2), we could construe the origin of architectural composition in a bare lump of unworked stone. Architecture's drama or narrative would then unfold from those humble beginnings, by ever greater distance from the roughness of that stone. We could conceive of architecture 'growing towards' lighter weight, towards overcoming the properties of that lump, including gravity and roughness. If we were to *spatially* align that narrative's discreet stages across time next to each other, we could see these stages expressed *vertically* in the façades of Semper's buildings, once our eyes follow their progression in an upward movement.⁵⁶⁴



Fig 8.4a Semper's second *Hoftheater* (1868, rebuilt 1985). Photo by Author (2013).

What specific role, however, does rustication play for Semper in this regard? Harry Mallgrave claims that,

Semper's preference for a strong lithic rustication was closely related to his developing theory of architecture; in his later text on style he devoted several chapters specifically to exalting the process of 'taming this coarse natural motif'. Rustication, he argued, was principally an aesthetic idea, an expression of the network of lithic forces and of the building's more general relation to

⁵⁶⁴ In Schinkel's *Bauakademie*, by contrast, that narrative is executed not by architecture's own means of expression, but by iconography in the frieze panels. See the standard 'reading' of that work by August Rave and Barry Bergdoll, on which the panels 'express' Goethe's theory of the original plant, which I discuss in CHAPTER 10. In Schopenhauer's terms (CHAPTER 7), the question is whether Schinkel's building, which is to *house* architecture, can at the level of expression stick to the 'core theme' of architecture.

the ground [thus, *firmitas*]. The two elements to be considered are the framing ‘edge’ and the force-laden ‘face’. This last effect can be enhanced, for instance, by increasing the projection of the face from the regular frame of its edge and by | controlling the direction of the chisel work – the bossage he developed for the Dresden Gallery derived from early Renaissance examples[.]⁵⁶⁵

One could argue, based on this passage, that Semper takes to heart Schopenhauer’s strictures on the roots of architecture and architecture’s expression, sc. its foundation in stone, but rejects these stricture’s reductive or eliminativist implications.⁵⁶⁶



Fig 8.4b Semper’s *Hoftheater*, rustication detail. The drums on the columns are articulated individually.

However, when Mallgrave revisited the point more recently, this is out of the question. He says (and I quote in full),

Greek great architecture becomes akin in a sense to Schelling’s notion of frozen music, in which forms can be read through their volitional statics and ornamental dynamics. Form as in the organic world represents a balance of competing forces in which gravity is opposed by will, and more generally by dynamic principles of growth and development. So this in fact becomes a theme of [Semper’s *Stil*]. The animism suggested by Schopenhauer and Boetticher in the visual conflict of, or representation of, matter and gravity, now plays heavily into Semper’s discussion on how the Greeks (in his view) were intent on eliminating all thoughts of weight in architecture. Semper describes the forces acting on a column, for instance, not as transfers of gravitational loads acting downward (as Schopenhauer and Boetticher had interpreted it) but rather as the upward striving force field meeting the resistance of the architrave – whereas the supple and elastic strands in the Ionic volute mediates this conflict and offers resistance without violence.

⁵⁶⁵ Mallgrave (1996, 112 and 114), quoting S II [1860 ed.], 365 (tr. 2004, 732).

⁵⁶⁶ Wölfflin, ‘II. Der Gegenstand der Architektur’, in his (1886).

In Semper's discussion of rustication, he notes that this particular wall dressing should occur in the lower level of the wall where the gravitational loads are the most severe, and that the purpose of the rough and stone is to provide a sense of security to the spectator – the symbolic articulation of these gravitational forces is affected by how the ashlar are detailed. The face of the block should go outward, expressing the pressure of the load. But the stone should also be edged with a flat band that in essence frames the bulge and thus contains the outward direction of forces. [...] What Semper was struggling here was not the architectural material or the form in itself, but more how we assume or sort of experience or create a relationship with form, and that is how we design our built work as a transposition of our own corporeal values.⁵⁶⁷



Figs 8.5 and 8.6. Semper's *Hofgalerie*: 'vertical drama'. Photos by author.

This brings out beautifully how Semper diverges from Boetticher and Schopenhauer, in that the forces of gravity at work in unworked stone – or the closest approximation thereof in architecture: rustication – are not to be expressed in 'translation' or 'preservation' of their natural state, but rather to be sublimated and inverted, by an upwards striving. Two additional points that tell in favour of this reading are (1) how Semper's working of stone recommended in *Stil* II, 343-347 differs markedly from that suggested by Boetticher, in that Semper emphasizes the very articulation of joints that Boetticher would have suppressed by the perfectly aligned bricks and drums of Greek temple architecture. Indeed, Semper goes so far as to write of the seams (II, 350) that gilding or other forms of decoration emphasize their place in the overall composition, as long as such decorative elements do not undermine the solidity or firmness of the load-bearing wall ('Das Prinzip ist dabei leicht fasslich. Die Alten vermieden, wie ich zeigte, derartigen Schmuck der Mauer, der die absolute Haltbarkeit der letzten zweifelhaft erscheinen macht.').

That is, Semper posits, as a matter of principle, that the decoration of joints and joinings of masonry work is only legitimate where it does not visibly suggest that the solidity of the construction is 'dubious'. This

⁵⁶⁷ Mallgrave (2014).

means, as far as stereotomy is concerned, the principle of decoration is certainly *in service* of the expression of solidity – something that Semper will be less scrupulous about in the upper parts of the façade, parts not governed by rustication.

On that very note, we can observe how the previous passage from Mallgrave continues on, to the very second motif mentioned earlier, the ‘vertical drama’ observable on a façade that begins with, but does not end with, a rusticated segment:

This eurhythmic and crystalline strength below, for Semper, also contrasts with the smoothness and delicacy of the detailing above [at the *Hofgalerie* façade], that point at which the stone now becomes fully tamed by art. (Mallgrave 1996, 114)

My final observation, and supporting consideration (2), is to highlight Semper’s use of *framing* the rough ashlars in his rustication, again emphasizing that we are – in contrast to Roman architecture – not dealing with Cyclopean masonry bonds where (as Boetticher recommended more generally) *mortar* and *joining materials* are absent from the composition. Instead, the very joining and discreteness of the ‘building blocks’ (here, literally, of bricks) is emphasized. The extent to which this emphasis in Semper approximates decoration is brought out once we colour in the conjoining segments of his composition (Fig. 8.9). This finally also explains how the exterior of his buildings, as much as their interior, is dominated by framed panels (in particular, that of the Vienna art museums), even in the very segments of his façade composition that are dictated by constraints of *firmitas*. Such framing (elements B and C in Fig. 8.9) highlights that already here we have early hints of screen-walls, and not just load-bearing walls. Indeed, the very bricks making up the load-bearing *Mauer* become framed as if they were hung on a screen wall full of paneled *Intarsienholz*. In a similar vein, the upper façade elements (see Fig. 8.5) show hints of the rustication masonry of the lower segment, again emphasizing the cross-pollination of the two – that is, of *Wand* below and of *Mauer* above, to emphasize their fluid continuity even when divided by discrete segments, allowing for their vertical legibility.




Fig. 8.7 Corner rustication on Semper’s *Hoftheater*. **Fig. 8.8** Illustration from *Der Stil* entitled, ‘Brick work on Dresden Museum’ (II, 346). [Photos by author.]

This concludes my inquiry into the compositionally most dominant means Semper brings out in his architecture. As we saw in the final paragraph, his attitude towards the tectonic tradition is incredibly nuanced, in that he accepts *within reason* firmness as a constraint on Π for certain parts of his composition, but only to a certain degree. Considerations of *firmitas* are allowed to intrude the upper, lighter and more ‘art like’ (Mallgrave) elements of his composition, but are not allowed to dominate them, just as the lower segments are not totally dominated by them.




Fig. 8.9 and Fig. 8.10 Coloured versions of Figs. 8.7 and 8.8.

In sum, Semper rejects Boetticher's ethical strictures on the proper relation of means to ends, in that he subverts the primacy of construction, structure, and 'core forms' or kernel. Rather, it is a building's skin, hung from frames or *pegma*, that define what architecture essentially is and is busy with – spatial enclosure, the creation of a home. A Greek temple, where every dominant element (as per the Classical Orders) is dictated by interlocking relations of bear and load, exhibits the primacy of core form, and the derivation of art form from core form. For Semper, however, Greek architecture featured compositional elements that are excluded by this neat story, including polychromy and incrustation, and more generally, a debt to the technical arts and their motifs, first and foremost textile art.⁵⁶⁸ If this shift in how to properly individuate Π subverts (while preserving) some of the tectonic tradition's core tenets, we have to see in the next chapter how Semper motivates some of his architecture's larger goals. For, with Π adjusted, we can expect \mathcal{M} to be expanded in a similar manner. This is a point the next chapter takes up at much greater length, where, in addition, I document further how Semper's individuation of Π expands ever wider from the type of position championed by Schopenhauer and Boetticher.

In light of this chapter's findings, recent allegations that Semper was a minimalist or even eliminativist about architectural content look doubtful. Even so, such allegations need to be addressed, since they present, as I will now show, a formidable counterargument to the position defended in my CHAPTERS 8-9.

§8.4 AUTONOMISM AND MORAL QUIETISM?

Among others, Caroline van Eck has recently claimed that Semper's very forays into masking (expressed at *S I*, 216-217n.3 and explored in great depth in §8.2.3), reveal how for Semper built works 'lose not only any trace of materiality, but also of content'.⁵⁶⁹ By this van Eck means (*ibid.*, 229),

the loss of content in architectural representation, in the sense of any [!] meaning lying outside the sphere of architecture itself in the strictest sense of spatial concepts and structural parts[.]

⁵⁶⁸ And, of course, the ornamental-functional aspects that arise from textile art, like the knot. Other ornamental aspects of the Greek orders, like the Acanthus leaf, are harder to derive, and hence served some of Semper's later critics, including Alois Riegl, as primary examples to challenge some Semper's fundamental theses about architecture (Riegl 1922/1992, 187-206). More recent, if partly speculative, work by Viennese architecture historians has however argued for seeing in the Acanthus leaf a principle of spatial organization and enclosure (see e.g. Graf 1999). If this line of argument can be maintained, then Semper's larger thesis – that the most fundamental art-forms of architecture can be derived from spatial enclosure – can be sustained against apparent counter examples like the Acanthus leaf.

⁵⁶⁹ Van Eck (2009, 328).

The resulting position attributed to Semper is then called, ‘formalism or ‘compression of meaning’’,⁵⁷⁰ owing to Mari Hvattum’s recent monograph.⁵⁷¹ Hvattum’s reading relies on (1) a particular understanding of Boetticher she summarizes as ‘tectonic imitation... and the autonomy of form’ (2004, 57) and on (2) having (this understanding of) Boetticher’s position more or less set the terms for Semper, with (3) the net result of the position of autonomism (expressed in the last quote from van Eck) being Semper’s position, and not just Boetticher’s. §8.3 provided some material to cast some doubt on (2), in that Semper’s stance on the nature and expressive limits of architecture can be shown to reject, instead of rely on, nearly all core tenets of Boetticher’s position. In CHAPTER 9 I shall directly tackle the charge of Semper being an ally of ‘autonomism’ more directly. For now, we should observe how the attribution of autonomism or a ‘compression of meaning’ to Semper has vast consequences for our understanding of Semper in other regards, and leads van Eck to conclude on

His [sc. Semper’s] total failure to forge a connection between the formal properties of art works, buildings and artifacts, of which he was such a subtle and eloquent analyst, and the social, political and cultural conditions that surrounded their making. (ibid., 332)

This conclusion undercuts the main tenets of this chapter and the next, where I argue that Semper not only subscribed to a non-formalist individuation of Π , but also to a successful morally appraisable set of Π precisely in that he – successfully – interrelates the compositional properties of buildings with their moral and specifically societal dimension. Plainly, either this analysis or van Eck’s counter argument is mistaken.

In response, I allege that van Eck’s claim rests – as she herself is well aware – on the aforementioned footnote on masking at *S I*, 216-217n.3. More particularly, however, her point relies on Semper’s phrase (a propos Pheidias’ sculpture at the Parthenon) ‘...von aller materiellen und äusserlich demonstrativen Kundgebung seines ausserbildlichen religiös-symbolischen Wesens befreite.’, which she translates as ‘to liberate [...] from any ‘announcement of extra-pictorial religious or symbolical nature’ (van Eck 2009, 328). Suppose we concede that the intent of the passage is fully general, and Semper indeed intended to extend the point of this phrase from sculpture to architecture. Even then, I allege, two points remain.

First, Semper does not seem to divest sculpture from *any* meaning, but only from the *ostensive announcement* of meaning – which is a far weaker claim. Plainly, architecture can contain and express all sorts of meaning while curtailing its demonstrative efforts. Second, and more seriously, van Eck’s translation commits an egregious error. Whereas in Semper the word ‘extrapictorial’ is a *qualifying adjective* on ‘religious-symbolic nature’, van Eck (1) renders it into a *free standing adjective* on a par with ‘religious-symbolic’ and (2) inserts between the two adjectives a disjunct (‘or’) absent from the German. Mallgrave’s official translation fares not much better, likewise rendering Semper’s phrase as, ‘freeing it of all material and outward expression of its non-pictorial *and* religious-symbolic nature’.⁵⁷² As before, Semper’s two compound adjectives end up (2) *flanked by a logical connective* absent from the German. Either construal alters the logical *scope* of the crucial adjective ‘extrapictorial’, and thus obscures the logical difference between statements like the following:

Semper*	This regulation excludes third year philosophy students.
and, Van Eck*	This regulation excludes third year <i>or</i> philosophy students.
(Mallgrave*	This regulation excludes third year <i>and</i> philosophy students.)

The last two statements permit for a much wider scope of the exclusion class than the first one, precisely because the two qualifying phrases no longer *intersect* but apply *disjointly*. In just this way, Semper appears

⁵⁷⁰ Van Eck (2009, 332).

⁵⁷¹ Hvattum (2004).

⁵⁷² Mallgrave (2004, 438-9n.85), emphasis added.

to rein in a particular variety of extra-pictorial content – that which is religious-symbolic – and not all such content.⁵⁷³

Again, his actual claim is far weaker than van Eck would have us believe. Hence, attention to the *linguistic detail* of what Semper actually says, coupled with appreciation for the *logical grammar* attaching to such detail, becomes a game changer when nothing less than Semper's overall stance on the nature and morality of architecture is at stake. In the present case, the enterprise of saddling Semper with semantic minimalism or eliminativism rests on translational and logical errors. As a result, van Eck's counter argument to saddling Semper with a *substantive* view on the moral and societal role of architecture misfires.

This concludes my first foray into the tectonic and moral foundations of Semper's thought. The next chapter will show how he manages to establish a morally more ambitious architecture on the basis of such foundations, and how how manages to expand them.





Fig. 8.11 (left) *Hoftheater*, side entry. **Fig. 8.12.** Illustration by Semper (Stil II, 344).

⁵⁷³ The point is an entirely familiar one for the period, and the tectonic tradition in particular. See Hübsch (1847, 2-3): 'Die Architectur ist übrigens wieder in vielfacher Beziehung von ganz anderer Natur, als die Malerei und Sculptur. Während sich die beiden letztern eigentlich nur durch die Verschiedenartigkeit ihrer Darstellungsmittel unterscheiden, nicht aber ihrem innern Gehalte nach, und während sie die geistig höchsten idealen Interessen der Menschheit ihrer *Zeit direct* durch die Abbildung der Menschengestalt schildern, so stellt die Architectur nur *mittelbar* die gewissermaßen äußerliche Seite dieser geistigen | Interessen dar. Sie gibt selbst bei ihrer höchsten Aufgabe nur die monumentale Darstellung der aus dem religiösen Cultus sich entfaltenden Räumlichkeiten, und bildet also nicht das geistige Innere des Menschen selbst ab.' We already encountered the final clause in Schopenhauer's work (§7.2).

CHAPTER 9

‘WITH ALL PERMISSIBLE MEANS’: ETHICS AND INDIVIDUALISM IN SEMPER’S URBAN INTERVENTIONS

Vor der Erbauung des neuen Schauspielhauses waren die Umgebungen des Königl[ichen] Schlosses und der kostbarsten Monumente Dresdens verunziert von einem unregelmäßigen Haufen kleiner Hütten, die ursprünglich bloß zu Wohnungen für die bei dem Baue der katholischen Kirche beschäftigten fremden, meist italienischen Arbeiter, auf die Dauer ihres Aufenthalts in Dresden bestimmt, aber später zwar nicht zu eigentlichem Besitze, aber doch zu Nutzniessung auf unbestimmte Zeit, käuflich in die Hände anderer Privatleute gekommen waren. Die Beseitigung dieses, unter dem idyllischen Namen des Italienischen Dörfchens berühmten Stadttheiles, war schon lange der Wunsch des Dresdener Publikums, den der Verfasser von ganzem Herzen theilte, so dass er sich vornahm, mit allen erlaubten Mitteln, die ihm zu Gebote standen, dahin zu wirken, dass der schönste Theil der Stadt von diesem entstehenden Provisorium befreit werden. Gottfried Semper⁵⁷⁴

§9.1 NEW TYPOLOGIES

As with Le Corbusier (CHAPTER 6) or Mies van der Rohe (CHAPTER 10), commentators diverge in their moral appraisals of Semper’s architecture, in part because they attribute different non-moral properties to Semper’s designs, and in part because they operate on different value systems when appraising these designs. As a result, inquiring into the specifics and foundations of their differences presents another case study to test, refine, and (as we shall see) significantly *expand* the scope of my CHAPTER 2 framework. To this end, the current chapter focuses on Semper’s efforts to redesign the main forum at Dresden, Germany, in the 1830s and beyond.

Semper’s innovations in architectural thought and building we explored in CHAPTER 8 did not occur in a vacuum but were considerably owed to the conditions he found himself in. Most decisively, the late eighteenth century brought with it a ‘rapid proliferation of new kinds of buildings to house unprecedented institutions’ such as hospitals, museums, department stores, and more.⁵⁷⁵ Not all of these functionalities, and the typologies these demanded (meaning, the *accommodation* of specific functions as indicated in a building’s overall outline and subsections as per its floor plans), were wholly new as such. But they had to be re-adapted to a different audience and clientele, given the decreasing importance of court life and the ascendancy of a self-conscious bourgeois class. As a result, urban designs were increasingly expected to cater to, and express through the very compositional means at their disposal, the greater ‘individualism’ of its new clientele, in a sense of societal and urban ‘individualism’ that the present chapter aims to render more precise in due course.

Arguably the two points are connected given how, in architecture historian Barry Bergdoll’s assessment, many of the aforementioned ‘functions had earlier been housed within palace or monastery complexes, but for the first time they were to be treated as free-standing buildings and given a new form appropriate to changing uses, a broader audience, a new prominence in the city.’⁵⁷⁶ Bergdoll’s emphasis on buildings as ‘free-standing’ is crucial here. For, unlike Schinkel whose Berlin designs were (and still are) frequently critiqued for their disregard to urban context (see §9.2), Semper wanted his designs to harmonize with (a) their urban environment as much as (b) the new altered societal setting. As both architects likewise attempted to accommodate the relative ‘free standing’ character of their monumental architecture, we have to see how this fares in the respective urban contexts they operated in. I raise this in §§9.3-9.4. A related concern, addressed in §9.5, is (c) the belief (shared by Schinkel and Semper) that architecture should educate mankind and thereby aid its process of intellectual and social emancipation from

⁵⁷⁴ Semper (1849, 1).

⁵⁷⁵ Bergdoll 2000, 91).

⁵⁷⁶ Bergdoll (2000, 91).

antiquated structures. Such a belief is likewise conditioned by the arrival of an increasingly egalitarian social order, bequeathing on architecture a new public, and new public roles.⁵⁷⁷

§9.2 FREE STANDING BUILDINGS

Value judgements on urban designs focus, among other things, on how a building relates to its surroundings. Here the crucial question is whether a building forges an ‘active connection’ to its surrounds, or operates independently (‘autonomously’) from it.⁵⁷⁸ To see how this arises, consider two divergent verdicts on Schinkel’s *Altes Museum* (Berlin 1828). The first one attributes to Schinkel a design stance documented in his written work and realized in the museum design. For, Schinkel had believed that ‘every construction be pure, complete, and brought to a close in itself.’ The result, Werner Hegemann contests, is that every of Schinkel’s major classicist building in central Berlin is constructed ‘from the inside out, with little regard to the neighbour[ing buildings]’. As a result, there is ‘not one well-placed building’ of Schinkel’s in Berlin, as the urban environs of the museum testify; gone were seventeenth century accomplishments to create ‘grand urban ensembles’.⁵⁷⁹

By contrast, David Watkin attests to the *Altes Museum* a ‘careful siting’ that takes ‘account of the views from it as well as towards it’ and is thus ‘characteristic of [Schinkel’s] constant concern to relate his buildings to their settings, whether urban or rural.’ The same concern for preserving valuable urban vistas transpires from Schinkel’s own perspective engravings of the work.⁵⁸⁰

Apparently, Hegemann and Watkin apply different criteria to determine whether (and if so, how successfully) Schinkel’s buildings resonate with their urban environment. Even if Hegemann is right, there is a further question – whether he has outlined the urban context correctly that Schinkel (allegedly) fails to respond to. In that regard, consider Fritz Löffler’s observations of early nineteenth century Dresden, the very context of Semper’s earliest (realized) architectural projects. Löffler points out how urban dwellers had begun to create abodes for themselves outside the city walls, even if in times of danger they still sought the safety of the city walls. However, as technological advances in warfare rendered the purpose of city walls and fortifications increasingly obsolete, these walls were torn down, opening up the very space on which cities were founded. As a result, we get a greater cross-fertilization of urban with landscape design. Löffler concludes,

Wenn auch für eine ausgesprochene Stadtbaukunst zunächst keine Aufgaben mehr vorhanden waren und die alte Geschlossenheit der Formen, wie die Symmetrie des Barock, sich gelöst hatte, so entband „das neue Unendliche“, wie es Emil Kaufmann genannt hat, doch nur zu einer Freiheit, an deren Ende wieder entsprechende neue Bindungen stehen mußten. Zunächst trat der bindungsfreie architektonische Einzelkörper an bevorzugte Stelle. Er wuchs ohne Bedenken an beliebigem Ort als Repräsentant des „individualistischen“ Zeitalters.⁵⁸¹

Löffler’s remarks set the stage, literally and figuratively, for Semper’s projects in Dresden – and how we should appraise them – that is, the need to situate public works in an appropriate context they help to co-create. He links, as did previous remarks, the individualism and ‘opening up’ of social structure to the loosening of Baroque urban structure, what Kaufmann called the Baroque ‘urban bond’ (*Städteverbund*), a verbal echo to masonry bonds (linking individual and morphologically constant bricks to form a unified wall). The question is whether this transition from one social context to another would require, as Kaufmann appears to have alleged, a dominance by free-standing buildings.

⁵⁷⁷ Watkin (2011, 478).

⁵⁷⁸ The classic study on this sense of ‘autonomy’ is Kaufmann (1933).

⁵⁷⁹ Hegemann (1931, 161-2): ‘kein einziges wirklich gut aufgestelltes Gebäude [...] große Kunst stadtbaukünstlerischer Ordnung’.

⁵⁸⁰ Watkin (2011, 478).

⁵⁸¹ Löffler (1989, 346).




Fig 9.1. 1835 (Sep 1) design by Semper of the Zwinger forum. (Source: Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Abt. Deutsche Fotothek; Mallgrave 1996, 99 fig.38 / Nerdinger and Oechslin 2003, 151 fig. 12.3.)




Fig 9.2. 1842 (Feb 23) plan by Semper of the Zwinger forum. (Source: gta Institut, ETH Zürich; Mallgrave 1996, 110 fig.48/Nerdinger and Oechslin 2003, 154 fig. 12.8.)





Fig. 9.1a (above) and Fig. 9.2a (below). Semper's 1835 and 1842 forum plans, with annotations.






Fig 9.3. 1842 (Feb 23) perspective by Semper of the Zwinger courtyard. (Source: gta Institut ETH Zürich, Mallgrave 1996, 111 fig. 49 / Nerdinger and Oechslin 2003, 155 fig. 12.9.)




Fig. 9.3a. Semper's 1842 perspective (Fig. 9.3) with annotations.

This is the question §9.3 will raise for Semper. As with Schinkel, commentators diverge in their appraisals, in part because they attribute different non-moral properties to Semper's designs, and in part because they operate on different value systems. As a result, inquiring into the specifics and foundations of their differences presents another case study to test, refine, and (as we shall see) significantly *expand* the scope of my CHAPTER 2 framework. The arguments are very involved and impossible to follow without visual aid. I therefore provide three drawings, all from Semper's hand, two showing plans of the Dresden plaza (also called 'Zwingerforum') into which his buildings, namely the gallery and theatre, were to be inserted, and one perspective drawing (Figs. 9.1-9.3). Furthermore, to enable readers to reference individual buildings and elements to the urban design, I provide three annotated versions of the same three drawings (Figs. 9.1a-9.3a), annotations that reference the individual buildings. Of particular relevance are, of course, Semper's own buildings (Theatre and Gallery), as well as the Baroque 'Zwinger' palace, built by Matthäus Daniel Pöppelmann (completed in 1728), which together with its opening towards the north east provides a paradigm case of a 'Baroque urban bond' (*Barocker Städteverbund*), in Kaufmann's terminology.

§9.3 ANALYSIS OF SEMPER'S URBAN INTERVENTIONS

As indicated, our lead question is whether the dissolution of Baroque social order into a greater degree of individualism (the relative autonomy of individuals vis-à-vis one another, not least in legal terms) requires a similar outcome at the architectural and urban level as Kaufmann had suggested – that is, whether a dominance of 'free-standing' buildings is necessary. A (to the thesis' core concerns) more pertinent question arises from the moral and other other normative grounds on which answers to the first question are provided, specifically with respect to Semper's buildings in Dresden. I begin with Wolfgang Herrmann, who is rather outspoken on the delicate relation Semper's building(s) assumed on these two issues. Regarding the 1841 *Hoftheater* Herrmann writes,

The site [Semper] chose for the theatre clearly indicated an interrelation with the existing structure, but the building itself had an individual character. He achieved this by adapting, though in no way imitating, the festive and rich quality of the surrounding monuments and by consciously rejecting the contrasting stylistic forms then in fashion[.]

And as for the *Hofgalerie* or museum gallery (1839-1855),

Several locations were proposed [...]. The one Semper most favoured was to place it, a free-standing monumental building, near the Zwinger where it would form an integral part of the assembly of buildings, thus lending the forum still greater significance. However, for financial reasons this site was turned down. Reluctantly Semper accepted the final decision to make the [*Hofgalerie*] the fourth side of the Zwinger court, although the spatial unity of Zwinger and forum and with it his grand plan of urban development were thereby destroyed.⁵⁸²

This analysis already singles out all the salient issues, including the magic words 'a free-standing monumental building'. What is missing from Herrmann's account, however, is the prerequisite background to help assess the veracity and accuracy of his verdicts. Here we are helped by other writers. Harry Francis Mallgrave for instance begins his discussion, not with a verdict of his own, but by attention to contemporary discussion of Semper's urban plans in the 1844 *Allgemeine Bauzeitung*.⁵⁸³ The journal praised Semper's 'plan for the enlarged Dresden forum', specifically for realizing 'the much needed link between the theatre and the Zwinger'. The latter is the central issue, as we shall see.

Less favourable was the view of Semper's contemporary and fellow architect Wolframsdorf who had designed the *Orangerie* (see fig. 9.2a). If Wolframsdorf contended 'that it was necessary to move the orangerie away from the theatre for safety reasons', writers more favourable to Semper alleged that that problem could easily be circumvented 'with modern construction methods'. It was the *Orangerie* that had

⁵⁸² Herrmann (1984, 5 and 6-7).

⁵⁸³ Mallgrave (1996, 110).

first jeopardized the 'Italian Village', and Semper's plan [R1] required 'expropriating [yet] more land in the Italian Village', a point on which the Saxon Diet objected to Semper's plan. (Below I return to the Italian Village; the northern half of its location is singled out in fig. 9.2a.) Let me designate this property of his composition as 'R1'. Further features in Semper's composition that gave rise to objections included, [R2] 'the gallery's proximity to both the palace and the theatre', which was again objected to on grounds of [R3] of fire hazard, and secondly, the twin problems of [R4] creating a wind channel on the new axis ('l-axis') that would compound [R5] 'a dusty street running between the museum and the palace'.⁵⁸⁴

The Diet forced Semper to relocate the gallery by shifting its orientation by ninety degrees; this would seal off the l-axis, and thus close the wind channel. One effect, however, is to destroy the inclusive character of the Dresden forum Semper had envisaged, the continuity of citizenry with court life (represented by the Zwinger), with the very gallery intended to mediate between the two now acting as a barrier of sorts between them. In this case, we can assess Semper's gallery building *b* by reference not only to its intrinsic compositional features, but also its *relational* compositional features, including *b*'s siting and orientation – factors that can only be evaluated against the urban context or 'fabric' *b* is inserted in. (My use of the variable '*b*' is meant to recall its place in the formal framework developed by CHAPTERS 2 and 3. The location of Semper's gallery building in his urban designs is marked in my annotated images separately, not with a '*b*'.) The problem is entirely contemporary and arises in most contexts where (1) public space is sparse and (2) a new project is inserted into a pre-existing urban fabric on grounds of 'urban renewal'.⁵⁸⁵ Semper's case is instructive because the extant 'urban fabric' included 'high art' architecture and vernacular building.



Fig 9.4 Volumetric study of Semper's 1835 Dresden forum designs, by the ETH Zürich. (Source: Nerdinger and Oechslin 2003.)

⁵⁸⁴All quotes in this paragraph from Mallgrave (1996, 110-111).

⁵⁸⁵ Limitations of space precluded me from proper discussions of the 2012 London *Shard* by Renzo Piano, the multiple interventions by James Stirling in Stuttgart, including his 1984 gallery, and the unrealized *SpuiForum* (theatre and opera house) in The Hague by NeutelingsRiedijk (2014). The last project shares with Semper's Dresden designs the fate that its original orientation was rejected by the local city council in favour of an axial re-orientation by ninety degrees. See §P.1 and §C.4.




Fig 9.5 Volumetric study of Semper's 1842 Dresden forum designs, by the ETH Zürich. Observe Schinkel's *Königliche Wache* in the foreground (lower right). (Source: Nerdinger and Oechslin 2003.)

The mandated (1844) as opposed to Semper's preferred (1842) location and orientation of the gallery can be assessed for their comparative merit on grounds R1 to R5, except that we now have to assess the gallery *b* by virtue of an expanded individuation of *b*'s compositional properties Π so as to include *b*'s relational properties. Factors mentioned by R1-R5 explain more fully what the vague notion of a building's required 'fit with extant urban fabric' requires, where the latter is a normative *goal* for that architecture. I would also add, as another factor R6, that Semper's 1844 design envisaged the *relocation* of some of the most prestigious parts of that 'urban fabric', namely Schinkel's *Königliche Wache*, from the gallery's intended site to the Elbe – to a site where the *Wache* would inaugurate a longitudinal rather than vertical (north-south) axis, what Fig. 9.1*a* and 9.2*a* term the 'l-axis', to contrast the vertical axis prescribed by the Zwinger's own orientation, and restored by the final location of Semper's gallery (see the red frame in Fig. 9.2*a*). More generally, we should mention that in the final design, [R7] the primary *axial orientation* of the overall forum is shifted from the 'l-axis' (Semper's preferred stance) back to the vertical 'Zwinger axis'. This axuality is one more *relational* feature of *b*, and we have to understand how R7 interacts with R6, in that Semper's stance on R7 would place Schinkel's building at the *outset* of that axis, as communicated by the perspective drawing where we look onto the scene from Schinkel's building, so as to underscore the vital role Schinkel's design would have for the new Dresden forum. Similarly, [R8] Wolframsdorf's *Orangerie* (1841) was to be complicit in Semper's envisaged extending of the Zwinger up to the river Elbe, be connected to the Semper's own theatre. The final part of Semper's design was presented by [R9] two columns featuring the goddess of victory (*Viktoriasäulen*) which framed the composition from the perspective of those approaching the forum from the river, as they do in Semper's own perspective drawing (the columns are annotated 'C1-C2' in fig. 8.18).⁵⁸⁶ Semper himself summarizes his overall intent thus.

Dieses Project umfasste den ganzen Raum von der Ostraallee bis zu dem linken Stromufer, das mit Vorsätzen eingeschlossen und durch breite Freitreppen, die bis an den Spiegel der Elbe hinabführten, zugänglich gemacht werden sollten. Verschiedene Elemente, welche zu diesem Bauprojecte zusammenwirken sollten, waren schon fertig vorhanden, andere standen in Aussicht,

⁵⁸⁶ For discussion of R6-R9, see Löffler (1989, 375); e.g. 'Der Orangerie setzte [Semper] das zu errichtende Theatre an. Die soeben erst vollendete Wache Schinkels versetzte er an die Elbe, in die Achse des Kronentores.'

und konnten hineingezogen werden. Zu den schon vorhan-|denen Elementen gehörten: das Königl. Schloss, die grossartige katholische Kirche, die [Schinkel'sche] Hauptwache, (die jedoch wegen ihrer schiefen und planlosen Lage mit dem Uebrigen schwer in Verbindung zu setzen war, und deshalb nach einer später[e]n Umarbeitung des Planes als an die Elbe verlegt, gedacht wurde), und endlich, als Anfang der alle diese Gebäude verbindenden Hallen oder Arkaden, das reiche Zwingergebäude. (1849, 1-2)

R6-R9 then relate to political factors like R2 – the *axial orientation* of *b*, the re-location of extant architecture, and the *proximity* of *b* and other non-court buildings to the court, all tie into one another. And these are of course appraisable on political grounds in that Semper's designs and the Diet's preferred solution are premised on divergent ideas of what (political configuration) the forum should express and represent, as per *b*'s properties emerging from taking very distinct stances on issues R1-R7, including the moral value of human safety (R3).

Because the political ideas are 'rooted' in those properties, the end result makes it possible to evaluate, not simply the agents who put forward these configurations (and stances on R1-R7), but to evaluate the configurations put forward. That is, we can morally assess the comparative merits of *b1* and *b2*, to respectively designate Semper's and the Diet's plans for the gallery building, by virtue of their intrinsic and relational compositional properties, properties *b1* and *b2* are rationalized to have on grounds R1-R7. That is, we are debating which properties the buildings *ought to have*, and part of that debate features a moral 'ought'.

The politically dominant features, I suggest, arise from R2, but the morally more sensitive issue may arise from R1. Semper intended to create a more impressive urban vista by giving proper due to the monumental buildings at the forum, like the *Hofkirche* (Catholic church at the south end of the forum). Those approaching those buildings from the north east, arriving from the river Elbe, would find in their gaze 'disorderly heaps of little huts' (*ungeregelte Haufen kleiner Hütten*), the so-called 'Italian Village', a temporary residence for the very craftsman who had helped construct the *Hofkirche* (see figs. 9.4-9.5, both also depict the trees near the *Orangerie* of Wolframsdorf). For Semper the village presented a 'disfiguring provisory arrangement' (*entstellendes Provisorium*) that had lasted far too long, leaving the intended forum space nearly 'deserted' and 'occupied only by children and spinsters'.⁵⁸⁷ Fritz Löffler speaks more euphemistically of Semper's noticing a perceived need to 'revamp' the Italian village, not least if Pöppelmann's old ambition to extend his Zwinger design up to the river (Elbe) was to be finally realized. As a result, to open the fourth (unbuilt) side of the Zwinger towards the Elbe, the 'mess of houses' created by the Italian Village had to be removed, as it stood in the way.⁵⁸⁸

Importantly, Semper's own design and the Diet's preferred location for the building of the gallery agreed on R2. The only remaining issue for them was how the gallery would relate to the Zwinger court building, given that there was an alleged *discrepancy of scale* [R10] – Semper's building, for instance, is more massive and higher than Pöppelmann's are. Löffler (1989, 380) thinks Semper's museum met the challenge to the architect's 'Taktgefühl' (feeling of tact), in that the building's 'finely segmented, joyously ornamented treatment of Italian High Renaissance, helps to glide over the discrepancy in scale, and gives to the Zwinger the main theme or melody in this architectural ensemble'.

⁵⁸⁷ Semper (1849, 1-2); see also chapter motto. For discussion, cf. Laudel, 'Pläne zur Erweiterung des Zwingers Dresden' (in Oechslin and Nerding 2003, 149-157, at 150).

⁵⁸⁸ 'Ihm war nicht entgangen, daß das ganze Italienische Dörfchen einer Sanierung bedurfte. Er nahm den alten Gedanken Pöppelmanns, den Zwinger bis zur Elbe zu führen, wieder auf [...] Der Plan beseitigte das Häusergewirr des Italienischen Dörfchens und öffnete die unbebaute vierte Zwingerseite nach der Elbe.' (Löffler 1989, 375). For a more critical appraisal of the Italian Village's demise at Semper's hands, see Milde (2006).



Fig. 9.6 Zwinger vom Schlußturm aus, Deckfarbenblatt von K. Enslin, ca. 1825; 'Italian Village' depicted in the lower right corner. (Source: Fritz Löffler, *Das Alte Dresden* 1989, 364)




Fig 9.7 Carl Wilhelm Ardt, Panorama der Residenzstadt Dresden, ca. 1833; to the right in the foreground the so-called 'Italian Village'. (Source: Nerdinger and Oechslin 2003, 150 fig 1.1)

Mallgrave is less forgiving, but points out how Semper had to operate on parameters of mass and height that he had little say on,

Increasing the spatial program of the museum [*Hofgalerie*] also made it difficult to mediate the work compositionally with the smaller proportions of the Zwinger [...]. In response to this problem, Semper stepped down the Zwinger façade a half level to ease the transition, but the sensitivity to the Zwinger's height and scale that characterized his earlier scheme was all but lost in the executed version. The massive gallery simply overwhelms the more fragile Baroque elements of the Zwinger. (1996, 112)

Mallgrave's commentary brings out two important points that occasion my first concluding section.



Fig. 9.8 Schinkel, *Königliche Wache*, Dresden 1832. (Photo by Author, November 2013)



Fig. 9.9 Schinkel's *Königliche Wache* in relation to Semper's *Hofgalerie* (rear left). (Photo by Author)

§9.4 THE ETHICS OF ARCHITECTONIC COMPOSITION REVISITED

First, to enable a moral appraisal of architecture, we have to expand a building *b*'s compositional properties Π so as to include *b*'s intrinsic as well as relational features; and we have to query how the two sets of features *interact*, indeed how successfully they do so. Massing, height, fineness of detailing on a façade are among the very intrinsic compositional features that enable a building to successfully resonate with and, if need be, challenge its surroundings. For these intrinsic properties decide the stance a building's design takes on, for instance, *what* comparative scale is assumed (thus one of the building's goals) and how successfully that stance is accomplished (as per the building's compositional means). We require substantive philosophical inquiry into the proper alignment between a building's intrinsic and relational features, at the level of their means and ends, before we can incorporate all of this in the two-step model outlined in CHAPTER 2.

Secondly, where Löffler wants to appraise Semper's design in terms of its architect and his feeling for 'tact', Mallgrave emphasizes that the object of appraisal is still the building *and its physical properties*, irrespective of intent. Excluding considerations of intent is especially relevant in contexts where the building *does not realize the architect's own, original intentions*. What is more, the latter should not be discerned or scrutinized on grounds of his or her verbal and written attestations, but have to be read off from his or her design plans themselves. This is not to devalue the immense results that have been unearthed about Semper's political commitments from biographical studies, specifically on his involvement with the 1849 revolution in Dresden, where the bourgeoisie attempted to uproot the local autocracy by forcing the Diet to acknowledge a proper constitution, and allocate proper rights of freedom to the press.⁵⁸⁹ It is only to declare the irrelevance of such results, and what they report, to the present issue – except to note in passing how, in this particular instance, politics seems to have been the continuation of architecture by other means, and not the other way round. For, if Semper *as a person* mounted the barricades to uproot such social structures (as he literally did in 1849), that is one thing. If his royally commissioned *designs* in Dresden (and later, Vienna) attempt something similar – that is, establish a ground for aristocracy and citizenry to meet at eye level, and (begin to) operate in a joint space –, that is quite another affair, and one where the question of biographical intent is secondary. For we want to know what is *accomplished at the level of (his) architectural and urban design*.

We are, then, still comparing *b1* to *b2*, and attend to written reports by the Diet and the architect *only* insofar these help us appraise *b1* and *b2*'s intrinsic and relational compositional features – because, as before, our *moral and overall appraisal* of the merits of these building designs arises, as it has to, purely from those features. In the final instance, we *may* take the accumulative results yielded by this exercise to *then* issue in moral appraisals of the agents who decided which properties the museum or gallery ought to have (had), but what accounts for the moral quality attaching to those agents (and/or their intentions) accrues from the moral appraisal of the compositional properties, *and not the other way round*. If Peter intends to hit Sally, it is the moral undesirability of Sally's being (actually or counterfactually) at the receiving end of unprovoked and certainly unmerited pain that explains the moral undesirability of Peter's intent. In the same way, if we deem the eradication of the abode of the very craftsmen who helped to erect the Court Church in Dresden to be morally problematic, especially in light of the ostensive goal of *providing a better urban vista* for said church, this moral appraisal attaches to *what is decided on*, and not to *who* is deciding it or even *that* it is being decided on at all. It is not the *decision* that is morally appraised, but its *content* – and that content accrues from the *compositional features* of buildings, intrinsic and relational, that are decided on.

⁵⁸⁹ See in particular Quitzsch (1981) and Mallgrave (1996). Historians are quite divided on whether to see Semper's involvement with the May revolution as 'heroic' or 'pathetic', but that too is no concern for us here, even though (as CHAPTER 2 suggested), the proper appraisal of such moral appraisals would have to home in on a proper understanding and individuation of his involvement, that is, of his actions and (where traceable) intentions.



Fig. 9.10 Semper, *Hoftheater*. (Photo by Author, November 2013)

The first issue is the more difficult one. On the adjusting of intrinsic to relational properties, and in direct response to (what I term) the alleged property [R10], Laudel comments (1991, 23) how Semper [R10-1] removed from the Dresden gallery's 1838 design the central copula (still visible in Semper's earlier drawings, e.g. fig. 9.3) as it protruded into the vistas onto the Church and Palace to the South, and how Semper [R10-2] proportioned the gallery building in accordance with the modular height from the Zwinger's façade. Semper himself reports on this when he writes how the height of the gallery was calculated based on the Zwinger's compositional properties, for instance the segment

‘von Höhe des Stylobates bis zum Rande der Balustrade des oberen Stockwerkes gerechnet[.]’⁵⁹⁰

An in-depth study of Martin Fröhlich has revealed that many more intrinsic properties of Semper's composition were determined by such calculations. The proportions of all the major compositional segments of Semper's *Hofgalerie* were directly dictated by those of the Zwinger, especially the height and length properties at the Northern façade (facing the theatre square), both in total, and in its subsections (left corner risalit, wing, median risalit, wing, right corner risalit):

These measurements could be freely chosen *only up to a degree* [*nur bedingt*], as the combined length of median risalit and wings yields the distance between the pavilions in Pöppelman's Zwinger court. The proportioning of the wings themselves demonstrates that they are the result of precise measurements of the floor heights and window axes width of the Zwinger buildings.⁵⁹¹

So much for the compositionally relevant detail [R10-2]. A related one [R10-3] is how Semper's typological design for the *Hofgalerie* departed from Schinkel's idea to ground the floor plan's distribution, arrangement, and axial orientation of rooms on the typology of a temple, and instead rendered it closer to

⁵⁹⁰ Semper (1849, 2).

⁵⁹¹ Fröhlich (2007, 47). Fröhlich's analysis (ibid., 45-53) unearths many more relevant compositional properties, as does Fröhlich (1990).

that of a palace. Among a plethora of salient compositional details to establish this claim [R10-3], Fröhlich points to the distribution of *wings*, an articulate ‘broadening’ of the building instead of, as in Schinkel’s *Altes Museum*, a more centralized design with overt similarities to a temple. Similarly, the typology of Semper’s *theatre*, again in marked contrast to Schinkel’s, is likewise closer to that of a palace than a temple.⁵⁹² This again helps Semper establish the continuity in the *composition* or design of his own buildings – housing the basic institutions and self-representations of the citizenry – with those of court life.

Further, [R10-4] Semper himself comments how adjusting one building x to another y does not simply mean to attend to x ’s ‘detailing, but rather to the picturesque (and, arising from an inner need) grouping of massing, from which the individual [detail or building] receives its individuation.’⁵⁹³ This quote constitutes a written rejection of Kaufmann’s urbanist strictures, and Semper’s own built work shows how to concretely attain that rejection (a point on which more later).

Furthermore, if we step back from Semper for a moment, just what *is* the proper alignment between a building’s intrinsic and relational features, at the level of their means and ends? Presently, extant philosophical research on such issues operates on dubious assumptions, in that influential writers prefer, for instance, a façade design ‘characterized by a vertical order or organization of elements’, as such design ‘makes [buildings] better suited to man’s natural posture.’ But in modernist architecture, we learn,

there is no vertical ordering of elements and the building does not have a particular orientation. As a consequence, there is no dialogical relation with the adjacent buildings and difficulties arise as to how the building ought to fit within the existing environment[.]⁵⁹⁴

One wonders what motivates a demand to accommodate this particular constraint in the first place, and why of all things it is to account for a harmonious built environment, or indeed any such environment.

Rafaël De Clercq, who is merely reporting these positions, provides good grounds to find them dubious. The very argument (due to Roger Scruton)

against the horizontal [i.e. the modernist] style rests on the assumption that (i) we are spontaneously inclined to see a human figure in a building, and in particular, a human face in a facade, and that (ii) the horizontal style frustrates this inclination of ours. However, even if this (double) assumption were to be correct, it would still be questionable whether the consequence of (ii) is as dramatic as Scruton thinks it is: an intelligible form [...], coherence [...], a clear orientation within the environment [...], and the like, surely have not disappeared with the disappearance of the traditional façade. (ibid., 144)

But De Clercq’s own proposal fares no better. He is off to a promising start, defining the harmony of two buildings x and y as, ‘the spatial proximity of x and y confers positive aesthetic value upon the whole composed of x and y ’.⁵⁹⁵ But this formula is not filled in successfully, but seems to simply push the bulge in the carpet to another spot. His suggestion (ibid., 77) that *only* the type of codified rules made famous by Renaissance architects in their treatises could ever create a ‘shared grammar’ for x and y enabling them to ‘harmonize’, is not only lifted from Scruton (as he is well aware) but raises the exact same questions he leveled at Scruton before. If we think of Semper’s work in Dresden (or Stirling’s in Stuttgart), such urban ensembles succeed, where they do, by operating across a vast disparity of architectural stylistic strictures. In that sense, I would allege, analysis of Semper’s work challenges positions currently entrenched in the philosophical literature.

This point made, I commence to a full moral appraisal of Semper’s design in §9.4.1, and address a set of hard hitting objections to the very attempt thereof which bring us to matters at the heart of this thesis.

⁵⁹² See Fröhlich (1991, 24-29, 63).

⁵⁹³ Semper, 1843 *Begleitschreiben* on a building extension (quoted *apud* Laudel 1991, 25).

⁵⁹⁴ De Clercq (2004, 139-141), reporting a position of Roger Scruton.

⁵⁹⁵ De Clercq (2011, 71).

§9.5 then resumes my larger analysis of Semper, and turns to one final issue to bring out in full the specifically ethical ambitions of Semper informing his own built work: its pedagogical value.

§9.4.1 A MORAL APPRAISAL OF SEMPER'S URBAN DESIGN, AND SOME KEY DIFFICULTIES FOR ANY SUCH APPRAISAL

Having summarized the morally salient properties of Semper's compositions at Dresden, [R1] to [R10-4], how can we arrive at an overall moral verdict? Semper's design, I allege, has both moral 'pro's' and 'con's', where the evaluation of either as such depends on a particular set of moral and political values \mathcal{M} . On the 'pro' side we have,

- (1) the gallery's *proximity to* and *appropriate axial orientation* in relation to both the palace and the theatre without creating a barrier between them, helping to create a *common forum* for aristocracy and citizenry;
- (2) a *shared proportionality* and *continuity in typology* across designs (for both Semper's buildings and those of others already on the site), which again creates an even playing field for buildings allocated to aristocracy and citizenry;
- (3) the *avoidance of excess monumentality*, given Semper's removal of the domed cupola atop the gallery.

On the 'con' side we have,

- (4) the *elimination* of extant dwellings such as the 'Italian Village', and
- (5) a proposed *axial re-orientation* that is objectionable (and was vetoed) on grounds of (i) fire hazard, (ii) creating a wind channel on the new axis and (iii) its creating a dusty street running between the museum and the palace'.

Finally, we have the more difficult to categorize feature of

- (6) the *relocation* of historic buildings, and the '*framing*' of them (such as Schinkel's *Wache* with Victoria columns), which alters the original design.

The reason (6) is harder to place is because preservationists can offer fairly principled arguments against such alterations, whereas on a looser value set one could see in (6) Semper's successful attempt to bring out the compositional properties the Schinkel building already has in a better manner – by placing them more prominently, and help them interact with the rest of the (now altered) site in a much more effective, interactive, and harmonious way.

But the CHAPTER 2 framework asked for more than a simple 'line up' of such features: it asked for such factors in the Π -base to enable us to arrive at a categorical verdict of b 's moral status as 'morally good' or 'morally bad' (allowing for graded, if equally categorical notions of goodness). But this, we shall now see, is not possible, and is why, at the commencement of CHAPTER 9, I said that attention to Semper's works – written and built – will both challenge my framework and help us revise, expand, refine, and correct it. This should remind us once more that philosophy *needs* (input from and attention to) architecture to at all arrive at respectable results in the philosophy of architecture. What, then, are the difficulties here?

First, my framework requires a *constant* moral set of values by which a specific Π is appraised, requires that for each instance of $V(b)$ there is one \mathcal{M} (*not*: that there is one \mathcal{M} for every $V(b)$). But unless (1) to (6) operate on a highly conjunctive set of such value frameworks, one that is free from internal tension and inconsistency, this is not possible. For instance, (1) requires us to place a high value on a particular political constitution – the one Semper, alongside others in Dresden, wanted to pursue, and which formed one moral 'end' for his designs; whereas (5i) presupposes a much weaker moral requirement, sc. the avoidance of human harm, regardless of the political constitution these humans find themselves operating (or having to operate) in. So far this is not inconsistent, it simply means expanding (5i)'s implicit \mathcal{M} to that of (1). But then we get (4), which directly collides the two. To see through the value underlying (4), we

now have to compromise the very value that feeds into (1). So, however we ‘add up’ (1) to (6), we appear to lack a constant \mathcal{M} that applies to them across the board, and the very idea of ‘adding them up’ collapses here. Much rather, it appears that Semper’s design was subject to irreconcilable moral demands.

Our next difficulty is that the input of (1) to (6) does not create a categorical moral verdict at all, but a mixed one. That is, because there are both moral con’s and pro’s to Semper’s design, neither one of the type of verdict my framework seems to vindicate is on offer (*b* is morally good/bad).⁵⁹⁶ Does this, then, not totally erode whatever theoretic, ethical ambitions that framework ever held, as per CHAPTER 2?

I think not. Much rather, this – entirely legitimate – worry alerts us to the actual nature of moral appraisals of architecture. Though the moral appraisal of concrete buildings (*b*) is at stake, what gets actually appraised is *b* insofar it is Π . That is, *b* is morally good (or bad) insofar it is Π – thus CHAPTER 2. What the current objection alerts us to is that Π may pull us in opposite directions here. If so, that is a feature we are all familiar with in morally appraising art works of categories other than architecture. A play by Friedrich Dürrenmatt, or a movie by Ulrich Seidl (*1952), will feature some scenes that are morally objectionable, and others that are morally permissible, even praiseworthy. Seidl’s *Import/Export* (2007), for instance, portrays women as objects of male sexual gratification, and his portrayal is, in some moments, as graphic in its expression as commercial pornography is (and led to some in the audience to leave the movie theatre). Such scenes, however, are followed and preceded by other ones that show the male characters whose gratification is at stake here, in a less than favourable light – for instance, as being physically insecure, and themselves victims of physical violence by others. By being framed thus, the male characters’ presence in the morally objectionable scenes is meant to alert us, not only to *the film’s* demeaning portrayal of the women, but to the women’s treatment as such *at the hands of men* – both literally, by the other characters *in* the scene, and figuratively, by the scene’s being framed in visual terms that elicit a type of gaze that objectifies all of its participants. Seidl’s scene elicits the male, objectifying gaze as much as it critiques it and anyone complicit in its production. There is, then, no easy way to say whether Seidl’s movie *as a whole*, or even this single scene *as a whole*, is *categorically* morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Much rather, it features a delicate and (in its complexity) bewildering mix of such elements, which is the aim and success of its composition. Just so, I allege, the many factors that are operative in Semper’s urban designs, the complexity of its values *and* of its compositional properties, is such that a categorical moral verdict may be hard to come by. But this should not at all lead us to resist their moralization wholesale. Instead, it should remind us of the enormous sensitivity and attention to detail that attempting any such moralization requires *to be a responsible and responsive one*. Semper’s artworks, like Seidl’s and Dürrenmatt’s, are undoubtedly open to moral appraisal. Indeed, we would miss something important and arguably central to his buildings if we resisted such appraisal, or refused to engage in it on ideological grounds. Particular in the case of the Dresden forum, it appears that any *aesthetic* critical engagement with Semper’s architectural efforts would fail to engage its objects in the right manner *at all* – would view them as objects for a contemplation of sorts that is utterly disconnected, not just from Dresden in the 1840s, but the very compositional properties underlying these buildings.

In this limited sense, then, my thesis’s main conclusion has been established, sc. *that* buildings are morally appraisable. How exactly, and how conclusively this can be done, is another question (to which I get again shortly). Nor is the delicate question as to *which* moral framework to opt for – and the availability of a consistent and applicable one – one that interferes with that conclusion at this point any longer. That question is real, and merits real (case by case) answers, but it does not erode the larger project.

Even so, however, several issues remain over the individuation of Π in the case study here, with respect to features (1) to (6). CHAPTER 2-3 argued that Π -properties have to be both intrinsic to their building(s), and that they have to be insulated from the causal process which gives rise to *b*’s creation – just as Kant resisted a moral condemnation of the pyramids based on the causal factors such as slave labour involved

⁵⁹⁶ Thanks to Ben Sweeting for raising this objection (Delft, 10 July, 2014).

in their creation (cf. §5.3.3). It appears, however, that factors (4) and (6) very much belong to the *causal ancestry* of Semper's designs and not to their intrinsic nature.⁵⁹⁷ In response, I would highlight how the very *having* of certain intrinsic features of Semper's designs – such as the open forum plaza on which his axial re-orientation depends – *presupposes* certain factors. It is simply not possible for Semper's designs to *have* those very intrinsic features, without the other ones. It thus seems to me that, though the link is extrinsic and causal, it is a lot tighter than in the case of the pyramids, which could have had all *their* intrinsic formal features in the absence of unpaid construction labour. There is, then, a real need to be a great deal more precise about when factors of causal ancestry are *entirely* irrelevant to a building's intrinsic features, and when they are co-constitutive of them.

As to factor (6), here the issue is that the properties that emerge arise from *between* the buildings – thus, as I said earlier in §9.4, the resulting set of properties for *all* the buildings in Semper's forum design are relational ones, but are also *intrinsic to the built realm*. Relocating Schinkel's *Wache*, then, is not a relational feature to be located (at least in part) in the realm of human-building interactions, as the example of the pyramids would have to be. As before, there are important distinctions to be made here, and a genuine need to replace Kant's too roughly articulated worries about (wrongly) morally condemning artworks purely for features having to do with (a particularly worrying sort of) causal ancestry. As before, the 'purely' needs reconsideration, as does the qualifier 'particularly worrying sort of': there are impure cases, and 'sorts' other than the ones Kant worried about and which, consequently, we cannot blindly subject to his misgivings. If, so far, CHAPTER 9 argued for an extension of buildings' intrinsic to their relational features, as long as these are *intrinsic to the built realm* (sc. the properties buildings have in relation *to one another*), the same pertains to expanding the base of Π to *diachronic* features, as long as these diachronic features single out properties of buildings *intrinsic to the built realm*.

Next up is a related worry of individuating the *intrinsic* properties of the entire set of buildings in the first place, where these are 'not yet moralized' ones in the sense the PREFACE demanded (§P.2). For it now seems that (1) and (2)'s *classifying* some of Dresden's buildings – or even some of their compositional features, as in (2) – as belonging to the sphere of aristocracy rather than citizenry (and vice versa), appears to be an *extrinsic* feature of them rather than an intrinsic one. Moreover, such classifications re-import the type of symbolic, societal connotations that §1.6 argued to be irrelevant for the moral appraisal of architecture, at least in the prerequisite sense the present book is after.⁵⁹⁸ That is, the individuation of Π given in (1) to (6) is too 'thick', and morally laden.

In response, I would allege that my *articulation* of (1) to (6) is arguably sloppy on this point, but that the individuation of Π given in §9.3-§9.4 is not, or at any rate need not be so. All the features in (2), for one, can be given a purely mathematical description (or at the very least, one free of societal and symbolic connotations), and their description in Martin Fröhlich's analysis (to which they are owed in the first place) provide just that. That Semper's additions share typological and proportion-based properties with some of Pöppelmann's (and Schinkel's) buildings can be stated in ways that individuate those properties in a politically neutral, indeed apolitical way. All that matters is that these properties are *shared* across these architects' work. And then, once we bring in a moral framework \mathcal{M} such as for (1) (see above), we can enrich that 'thin' individuation of the salient properties by the categorization required by their moralization. The symbolic and political connotations owed to Semper's designs, then, do not simply arise from their compositional properties as such, but from our viewing them in their political context (and our viewing that context in a highly particular way). While those connotations will remain extrinsic to Π itself, and while some of them will connote an extrinsic (instrumental) rather than intrinsic value of Semper's buildings, the original objection still stands. For now the issue is whether the *relation* of \mathcal{M} to Π need always be an intrinsic one. If it need not, my framework can avoid the present objection. On reflection,

⁵⁹⁷ Thanks to Christian Illies for this objection (Delft, 10 July, 2014).

⁵⁹⁸ Thanks to Maarten Franssen for this objection (Delft, 10 July, 2014).

however, the relation appears to be an intrinsic one, and quite necessarily so. For if V accrues to *b* on the basis of Π relative to \mathcal{M} , and \mathcal{M} is extrinsic to *b*, then V is extrinsic to *b*. But that is precisely the type of moral appraisal my framework is not designed to address, let alone address primarily.

What seems needed, much rather, is to accord *b*'s intrinsic and relational properties *one* moral appraisal, and *b*'s extrinsic properties (including the ones which presuppose our viewing them in a certain political context) *another*, and finally an account of how these two appraisals interact to yield an 'overall moral appraisal' of *b*. Semper's designs, then, require a sort of mixed appraisal that is between CHAPTERS 1-2's crude distinction between moral appraisals *wholly* grounded in a building's intrinsic properties (FACE VALUE TREATMENT) and moral appraisals wholly grounded in a building's extrinsic properties *unrelated* to the building itself (REDESCRIPTIVISM). On the interaction of intrinsic properties with extrinsic properties grounded in intrinsic ones, see §11.3.

A final difficulty (or group of difficulties) may arise from the attribution of certain properties in Π to *b* at all, specifically where *b* is a historic building and our only evidence for its properties is (highly) indirect. In that case, the worry goes, our evidential base on which to rest *b*'s moralization is simply too fragile to allow a strong moral claim. In response, I acknowledge this difficulty as real – architecture historians, after all, are still struggling to determine the 'real' properties of many buildings in their 'original' state. We lack detailed drawings of the plans and sections of several historic buildings restored in the mid nineteenth century by Viollet-le-Duc, for instance, but we know from his own recordings that he altered their underlying structure and outward appearance often drastically. Just so, the extent to which Schinkel's own drawings of his buildings (some of them now destroyed) ever corresponded to them when built can likely not ever be determined conclusively and accurately. And finally, even where fairly detailed drawings exist, allowing for these buildings' restoration, the built result is often amenable to highly divergent interpretations – not so much of what moral appraisal we should accord such buildings, but of their compositional properties in the first place. Josef Quetglas' study of Mies van der Rohe's *Barcelona Pavilion*, for instance, shows how across eight decades one and the same building has received an astounding diversity (and discrepancy) as to which properties it actually has, and how to best describe them.⁵⁹⁹ Just so, one could, on the authority of noted historians of nineteenth century Germany no less, challenge my basic political 'decoding' of Semper's museum designs, and the Dresden forum more widely, as being far more complicit with the royalist societal order of old than my reading permits.⁶⁰⁰

I will not concede, however, that this set of related worries at all undermines the main thrust of my CHAPTER 2 model for the moral appraisal of architecture. For one, the worry is epistemic rather than metaphysical. True, there are evidence based limitations in determining and correctly articulating the set of compositional properties Π whose moral appraisal is at stake. But by the same token, the point of the exercise is precisely to appraise a building *with respect to* such a set of Π . As a result, if the *relation* of Π to the actual *b* is tenuous – in that the actual *b* never had (all of) the properties that drawings of it ascribe to it – then the resulting appraisal is, first and foremost, of a building with *that* set of properties: *b* is morally good (or bad) *insofar* it has Π . Recall from CHAPTER 2 that *b* is rigidly defined in terms of that set. If, then, the historical *b* had another set of such properties, that means the moral appraisal is not of it, but of something that features the attributed composition. Moreover, in some cases we have a plurality of sources and drawings to extrapolate which of the properties *b* has, and which are harder to ascribe to it conclusively. If so, a moral appraisal of *b* should distinguish the two. Again, my model can absorb such epistemic difficulties, instead of ignoring them or crumbling under their weight. Finally, evidence related

⁵⁹⁹ Quetglas (2001). I owe this reference to Vasilis Ganiatsas, and owe to him too – and to Jules Schoonman – the basic worry raised in this paragraph, in response to the present chapter's presentation at a conference in Delft on 10 July, 2014. I return to compositionally and morally 'interpreting' Mies's architecture in CHAPTER 10 below.

⁶⁰⁰ See the fascinating study of the entrance composition and decorative schemes of the *Hofgalerie* in Sheehan (2000, 128-129), and (ibid., 116) on the Dresden museum's 'populist aspiration' depicted in contemporary paintings. See also Sheehan (1989, 525-542).

difficulties alert us, once again, for the need of scrupulous architectural historical work on buildings we want to assess, aesthetically and morally. Their value to the project of this thesis is indispensable, and no amount of argumentation can remove the vulnerability an undertaking like mine has towards historiographical reservations. Precisely because my two-step model allows for, indeed insists on, an interface between ethics and architectural history, it will inherit all the internal difficulties the latter discipline faces in coming up with a determinate, and fairly settled, understanding of how a building is or was actually composed. Nor, finally, is this difficulty only germane to historic case studies. As I show in the CODA, even present day buildings feature surprisingly incomplete records documenting their composition, and many morally salient features can only be guessed at. This, however, does not call so much for a revision of my model, as call out for the need for better documentation, and careful reading of that documentation, at the hands of others.

§9.5 ARCHITECTURE AS AN EDUCATIONAL DEVICE

In his 1850 manuscript ‘Vergleichende Baulehre’, Semper says how architecture,

has over the centuries created its own store of forms from which it borrows the types for new creations, by using these types, architecture remains legible and comprehensible for everyone[.]⁶⁰¹

Such ‘comprehensibility for everyone’ (a demand we are familiar with from Schopenhauer), however, is not simply afforded by public architecture *implementing* a fixed canon of architectural base forms. Rather, Semper thinks, for architecture to be legible, it first needs a *literate* audience. By taking up the stance, Semper rejects earlier views on architectural legibility, such as Boulée’s idea of ‘architecture parlante’, as much as later views such as those surfacing in Colin Rowe’s dismissal of modernist architecture’s (failed) pedagogical mission.⁶⁰² Rowe in particular posits the false dilemma of architecture having to *either* cater to an architecturally literate elite *or* to be legible to the lowest common denominator, namely a crowd of illiterate brutes. The happy intermediate, of overcoming the dark ages of architectural illiteracy, is here simply ruled out.⁶⁰³ Semper, however, thinks that architectural literacy can be established beyond the reach of a small elite, whether we define that elite socio-economically (financially privileged court life) or, as is endemic nowadays, in terms of a cultural elite that carefully insulates itself from outside criticism and comprehension alike – of which much work by contemporary architectural critics and historians, not to mention architecture theorists, provides enduring testimony. Such cynicism or self-protectionism, in Semper’s mind, is ill warranted and shields architecture from its public role to help educate the masses, and elevate them to a deeper life. Semper understands that his built efforts need to be *complemented* by measures to didactically guide (never determine) the public in its very reception of such works.⁶⁰⁴

To that end, what would be needed is an ‘orderly exposition’ (Bergdoll 2000, 236) in the aforementioned ‘store of forms’, an exposition highlighting the forms’ genealogy and evolution, one that would be available and accessible to the public. To that end, Semper devised his museum projects in Vienna, as *thesauri* of artistic and natural *motifs*, and some artifacts on display there today – especially the *pegmata* – are

⁶⁰¹ Quoted from the translation *apud* Herrmann (1984, 193).

⁶⁰² Rowe (1972/2000).

⁶⁰³ The same is true of Roger Scruton who declares that for architecture to be part of the public order, the architect ‘must translate his intuition into terms that are publically intelligible, unite his buildings with an order that is recognizable not only to the expert but also to the ordinary uneducated man.’ (1979, 250). The slip from ‘ordinary’ and ‘publically’ to ‘uneducated’ is arguably the flip side of elitism: the belief that literacy is beyond the reach of the unwashed masses. Literacy cannot be reasonably demanded from ‘ordinary men’, nor the means of attaining it brought to them. As a result, being educated or refined is upheld as a class barrier that is at once legitimate and insurmountable. For a contrary view, see Ryan (2012).

⁶⁰⁴ Hannoncourt (1982) champions the same outlook to increase musical literacy across the board. In this mission, he is aided by the still prevalent institution of music conservatories across the country that afford high caliber music education to masses of lower class citizens (their children, that is), provided by the Austrian welfare system. See again Ryan (2012) for the larger point here. – On ‘didactically guide (never determine)’ cf. Carter (2009).

a stellar example of the attempt's success (see CHAPTER 8, fig. 8.2*b*). Bergdoll goes so far as to see the project realized in a stronger sense, writing a propos Semper's 1873 museum projects in Vienna,

In this monumental project for expanding the palace and creating new museums of art and natural history, Semper was able to give form to his theory that monumental facades should be the theatrical backdrop to the rituals and institutions of urban life. The Renaissance for him coincided with the emergence of free city-states and bourgeois culture and he proposed it be further developed for modern times. (2000, 259, *ad*)

This, however, must be contested. Semper's plans for the *interior arrangement* of the content of the Vienna museums ended up contravening his lofty goals. As Gerhard Roth recently reported (quoting as authority the museum's own director), the museums are arranged by a *historical evolutionary* line-up, that follows the *biological* diachronic itinerary rather than Semper's (scientifically more dubious) ideas of *morphological* evolution.⁶⁰⁵ Those ideas were only recently published in a manuscript originally donated by Semper to the city of Vienna in 1862 (see fig. 9.11), where Semper's diagrammatic plan shows how he wants architecture to accommodate or host (provide a home for) the very store of technical and artistic motifs that, on his view, give rise to architecture itself. This reciprocal dependency – architecture houses the very possibilities of its own forms – would have been a monumental achievement, a near literal realization of Semper's most profound ideas, if only the city of Vienna had seen fit to implement them.




Fig. 9.11 Facsimile and transcription of Semper's 1852 drawing of the Vienna museum plan. (Source: Pokornynagel and 2007, 39 and 57)

However, Semper's agenda, of educating the public on the basic stock of architectural forms or artistic motifs so as to enable the public's appreciation of the architecture surrounding it, was not confined to his museum projects. It also emerges in his intentions for his theatre designs, which could occasion a re-assessment of Semper's views on the ethical role of architecture to educate the public. In Laudel's view,

The [very] significance customarily accorded to [Semper's first Dresden theatre] in his oeuvre corresponds to the first rank that (since the eighteenth century) is increasingly accorded to building as a moral institution, as an institution for the education of the people (*der Bauaufgabe als moralischer Anstalt, als Bildungsstätte des Volkes Bildung*).⁶⁰⁶

This observation returns us to the core tenets of CHAPTERS 8-9, namely the design of Semper's buildings irrespective of their urban context or an underlying moral vision. Laudel here helps to emphasize that the ethical goals Semper attributed to his work at an architectural, urban, and societal level were intended to

⁶⁰⁵ Roth (2009, 30).

⁶⁰⁶ Laudel (2003, 135), my translation.

align with one another. The result is a highly ambitious ‘program’, pursued by Semper across his oeuvre. But did the program succeed?

§9.6 THE ETHICS OF AUTONOMY, RECONSIDERED

In the context of the present thesis, what matters less is the particular moral values Semper accorded his buildings than the *basis* of his doing so at all. CHAPTER 8 showed Semper making deft use of symbolism surrounding the ‘technical motifs’ and tapping into (as much as transcending) earlier philosophical visions on the expressive limits and possibilities of built structures. In Semper’s museums, architecture would both host, display, and its design be literally informed or infused by, a stock of basic ‘forms’. Architectural literacy for ‘the masses’ would be accomplished in unison by this iterated deployment of the same stock of forms, the relation among the forms explained in additional registers by the museums’ interior collections. CHAPTER 9 showed Semper’s awareness of and commitment to the moral role that architecture thereby assumed; and where CHAPTER 8 focused on the intrinsic compositional features at work in Semper’s architecture, owing to the intricate use of rustication and vertical order, the current chapter opened up his building’s relational features, features he was very sensitive to and that for him were complicit in the aforementioned societal goals (moral and educational), indeed, indispensable in accomplishing such goals. As he said on even the most delicate of issues – the eradication of Dresden’s ‘Italian village’ to pave the way for his monumental architecture – he was ready to ‘use any means permissible, whatever would be at his disposal’ (see CHAPTER 9 motto). What are those means? A building’s axial orientation, sensitivity to siting, its comparative scale and massing are all factors that decide not only how well it fits or harmonizes with its surroundings, but help home in on what such harmony itself consists in at a more concrete level. And it is an appraisal of those means, not some biographic intent, that dictates whether we can go along with Semper’s own verdict, and assess the resulting design as indeed ‘permissible’, and perhaps even desirable. Such permissibility and desirability, the current work contends, is flatly moral.

In such regards, it appears Semper did not share Emil Kaufmann’s later argument that an individualist society requires equally individualist or ‘autonomous’ urban compositions, of ‘free standing’ monumental buildings with few binding relations between them. While contemporary commentators debate the free standing nature of Semper’s (and Schinkel’s) monumental architecture, Semper’s own designs, even when he did not succeed to push them through against the authorities, insisted on uniting the old and new. Semper’s plans integrated the Zwinger’s aristocratic and the forum’s bourgeois social structures into one overall structure— an urban fabric oriented on a single axis of orientation and vista that ran from Schinkel’s classicist *Wache* to the court palace, flanked on both sides by Semper’s own buildings, the theatre and the gallery, buildings celebrating and hosting the citizenry’s cultural and societal prestige.⁶⁰⁷ So far from a dissolution of the Baroque urban bond, Semper’s own designs intended a continuity of that bond by incorporating his own and Schinkel’s new additions into an overall coherent ensemble. If Semper’s written work leave us little to address Kaufmann’s allegation that the two senses of autonomy – of individual human wills, and of buildings – are compellingly related (beyond chance homonymy), Semper’s built work presents a persuasive rebuttal of any such necessary connection.⁶⁰⁸ The result speaks for itself, in that it conveys a very different idea of how social and built order interrelate, and which values are operative in and across either domain.

In the final instance, it may well be that Semper’s own ethical ambitions outran the immense compositional repertoire he documented and deployed in his built and written work. But his effort to articulate and align the two stands nearly out and apart across the Western tradition, and comprises his perhaps most enduring legacy to monumental architecture – on an understanding of the monumental measured not by the scale of a building’s massing, but the scope of its moral ambition. It is that

⁶⁰⁷ Pöppelmann had built a much smaller court theatre within the Zwinger court itself. It was much smaller since the audience was much smaller.

⁶⁰⁸ See also the quote from Semper’s 1843 correspondence quoted in §9.4.

understanding that opened our inquiry of Semper's work in CHAPTER 8, and now provides us with the point of its conclusion:

A work of art not striving towards the monumental (nor wanting to do so) is no work of art. By which I mean: there ought to dwell a spirit in a work of art that enlivens other human creatures and lives on with that work of art, for as long as the matter bearing its form holds up.⁶⁰⁹




Fig. 9.11 Semper, *Dresden Forum*. Reconstruction by Martin Fröhlich (see interior cover for details).

⁶⁰⁹ Schinkel (1863/2006, 601) my translation.



Fig. 9.12 Semper, *Hofgalerie*, view from Zwinger court. (Photo by Author, November 2013)



Fig. 9.13 Pöppelmann, *Zwinger* (1728). (Photo by Author, November 2013)

CHAPTER 10

MORALITY AND ARCHITECTURE: TECTONICS AND PLATONISM IN MIES VAN DER ROHE

[Mies] suddenly realized that we [the architecture students] knew nothing about bricks – what bricks did, what different kinds of bonding there were, and that sort of thing. So, one day we came to the class and in the corner of the room was a pile of bricks. And Mies said, ‘Now we will learn how to build a wall.’ – We had bricks in our hands, the first time we had materials in our hands, [we] never [had had] that in the other program, we never touched anything of that nature. And he went through the same thing with steel, with concrete. He would never let us go into a design problem or finish it unless we knew how it was being built. – George Danforth⁶¹⁰

Architecture begins when two bricks are put carefully together. – Mies van der Rohe⁶¹¹

§10.1 INTRODUCTION: ‘THE QUESTION OF VALUE IS DECISIVE’

As we learnt in the PREFACE, moralizations of architecture – that is, of buildings and their architects – is especially rampant in historical writing on architecture. This is nowhere truer than in writings about modernist architecture, given how – as we saw with the work of Le Corbusier in CHAPTER 6 – such architecture frequently came with moral visions forcefully expressed in architects’ writing. In such cases, the architect’s own writing presents a yard stick (certainly not the only one) by which others can appraise, morally and otherwise, the achievements of his buildings. CHAPTER 6 focused its philosophical efforts on scrutinizing the vision, largely side-stepping attention to buildings; as explained there, this arose because Le Corbusier’s thought, more than his buildings, present a formidable challenge to nearly each of the present work’s core tenets on the ethics of architecture. The present chapter allows us to reverse this allocation of interest, since the architect we are dealing with wrote little, what he wrote is highly enigmatic, not to say elusive, and his buildings, on the other hand, provide a formidable challenge to the interpreter.

Recall the main contention of the present work. To morally appraise people, we need to know what they do. To morally appraise buildings, we need to know what they do. Or, more precisely, what they consist in – how they are composed, which properties they have, and which moral significance (if any) we can attribute to these properties. I called this calibration of the compositional and the moral the CALIBRATION CHALLENGE. The present chapter is really there to showcase how the philosophical foundations of the CALIBRATION CHALLENGE – namely CHAPTER 2’s FACE VALUE TREATMENT, CHAPTER 3’s work on the metaphysics of architecture – serve as a powerful corrective to irresponsible moralizations of architecture in historical writings of an entirely contemporary nature. Architecture historians arguably do not influence the public fate of buildings with their work, but it has been customary for some decades now that some of them instrumentalize their historical findings (or claims) to explicitly pursue contemporary political interests – in particular, shift our understanding of where architecture currently is going, and where it should be heading next.⁶¹² The present chapter looks at tendentious writing of this variety on both sides of the spectrum – that which would discern in modernism a timeless moral vision to guide all architecture beyond it, and that which sees it on a par with the twentieth century’s most alarming evils, and as such to be morally rejected by all future architectural practice. Such moralizations, I will argue, stray equally far from the truth, and the CALIBRATION CHALLENGE is there to show us why.

⁶¹⁰ George Danforth, student in (and here, taking about) Mies’s classes at the Illinois Institute of Technology at Chicago; quoted from Hughes (2008).

⁶¹¹ *Apud* Wagner (1969, 9).

⁶¹² This type of historical writing is sometimes called ‘operative’. For an introduction and critical assessment, see Zimmerman (1999).

To impart this lesson, CHAPTER 10 discusses the oeuvre of Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969), and focus on two issues of particular relevance to this thesis, dedicated as it is to establishing an ethics of architecture that allocates heavy emphasis on considerations of tectonic composition. First, can the architecture of Mies van der Rohe be classified as tectonic? Or should it better be regarded as a challenge to the core tenets of the tectonic tradition, tenets outlined in previous chapters? Secondly, on what specific grounds can Mies's architecture be appraised ethically? (Recall from CHAPTER 2 that choice of *M* is crucial in morally appraising buildings *b*.) And do these 'grounds' ever converge with factors contributing to classifying Mies's work as tectonic? As a tertiary issue, I shall take discussion of contemporary analysis of Mies's buildings as opportunity to showcase just how diverse contemporary writing employing the term 'tectonic' is, following up a project begun in §4.2.

The first two issues are closely related, once we understand that close attention to Mies's buildings is an indispensable *preliminary* to understanding (and assessing) the moral and ethical appraisals his buildings have received at the hand of critics. For, if Mies thought that 'the question of value is decisive' in architecture, we have to understand, says Wolf Tegethoff, how proponents of 'New Building' like Mies,

were filled with the solid determination to contribute, with all means at their disposal, to drawing forth new ways of human sociability. To demonstrate this requires more than citing some memorable buzzwords and a superficial march through twentieth century architectural history. It requires, rather, a precise knowledge of sources and facts (which are available, in the current state of research, in the fewest of cases) on the one hand, and an in depth analysis of the buildings themselves on the other. For these [sc. analyses, factual and source knowledge] alone can provide a sufficient answer as to the goals and ideas of modern architecture.⁶¹³

If such remarks set standards of methodological decency for any inquiry like mine, they more locally set the scope and goals of this chapter's investigation, which will proceed as follows.

To address the first of the two abovementioned 'issues', I will look at the notions of *structural expression* and *joints* in, respectively, §10.2 and §10.3. I chose those notions because, in my view, recent debates on the classificatory issue of Mies's work being (or not being) tectonic appear to boil down to these two notions rather than an understanding of 'the tectonic' itself, let alone, a historically informed one. In brief, depending on how strongly or 'articulate' one wants the expression of a building's *actual* structure, and of the *real* joints accounting for its structural frame, to be visible or 'legible' on the building's exterior or 'skin', one ends up classifying Mies's buildings as tectonic or *atectonic*. The point of §§10.2-3 is to explain, define, and deploy these notions and points in great detail. The major point to emerge from §10.2, , not original to this chapter but simply following the best of current Mies scholarship, will be that Mies ultimately refuses to *display* the building's actual structure and instead *inscribes* an echo thereof on the building's outer 'skin'.⁶¹⁴ This hovers uneasily between outright *revealing* the building's actual frame – and categorically *obscuring* 'what that frame is' from the viewer, for Mies does neither.

If this nuanced position, sitting somewhat uneasily between the tectonic tradition and radically *atectonic* approaches like Le Corbusier's (CHAPTER 6), explains why Mies's work often defies easy categorization, that very same aspect to his designs – to wit, the expression of, not the actual frame, but an echo or idea thereof – has encouraged exegetes to classify Mies as a 'Platonist' and his architecture as 'transcendental'.⁶¹⁵ In light of material developed in earlier chapters, I argue in §10.4 how the classification

⁶¹³ Tegethoff (1981, 10), my translation. The Mies quote (cited *apud*) reads, 'Aber gerade die Frage nach dem Wert ist entscheidend.'

⁶¹⁴ I owe my first acquaintance with this central point to Claire Zimmerman's work. See also §10.2.

⁶¹⁵ Indeed, writers in architecture are frequently happy to regard these terms as synonyms, with little regard to whether Plato and his followers from antiquity to the Renaissance subscribed to radically otherworldly ('transcendental') metaphysical views. Something similar, incidentally, pertains to how many architecture humanities scholars use the word 'metaphysical', in that they always means something that *entirely* deals with issues *transcending* empirically observable, physical reality. As I show in §10.3, even the grandest ambitions of Mies's architecture are not at all for it to be (ultimately) 'metaphysical' in this sense.

of Mies as a ‘Platonist’ stands on shaky grounds indeed, even when one brackets – as the entire field of Mies scholarship has done – Plato’s actual views on architecture explained in his *Republic* (401a-b and 596a ff.).

What is more, §10.4 will outline how the alleged complicity of Mies with ‘Platonism’ has been instrumentalized to paint his architecture as either the *apex* of moral goodness or the pinnacle of architectural *evil*. §10.4 thus ends up pursuing two closely related goals. First, I want to ask to what extent the alleged Platonism actually helps us to *understand* Mies’ architecture and the design choices that demonstrably inform it. (I shall argue it does not). More importantly, I also ask how accurate, appropriate and apt Platonism is as a tool for architecture’s *moral appraisal*, whether it is for reasons of praise or condemnation. Here my goal is to show that architecture’s *moralization* on Platonist grounds is inherently problematic and points to a cognitive (and perhaps moral) problem, of exaggerating the extent to which architecture can be (made out to be) complicit with full blown moral systems, or if not systems, then thoughts and theories by philosophers.

In that regard, I wish to reinforce a lesson unearthed in CHAPTER 7, on the inherent expressive austerity that characterizes architecture, properly understood. Mies’s architecture is, if anything, the pinnacle of austerity, and that austerity ought not, *pace* recent ‘minimalist’ readings (addressed in §10.4.4), license grand attributions and accusations of a moral variety. Not *more* ethics but less, is the ostensive lesson that Mies’s architecture, and its treatment at the hand of critics, seems to hold for a more discerning audience.

My own conclusions, then, are largely negative in that I do not unearth an ethical view of architecture from Mies’s written or built work. I rather want to establish that the discussion of Mies’s work in the past fifty years has not, thus far, afforded us a solid way to unearth one either. Since demonstrating that directly points out avenues that are *not* fruitful to progressing towards an ethics of architecture (whether Mies’s or others’), the chapter’s contribution to that goal is, if not exactly direct, then still substantive. Beyond that, of course, the chapter will successfully address its two lead questions identified on the previous page. Readers will find my answers in §10.3.3 and §10.5.

§10.2 STRUCTURAL EXPRESSION

This subsection shall argue for a developmental reading of Mies van der Rohe’s work from a relatively atectonic design stance towards a nuanced embrace of some of the tectonic tradition’s core tenets. Before I embark on details, seasoned readers may appreciate a brief historiographic contextualization (and newcomers do well to be aware of the terrain as well). While my analysis glosses over a great amount of detail when it comes to individual works, in outline it follows a developmental reading of Mies’s oeuvre that has been accepted as canonical in the wake of Wolf Tegethoff’s work, from which I shall sample generously. Central to Tegethoff’s account is his pioneering study of the (then) lesser known houses Mies designed in the late 1920s, which help mediate between the earlier formalist and the later structuralist phase.⁶¹⁶ A strong challenge to Tegethoff’s account is offered by Kenneth Frampton, who sees a stronger continuity in Mies’s work in the 1920s and 1930s.⁶¹⁷ In particular, Frampton (1995, 159) divides Mies’s

⁶¹⁶ Tegethoff (1981), translated 1985 into English. See also Tegethoff’s shorter (1989). Tegethoff’s work is proclaimed ‘a monumental effort, unsurpassed in scholarship and vital to virtually all Mies research carried out since’, by the standard biography and ‘Werksgeschichte’ (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 421; unsurprisingly, their own work is heavily indebted to his). The developmental narrative that followed in the wake of Tegethoff’s work has received its most succinct expression in the work of Claire Zimmerman; see her (2006) and her project analyses in Bergdoll and Riley (2001). Similarly indebted are Dietrich Neumann’s analyses of Mies’s ‘Five Projects’ (of which more shortly), also in Bergdoll and Riley (2001, 180-194).

⁶¹⁷ Frampton (1986), (1995, 159-195). Tellingly, Frampton refers to Tegethoff’s analysis only once, and then on a minor point (on Mies’s relation to Mondrian) (1995, 400n.5); the other two occasions Tegethoff’s book are mentioned serve to extract translations of Mies’s own text (1995, 400nn. 17, 21). Unlike Tegethoff’s conservative and philosophically *restrained* analysis of Mies’s own thought on architecture, Frampton’s is indebted to Fritz Neumeyer’s considerably more *speculative* reading. For Frampton, ‘Neumeyer totally revolutionizes our knowledge of Mies’s ideological roots[t]hrough painstaking research into archival material’ (1995, 400n.22). As §10.4 will show, the

development into five internally homogenous stages, and names one of them ‘the European transcendental phase (1925-1938)’. I shall return to one particular point of Frampton’s reading below in §10.3, but for limitations of space, addressing the comparative merits of his reading versus Tegethoff’s is not possible here.⁶¹⁸

In some of his earliest work, Mies essentially probes new ways of architectural design irrespective of their built execution. Several of his later so-called ‘Five Projects’ from the 1920s, including a design for a skyscraper made of glass, are unbuilt and arguably could not have been realized, as they would fail basic constraints of circulation, ventilation, and the preservation of (livable) interior temperature, making the inhabitation of these structures unrealistic, even if they could be physically realized.

A similar verdict was recently suggested by Alan Colquhoun for Mies’ work on the *Concrete Country House* (1923) and *Brick Country House* (1924),⁶¹⁹ where in the latter ‘closed volumes have disappeared and the space is defined only by free-standing planes’.⁶²⁰ More precisely,

In the Concrete Country House [a] the cube is dissolved into a spread-eagled, swastika-like form; in the Lessing House [b] the cube is broken up into smaller cubes, interlocking with each other in echelon; in the Brick Country House [c] the cubes are replaced by a system of planes. This progressive fragmentation and articulation, in which the external form of the house reflects its internal subdivision, betrays the indirect influence of [...] Berlage, and Wright, but its immediate ancestry is De Stijl. (Colquhoun 2002, 174; ‘a’ to ‘c’ refer to the nomenclature in fig. 10.1)

To grasp this final point, we have to understand that Colquhoun’s analysis squarely bases its conclusions on the floor plans of Mies’s buildings (see fig. 10.1). Colquhoun never shows models, sections, or elevations of the projects in questions. This enables him to detect in De Stijl – which for current purposes we may identify by the paintings of Mondrian (fig. 10.2) and the floor plans by van Doesburg (figs. 10.3) – the ‘immediate ancestry’ for Mies’ design.

Apart from such visual evidence, we know as a historical matter of fact that van Doesburg influenced Mies (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 78), given how the two architects interacted directly in the early 1920s. But this very interaction points up avenues of artistic divergence, and Schulze and Windhorst precisely point out how ‘Mies rejected van Doesburg’s elevation of aesthetics above constructive logic’ (ibid.). What is more, Mies himself ‘energetically rejected any alleged influences of Mondrian on his buildings’, as Tegethoff (1981, 50) puts it, quoting from a 1968 interview of Schulze with Mies,

Schulze: One would think, perhaps, that [you] would favour Mondrian. [Your] work might seem to be influenced by the clean lines of the great Dutch abstractionist. Is this true, Mies?

Mies (with emphasis): The Museum of Modern Art thinks so. I don’t. Really, my ideas were arrived at independent of Mondrian.⁶²¹

methodology on which Neumeier’s results rest falls rather short of ‘painstaking’. As a result, their contribution to our actual ‘knowledge’ of Mies’s ‘ideological roots’ is at best indirect, and at worst, irrelevant.

⁶¹⁸ Finally, an author who somehow stands outside the Tegethoff vs. Frampton divide is Philip Johnson, who offered the first (and to this day, influential) overview of Mies’s work in a 1947 monograph. Mies himself thought rather lowly of Johnson’s understanding of architecture. Johnson’s recorded failure to understand the architectural brilliance in Berlage’s *Stock Exchange* (Mies’s take on which is quoted in §10.3) proved too much, and triggered a permanent break between Johnson and Mies (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 338-339). If Mies had been licensed as an architect in New York, as Johnson was, we may wonder if he would ever have sought out Johnson’s collaboration for the *Seagram’s* realization in the first place.

⁶¹⁹ These are their canonical English descriptors. A more precise way of referring to them would speak of *reinforced concrete*, as their German designators are *Landhaus in Eisenbeton* and *Landhaus in Backstein* (Tegethoff 1981, 10). On the (sometimes controversial) issue of dating of Mies’s projects I follow Riley and Bergdoll (2001).

⁶²⁰ Colquhoun (2002, 172).

⁶²¹ Quoted from Tegethoff (1981, 51), original in English. The final line alerts us to a fact that pervades much American reception of Mies throughout the twentieth century – how the Museum of Modern Art created a frequently *fictitious* vision of Mies. This began with the infamous ‘International Style’ exhibition in 1931, an effort by





Fig. 10.1. Mies' formalist 1920s designs. – Source: Colquhoun (2002, 173)



Fig. 10.2 Piet Mondrian, *Composition IV* (1914). Source: Gemeentemuseum, The Hague (photo by author, February 2014)



Johnson and Russell Hitchcock to do for architecture what the 1913 Armory Show, subtitled an 'International Exhibition of Modern Art', had done for painting – alert the US public to 'modernist' sentiments coming out of Europe. Two impeccably researched exhibition catalogues published by the institute in 2001 on Mies (cf. fn. 3) did a lot to rectify the historic distortions propagated by the institute's earlier curators.

Fig. 10.3 Two 1923 floor-plans by Theo van Doesburg, contemporaneous with Mies's 1923-24 projects. – Source: 702.IIIc and 702.III d (*Plattegrond tweede en derde verdieping*) in Els Hoek (ed.), *Oeuvre Catalogus*, Centraal Museum Utrecht 2008.

Tegethoff (1981, 50) adds that the reason for this is not hard to discern, once we realize that Mondrian's paintings (such as the one illustrated in fig. 10.2) do not have a centralized point from which the remaining lines emanate, nor are they controlled by a frame set by a land lot or building foot print. By contrast, Tegethoff continues, Mies's floor plans are always organized in this manner, and failure to see this means to simply misread his floor plans, that of the *Brick Country House* included.⁶²² Speaking of, once we go beyond Colquhoun's fixation on the buildings' floor plans, and attend to the buildings' models, we can see how the buildings' volumetric composition and budding emphasis on a legible frame anticipates core elements of Mies' later architecture (figs. 10.4 and 10.5).⁶²³ Indeed, the *Brick and Concrete Country Houses*

both embody the structural and detailing strategies that Mies would soon make famous in the German Pavilion at Barcelona's International Exposition and the Tugendhat House. [...] there is much more than the open plan in both proposals[.] (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 70-71)

I shall shortly return to these 'structural and detailing strategies'. Mies' own statements about the *Concrete Country House* in particular are revealing of his actual intentions, and show him very remote from the (anti-tectonic) De Stijl influence Colquhoun alleged:

Es genügt natürlich nicht, ein Backsteinhaus in Eisenbeton zu übertragen. Den Hauptvorteil des Eisenbetons sehe ich in der Möglichkeit großer Materialersparnis. Um diese bei einem Wohnhaus zu ermöglichen, muß man die tragenden und stützenden Kräfte auf wenige Punkte des Gebäudes konzentrieren.

It's not enough to simply transpose a brick house into ferro-concrete. The chief advantage in the use of reinforced concrete as I see it is the opportunity to save a great amount of material. In order to realize this in a dwelling it is necessary to concentrate the bearing and supporting forces on only a few points in the structure[/the building].⁶²⁴

Further ammunition against Colquhoun's reductive, formalist readings is provided in the painstaking analysis of Tegethoff, who writes,

The extremely contradictory character of the individual [of the "Five"] projects is only partially explicable in terms of the discrepancy of program. If we abstract from situation specific factors, it is mostly the used materials the (respectively divergent) properties of which have a determinative effect on the siting and shape of the conceived buildings.⁶²⁵

⁶²² See Tegethoff (1981, 50). Neumann (in Bergdoll and Riley 2001, 194) mentions, 'Many critics have pointed out a resemblance between the plan [of the *Brick Country House*] and Theo van Doesburg's abstract painting *Rhythm of a Russian Dance*, of 1918,' but wisely abstains from commenting on the comparison's aptness. A more apt comparison, as Michiel Riedijk pointed out to me, is the 1923 model of van Doesburg and van Eesteren's *Maison d'Artiste*, but even there (I would allege) the similarities end at a generic emphasis on volumetric composition.

⁶²³ Mallgrave (2005, 272) has contested the compositional success and originality – thus, indirectly, the pivotal role it exerted on subsequent architectural history – of the *Brick Country House* design, given how Hugo Häring's 1922-1923 designs allegedly anticipate its core tenets. I shall not pursue that point further here, but point interested readers to Tegethoff's (1981, 37-51) analysis of the project and its historical influence.

⁶²⁴ Mies (1923, 1), translated by Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 70; I supply the first sentence, omitted in their translation). Mies would explore the design principle named in the last sentence in many of his later projects, including the *House Tugendhat* (1930), *Barcelona Pavillion* (1930), and *Farnsworth House* (1951), but was certainly sensitive to its limitations and contextual requirements. Thus, when it came to deploy the same 'principle' in the envisaged *United States Post Office* (1973), he realized 'soil conditions at the site were found to require costly footings for a structure with so few concentrated loads, and it was eventually decided to build with a conventional columnar grid' (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 346).

⁶²⁵ 'Der äußerst gegensätzliche Charakter der einzelnen „Fünf“ Projekte ist nur zum Teil auf die Verschiedenartigkeit der behandelten Bauaufgaben zurückzuführen. Sieht man von situationsbedingten Faktoren ab, sind es vor allem die benutzten Materialien, deren jeweils anders geartete Eigenschaften sich bestimmend auf Anlage und Gestalt des konzipierten Bauten ausgewirkt haben.' (1981, 15)




Fig. 10.4. Model of *Reinforced Concrete Country House* (1923). – Source: Tegethoff (1981, 23 fig. 5).




Fig. 10.5 *Brick Country House* (1924) (model). – Source: Architecture Collections & Productions *Bouwkunde TU Delft*, currently exhibited in The Hague, *Gemeente Museum*. (Photo by author, February 2014.)

To similar effect, we have Mies himself saying (in a 1923 letter to Gropius) how he wants to present not just an isolated but at least three (of the “Five”) projects⁶²⁶ in Gropius’ exhibition precisely

because I want to show the impact of one and the same same constructional principle on three so divergent programs. Since I reject formalism of any stripe, and look for a building solution always on the basis of its program, there will never be a formal kinship among the[se] individual works.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁶ In particular, *Country House in Reinforced Concrete*, *Office Building in Reinforced Concrete*, *Glass Skyscraper*.

Mies himself explained the core principles of the *Reinforced Concrete Country House* as follows,

The main living area is supported by a four-post truss system. This structural system is enclosed in a thin skin of reinforced concrete, comprising both walls and roof. [...] I have cut openings in the walls wherever I required them for outside vistas and illumination.⁶²⁸

Tegethoff builds on these points when he claims (as we just saw) that ‘the same constructional principle’ pervades the three (of the five) projects. Moreover, his elaborations on that point hold the key for his understanding of Mies’s development *as an architect*, and thus deserve to be quoted at length.

Die Gemeinsamkeiten beschränken sich vordergründig auf die Ausschöpfung der technischen Möglichkeiten eines im wesentlichen identischen Konstruktionsprinzips, das heißt einer Eisenbetonschale mit untergezogenen Trägern, die auf frei in den Raum gestellten Stützen ruhen. Dabei gestattet die hohe Belastbarkeit der Träger eine weite, freischwebende Auskragung der Deckenplatten, während die Trennung von Stütze und Wand zu einem folgerichtigen weil funktional begründbaren Verzicht auf eine formale Differenzierung zwischen horizontalen und vertikalen Flächen führt. Die nicht länger tragende, lediglich als Raumabschluß dienende Wand schließt sich nunmehr mit der Decke zu einer homogenen Außenhaut zusammen. [...] Der etwas frühere Entwurf des Betonhauses [...]nimmt] die für die nachfolgenden Bauten so entscheidende Trennung von Stütze und (nichttragender) Wand im Ansatz vorweg[.] Andererseits gelangt im kurz darauf entstandenen *Landhaus aus Backstein* das Motiv der freistehenden Mauerzüge, das ab 1919 der Mies’schen Architektur ihr charakteristisches Gepräge verleiht, bereits zur vollen Entfaltung. **Ein Vergleich von Grundriß und Außenansicht** der zweigeschossigen Anlage zeigt allerdings deutlich die Unvereinbarkeit der resultierenden offenen Raumgestaltung mit den konstruktiven Möglichkeiten des traditionellen Ziegelbaus. Erst die wesentlich später (*Barcelona Pavilion*) vollzogene Verbindung dieser zunächst unabhängig voneinander entwickelten Prinzipien schuf die grundlegende Voraussetzung zur Überwindung des labilen Konflikts zwischen den angestrebten einheitlichen Raumzusammenhang und den statischen Notwendigkeiten, die seiner Verwirklichung Grenzen steckten. (1981, 16, bolding mine, to contrast Colquhoun)

In short, it is important to realize how the constructional principle of *having structural support focused on few points of stress* frees up (large segments of) the wall from its load bearing function. Instead, the wall becomes more of a dividing screen (as it did in Sempër), and can now be freely shaped to serve other purposes, such as fenestrations to provide interior lighting and pleasant views of (and from) the surrounding. This is why Mies emphasized (to repeat),

Aus den Wänden habe ich an den Stellen Öffnungen herausgeschnitten, wo ich sie für die Aussicht und Raumbeleuchtung brauchte.

This, as Claire Zimmerman alleges, was followed in the realized *Ester* and *Lange* houses (of which more shortly) where

Mies let the spatial design dictate the structural calculations, following rather formal aesthetic aspects than the principal points of construction schemes. This is expressed for instance in the load bearing external walls, due to the large openings seemingly liberated from its load bearing function[.] (2006, 37)

⁶²⁷ ‘...weil ich zeigen möchte wie sich an drei so verschiedenen Aufgaben dasselbe konstruktive Prinzip auswirkt. Da ich jeden Formalismus welcher Art er auch sei, ablehne und aus dem Wesen der Aufgabe heraus ihre Lösung versuche, so wird nie eine formale Verwandtschaft die einzelnen Arbeiten verbinden.’ (*apud* Tegethoff 1981, 16)

⁶²⁸ Mies (1923, 1): ‘Der Hauptwohnteil wird von einem vierstieligen Bindersystem getragen. Dieses Konstruktionssystem wird umschlossen von einer dünnen Eisenbetonhaut. Diese Haut bildet gleichzeitig Wand und Decke. [...] Aus den Wänden habe ich an den Stellen Öffnungen herausgeschnitten, wo ich sie für die Aussicht und Raumbeleuchtung brauchte.’ English translation by Dietrich Neumann in Bergdoll and Riley (2001, 190). Neumann comments, ‘Mies lacked experience with concrete, and his understanding of its qualities was still rudimentary; his intended structural unity of wall and roof would have been problematic.’ (*ibid.*)

More precisely, however, it appears that the exact reverse held true – in that *the structure* opens the possibility to make the particular spatial and volumetric composition of the building possible in the first place, and so acted as an enabler more than a determinant.⁶²⁹

The same point emerges in Schulze and Windhorst, once they explain what (to repeat) they see as the 1923 projects' 'structural and detailing strategies' that (they hold) Mies would later explore in the 1928-1930 *Barcelona Pavilion* and *House Tugendhat* in Brno. Other than having structural frames that are maximally efficient by focusing on few points of stress only, freeing up the rest of the design, Mies also

envisioned a potentially new application for concrete construction, one in which a building enclosure could be freely punctuated by [fenestration, i.e.] long strips of windows, oversized doors, or even voids. Strip windows [...] appeared here for the first time in Mies's work. (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 71)⁶³⁰

This 'opening up' of the houses' basic frame, with the ample opportunity to have window and door openings, and the overall emphasis on structural concerns employed to aesthetic ends, would soon emerge in built examples of Mies' designs.

First we have the 1925-1927 *Wolf House* in Gubin, Poland, a project that

offered Mies the opportunity to apply concepts recently conceived for the Brick and Concrete Country House projects[. ... At the rear,] the vista was hidden by the interlocking cubical masses of the load-bearing, three-story brick building, but it was visible from a suite of first-floor living[.] (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 83, 84)

However, the project not only looks back, but (as Tegethoff again points out) anticipates the better known designs of 1930.

Die strikte Vermeidung axial gebundener Raumfolgen im Inneren und die dadurch erzwungene mehrfache Richtungsänderung beim Durchschreiten der Räume nimmt wesentliche Züge des *Barcelona Pavilion* vorweg. Dies gilt ebenso für die uns bereits beim *Landhaus in Backstein* begegnende Ausbildung von frei vortretenden Mauerzungen, die die Tiefenstaffelung der Raumesabschlüsse betonen und dabei zugleich schon ihre beginnende Aufspaltung in isoliert stehende Wandsegmente erahnen lassen. (Tegethoff 1981, 58)

Second, we have the 1927-1930 *House Ester* and *House Lange* at Krefeld, Germany, where Mies begins to play with the notion of load-and-bear relations as displayed in the building's exterior. And, contrary to Schopenhauer's dictum, he will not aim at a direct expression of these relations, but will not conceal them either, as an anti-tectonic stance, like the one developed by Semper commands. (Indeed, once we understands Semper's dialectic between *Wand* and *Mauer*, that is, the relation of non- to load-bearing walls (§8.3), a lot of Tegethoff's thought falls into place by way of historical contextualization.) In these houses, Mies would not employ load-bearing brick, and 'in the drive toward openness and transparency [of structural expression], 'structural honesty' was not yet a goal.' (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 86) We still have to see to what extent, and how precisely, 'structural honesty' ever became 'a goal' for Mies later.

⁶²⁹ I owe this point to Michiel Riedijk. This corresponds to Zimmerman's own earlier (unpublished) analysis of houses *Esters* and *Lange* (see fn. 22 below).

⁶³⁰ The two quotes from Zimmerman and Schulze and Windhorst prove my larger historiographical point made earlier, sc. how Tegethoff's analysis was a 'game changer' for the international reception of Mies, set new standards of precision, and invented the terminology in which to discuss and understand his architecture – for instance, Zimmerman's metaphorical use of a building's 'skin' is lifted straight out of Tegethoff ('Haut'). What is novel to Zimmerman's analysis, by contrast, is the way she develops Tegethoff's analysis forward towards Mies's US projects.



Fig. 10.6 Mies, *Lange House*, Krefeld (1927-1930). (Photo credit: Museum Haus Lange)

As Claire Zimmerman puts it,

The Esters and Lange buildings were both surfaced in dark brick; but they are only partially bearing-wall structures. They were among the first modern buildings to free brick from its load-bearing function; their facades were therefore extremely unusual for the time. Much of the load-bearing structure was steel, tailored to an extremely complicated design. This metal substructure allowed the architect to cut large openings in the exterior walls—windows far too large for brick construction alone to sustain. Much to the chagrin of his structural engineer, Ernst Walther, Mies let the spatial design dictate the structural calculations, following rather formal aesthetic aspects than the principal points of construction schemes. This is expressed for instance in the load bearing external walls, due to the large openings seemingly liberated from its load bearing function, contradicting consequently and deliberately the vivid character of the façade and its engineering. It was not until the construction of the Barcelona Pavilion that Mies would solve the conflict between architectural visions and the requests of engineering when he completely differentiated support and wall.⁶³¹

Or, in Tegethoff's analysis,

wie beim *Haus Wolf* [bleibt] die blockhafte, kubische Durchbildung des Baukörpers vorherrschendes Gestaltungsprinzip[.] (1981, 62)

More precisely,

Mit dem Fortfall der seitlichen Anbauten setzte sich schließlich eine betont wandhafte Lösung durch, was vor allem in der Schrägansicht deutlich zum Ausdruck gelangt. Von der Seite gesehen offenbart sich nämlich die vermeintlich massive, in der westlichen Hälfte völlig geschlossene Straßenfront als eine vergleichsweise dünne, vorgeblendete Wand, die nur noch partiell Innenraum umschließt und daher nicht von ungefähr an eine Scheinfassade erinnert. In einer geradezu dialektischen Vorgehensweise wird also zunächst Plastizität vorgeschützt, der so gewonnene Eindruck aber sogleich wieder ad absurdum geführt. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit der im Blockverband ausgeführten Klinkerverblendung, die die Vorstellung von durchgehend

⁶³¹ Zimmerman (2006, 33 and 37); her analysis is considerably indebted to Frampton's here (1995, 167), which I quote below. In earlier manuscripts of her (2006), Zimmerman had further emphasized how Mies would *later* let the steel frame determine the 'economies' of the project's spatial/geometric design, choice of materials, and even overall cost; whereas (she argues) with the *Lange House* the priority is reversed and the frame is made *subservient* to a pre-existing volumetric design – a stance that, Zimmerman suggests, falls within 'De Stijl planning principles', and might have been a residue of the building patron's former interest in hiring Cornelis van Eesteren and Theo van Doesburg themselves. I thank Zimmerman for sharing and discussing her manuscripts with me.

tragendem Ziegelmauerwerk erweckt, und der – im Gegensatz dazu – **vollkommenen Negierung des tektonischen Gefüges** durch die weitgespannten quer-rechteckigen Wandeinschnitte. **Die massierte Verwendung von Eisenträgern, ohne die eine derartige Konstruktion kaum denkbar wäre, tritt an keiner Stelle in Erscheinung.** Allerdings wird sie andererseits auch nicht direkt gelehnet, da die Fensterstürze bezeichnenderweise keine Rollschicht tragen, sondern als einfache Läufer- oder Binderlage über die Öffnungen hinweggeführt sind. Somit ergibt sich erneut ein offenbar gewollter Widerspruch zwischen der betont plastischen Oberflächenstruktur des Baukörpers und **dem beinahe schwerelosen Charakter der (scheinbar) jeder statischen Funktion entkleideten Außenwände.** (1981, 63, bolding mine)

The bolded elements mark where Tegethoff's analysis departs sharply from Zimmerman, Frampton, and Ford – for they elide the detail that the window has no 'Rollschicht' (*Rollaag* in Dutch) in place of a lintel across the upper horizontal edge, which means, the surrounding brick construction cannot possibly be *load-bearing*, as brought out by Fig. 10.6a. in contrast to elements 'a b' in fig. 10.6b.⁶³²




Fig 10.6a. Fenestration detail in Haus Esters. Absent is the masonry window header illustrated in **Fig. 10.6b.** to the right. Sources: Kleinman and van Duzer (2005, 113 fig. 7) (left); The Colliery Engineer Co., *A Treatise On Architecture And Building Construction Vol. 2: Masonry. Carpentry. Joinery* (1899, fig. 118).

By way of contrast, here is Edward Ford:

Both in form and in technology, [*House Lange*] straddles the fence between tradition and Modernism. Its materials are modern (steel beams, concrete planks, steel windows), but their configuration is not; it is essentially a load-bearing masonry building. [...] Despite its large wall openings and the planar extensions of walls from its main volume, the Lange house is essentially a load-bearing brick box.⁶³³

⁶³² For another exception, see Kleinman and van Duzer's (2005, 104) refusal to regard the Krefeld villas as (failed attempts at) 'typologically conventional brick structures'. Beyond the point that the fenestrations are clearly 'too large for traditional [load]bearing-wall construction' (2005, 104), they point out how 'immense effort and expense was incurred to allow openings without visible headers and to provide a smooth ceiling despite vast eccentric forces overhead' (2005, 116). See also fig. 10.6.a.

⁶³³ Ford (1997, 267).

Ford adds that the house's 'ribbed slab is supported by steel beams, which are then supported by the wall', though an 'exception' to this is 'the set-back wall of the main façade, which is supported by a complex bracing system' (ibid.). However, the accompanying diagram (1997, 262 fig. 9.3), to which Ford refers us at this point, lacks an indication of the top horizontal window beam (*rollaag*), and refers to the steel structure on the upper window frame as a 'pocket for roll-down shutter' (ibid., 263). Ford's own conclusion that it 'is difficult to believe that the Lange house was designed almost simultaneously with the *Barcelona Pavilion*' (ibid. 267) must be read in light of his claim that 'Mies said that the *Barcelona Pavilion* was the first building in which he achieved independence of column and wall.' (ibid., 273) Mies's saying so has to be understood, not as his *reading* of *Haus Lange* but its *suppression* from his (or later) catalogues of his work, until Tegethoff brought it to public prominence in the 1980s.

Frampton similarly interprets *Haus Lange* in terms of,

the contrasting qualities of different materials [which] become the terms of a binary opposition in Mies's work, comparable to the distinction that Semper drew between stereotomic mass and skeletal, tectonic form. This distinction appears in Mies's later German houses as a means of expressing the institutional [?] differences between the public, freely planned status of the living volume and the more private nature of the bedroom, **enclosed by load-bearing masonry.** (1995, 173)

As before in §8.3 we can observe how, on Frampton's analysis, massing and *pegma* exhaust the range of compositional options (be it for Semper and Mies).⁶³⁴ Frampton goes so far as to say how,

structural logic is variously compromised in all three works [*Haus Wolf*, *Lange*, and *Esters*], since the steel lintels used in each case to span various horizontal openings remain totally unexpressed. In each instance, joists or trusses are concealed behind brick stretcher courses[.] (1995, 167)

The modifier 'totally' is crucial – the fact that the *rollaag* is not there in the brick composition, however, is very much an indicator of the underlying steel structure, as Tegethoff's analysis pointed out. Nor is this an occasional slip of Frampton's; he makes the same point equally emphatically elsewhere.

While there is nothing remotely classical about these brick villas [*Haus Wolf*, *Lange*, and *Esters*], the presence of exposed, load-bearing brickwork brings them within the rubric of traditional building culture, even if the walls and openings are occasionally manipulated as though they were made out of a continuous plastic substance such as concrete. Although there is little here of the structural rationalism of [...] Berlage, whom Mies greatly admired, the way in which these houses are detailed and built establishes them as tectonically disciplined works.⁶³⁵

The final sentence leaves it deliciously unclear just how close, in Frampton's estimate, the three houses are to Berlage's attitude – and, consequently, just what we are to understand by these works being 'tectonically disciplined'. Tectonics and its cognates is once again allowed to form a key role in analysis, but also allowed to stand largely undefined. I would contend, however, that Ed Ford's analysis of Berlage's *Stock Exchange*, which Mies admired greatly and which, arguably, Frampton has in mind here, is more than apt. Ford calls the building the 'perhaps finest and most original' example of a 'monolithic style of building', which he defines as follows (1997, 263).

The walls are monolithic brick, unplastered inside and out, and the roof trusses of the major spaces are completely exposed. [...] there is no distinction between what is structure and what is finish, or between what is structure and what is architecture. Ironically, although Berlage was influenced by Semper's ideas in a variety of ways, the *Stock Exchange* is devoid of cladding. It is

⁶³⁴ In this regard, cf. Frampton's striking reference to Semper and screen-walls (only) because Mies later designed (with Lily Reich) an exhibition space *for textiles*, where textiles also formed 'quite literally' 'the Semperian wall hanging as the symbolic representational form of built enclosure.' (1995, 173) That *Textrin* could present a compositional principle in Semper or Mies in a less literal and far more profound sense is missing from this analysis.

⁶³⁵ Frampton (1986, 40-41).

strange that Mies should have admired this building in 1910. It has little to do with the work he did between 1910 and 1930 – a period in which exposed structures are rare in his work[.]

The passage itself recalls Boetticher's demand that monumental architecture must look as if it was 'built from a *single monolith*' (B 10; see §8.2.1 above).

It is also on this terminological point that Ford explains his distance to Frampton's analysis.

Tectonic is not a word I use much since for me it doesn't have a very precise meaning. Like everyone I owe a great deal to Ken Frampton. I think our analysis differs in part because of his interest in what I call monolithic masonry and concrete systems of building. As you know I see the developing systems of modern construction as becoming progressively more complex and layered. In this situation it necessary to speak about a narrative of construction that parallels the reality of construction. The architect cannot either reveal or visually explain the entire organization of the building and therefore must construct a narrative of that construction which may be to a degree accurate or inaccurate, but can rarely if ever be complete.⁶³⁶

This not only explains the difference of monolithic to layered construction, it also points out how, in the latter case, architects have to make a choice as to a 'cut off point' somewhere when it concerns *how much* of the underlying (tectonic) structure they express. This, too, is a point I shall return to at the close of the current subsection, since it is utterly central to §10.2's lead question on tectonic expressivity and 'legibility' in Mies.

For now, let us focus on Frampton's analysis. If Berlage's building sets, for Frampton, the frame of reference on how to understand Mies's houses *Wolf*, *Lange*, and *Esters*, we may begin to understand how far they are from the structurally more 'layered' compositions of Mies's later oeuvre. However, the attribution of such a contrast requires the crucial omission of details in one's analysis of those three houses. As with Ford earlier, Frampton's analysis obscures the finer points of detailing brought out by Tegethoff, especially the lack of a proper *rollaag* that expresses, albeit indirectly, the presence of a steel frame (sc. a hidden steel beam or lintel), as do the unusually (perhaps: suspiciously) large and unusually placed fenestrations.

It is attention to these very details that Tegethoff himself takes to be decisive to explain the overall developmental trajectory of Mies's built oeuvre. He writes of *Haus Lange*,

Solange aber die Trennung von Stütze und Wand und damit die Hinwendung zum Skelettbau nicht vollzogen wurde, die äußere Mauerschale also nach wie vor sowohl Raumabschluß wie tragendes Korsett im Ganzen war, blieb der Eindruck des Körperhaften, des in sich abgeschlossenen Volumens – und das heißt mithin auch: die strenge Scheidung von Innen und Außen – bestimmend für das Raumgefühl des Betrachters. Genau an diesem Punkt fordern die in der Konzeption des Gebäudes zutage tretenden ‚Widersprüche‘ zu einer differenzierteren Sehweise heraus. Dahinter verbirgt sich im Grunde nichts anderes als der gezielte Versuch, Mauer durch Wand zu ersetzen und somit den Massenbau in seinen Grundbedingungen zu hinterfragen.

Das *Haus Esters* und mit ihm das *Haus Lange* stehen, so gesehen, am Ende einer Entwicklung, die über das einmal Erreichte hinauszuführen, mit den bisherigen Mitteln letztlich nicht mehr möglich ist. Während hier das Problem: die weitgehende Öffnung des Raumes unter Wahrung seiner Eigenständigkeit allenfalls als Idealzustand ins Bewußtsein gerufen werden konnte, bietet sich mit der erstmals am *Barcelona Pavilion* vollzogenen Differenzierung von Stütze und Wand eine denkbare Lösung an. (1981, 63)

⁶³⁶ Ed Ford, p.c. with author, 25 March 2013.

This highlights, once again, that the ‘choice of means’ is essential in attaining certain ends, and that Mies had to rethink ‘the means previously at his disposal’ – language that at once recalls Semper (§9.1) and Le Corbusier (§6.3) on a central moral issue in architecture: the calibration of means to ends.

More broadly, if we conclude that these houses failed to dissolve the ‘conflict between architectural visions and the requests of engineering’ before Mies ‘completely differentiated support and wall’ (Zimmerman)⁶³⁷, we also understand how the dialectic between these factors paved the way for Mies’s mature design stance.

This is true for the 1928-1930 works he is most well known for, and which (for reasons of space) I cannot here describe in their own right,⁶³⁸ and especially so for Mies’s US designs at Chicago (*Crown Hall* [fig. 10.7], *Lake Shore Drive* [fig. 10.8]) and New York (*Seagram*).

Where Mies’s *Ester* and *Lange* houses had not yet championed a ‘transparency’ of structural expression, and ‘structural honesty’ ‘was not yet a goal’ (Schulze and Windhorst), then,

In contrast to his German years, and to the later evacuation of structure from the interior of his large spaces, Mies [in his US time] developed a system where building skin and frame were once again connected to each other, in his buildings for IIT [like *Crownhall*]. (Zimmerman 2006, 15)

The same principle, however, could not be pursued for the high rise projects, given how

codes demanding the fire retardant for steel structure over one story high introduced an extra layer between the building’s structure and its exterior skin. Mies first confronted this new condition in two-story buildings for IIT, devising some of his most brilliant and best-known solutions, in response to it. The load-bearing structure is echoed in non-structural steel elements on the building’s skin, depicting the encased steelwork frame on the façade and at the corners of the building. Thus Mies’s earlier ideas of the importance of a clear conceptual structure emerged in his IIT work with a diagrammatic clarity. In the high-rise buildings, the problem of internal skeleton versus external expression became even more focused. Mies’s efforts to show the internal structures of his tall buildings on their exterior skins evolved into representing an idea of clear structure. (Zimmerman 2006, 15)

Slowly, his task had become clearer: to make buildings carry an idea about themselves that was not dependent on literal ‘truth’, but rather on a clear structural idea. (Zimmerman 2006, 16)

This principle is applied to the steel frame at the *Lakeshore Drive* apartments (fig. 10.8), and the *Seagram*.

In his American work, it is the expression of the steel-frame structure that comes to the fore. [...] this architectural element is based on industrially produced steel girders, [...] the *Lake Shore Drive* apartments] were the first tall residential buildings to make use of such a clearly expressed steel frame. Rather than the steel being hidden behind brick or stone [as in the *Lange House*], it is put on display, with only glass between the steel frame-members. [...] Achieving this simplicity of appearance is more complicated than it seems. When masonry carries a steel frame, it makes the building look more traditional, but it also protects the steel from fire damage. Mies’ building needed such fire-protection, and it is there as a concrete casing for the steel, but the concrete is then covered over with steel to make the appearance match the original intention. So there is more than expedient pragmatism involved.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁷ As before, attention to such details reveals just how much modern US reception of Mies is shaped by Tegethoff.

⁶³⁸ Concerning these massively researched projects, see especially Tegethoff (1981, 69-98), Tegethoff (1998), Tegethoff (2000; esp. 51-60 on the house’s structural and spatial composition), Frampton (1995, 175-180). Neumann (2012a, 2012b); Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 115-137).

⁶³⁹ Ballantyne (2012, 90); cf. also Ford (1997, 263) on the connection of ‘modern fire [safety] codes’ for high rise building to Mies’s choice to not expose the actual steel frame on the exterior.



Fig. 10.7 *Crown Hall, IIT* (1950-1956), July 2013, photo by author. The building was closed at this point since, as IIT's own Michael Davis later told me, 'several leaks [had to be] fixed, windows replaced, woodwork cleaned, and so on.'

The *Lake Shore Drive's* façade, Zimmerman adds, is not a faithful or 'literal' expression of the actual frame, given how the exterior frame had to meet added functionalities having to do with 'stiffening the skin and preventing warping from heat and wind loads.' (2006, 67) This is why she prefers the slightly metaphorical idea that the frame that *gets* expressed is more of an 'idea' of the (actual, load-bearing) frame than the actual one. She writes a propos the *Seagram* (2006, 77),

the detailing of the exterior surface was carefully determined by the desired exterior expression. Here, [...] Mies sheathed the exterior in a non-structural metal skin, this time of bronze, that nevertheless articulated an idea about the building's structure that echoed but inflected the structural frame underneath.

The principle itself is arguably owed to a meditation of an architect who heavily influenced Mies, namely Schinkel.⁶⁴⁰ As Bergdoll says of Schinkel's *Schauspielhaus* (1818-1821),

His system exquisitely interweaves two scales and accommodates a great diversity of spaces within *a highly legible frame*.⁶⁴¹

⁶⁴⁰ I would also argue that it is operative in Viollet-le-Duc's 1843 restoration of the *Basilica of Mary Magdalene* (11th century AD) at Vezelay, where the restored building expresses the frame more clearly than the original ever did, as if Viollet-le-Duc wanted to create a pristine idea, of the building, and Romanesque architecture more broadly (cf. his own *Dictionnaire arch.* I, 231). Related to this 'idealization' of a building is Viollet-le-Duc's choice to (1) remove the building's previous colourfulness, and render it in white and light shades of earth colours, and (2) the removal of pagan imagery (such as mermaids, replaced by saints) in the sculpts. The example (I owe it to Andrew Ballantyne) thus contains all features that one would ever need to 'latch onto' it the philosophical position(s) described as 'Platonism (in architecture)' in §10.4. If so, the radically divergent architecture of Mies, Schinkel, Viollet-le-Duc is held together by an 'underlying philosophy', which looks to me like a *reductio* of the exegetical exercise. Conclusions established on such grounds not only oversimplify relevant details, they appear to map such details incorrectly onto philosophical positions at all. See further §10.5.

⁶⁴¹ Bergdoll (2000, 191 *apud* fig. 91, italics mine)

Similarly, in my own discussion with Zimmerman on Schinkel's *Bauakademie*, we started off with the observation how the building *looks* as if it was built with an underlying steel frame, a construction technique that of course predates the building's *actual* construction. (For the historical correctness of this observation, see the long quote by Gottfried Riemann in §4.3.) In Zimmerman's words,

The scribing on the surface of Schinkel's buildings traces a structural frame onto a building that may have been built without one[.]⁶⁴²



Fig. 10.8 *Lake Shore Drive*, Chicago (1948-51), July 2013. Photo courtesy of C. A. Fahey.

To even understand this statement, however (she added), would already require *prior knowledge* of the building's construction, even if, to some degree or other, it could be gathered from its outer expression.

In any case, this type of the facade's legibility, and its semantic content (if we can call it such), differs markedly *in type* from the more metaphorical meanings attributed to Schinkel by his exegetes, on which the *Bauakademie's* decorative schemes (in particular, the paneling ornamentation) 'illustrates' Goethe's theory of the 'Urpflanze', owing to which the building can be seen to resonate with a 'higher order of nature'.⁶⁴³

I mention this claim because it shows us the type of juxtaposition that will land Mies' architecture in semantic and (consequently) moral, trouble. I would contend that Schinkel's paneling, with its use of the Acanthus leaf (a core motif of the Corinthian column order) much rather dwells on the relation of

⁶⁴² Personal communication, May 2013.

⁶⁴³ See in particular the work of Bergdoll (1994, 205; 2000, 154), relying on similar claims made by Rave (1941).

structure to ornament itself, and in doing so, is a commentary on the building itself – and on the discipline it houses, as an architecture academy or *Bauakademie* – rather than ‘illustrating’ high-flung theories of teleology (*Urpflanzę*) let alone of ‘metaphysics’.⁶⁴⁴ We shall return to this conundrum shortly.

For now, we can conclude the current subsection which focused on the ‘legibility’ of a building’s frame discernable on its ‘skin’, as driving the (currently dominant) developmental narrative of Mies’ oeuvre, and summing up the major trajectory of his development of an architect. And, for purposes of this thesis, it is this aspect of his design that helps us situate his built oeuvre with considerable nuance in the spectrum of ‘tectonic <—> anti-tectonic’. That same narrative helps us contextualize Frampton’s more isolated assessments such as,

Mies saw glass as embodying a new challenge, as it were, to the fundamental tectonic elements of the wall, the floor, and the ceiling. (1995, 175)

It also enables Frampton to liken the columns of the *Barcelona Pavilion* to Le Corbusier’s *pilotis*, as

Both column types are, in fact, abstractions of the idea of support, since, due to the fact that no beams are *expressed* in either instance, a somewhat insubstantial act of bearing is conveyed by the form. In both instances, the ceiling is treated as a flat, continuous plane. Here we see how modern, beamless construction favours the suppression of the frame; that is to say, it eliminates the very trabeation that for Perret was a prerequisite of tectonic culture. [...] While columnar support is patently a key element in the structuring of the Barcelona Pavilion both technically and phenomenologically, the ontological interaction between support and burden (Schopenhauer’s *Stütze und Last*) is patently absent. (1995, 177, italics mine)⁶⁴⁵

Frampton also sees a comparable ‘suppression of the tectonic’ at work in the *Lange House* (*ibid.*, 179), a remark that should be read in light of his earlier analysis of the *Wolf, Lange and Esters Houses*,

Structural logic is variously compromised in all three works, since the steel lintels used in each case to span various horizontal openings remain totally *unexpressed*. In each instance, joists or trusses are concealed behind brick stretcher courses [...]. Mies’s engineer, Ernst Walther, complained at length about the economic and technical problems involved in achieving such large spans in brick openings. [...] However, such spans enabled Mies to provide large picture windows in both the Esters and Lange residences, the latter being equipped with retractable plate glass window that could be lowered mechanically into the basement. (1995, 167, italics mine)

As indicated earlier, Frampton’s analyses of individual buildings are the outgrowth of an overall developmental reading of Mies’s oeuvre that differs markedly from Tegethoff’s (hence, from the one offered earlier in §10.2). Observe, in particular, how we get an emphasis on the direct *expression* of structure, which is found wanting, and accordingly leads Frampton to argue for a ‘suppression of the

⁶⁴⁴ Ultimately, this reading was suggested to me by the happy convergence of, first, Richard Neutra’s autobiographical notes reporting his first encounter with Sullivan’s façade ornamentation on the Guardian building, and secondly, further p.c. from Zimmerman in which she suggested that Bergdoll’s interpretation precisely focuses on the relation of structure to ornament at a historical moment when, ‘thanks to the growth of iron and later steel, and the emergence of skeletal construction’, that relation becomes important as something for architects to rethink and reflect on – such that the relation itself is the view that is being *illustrated* (p.c., May 2013). If so, nothing *non-architectural*, *non-material*, or ‘meta-physical’ is being communicated or groped after in Schinkel’s façade, be it in its frame traces (or tracings) or on its panels.

⁶⁴⁵ Two odd details about this passage. First, the Barcelona Pavilion does not literally feature ‘beamless construction’, as it contains beams. Arguably, what Frampton really meant is that the building does not *display* or ‘express’ the beams (of which more later). Second, the passage contains Frampton’s deviant usage of philosophical terms, in particular ‘ontological’. At (1995, 16) he explains his use of the terms ‘ontological’/‘phenomenological’ (or, as a stand in for the latter, ‘representation(al)’) by mapping the contrasting terms onto (a) the ‘technical’/‘symbolic’ divide Frampton detects in Semper and (b) a duality Frampton attributes to Boetticher, of the *structural frame* that props up a building and a building’s *skin* supported by that frame. As a third point, Frampton’s understanding of Schopenhauer should be read in light of the (sole) excerpt quoted at Frampton (1995, 396n.26), which is on load and bear.

tectonic' in that segment of Mies's oeuvre, which can accordingly be termed 'transcendentalist'. By contrast, Tegethoff's analysis sees signs of Mies's nuanced relation to the tectonic tradition already in his late 1920s work, and Tegethoff's commentary on *House Esters* (to repeat from the above), emphasizes how the frame, while not expressed, is not negated either.

Die massierte Verwendung von Eisenträgern, ohne die eine derartige Konstruktion kaum denkbar wäre, tritt an keiner Stelle in Erscheinung. Allerdings wird sie andererseits auch nicht direkt geleugnet, da die Fensterstürze bezeichnenderweise keine Rollschicht tragen, sondern als einfache Läufer- oder Binderlage über die Öffnungen hinweggeführt sind.

In the end, the classification of Mies's work as atectonic or tectonic boils down, less to an analysis of his building details of the variety Tegethoff recommends as an indispensable preliminary to moralization, than to a largely terminological decision on how to categorize a specific subset of those details. We shall encounter the same issue in the next section, which focuses on a different facet of Mies's buildings to enter the contested debate of Mies's work of tectonic or atectonic.⁶⁴⁶

If Mies's ultimate choice to render his building frames discernible on their skins situates him in the tectonic/atectonic divide, it is that same aspect of his oeuvre that, surprisingly, has led some of his more adventurous commentators to pin moral verdicts on Mies' architecture. The use of the steel girder, they claim, aligns him with the forces (benign or malign) of capitalism and worse. In particular, we are told, his drive towards structural expression aligns him with 'Platonisms' of all shades, and again makes, not him, but his buildings, exemplifications of moral character ranging from the laudable and virtuous to the vile. It is this aspect, in particular, I will to focus on in §10.4.

§10.3 THE CENTRALITY OF JOINTS

Disambiguating several meaning of 'tectonic' may clear some disagreements in the reception and characterization of Mies van der Rohe's architecture. On one reading, tectonics is to be understood as, not simply the display of construction and structure (whether real or 'ideal'), but as a 'celebration of detail', specifically when it comes to joints. As Edward Ford writes,

The Greene brothers felt, as did Kahn, that the joint was the source of ornament. Their work is a celebration of the act of joining materials.⁶⁴⁷

This contrasts Ford's point that Mies' own work carefully covers the joints.⁶⁴⁸ What is important is that other writers take up Ford's notion, the 'celebration' of (and in) details, to make it a defining feature of tectonics. For instance, in a 2012 lecture Greg Lynn said this:

Tectonics is really about the fact that we build large objects out of a lot of small parts and pieces – and the tectonic tradition of architecture is that we celebrate the fact that we build objects out of parts and pieces. So when we detail a building, the place where structure and cladding – or the place where different materials – come together, that's where we locate our details, it's usually what we celebrate in construction and design.⁶⁴⁹

This, we shall see, opens up an interesting conundrum for our interpretation of Mies (the very context from which Ford's quote itself is lifted). For, both Kenneth Frampton and Alan Colquhoun would agree

⁶⁴⁶ This is very likely the best juncture to cite an email I received from Ed Ford in April 2013. Ford aptly pointed out that he thought the term 'tectonic' be better avoided, as architectural writers frequently use it to mean whatever they want. As a sociological observation, I cannot but concur with Ford on this, whereas I of course attempt to bring more stringency to the term within my own work, in a manner that respects the considerable interpretative variance the term received already in the nineteenth century.

⁶⁴⁷ Ford (1997, 265). See also my discussion of Boetticher vs. Semper in chapter 8, §8.3, which focuses on the same notion.

⁶⁴⁸ Ford (1997, 263).

⁶⁴⁹ Lynn (2012).

with a key point in Ford's analyses (and how could they not?), on which Mies essentially *covers the joints*.⁶⁵⁰ What is more, they also do agree on the close relation of tectonics to detailing.⁶⁵¹ Yet they disagree on whether or not to characterize Mies's work as 'tectonic'.⁶⁵² How is that possible?

Because, or so I suggest, they may have had a different individuation of 'detail' in mind, in that only one of these authors subscribes to the thesis that (in Frasciari's words),

the joint is the original detail[.]⁶⁵³

Consequently, if (with Frasciari and Colquhoun) we tie detailing to joints, and tectonics to detailing, we end up with Mies as non-tectonic. If, on the other hand, we loosen the conceptual connection of detailing to joints, but retain that between tectonics and detailing, we end up with the possibility of reading Mies' work as tectonic. Insofar Frampton ends up precisely there, we can hazard the guess that he, unlike Colquhoun, does not subscribe to a rigorous individuation of detailing that exclusively roots it in joints.⁶⁵⁴ What is more, by severing the connection of detailing to joints, Frampton would also be forced to forego the definition of tectonics Lynn offers above. The latter is somewhat ironic, in that Frampton himself quotes (apparently, approvingly) Borbein (1982) who expressly states that,

Tectonic becomes the art of joinings.⁶⁵⁵

Now, in one sense these are simply terminological quibbles, over the propriety of the term 'tectonics' and/or 'detail'. In another sense, however, given how much ethical and (more generally) normative weight has been put on the notion of 'tectonics' – notions like constructional truth are frequently enough taken to be indicative of the 'ethical' quality of a work – I would say that a proper understanding of detail, and of its proper relation to tectonics, has the immense effect that it can ground an ethics of architecture, or at least a crucial part thereof, namely on Vitruvius' lead question (§3.4) how architects are to permissibly deploy the material means at their disposal.

At this level of generality, Edward Ford's latest work,⁶⁵⁶ which probes multiple definitions of 'detail', could become quite relevant to decide some central issues in the interpretation of Mies in particular, and the ethics of architecture in general, though this is a route I shall not probe further at this point. For now we can posit the more local question, 'What does detail mean in Mies?'. I shall approach this issue from two angles, its moral significance having been (to some degree) clarified.

§10.3.1. MIES ON DETAIL, 1: GOD'S POINT OF VIEW

One of the more revealing biographical details on architectural detailing emerges from early on in Mies's childhood, in a recorded dispute he witnessed between his father and his older brother over the family trade, marble carving.

My brother would say[, reports Mies], 'Look we can produce such-and-such an ornament without all that fuss, especially if it is way up high on a building façade where no one can look at it closely.'

⁶⁵⁰ Frampton (1995, 167). Colquhoun (2002, 179). Value-charged descriptions of this point, with Mies 'hiding' or 'concealing' the joints, suggest a morally charged intent we cannot verify.

⁶⁵¹ Frampton (1995, 169-171)

⁶⁵² Frampton (1995, 171), Colquhoun (2002, 179).

⁶⁵³ Frasciari (1984/1996).

⁶⁵⁴ This, I submit, is what explains the drift of Frampton's discussion in passages like the following. 'As in the large fenestration of the Lange House, the tectonic attains its most direct expression here [sc. *House Tugendhat*] in the *detailing* of the 80-foot-long plate glass window that, when withdrawn into the basement, converts the living space into a belvedere. [...] Once again, as in the Barcelona Pavilion, the suppression of the tectonic in the planar space-endlessness of the interior finds its countervailing [sic] reification through the careful placement of material and the precision of small-scale detail' (1995, 179, 179-180, italics in original). This is dialectically elegant, but not exactly persuasive if Carter's understanding of the relation, in Mies, of detailing to structure is correct. I discuss Carter's take on the relation at the close of §10.3.

⁶⁵⁵ *Apud* Frampton (1995, 4).

⁶⁵⁶ Ford (2011).

My father wanted no part of that. ‘You’re none of [us] stonemasons anymore!’ he would say. ‘You know the finial at the top of the spire at the cathedral in Cologne? Well, you can’t crawl up there and get a good look at it, but is carved as if you could. It was made for God.’⁶⁵⁷

We may of course never know whether (let alone, to what degree exactly) Mies shared his father’s reaction.⁶⁵⁸ But it is fairly obvious that a childhood episode related by a grown man decades afterwards must have left a suitably strong impression. If so, the salient point to take away from this episode is that detailing matters even where it is *not* visible to the naked eye, that is (here), the pedestrian viewpoint. What rather matters, in a slightly odd turn of phrase, is ‘God’s point of view’, and explains a dictum often attributed to Mies (e.g. in the 1969 *New York Times* obituary of his) whereby ‘God is in the detail(s)’. The point, then, is that successful architectural detailing for Mies even when it concerns the building’s visible exterior, such as the (here named) façade, need not always require *visibility to the human eye*.

Nothing here, however, is particularly ‘transcendental’ or ‘Platonist’, because ‘the finial at the top of the spire at the cathedral in Cologne’ is very much part of empirical, physical reality, and does not transcend or stand outside it in any ‘metaphysical’ sense. The finial is simply not visible to the pedestrian onlooker, that is all. The same holds, for instance, of the structural support of the *Hagia Sophia*’s central dome, rendered visible only by Choisy’s axonometric representations of that building. But that representation is drawn from a perspectival point of view that no ordinary human could ever *physically* assume. The dome’s supporting drums, however, are not particularly ‘transcendental’, they are just not visible from *one particular point of view*. (Wittkower once observed the same about some of Palladio’s villas – how the precise proportions and spatial principles governing their floor plans were inaccessible to a person taking them in visually, by walking through the building. They would only be disclosed by looking at a drawing.)

The core lesson, to repeat, is that ‘successful architectural detailing for Mies even when it concerns the building’s visible exterior, such as the (here named) façade, need not require *visibility to the human eye*.’ And that lesson generalizes across the board in that a great many choices in modernist architecture may be interpreted as transporting the (pre-modernist) richness and complexity of detailing from the *external* (in ornamentation) to the *interior* structure.⁶⁵⁹ That point is fully borne out by the *internal* detailing of Mies’s structural *columns*, as shown in section drawings of Mies’s columns at the *Barcelona Pavilion* and IIT’s *Carman Hall*.⁶⁶⁰ These details are all there, in his buildings, they are not in the least ‘transcendental’, they are simply not visible to the naked eye even if and when they account greatly for the overall structure and ordering of his buildings which very much *are* so visible.

What this means for the larger question guiding §10.3 should be obvious. Mies’s work certainly ‘celebrates’ detailing, in that he puts immense care into the correct placement of joints in particular. It is just that none of that would, and certainly need not, for him transpire into something that is *visibly expressed*. But that very point, of something’s being visibly *expressed*, is what governs contemporary debates on classifying architects as tectonic or atectonic, if we recall the (italicized) excerpts from Frampton sampled at the close of §10.2, to wit, Mies’s

column types are, in fact, abstractions of the idea of support, since, due to the fact that no beams are *expressed* in either instance [...] Structural logic is variously compromised in all three works, since the steel lintels used in each case to span various horizontal openings remain totally *unexpressed*.

⁶⁵⁷ The episode is recorded in Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 9). Other salient passages on Mies’s understanding of detailing occur on *ibid.*, pp. 77, 85, 95, 111, 167, 311, 367ff.

⁶⁵⁸ Or, indeed, whether (as Michiel Riedijk suggested to me) the episode is not in the end apocryphal, servicing a ‘creation myth’ of sorts.

⁶⁵⁹ I owe this point to Carolyn A. Fahey.

⁶⁶⁰ See respectively Frampton (1995, 177 fig. 6.26) and (1995, 191 fig. 6.40).

Indeed, such points should incline us to forego Ford's and Lynn's and Frampton's language of the 'celebration' of details. What they seem to be on about is not anything festive in particular, but rather the *expression* of something that is *visible* to the naked eye of the naïve onlooker placed at street level.

§10.3.2. MIES ON DETAIL, 2: STRUCTURE, ORGANISM, AND *UTILITAS*

Visible expression is also how Schulze and Windhorst characterize Mies' demand for 'clear structure', to which I turn next. Before I do so, however, let me explain why I think structure may explain our understanding of 'detailing' in Mies. For, a somewhat different avenue into Mies's understanding of detailing emerges from his use of the term 'structure', a term itself widely taken to be central to his philosophical understanding of architecture in his late phase (cf. §10.4). Mies there makes essential reference to detailing in that he defines structure as 'The whole, from top to bottom, *to the last detail*, with the same ideas.' He develops this point *a propos* Berlage's *Stock Exchange*, saying,

The idea of a clear construction came to me there, as one of the fundamentals we should accept. We can talk about that easily but to do it is not easy. It is very difficult to stick to this fundamental construction, and then to elevate [it] to a structure. I must make it clear that in the English language you call everything structure. In Europe we don't. We call a shack, a shack, and not a structure. By structure, we have a philosophical idea [in mind]. The structure is the whole, from top to bottom, to the last detail – with the same ideas. That is what we call structure.⁶⁶¹

Peter Carter, to whom Mies made this statement in 1961, claims we should summarize Mies's understanding of 'structure' as 'an order which permeates the whole building fabric, illuminating each part as necessary and inevitable' (and accordingly suggests should think of 'order' less in terms of 'constructional organization' than 'the order of a structural organism').⁶⁶² What, finally, explains the connection of 'structure' (thus understood) to detailing is a statement from one of Mies's students, to the effect that a building

should be a coherent work of structural art in which the detail suggests the whole and the whole suggests the detail.⁶⁶³

Such broad reflections on the term 'structure' (in Mies) in place – and they should recall §3.4's strictures on the part-whole calibration of tectonically composed structures –, we can turn to specifics – and turn to the point indicated earlier, how concern for *visible expression* resurfaces in this area. Schulze and Windhorst characterize Mies' demand for 'clear structure' at *Lake Shore Drive* (1948-1951) as follows.

The riveted steel structure is technically indistinguishable from those used in countless skyscrapers of the 1920s. But [...] Mies was able to produce a technologically impressive *expression*. It was not simply that he omitted the masonry cladding and the ornamental regime that had reigned since the very beginning of the high-rise in the United States – though he did that. Rather, he created a novel exterior wall, exploiting the new technology of shop- and site-welded architectural steel to reduce the building envelope to ordered essentials. The result, for the first time, is a high-rise, structural frame legible (and therefore *expressed*) through an exterior wall. (2012, 289, italics in original)

In particular, they add (2012, 290),

⁶⁶¹ Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 192-193); italics added to preceding quote. The episode also features in Frampton (1995, 185-6) and Carter (1999, 10). Particularly funny in the remark is the exclusion of '(the) English' from 'Europe'. This is in an important (if highly incidental) sense correct, in that Ruskin's moralizations of 'truth to structure' actually do not align with similar precepts in the German, French or (for that matter) Dutch traditions that Mies likely has in mind here. See §7.2.4 on Ruskin.

⁶⁶² Carter (1999, 9); the 1961 interview is partly reported in Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 193-4). As to 'organism', a somewhat servicable gloss is given by Mies himself, 'Das Bürohaus ist ein Haus der Arbeit, der Organisation, der Klarheit, der Ökonomie. Helle weite Arbeitsräume, übersichtlich, ungeteilt, nur gegliedert wie der Organismus des Betriebes. Größter Effekt mit geringstem Aufwand an Mitteln.' (*apud* Frampton 2010, 147)

⁶⁶³ Myron Goldsmith, *apud* Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 194).

The column face, like the spandrel, is clad in steel plate, with the ‘real’ column behind and fireproofed by an interior plaster surround. The exterior wall is thus a grid of intersecting spandrels and columns all in the same plane [...]. The grid gives almost equal legibility to horizontals and verticals, except that the verticals, ‘representing’ the real columns behind, are visually favored when extended to grade.

As before in §4.3 and §10.2, the importance is that this legibility is achieved by an expression and representation of the interior structure at the exterior, without the two being structurally equivalent in all respects.

Equally important is the delegation of *utilitas* (the interior program) to the back seat when it comes to what the building primarily expresses – it really is *firmitas* first and *utilitas* second, with *venustas* arising from a subtle play on the former. The same is observable for Mies’s designs for the IIT Campus (fig. 10.7), where the lack of programmatic differentiation between the individual built units on the campus arose from the fact that, at the time of commission, no one yet knew precisely which units would accommodate which educational and other facilities. In Mies’ own words,

We had to build school buildings, and often we did not know <how> they would be used. So we had to find a system that made it possible to use these buildings as classrooms, as workshops, or as laboratories. (*apud* Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 197)

Hence, all units are organized around a single, coherent modular system, where the primary dimensions, including the floor height, is kept uniform across (nearly) the entire campus.⁶⁶⁴ The lack of programmatic differentiation *legible at the building exterior*, then, is not a devaluing of *utilitas* as such but a design choice on what and what not to express at the visible exterior. As before, nothing ‘transcendental’ or ‘Platonist’ is going on.

Finally, Mies is also highly *selective* in which part of structure or *firmitas* he expresses. Utterly suppressed, for instance, is the lateral bracing that wards off the horizontal wind loads that pressurize his high rise buildings, such as *Lake Shore Drive* or *Seagram*. Recall Zimmerman’s observation how the *Lake Shore Drive’s* façade is not a faithful or ‘literal’ expression of the actual frame, given how the exterior frame had to meet added functionalities having to do with ‘stiffening the skin and preventing warping from heat and wind loads.’ (2006, 67) To see the connection of a building’s lateral bracing to its having to withstand wind loads, consider the following.

The most effective and resourceful use of material to stiffen a frame is the diagonal. Diagonals run from one frame corner to the other. A pair of diagonals forms cross bracing. Under a lateral load, the forces follow the diagonals as pure axial forces. The tension force in the diagonals prevents the frame from moving laterally.⁶⁶⁵

Two architectural examples would be the *Seagram*, which Louis Kahn observed to conceal its vertical loads, in that the bracing is *not expressed*, whereas (by contrast), the Chicago *John Hancock Center* (by Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, completed in 1969) ‘uses the wind bracing as an expression of its architectural character.’ (*ibid.* 213) More specifically,

‘Take the beautiful tower made of bronze that was erected in New York. It is a bronze lady, incomparable in beauty, but you know she has corsets for 15 stories because the wind bracing is not seen. That which makes it an object against wind can be beautifully expressed, just like nature expresses the differences between the moss and the reed. The base of this building should be wider than the top,’ said Louis Kahn about the *Seagram Building* in 1960. He was showing that the wind loads in tall buildings are greater than the vertical loads. In spite of Mies van der Rohe’s uncompromised structural clarity, the wind bracing in the *Seagram Building* lies hidden in the core.

⁶⁶⁴ See Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 196-199 with 198 fig. 7.1).

⁶⁶⁵ Sandaker and Eggen (1992, 213).

As the tower becomes higher, the wind loads will be so great that they cannot be ignored. A 300-meter-high [...] skyscraper in Chicago, the *John Hancock Center* (1969), uses the wind bracing as an expression of its architectural character. With the cross bracing in the facades and the greatest width at its base, the building gradually tapers upwards to a height of 100 floors. The *John Hancock's* conical silhouette and 18-story-high diagonal pairs combined to give the impression of absolute stability in one of the most beautiful and most elegant of all skyscrapers. (1992, 213)

Both buildings use *firmitas* as a constraint on and source of what 'is expressed', but they differ on what and how much of the structure they express. This is also how Ford himself (1997, 267) posits the issue, as to how much 'adjoining' (*tektainomai*) gets expressed in Mies's architecture:

Exposed fasteners abound [in the Greene's work], and each piece of wood retains its identity as a part of a whole. Often the exposed fasteners are ornamental, concealing the real ones below, but the Greenes' work explains the process of becoming. Mies celebrated the joining of materials, but not the means by which it was accomplished. Exposed fasteners are almost unknown in his work. Important connections such as column to slab and column to beam, are concealed deep within construction. It is often easier to conceal a connection than to expose one, but it is often easier to expose than to conceal, and Mies went to extraordinary lengths to erase the marks of joining in his work, particularly the steel frame. Of course, Mies is well known for his use of the reveal (the notch at the joining of dissimilar materials); however, this occurs only at such locations as the joining of brick to steel; the joining of steel to steel is seamless and invisible.

As before, the importance is that such legibility is achieved by an expression and representation of the interior structure at the exterior, without the two being structurally equivalent. This being in place, it is time to address some of our larger questions.

§10.3.3 MIES AND THE TECTONIC TRADITION

With the accumulated material in place it is time to return to one of our lead questions from §10.1: Can the architecture of Mies van der Rohe be classified as tectonic?

As explained in §10.1, we shifted attention away from 'the tectonic' as defined in CHAPTERS 3 and 4 since the classificatory debates surrounding Mies's architecture on that point is rarely informed by a historically sensitive reading of the term. Instead, we shifted our attention to related notions of *structural expression* and *joints* in respectively §10.2 and §10.3. From there we concluded several points pertinent to the CHAPTERS 3-4 framework, especially its core tenets of §3.3 sc. the RECIPROCITY THESIS [E] as underwritten by (3)':

[E] Is beautiful(*b*) iff Is functional(*b*) iff Is solid (*b*)

(3) 'Is beautiful(*b*) and Is functional(*b*) and Is solid (*b*)' is true iff *b* is beautiful with respect to how its mode of composition Π (solidity, *firmitas*) realizes *b*'s function *f*.

And the centrality (emerging in (3)) of *firmitas* or *being solidly built* defined as,

CF 'Building *b* is firm' is true iff *b* is tectonically composed, and

b is tectonically composed iff the physical properties of *b*'s parts and the physical properties of *b* as a whole are mutually constrained so that *b* as a whole is held up.

There was no question so far that Mies's writings contain explicit endorsements of any of these claims. True, some of what he says may be complicit with – and certainly compatible with – these statements, but as we saw, his remarks on 'structure' or 'detail' are too cryptic to afford us more. Much rather, we looked at how Mies *built* his buildings, and here the issue becomes clearer. Claim (3) comprises an aesthetics of architecture, that is, comprises a normative claim about where, if anywhere, a building's architectural beauty or (more broadly) its aesthetically decisive features are to be located. Mies's subscription to this claim is fairly nuanced, if we recall the key points unearthed from §§10.2-3. First, the aesthetic discernability ('legibility') of the building's frame – that which accounts for its being 'held up' as CF puts it

- is achieved by an expression and representation of the interior structure at the exterior, without the two being structurally equivalent.

Second, in a similar regard, those properties of his buildings' parts that most likely pertain to CF's talk of 'parts', namely the joints at which different materials or segments come together, are likewise expressed if also partly concealed. For, as we saw, scholars' talk of Mies's 'celebration' of details was not about anything festive in particular, but concerned rather the *expression* of specific detailing *visible* to the naked eye of the naïve onlooker placed at street level. CF and (3) leave it wide open, however, what demands precisely the factor of *being aesthetically pleasing* places on visibility and expression. Only additional concerns, brought in from Schopenhauer's austere (not to say, eliminativist) strictures on architectural expression as being entirely limited to Π , would be in tension with Mies' nuanced treatment of detailing and expression. §7.5 left it wide open, however, which (if any) of such strictures are necessary for a satisfactory aesthetics of architecture that emerges from the core tenets of previous chapters, including CF and (3).

This leaves one central question – Mies's subscription, or not, to the RECIPROCITY THESIS itself. Our analysis unearthed that at least some of his buildings delegate a building's *utilitas* (understood to include its interior program) to the back seat when it comes to what the building primarily expresses – such expression really concerns *firmitas* first and *utilitas* second, with *venustas* arising from a subtle play on the former. This should remind us that Mies, like Semper, pays his dues to considerations of functionality and convenience, but does not constrain every last detail in his façade design (and elsewhere) by expressing that functionality precisely. It is exactly that point which made Sauchelli's suggestion we encountered in §1.4 – that the *Seagram* expresses 'the function of a tall office building' – not so much false as incomprehensible, possibly nonsensical.

If this resolves the nuanced and complicated relation of Mies to the tectonic tradition, and the error in categorizing his work as clearly tectonic or non-tectonic, we must now see how his buildings and writings fare when juxtaposed to the rest of the CHAPTERS 2-4 framework – that geared to moral appraisal. For, irrespective of whether Mies' architecture aligns with core tenets of the tectonic tradition, this framework enables us to now attend more fully to a moral appraisal of his buildings, and use that framework to test the highly diverse moral appraisals his architecture has received in recent decades, up to 2014.

§10.4 MORALIZING MIES

In §10.2. we saw how Mies's overall development focuses on the expression of structure more as an 'idea' than physical actuality, in that the frame 'expressed' is not the one bearing the building's actual load, where the I-girders at the building corners at Seagram and elsewhere form a key component of this 'ideal structure'. Unfortunately, thanks to Mies's own writings and inclination to pronounce philosophical sounding aphorisms,⁶⁶⁶ this straight forward construction technique and aesthetic principle as to what to express and how, has given rise to some pretty odd juxtaposition with 'philosophical' theories, theories on 'truth and beauty', and on a 'metaphysical order'. Most relevantly for my thesis, however, is the fact how Mies' architecture, via the juxtaposition with such 'theories', has led to the architecture's moral exaltation and condemnation alike. I offer four samples for consideration – Jencks, Neumeyer, Mertins, and Hays.

§10.4.1 MORALIZING MIES, 1: JENCKS

First, in the early 1970s, Charles Jencks started a crusade against modernist architecture, and lambasted Mies' architecture as follows. As regards Mies' work at IIT or

the town houses at [Detroit's] Lafayette Park[,] the purity of form leads to an inarticulate architecture, or one extraneous element, a bathroom vent, leads to monumental bathos. There | is no place for a mistake in this absolute universe, because extreme simplicity makes one

⁶⁶⁶ Most of which focused on such terms as 'order' and 'structure', terms that some exegetes have jumped on as evidence of some 'metaphysical' drama under way in his buildings. Cf. §10.3.2.

hypersensitive to each inch of a structure and the Platonic form, with its transcendental pretension, demands utter perfection.⁶⁶⁷

Jencks explains this assault (1980, 96) by starting from Lewis Mumford's observation that Mies'

hollow glass shells [...] existed alone in the Platonic world of his imagination and had no relation to site, climate, insulation, function, or internal activity,

Jencks accuses Mies of 'Platonic elitism' (1980, 97). It is unclear how Mumford's characterization, however, ever fits any of Mies's project other than those deliberately designed to evade the factors he enumerates, like the *Glass Skyscraper* of 1922. Let us, then, focus on Jencks' own favourite example, given how he takes exception to other people

saying that Lafayette Park is 'certainly the most civilized dwelling-quarter of | this century'. The problem with this kind of assertion is that it fails to note that as a civilization becomes more open, it makes more semantic discriminations between building types, a discrimination which Mies's 'neutralizing skin' does everything to obscure. (1980, 99)

As we saw in §10.3.2, lack of overt or even blatant functional differentiation at the level of building exteriors is an observable (sic) feature of some of Mies's designs. But at times that is causally owed, not to Mies's own moral decisions but the epistemic parameters under which he designed, such as at IIT's campus in Chicago (see again §10.3.2). Still, we should carefully distinguish the moral appraisal of Mies's designs from that of their causal histories. That aside, even today many public building commissions demand a design to accommodate flexibility towards repurposing, so as to ensure a building's longevity (perhaps sustainability) if and when (some of) its original purpose expires.⁶⁶⁸

Returning to Jencks's own remarks, we can observe how his damning words are not once juxtaposed to a proper historical and architectural analysis of *Lafayette Park*, a housing complex that teems with insightful landscape architecture by Mies's IIT colleague Ludwig Hilbersheimer, with vibrant children's life owing to the near kindergarten, and, finally, an empowering relation to Detroit's tortured history in that major proponents of Black Rights' people movement lived in *Lafayette Park*, including Detroit mayor Jerome Cavanagh, and law firm leaders George W. Crockett and Wade McCree, among several of Detroit's politically prominent Afro-American inhabitants.⁶⁶⁹ One could go on about how the tenants of *Lafayette Park* have found ways to work around the less accommodating features of Mies' designs, from windows that kill birds flying past the buildings at low height, or the climate condition that leave things to be desired in winter temperatures. But the major lesson remains – a varied community has found its way of life here, and keeps adapting the setting, built and landscape, to its daily changing needs (fig. 10.9a and 10.9b; recall also figs. P.3-P.4 in §P.1). Jencks' disparaging remarks about *Lafayette Park*, and the morality of its design in particular, would have benefited from an actual site visit and historical research. Instead, Jencks prefers *a priori* analysis, unperturbed by empirical detail.

⁶⁶⁷ Jencks (1973/1980, 95-96). 'Bathos' is not a typo for 'pathos', but a Greek term to connote a sudden transition (stylistic or otherwise) from the exalted to the mundane.

⁶⁶⁸ See Herman Hertzberger's realized campus design *Noordelijke Hogeschool Leeuwarden*. The original design catered to the comparative sizes of the individual departments, and designed spaces functionally sensitive to their programs. Meanwhile, department sizes have already fluctuated so widely as to necessitate a relocation of some of them to each other's sites and buildings on campus. (Hertzberger presented such details in a talk at Delft on 16 May 2011.)

⁶⁶⁹ See Aubert et al. (2012, 166-167), and cf. Finfer (1999).



Fig. 10.8a *Lafayette Park* (1956), contemporary aerial view. (Source:)

Before we see where this lands him, however, a rejoinder is possible to the previous paragraph. For, if anything, the details submitted here are irrelevant to the moral appraisal of Mies's *design*, as they only pertain to his design's *appropriation* and *utilization* by others.⁶⁷⁰ No moral apologetic can be pinned on Mies's design on such grounds, given what the INTRODUCTION and CHAPTER 1 have taught us about the ABOUTNESS CONSTRAINT. Much rather, a moral appraisal of *Lafayette Park* would have to scrutinize carefully the intrinsic and relational *compositional* properties of the design, and how these interact. (The only reason I marshalled such materials was to contest Jencks' allegations of the houses's hostility to habitation and appropriation, which is arguably an intrinsic feature of them, if one with extrinsic consequences.) One can observe, for instance, that the lower buildings feature dark, glazed front windows facing wide spaces of walkways and greenery. As one passes through the walkway, one is visible to the buildings' dwellers, whereas the reverse does not hold true. This means that the design preserves both the privacy of its tenants, while also enabling the shared, public spaces to benefit from open view and constant supervision, where required. Given that the public spaces feature play grounds and parking spaces (see again fig. 10.9*b*), this seems morally desirable. There is, then, a quite nuanced balancing of concerns between public and private concerns, and their allocation to individual design elements appears well considered. The same pertains to the overall grouping of the buildings, in that, while overall continuous, *Lafayette Park* comes in discrete sub-groupings, reinforcing the feeling of smaller neighbourhood community, while also – thanks to the shared design – reaffirming a broader sense of common belonging (see fig. 10.8*a*). As before, we seem to get a sense that diverging considerations, pertaining to closed and open communities, were given equal weight, and have been realized rather successfully in the final building.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁷⁰ Thanks to Michiel Riedijk for this point.

⁶⁷¹ This entire paragraph was provoked, and in many parts suggested to me by, Carolyn A. Fahey.



Fig. 10.9a *Lafayette Park* (1956). Photo by author, July 2013.

It is, finally, such properties of the design, both intrinsic (to individual buildings) and relational (in these buildings' relations to one another and the in-between spaces) that accounts for their successful utilization in the many years since. And all that would have to be viewed against an even larger context – the city in which the project was realized – where, as before, we have to see how one set of compositional features (intrinsic and relational-narrow) measure up against a wider set of compositional features (here, of a widened scope of relational properties). In Robert Fishman's words,

Mies van der Rohe's magnificent modernist vision built in the midst of a city undergoing the worst of urban crisis. [...] The collision between Mies's purer-than-pure modernism and the realities of Detroit is both comic and tragic – surprising, disturbing and, finally, inspiring.⁶⁷²

Our moral appraisal of *Lafayette Park* may well shift from emphatically positive to hesitant or even (in part) rejecting, depending on how narrowly or widely we define its compositional features. If so, that

⁶⁷² Robert Fishman, quoted on the blurb of Aubert et. al. (2012).

underscores the major merit of the CHAPTER 2 framework and what CHAPTER 8 called the task of ‘calibration’ – that is, how moral appraisals of buildings needs to correlate ends with a careful individuation and delineation of the salient compositional means.




Fig. 10.9b *Lafayette Park* (1956). Photos of interiors with current owners, by Corine Vermeulen, published as part of Alexandra Lange, ‘Home Sweet Architectural Masterpiece’, *New York Times* (3 October 2012).

But it also appears that, at whatever level of coarse- or finegrainedness our attention to *Lafayette Park*’s compositional details operates (and I have indicated these levels rather than exhaustively analysed them), it also appears that what emerges at any particular one of these levels sits rather uneasy with the disparaging remarks Jencks levels at *Lafayette Park*, and the morality of its design in particular. His own analysis appears to proceed largely *a priori*, unperturbed by empirical detail unearthed from site visits. Let us see where this methodological orientation lands him. At the broadest level, Jencks alleges that Mies’ reductive designs at Lafayette Park and elsewhere achieve (and are meant to achieve) ‘his [sc. Mies’s] Platonic essentialism.’ (1980, 100) We already saw earlier how Jencks tellingly glosses Platonism as ‘elitist’ and ‘transcendentalist’. What emerges from this juxtaposition of adjectives is the following.

If our brief foray into *Lafayette Park* showed the *descriptive unsuitability* of ‘Platonism’ (in any of its guises) to pick out actual details in the built reality of Mies’ work, we can now see how the position Jencks calls ‘Platonism’ does not even make sense on its own ground, whether or not we apply it to architecture. That is, Jencks has chosen to simply juxtapose three philosophical positions that have nothing in common other than an author – Plato – who allegedly penned them, if he did so at all, at different stages in his philosophical career. To that end we have, (1) *political* Platonism, that is, Plato’s alleged ‘elitism’ to have the mass of people ruled by an enlightened elite of philosopher kings, (2) *transcendental* or religious Platonism, in that Plato believed in empirical reality being ultimately explained by a structure or order transcend that reality, and finally (3) *metaphysical* Platonism, on which reality is to be explained by a type of entity that is repeatable, co-instantiable, and accounts for the ‘essential’ features of empirical particulars.

Not a single of these positions stands up to exegetical scrutiny.⁶⁷³ Position (3) is sometimes called ‘Platonic property realism’,⁶⁷⁴ and while philosophers continue to debate the cogency of the position, even its harshest detractors agree that it has nothing to do with (1) and (2). A moment’s reflection should reveal that there are no mutual entailment relations from any of (1) and (2) to the respective other elements in the triad of (1) to (3) either. Actual attention to Plato’s texts would equally reveal that (1) to (3) operate largely independently of Plato’s own views on architecture (and its ethical mission), and *vice versa*, but as before, this type of historical scholarship seems unwelcome in the type of contribution Jencks attempts. For, not only the rational origin but the actual *content* of positions (1) to (3) is systematically withheld by Jencks’s analysis, as is, for that matter, the historical (in)accuracy of labeling any of these positions ‘Platonist’. This means his writing fail to command the serious interest of readers who do care about historical or philosophical accuracy.

We can formally represent and generalize the overall achievement of Jencks’s argument against Mies as follows.

Mies van der Rohe once expressed a certain view, ‘P’. Some other people (no known relation with Mies) have said, some other morally despicable person H once expressed a view very similar to P. It is unclear whether P really expresses anything Mies would have subscribed to. In any case, let us call P ‘H’s view’. H was also committed two two further morally despicable claims, Q and R. Although there are no entailment relations from Q or R to H or vice versa, given how Mies believed P he must have also believed Q and R.

Here is the deal: substitute for the variable ‘P’ anything you like. As long as you can find someone (it does not matter who, just *someone*) who is willing to map that instance of P with a line or two from an appropriate line of H’s recorded beliefs, the conclusion in the final line follows. It is inessential whether or not we instantiate for ‘H’ the political leader of German national socialism, though this would be in line with Jencks’ own reasoning.⁶⁷⁵

The end result, as before, cannot generate results worthy of architectural historians’ interests, or anyone else’s for that matter. That the exercise itself is ethically problematic the moment it is enlisted to scandalize architects on moral grounds exacerbates the issue further.

§10.4.2 MORALIZING MIES, 2: NEUMEYER

The only problem with the situation is that the underlying reasoning (or something rather close to it) does not stop at Jencks’ door. It also holds for those who would attribute to Mies various transcendentalist, Platonist or ‘Neo-Platonic’ views, if only to make Mies’ enigmatic sayings the more impressive – and into moral goals for future architectural practice to emulate (or re-acquire). Chief among these exegetes, in this

⁶⁷³ See specifically Irwin (1995) and Schofield (2006b) for careful analyses of Plato’s *actual* ethical, metaphysical, and political views. Also, the entire field of Plato scholarship in the past eighty years has subscribed to a developmental, as opposed to doctrinal monolithic interpretation of Plato’s work, with the notable exception of Karl Popper’s discussion of Plato in his (1971), which made out Plato the bogeyman of totalitarianism, and a philosophical ‘stand in’ for Hitler’s views (of which more presently). While Popper’s work has been thoroughly debunked by philosophers and scholars immediately upon publication, the work enjoys a curious afterlife among amateur readers and, to all appearances, is Jencks’ only authority for his historical and philosophical fabrications.

⁶⁷⁴ See Armstrong (1978); and Fine (1993) on how Armstrong’s views on properties relate to Plato’s own.

⁶⁷⁵ ‘We have already mentioned how his [Mies’s] apoliticism, verging on fatalism, led Mies to accepting Nazism. As Karl Popper has argued, a belief in essences is one of the prime convictions of those who support a Closed Society.’ (Jencks 1973/1980, 106) The concluding line juxtaposes positions (1) and (3). Jencks’s study is not the only one to enroll Popper to mount a moral condemnation of modernist architecture in full generality, and to move Mies’s moral outlook in the direct vicinity of Hitler’s. Watkin equates Plato’s moral outlook with Nazism and Mies’s with that of the Third Reich, quoting with approval such tendentious comparisons of Popper’s as, ‘For Hitler – no less than for his contemporaries, Mies and Gropius – architecture was an expression of the central spirit of an epoch’ (Watkin, 1977/2001, xxvi). The 1934 episode of Hitler stomping on Mies’s floor plans for the *Brussels Pavilion* (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 169-170) is not once reported in such contexts, though as before we should be hesitant to enlist such details at all in the moral appraisal of a *built object*. Jencks and Watkin are good exhibits of what CHAPTER 1 called the ‘language games’ variant of redemptivism.

regard, is the work of Fritz Neumeyer.⁶⁷⁶ While Neumeyer never comes close to the histrionics and (staged?) fallacies of Jencks, his major methodology of *ascribing philosophical views to Mies* is just as questionable, a dubiety that infects Neumeyer's subsequent moral defense of Mies' thought on the very basis of the views thus ascribed.

The shortcomings of Neumeyer's methodology are thoroughly documented in an in-depth review of his work by Winfried Nerdinger; I will accordingly orient my own presentation on Nerdinger's essential points.⁶⁷⁷

Firstly, Neumeyer deduces from Mies' *marking* passages in books in his library (1) an understanding and (2) endorsement of the *content* of the marked passage by Mies. Nerdinger (1988, 424-5) rightly points out that humans often mark passages in books they do *not* understand, and understand a great many things they would not dream of endorsing. Also, even in cases where they do both, it is not clear they would do so years (sometimes, months) later upon re-encountering the same passage. To, then, conclude from such fleeting traces timeless commitments does not sit with our customary understanding of marking passages in books. Nerdinger also contests that some markings might not be of Mies' hand in the first place, deriding the confidence Neumeyer places in 'the type of stroke' (in the books he came across) as being 'unmistakably by Mies's own hand'.⁶⁷⁸

This 'inference from markings in one's personal library' – quite apart from the possibility of landing Mies' in the intellectual vicinity of undesirables, and thus providing cannon fodder for the likes of Jencks – provides the dubious basis for making Mies (or pretty much *anyone*, for that matter, who owns philosophy books with random markings in them) into a major philosopher who exchanged views with Augustine and Aquinas.

Relatedly, as Schulze and Windhorst put it more recently (*a propos* Neumeyer's numerous attempts to offload Riehl's and Guardini's philosophies onto Mies), if Mies often marked passages in his books, care must be taken in interpreting the *significance* of such markings. Sometimes no special meaning may be inferred, and selective citation from Mies's (alleged) underlinings can support a wide range of hypotheses. The lesson applies especially to those books in Mies' library he *reports* to not have understood, or to those he seemingly did not even *read*, even if (as happens to most of us) such books found their way into his library.⁶⁷⁹ Finally, the lesson certainly applies to pretty much *any* author, once we remember that we ourselves own many books which, even where we understand them, we often *disagree* with.⁶⁸⁰ And Neumeyer is hardly the only one perpetrating the error. As recently as 2009, a paper was published 'demonstrating' the vast extent to which Mies's 'spatial thinking' was essentially shaped by Eastern philosophy, given how Mies' shelves, at one point, boasted three books on Chinese philosophy, and given how Mies (allegedly) had once talked to Frank Lloyd Wright when (as everyone knows) Wright was 'into' Chinese conceptions of space.⁶⁸¹

Second, apart from the problematic nature of the *evidential basis* of Neumeyer's inferences, Nerdinger critiques the *extent* to which Neumeyer infers philosophical content in Mies' thought. At one point,

⁶⁷⁶ Neumeyer (1986/1991).

⁶⁷⁷ Nerdinger (1988). I owe my awareness of this essay to Dietrich Neumann, and am currently working on a complete English translation for *Architecture & Philosophy* 2.1 (2015).

⁶⁷⁸ 'Hier versteigt sich der Autor einmal sogar zu der mutigen Behauptung, eine Anstreichung zeige „unzweifelhaft die Strichführung von Mies“ ([Neumeyer 1986,] S. 90).^c (Nerdinger 1988, 425)

⁶⁷⁹ See respectively Schulze and Windhorst (2012), 435n.17 and 435n.19.

⁶⁸⁰ Speaking from personal experience, I more often underline (what I take to be) mistakes than agreements, because these prove more instructive and thought provoking in the long run. Thus Frampton (1995) is easily one of the most heavily annotated items in my library, but I doubt third parties could even begin to make sense of my scribbles.

⁶⁸¹ Kim (2009). Thus we learn, 'Providing other evidence that Mies read Lao-tzu's *Book*, Werner Blaser wrote that 'concerning the books that surrounded and inspired him and influenced his thoughts: in his Chicago apartment he always had books by Augustine and Lao[-tzu] at hand [...]' (256), from which the article concludes, 'the ideas of Laoistic voids and nature [can be] found in Mies's pursuits of the art of building' (260).

Neumeyer attributes ‘the complete Nietzsche’ onto Mies, on the basis of a scant three lines in Mies’ work in the 1920s (Nerdinger 1988, 425).

Thirdly, even when the evidential basis and the inferred (and attributed) ‘philosophical view’ are not entirely *disproportionate vis-à-vis one another*, Nerdinger still questions the degree of ‘descriptive fit’, in that many of Mies’s views are better explained by more mundane sources, such as construction and architecture weekly’s (sources he plausibly might be said to have read *and* understood, perhaps even endorsed).

Mies would have been able to unearth such ‘decisive ideas’ (Neumeyer) in pretty much *any* architecture office and construction weekly. It really didn’t require pseudo-detective work on his library [to detect such views], just a consideration of the ordinary context [he was operating in]. But next to Hegel and Plato, construction weekly’s look of course skimpy in comparison, and accordingly meet Neumeyer’s scorn of disregard.⁶⁸²

Fourthly and finally, Nerdinger questions the ‘direction of fit’ not only because, frequently enough, alternative (and more plausible) explanations of Mies’s ‘inspirations’ are available, but also because the sources Neumeyer submits sometimes only work because he *mis*describes (i.e. is factually inaccurate on) or *under*describes a building by Mies, to make it easier for him to map a philosophical tidbit onto one of Mies’s buildings. That is, even *if* Neumeyer’s points could be established legitimately (which is doubtful), the lessons they wish to draw simply *overgeneralize*.

Thus we have the *Barcelona Pavilion* as a cross breed of Plato, humanism and Nietzsche, as well as an illustration of books penned by Guardini and Ebeling. If we continue arguing in this manner, we will shortly deduce [the entire contents of] Marx’s *Capital* from any factory, and [deduce] Heidegger’s *Being and Time* from any house in the Black Forest.⁶⁸³

In short, the (relative) descriptive impoverishment, on Neumeyer’s part, of Mies’s buildings makes the *mapping* of such details to grandiose philosophical views (‘insights’) dubious in at least two regards. First, it is unclear that *so little* can license so much, unclear whether not more is needed to *warrant* the attribution or mapping. But secondly, given the paucity of architectural detail, the alleged mapping *over-generalizes*. That is, *if* the mapping works, then it must work for *any* architectural work that shares with Mies’s building the specific detail that licensed the mapping in the first place.

In Jencks’ case, this would be the use of steel frame and mullions or ‘T’-beams. In the case of the ‘minimalist’ interpretations of Mies (see §10.4.4) it would be the use of curtain walls. Such descriptive details cannot go proxy for proper analyses of Mies’s buildings at an appropriate level of detail and depth, and they certainly do not single (any of) them out from a wide ocean of modernist, sometimes even pre-modernist, buildings.

In some sense I sought to provide, on some projects at least, a helpful sampling of such detail, not so much to help us *map* precise philosophical views onto Mies’s buildings, but precisely so as to forestall *premature* mappings of the variety Nerdinger debunks. More generally, the purpose of the current chapter has been to *guard against* premature attributions of philosophical and ‘ethical’ views to Mies van der Rohe and his architecture. The *juxtaposition* of architecture – that is, of buildings in concrete, empirical reality – with full blown positions in philosophy requires considerably more work and scruples.

⁶⁸² ‘In jedem Büro und in jeder Bauzeitschrift konnte Mies diese [von Neumeyer genannten] ‘entscheidenden Ideen’ finden, es braucht hier keine pseudodetektivische Bibliotheksarbeit, sondern nur eine Einbeziehung des normalen Umfeldes. Aber neben Hegel und Plato nehmen sich Bauzeitschriften natürlich dürftig aus, darum werden solche Quellen von Neumeyer mit Verachtung gestraft.’ (Nerdinger 1988, 426)

⁶⁸³ ‘Der Barcelona-Pavillon als Kreuzung von Plato, Humanismus und Nietzsche sowie als Illustration der Bücher von Guardini und Ebeling. Wenn auf diese Weise weiterargumentiert wird, dann läßt sich aus jeder Fabrik das *Kapital* von Karl Marx und aus jedem Schwarzwaldhaus Heideggers *Sein und Zeit* ableiten.’ (Nerdinger 1988, 427)

This concludes my case for (that is, against) ‘morality and architecture’ in Mies. By way of concluding §10.4, I offer two ancillary points, one on the alleged ‘philosophical interests’ of Mies, and one on the recently favoured ‘minimalist’ interpretations of his buildings that, while sitting politically on the opposite end of the spectrum – that is, far left instead of far right –, share with Neumeyer the same methodological problems isolated by Nerdinger’s review.

§10.4.3 MORALIZING MIES, 3: MERTINS

The readiness to attribute to Mies philosophical views on the previously described basis is hardly Neumeyer’s fault alone. Thus, at one point in Detlef Mertins’ study of Mies, we learn that a *major* intellectual source for Mertins’ *own* construal of Mies’ philosophy (unsurprisingly, it focuses on the term ‘order’) is a book that Mies

may not have read[, as his] copy had many uncut pages[.]⁶⁸⁴

Instead of interrupting and aborting his exegesis of the *philosophical* content of Mies’s thought right there, Mertins continues undeterred, and happily attributes to Mies all sorts of intellectual insights. In his much more recent book on Mies, Mertins seems to initially steer clear of painting Mies as an intellectual, a philosopher even. He writes, that ‘Mies was by no means a philosopher’, but instantly qualifies the point: ‘his architecture was often considered philosophical’.⁶⁸⁵ For Mertins, this ‘consideration’ is correct, and his new book is here to show us why. For, Mies’s ‘was a practice seeking to serve life but also elevate it to a higher plateau of being, a level of value associated with a spiritual or philosophical life.’ (ibid., 9) In that regard Mertins enlists his monograph to cement the ‘conviction that his *modus operandi* is [Mies’s] greatest legacy.’ (ibid., 9) If the book, then, starts by raising readers’ expectations exactly along such lines, how does it meet them? How is Mies’s architectural practice the shining moral beacon for all present and future architectural production – or, at the very least, a legacy to contend with on such grounds?

The high road, and here Mertins follows Neumeyer as well, is provided by a foray into Mies’s library, stocked as it was with books of philosophical content. What is more, Mertins (ibid., 468n.10) informs his readers that this monograph will be the first to fully draw on the entirety of Mies’s library, way beyond Neumeyer’s more selective dippings. This raises the aforementioned (§10.4.2) issues of methodology, of how momentous juxtapositions of architecture with (moral) philosophy can be licensed on such slender foundations.

A particularly glaring example - and these are peppered across the entire text - occurs on page 329, where we learn from Mertins how,

Thompson’s *On Growth and Form* provides another complementary clue as to the role of the I-beams in Mies’s expression of structure. Unlike the philosophical books that Mies marked up so heavily and enthusiastically as he worked (or fought) his way through them, Thompson’s book is marked in only two places.

Beyond the problems of methodology already mentioned, Mertins’ analysis of the passage in question looks rather superficial and ill informed (it is not juxtaposed to anyone else’s analysis of Thompson’s work, for one), and its juxtaposition to compositional details in Mies’s work remains just that - a juxtaposition, rather than an informative ‘clue’ to our understanding of the latter, let alone a biographically credible clue.

At times, Mertins’ analysis provides hopeful signs of countervailing tendencies. Remarking on the extent to which the Tugendhats read Heidegger, with Grete Tugendhat even claiming the house to convey a ‘Heideggerian spirit’, Mertins (p.179) also mentions how for daughter Daniela Hammer-Tugendhat it,

never becomes clear, however, what [Mies] precisely meant by words like ‘the spiritual’ or truth’.

⁶⁸⁴ Mertins (2001, 636n.6).

⁶⁸⁵ Mertins (2014, 7).

Instead of letting such an observation inform or challenge Mertins' own philosophically quite heavy handed analysis of Mies's remarks and buildings, Mertins reports the remark at the end of a paragraph where it is literally left hanging. This looks like a major missed opportunity to provoke a more nuanced analysis that concedes, where necessary, the limits of understanding the actual philosophical content (if any) informing Mies's architecture.

As just discussed, a careful *juxtaposition* of architecture with full blown positions in philosophy requires considerably more scruple than Mertins and Neumeyer allow. Having dealt with 'Mies the underliner', let us briefly see to Mies's own, more overtly philosophical statements, and see what can be gleaned from them to help us understand his architecture. Even in Neumeyer's wake, many of today's most eminent Mies scholars would hold that Mies was no intellectual. Dietrich Neumann, for instance, makes that point quite categorically.

Der Mies war kein Intellektueller.⁶⁸⁶

It is hard to argue the point. For even where Mies (to all appearances) probed philosophical waters he comes across as less than competent. For instance, as part of his pedagogical program at the *IIT* (then *Armour Institute of Technology*), Mies proposed that all its students 'must be given the opportunity to acquire a basic architectural philosophy'.⁶⁸⁷ However, as Schulze and Windhorst (2012, 191) comment,

Like almost all of Mies's published professional expression, [his 1938 address at the *Armour Institute of Technology*] is aphoristic, proclamatory, and devoid of sustained argumentation. [...] with its compressed language, it is, sentence by sentence, almost beyond explication.⁶⁸⁸

Or again,

Much has been written about Mies's curriculum for Armour and IIT. Most of it is descriptive, noncritical, and often hagiographic. And though Mies wrote a few pieces describing his American program and educational philosophy – most notably the aforementioned 1938 inaugural address [...] – his most comprehensive description is a Bauhaus-inspired chart developed for Armour [...]. Like most graphical representations of ideas, it is subject to multiple readings, and it necessarily contains nothing in the manner of rationale. (Schulze and Windhorst 2012, 204)

Accrediting an architect of such personality and orientation with the ambition to endow his buildings with high flung philosophical, 'metaphysical' content, then, seems to strain credulity. It is, anyhow, as we saw not ever borne out by close readings of his buildings, but seems painted onto them like a thin layer of exterior varnish, reminiscent of what the thesis INTRODUCTION called *mere juxtaposition*.

But Neumann has a more forceful point – the misplaced confidence that philosophical beliefs can steer architectural production on their own. In his review of Mertins (2014), Neumann writes how Mertins's 'excursions' into Mies's 'intellectual foundations'

raise compelling questions about architectural agency and the nature of the design process. Mies said and wrote so little that it is hard to know how deeply he engaged with what he read and marked and if it, consciously or not, influenced his design decisions. It is easy to underestimate the complexities of architectural production, the legal, financial, collaborative constraints that, often invisibly, force an architect's hand and limit his freedom. While Mies would, occasionally, quote Thomas Aquinas and his terse statements might echo Guarini, he styled himself a builder-craftsman, not an intellectual.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁶ p.c. May 30, 2013.

⁶⁸⁷ Quoted *apud* Mertins (2001, 605).

⁶⁸⁸ The surrounding passages take Neumeyer to task for foisting, on Mies's terse and 1.150 word short speech, the entire philosophy of Guardini, Simmel, Scheler, and Bergson, proclaiming 'Nowhere else is the logic of the Miesian building art expressed more clearly' than here (Neumeyer). As Schulze and Windhorst point out, 'even Neumeyer was reduced simply to quoting long sections of the speech', uninterrupted by analysis of Mies's own text (2012, 191).

⁶⁸⁹ Neumann (2014).

The idea that moral beliefs of a highly philosophical nature drive Mies's architectural production, then, is quite dubious irrespective of problems of ascribing such (that is, very specific) beliefs to Mies in the first place.

§10.4.4 MORALIZING MIES, 4: HAYS, OR, *MINIMA MORALIA*

In recent years, a new interpretation of Mies's architecture appeared that emphasized the austerity of its detailing and 'content'. In particular, Rosalind Krauss argued that we should read Mies's works as illustrating theories of minimalist art practice, and (read them in light of) these theories' attendant ethical implications of refusing to engage audiences more directly, that is, by means of figurative and other content.⁶⁹⁰ This section sketches the resulting position and the ethical stance it attempts to attribute to Mies.

Drawing on Krauss' work, K. Michael Hays added to this a leftist ethics inherited from his mentor (Tafuri), to be made clearer shortly. To add further to the confusion, Mies's architecture, understood in this highly (con)tortured way, was then seen as complicit with (then) new strands in contemporary American architecture, above all, the minimalism of Peter Eisenman's work. In total, this mish mash of historically and culturally disconnected 'views' yields the following happy result in the words of George Baird.

In his [sc. Eisenman's] hands, this [sc. 'welding' ideas from Tafuri to 'theories of minimalist art practice'] has produced not so much a series of built forms ... but rather a design method that for Eisenman is more important as a process than it is for the architectural products resulting from it.⁶⁹¹

Owing to Tafuri's (outspokenly) Marxist leanings, an architect and his *projects* (if not, as we just learnt, in his built *products*) are deemed 'ethical' (that is, receive the moral thumbs up) if and only if they are politically 'critical' of late Capitalist consumerism (and, as before, what precisely counts as adequately 'critical' is never conceptually nailed down, and the historical phenomenon of 'Capitalist consumerism' is likewise left suggestively open). Complicity with Marxist Anti-Capitalism is the *only* way for architecture to take an ethical stance. Observe for instance how, again according to Baird (*ibid.*),

For Hays, following Tafuri, the paramount exemplar of negation in late Modernism was Mies van der Rohe. Like his mentor, Hays has seen the late Mies as embodying a 'refusal' of the terms of contemporary consumer society in the very surfaces of his built forms. (In this regard, the *Seagram Building* is as important a case study for Hays as it is for Tafuri.)

Baird, who reports this point, endorses it himself elsewhere, when he writes, in his 'Open Letter to [Rem] Koolhaas' (p.30),

I found the trajectory of your published polemics [...] too complicit in the evident 'flows of global capital' to be intellectually or ethically defensible.

Observe how the phrase 'ethically defensible' pops up – and is dropped instantly, because no further gloss, other than the one it receives here, is ever needed to explain its meaning.

More importantly for our purposes is the fleeting (if influential) name dropping of Mies's *Seagram* building by Hays and company at full throttle. For, two questions emerge at this juncture. What, to begin with, does the *Seagram*'s facade have to do with the 'rejection' of late Capitalist consumerism? Can we not here see the legacy of Charles Jencks (§10.4.1), who tried to pin an ideological stance – albeit in his case, a negative one – on Mies's architecture at the flimsiest of pretexts? What, if anything, have we learnt – or do we stand to yet learn – from such feeble attempts to link architectural detail, such as the regularity of composition on a curtain wall, to grand ideological stances like 'Platonist transcendentalism' (Jencks) or 'negation of Capitalism' (Hays) – sorry, 'ethics' – if not that it is highly tendentious, and descriptively

⁶⁹⁰ Krauss (1994).

⁶⁹¹ Baird (2004/2005, 17).

tenuous? Take for instance this gem of architectural analysis, from Hays' interpretation of Mies's *Seagram* building:

the reiterative steel structure mimics anonymous repetition of the assembly line and poses mechanization as another sort of contextual determinant.⁶⁹²

If that is *all* it takes (or requires) for architecture to pose critical commentary on a sociopolitical *status quo*, one wonders what sets the *Seagram* apart from hundred thousands of other buildings employing a 'reiterative steel structure' – and do these all pose a massive assault on Capitalism? If not, why not? If yes, why single out the *Seagram*, and cast Mies as 'paramount exemplar', a moral paragon? As Nerdinger asked (in §10.4.2), 'if we continue arguing in this manner' what stops us from deducing the entire *Capital* of Marx from *any* factory building, irrespective of how it is constructed, detailed, or socioculturally embedded?

Such questions alert us to the considerable compromises on intellectual and interpretative integrity one needs to make even *before* one commits oneself to the leftist ('critical') moral framework from which Hays and company *launch* their moral appraisals. And even then, we need to ask, as recent historians have done, whether their starting point is an apt one.⁶⁹³

After such samplings from contemporary historians of Mies's work, let us conclude by addressing our remaining lead question.

§10.5 THE MORALITY OF MIES?

Recall our lead questions from §10.1. First, can the architecture of Mies van der Rohe be classified as tectonic? Or should it better be regarded as a challenge to the core tenets of the tectonic tradition, tenets outlined in previous chapters? We answered this in §10.3.3. But secondly, on what grounds in specific can Mies's architecture be appraised ethically? And do these 'grounds' ever converge with factors contributing to classifying Mies's work as tectonic?

Recall from CHAPTER 2's framework to appraise moralizations about buildings, two things are crucial – the choice of moral story *M* we seek to tell when appraising the building, and our understanding of the building's compositional properties. As CHAPTER 9 reminded us again, without a proper *calibration* of these two, a moral appraisal might be taken at face value, but cannot be justifiably asserted – the CALIBRATION CHALLENGE.

§10.4's inquiry into contemporary moralizations of Mies's buildings showed the depth to which contemporary Mies scholarship founders on that CALIBRATION CHALLENGE. If, as we saw in §10.2-3, the precise composition of Mies's buildings is not appreciated, §10.4 revealed that the compositional analyses accompanying such moralizations are often missing entirely, or simply so generic as to be useless. In short, the moral glorification or vilification of Mies's buildings in its currently fashionable form is intellectually untenable.

That is not to conclude that Mies's architecture is not morally appraisable, as we saw in §10.4.1 a propos *Lafayette Park*. It just means that the details in Mies's buildings we have to attend to will often go beyond those considered to be tectonically significant (in the sense of §10.3.3), and the moral stories we tell about his buildings, thus individuated, will be less ambitious. Mention of 'Platonism' in particular turned out to be a red herring.

Previous chapters have done much to refine, substantiate, and where necessary add and revise the foundations laid in earlier chapters of a mostly technical nature. It is thus time to take stock and see what these revisions have afforded us, and which questions are still left open. Beyond that, we need to see what our findings enable us to say in response to the problematic statements and cases raised in the PREFACE. I answer these two issues respectively in CHAPTER 11 and the CODA.

⁶⁹² Hays (2007, 278). Hays (1994) runs along the same tracks.

⁶⁹³ Cf. Colquhoun (2002, 179) on the shortcomings of a 'post-modern' reading of the *Seagram* inspired by Rosalind Krauss' work, as Hays' expressly is. Ed Ford has similarly pointed out how, more generally, 'Postmodern criticism [in architecture] is almost devoid of technical commentary' (Ford 1997, viii).

CHAPTER 11

TAKING STOCK

The present chapter takes stock of the net result of this thesis, and pulls together some separate strands of discussion. It also highlights some questions that have been parked until now, and shows which of them have to remain parked, and which of them can be answered, if only in outline.

§11.1 HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES AND MORAL REALISM

What have the preceding chapters yielded in accumulation? It seems we are much clearer now on the *varieties* of constraints that have historically been put forward on the set of properties that should inform architectonic composition. We looked at the comparative merits of these varieties, and the proposals and banners under which they were put forward (with often mixed success). What, if anything, though is the more general result of such efforts at comparative analysis? As signaled in CHAPTER 9, flat out answers on the rightness and wrongness of this or that type of account for Π or \mathcal{M} appear less convincing on their own than in combination with one another. It is easier to say how well calibrated such pairs of accounts are vis-à-vis one another, than they are in isolation. But that raises questions in its own right. Is more substantive, systematic, and conclusive research on individual correctness constraints on Π and \mathcal{M} still possible – or can we already detect the onset of more principled, perhaps insurmountable obstacles?

Relatedly, what does the state of research accomplished by this thesis' conclusion mean for the two-step model itself proposed in CHAPTER 2, and for the moral appraisal of architecture in particular? Specifically, does it not seem that a building's having this or that set of compositional properties is never *flat out* wrong or right, but only *relative to* a certain set of aims as expressed and appraised by some \mathcal{M} ? If so, are all normative statements about buildings hypothetical on and relative to some \mathcal{M} or other, while categorical imperatives on how to design morally remain forever out of our reach? If so, does this mean such imperatives may well exist, but that our capacity to discern them is simply too clouded?

Two points can be made in response. First, Edward Ford has recently proposed a position that embraces this sort of outcome.⁶⁹⁴ On Ford's position, we reject a moral stance for architecture that is either flatly universalist or relativist, and instead view the aesthetic choices architects makes as context-bound as well as having ineliminable moral consequences. More precisely, an architect cannot make choices on and in detailing (and elsewhere) that are not partly attributed to aesthetic preference; and more often than not, architects inform such preferences by context-bound parameters, including which building materials are available, and how much of the interior in particular they want the building exterior to 'express'.⁶⁹⁵ A flat appeal to 'structural honesty' is out, for Ford, given how the complex layering of modern constructions inevitable mean that *some* part of a building's structure gets hidden in the interior.⁶⁹⁶ The very availability of Ford's position could help us appreciate relativity to specific \mathcal{M} 's as something we can embrace morally, instead of seeing as a moral or ethical shortcoming.

Secondly, however, it is important to realize that choices on Π hypothetical on \mathcal{M} and other context-variant features need not amount to a morally 'hypothetical' imperative in the standard sense. For that standard sense makes moral choices contingent on specific elements in agents' 'motivational set', where such a set contains motivational states (desires and interests) that other agents cannot morally required to

⁶⁹⁴ Ford (1997, 353-356), and Ford (1996/21998, ix-xi).

⁶⁹⁵ Ford (1997, 285 and 356).

⁶⁹⁶ Ford (p.c. 25 March 2013), quoted in §10.2.

adopt (canonically, purely prudential concerns).⁶⁹⁷ As long as individual architects' ambitions, as transpiring in context-driven needs and their own moral visions \mathcal{M} , are not contingent on idiosyncratic or purely self-regarding concerns (say, for self-aggrandizement), the hypothetical character of their choices regarding Π does not detract from these choices moral nature.

Independently of how we ultimately understand the relation of dependency that runs from \mathcal{M} to Π , some broader meta-ethical questions remain. In particular, where exactly does CHAPTER 2's two-step model ultimately sit in the meta-ethical landscape? Allegedly, it escaped all sorts of antirealism for its target group of statements ($\forall(b)$), but what about the model's own commitments at the level of its meta-language? Just how realist is it with respect to \mathcal{M} and Π , and the (further types of) norms that are said to constrain either? The thesis pretty regularly dodged the issue of epistemic realism on normative properties, but how long can it afford to postpone the matter? The issue is a pressing one since normative (specifically, moral) realism of any sort is said to incur explanatory costs it cannot cash in, predominantly epistemological ones. Which 'faculty' or cognitive capacity enables us to reliably and (in ideal circumstances) justifiable discern in, and attribute to, buildings the properties that license us to appraise them morally? *Pari passu* for the moral properties thus attributed.

I must confess I have no ready answers to these questions I am sufficiently confident to submit for consideration. Besides, a good many of the questions appear to arise for normative thought and talk quite generally, irrespective of the subject domain. If so, their resolution can be expected to occur, when it does, outside of, rather than as part of progress on, the ethics of architecture. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear to me how deep the realist commitments of my model run at the level of its meta-language constants, that is, regarding the constants in the domains of Π and \mathcal{M} . As long as the model does its explanatory job, it seems secondary, for instance, if these constants are amenable to naturalistic reduction or not. In that sense, commitment to either non- or naturalist moral and aesthetic realism seems not to be an inevitable part of a 'package deal' my model figures in. Much rather, it seems to raise the question just what sorts of package deal my model could figure in before it begins to lose all explanatory power.

§11.2 BEYOND ETHICS, BEYOND KANT

Contemporary analytic philosophy of architecture frequently appears to be in the thrall of a Kantian understanding of architecture. This is historically unsurprising, in that the major breakthroughs in the subdiscipline's pioneering era (1970s and 1980s), few as they are, are owed to researchers with strong Kantian leanings. The present thesis argued, however, that Kant's understanding of architecture is highly defective. It marginalizes attention to built detail, and where it talks about such detail it seems to get it wrong. This is, further, not for coincidental reasons, reasons one could easily extirpate from Kant's broader theoretic commitments. Rather, it seems these commitments generate these results rather tightly: certainly one cannot fault Kant here for failure of consistency or seeing things through to their end.

Reflection on architecture in the early nineteenth century, however, arising from architects rather than aesthetic philosophers shows up some serious issues with this entire framework, specifically its sidelining of 'firmitas' as a core concern in our understanding of architecture. In many areas, not least the aesthetics of architecture, and a proper account of the experiential content when experiencing buildings, remains to be entirely reworked with a firm view to non- or even anti-Kantian alternatives in mind. CHAPTERS 5 and 7 pointed out how to do this, building on the foundations of the largely metaphysical and ethical claims the thesis pursued more directly. However, as was acknowledged there, concrete positions in aesthetics and (also) epistemology of architecture would have to be developed with the same attention to step by step argument afforded elsewhere in this thesis. The result in the long run, it would be hoped, is a fully integrated philosophy of architecture that draws on results in each of its subdisciplines. Indeed, on the

⁶⁹⁷ McDowell (1998a).

approach suggested here, future work on the metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics of architecture all proceed in tandem, and pay close attention to progress in any one of these inquiries. In that regard, the thesis urges for a development towards greater systematicity, and for greater independence of Kantian theoretic commitments than are currently still prevalent in the field. Also, if the 1810s to 1830s are any indicator, philosophers should pay close attention to what is theoretically happening in architectural research, since then as now impetus for much needed correctives could well arise from there. If so, philosophers can only welcome and embrace such input, provided it survives their critical scrutiny.

§11.3 INTRINSIC DUPLICATES: THE ETHICS OF URBANISM AND THE FATE OF REDESCRIPTIVISM

With CHAPTER 9, we began to widen the scope of buildings' compositional properties to encompass not only intrinsic but also relational features of buildings. This made it possible to expand the CHAPTER 2 framework to address the moral specifics that emerge, not so much for buildings individually, as for buildings in relation to one another and built space (especially public space) more generally. By contrast, this mode of expansion was still deemed undesirable and impractical in CHAPTER 2:

I eschew answers on how to expand the [moral] framework to apply to *sets* of buildings, city districts, or even entire urban regions. The analogous challenge to expand, by way of summation as it were, frameworks for the moral appraisal of individual *agents* (or, individual *actions* thereof) to the moral appraisal of *human collectives*, seems just as daunting. (§2.1)

What occasioned the later change of mind was the insight that 'summation' is not the only way to grow the scope of a framework's analytic input outward. If it were the only way, §2.1 would be right that the task is hopeless. For collectives (human or built) cannot be appraised by simply lining them (specifically, the intrinsic properties they enjoy in isolation from one another) up for appraisal. But that is not how political philosophy normatively appraises *human* collective structures anyway. It rather focuses on the *relations* that particular configurations or constitutions hardwire into the dealings of people with one another – in short, it focuses on people's relational features. Just so, CHAPTER 9 argued, we have to recognize an additional *type* of property relevant to the moral appraisal of buildings – their relational features.

In CHAPTER 10 I further pointed out how, within that type, there is still room for discrepancies in *scale*, as when we discussed the relational features the buildings in *Lafayette Park* at Detroit have (1) *to one another* within a single neighbourhood grouping, then (2) in relation to other such neighbourhood groups, and finally, (3) in relation to the wider urban development that took place in Detroit at the time. What is missing from these points, however, is a philosophically rigorous inquiry into the proper individuation of these scope-shifting relational properties of buildings, of the variety the present work offered for Π at a more local (intrinsic) level. Only that in place can we begin to formulate a convincing ethics for urbanism. The significant advantage of such an undertaking, however, would be to integrate the ethical goals and means of urbanism and architecture, when much in the current literature leaves the two domains of practice and their values at a mutual loss.⁶⁹⁸ Moreover, we could then see at a greater level of detail how local compositional choices impact larger moral aims, and how, given the context, one would calibrate these two vis-à-vis one another. Semper's decision, discussed in CHAPTER 9, to compromise the architectural merit of his buildings at their intrinsic level to make room for contextual considerations – such as urban vistas onto other buildings – highlights how these different types of properties and the value considerations they give rise to interact. As before, this needs to be systematized in the manner this thesis showed – by equal sensitivity to empirical precedent and theoretical generality.

A related issue introduced in §9.4 concerns the proper relation of intrinsic to relational features of buildings, and indeed the question how getting this right matters for the development of an ethics of

⁶⁹⁸ I discuss this further in my (2014).

architecture. The reason this matters points us right back to the INTRODUCTION, where I discussed so-called redescriptive strategies to the moral appraisal of architecture. Such strategies treat buildings as the context for someone or something else's moral appraisal, but do not regard buildings as direct recipients of such appraisals themselves. Moreover, in cases where buildings literally features as the mere background or site of something else's moral appraisal, they appear to be entirely exchangeable, in that the original moral appraisal is unaffected by exchanging the building with another one. I said, moreover,

I have considerable sympathy with such redescriptive tendencies. That is, a large number of scenarios where moral talk attaches to buildings can be arguably disarmed, and subsequently analysed, in the manners [recommended by redescriptivism] – that is, as metaphorical, or in pragmatic terms on an instrumental or context-driven elaboration. Moreover, in such cases these strategies of restatement genuinely clarify what otherwise seem philosophically, not to mention morally, problematic statements. (INTRODUCTION)

I also deferred readers at that point to the present chapter for a reappraisal of such strategies' merit. We now have to take stock on where such redescriptive frameworks make sense, where they don't work, and where they need to be informed by the FACE VALUE TREATMENT championed in CHAPTER 2. And this is where the issues introduced in §9.4 are directly relevant.

To see this, consider a scenario of intrinsic duplicates in divergent contexts, such as (give or take a few details) the 1990 duplication of Rome's *St Peter's Dome* at Yamoussoukro in Ivory Coast, the *Basilique Notre-Dame de la Paix* (which allegedly cost over \$300 mio.). In actual fact, the latter diverges on some details such as dome height and the size of the ornamental cross, but let us bracket that for argument's sake. The idea then is that the two buildings agree with respect to intrinsic properties, but differ in their relational ones. This precisely raises the issue of a building's fit with its immediate environment that CHAPTER 9 raised. In one respect, one can raise the issue in terms of fit of scale, where that pertains both to the size of the building's footprint (for instance, does it take up too much space on too small a plot of land?) and its massing or 'bulkiness'. An envisaged building could feature massing and façade detailing (such as being clad in dark stone) that would be entirely appropriate for (or at least, not cause offense in) an out of town location, but could easily cause much public disturbance and debate if it were located in the heart of town, immediately bordering its historic district.⁶⁹⁹ Just so, the *Basilique Notre-Dame de la Paix* raises questions of propriety that seem to go beyond its intrinsic features considered in isolation – for otherwise such questions would arise for the 'original' in the Vatican just as much, but the suggestion (at least, for now) is that they do not.

The example of intrinsic duplicates is highly relevant to revisiting the merits of redescriptivist strategies, precisely because (in some of its forms) the example appears to invite us to focus on the appraisal of a building's context rather than the building itself. In cases where intrinsic duplicates give rise to divergent moral appraisals, it thus appears that context-driven variants of redescriptivism seem mandated. Or do they?

On reflection, they do not. What matters is precisely the *interaction* of a building, and its own intrinsic features, with its context. It is precisely the *same set* of compositional properties that seem architecturally appropriate in one context but not another. Such propriety, this thesis argued, is shot through with moral considerations. And we have no chance to properly locate and justify such moral considerations unless we partly root them in (that is, justify and explain them with reference to) buildings' intrinsic properties. That, precisely, is the oversight of a context-driven redescriptive strategy, which does not actually yield a proper delineation of built context. The strategy needs to be revised in light of considerations elicited by the FACE VALUE TREATMENT, just as the latter benefited by enriching its scope of attendance to relational

⁶⁹⁹ This is inspired by a real life example I worked on with the city's historic district commission in 2013: the student housing at 413 East Huron Drive at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

features. As before, more robustly developed variants of alternatives to the FACE VALUE TREATMENT will have to inherit at least some of its theoretic features.

More particularly, in some cases the correct solution to a mismatch of intrinsic with relational properties is to adjust the former, as Semper did with his 1838 gallery design, by adjusting the central copula to open up urban vistas (CHAPTER 9). Just so, on the proposition that one were to rebuild *St Peter's Dome* in the heart of Amsterdam, the scenario already looks less offensive and less crass if the proposed design featured adjustments to the scale and building materials of the original to better fit the new local context. Taking a leaf from Berlage's *Stock Exchange*, a Rome-type basilica in Amsterdam could scale down the massive dome, and replace some of the ostentatious marble masonry with the red brick construction that typifies other parts of the city. Significantly, Berlage's building is itself oriented on then contemporary church design, on then as now locally prevalent norms of sacred architecture.⁷⁰⁰ Hence the suggested change of materials would resonate both with other historic landmarks and such norms more generally.

While this hypothetical example need not convince at the level of detail, it brings out the salient issue – and that is, the proper relation of a building's typology and construction materials to site-sensitivity. As indicated in CHAPTER 9, interaction between these factors need not always be harmonious, or conform to existing structures and norms. At times, a building can be morally just as effective and defensible by building up potential for aesthetic and functional contrast. But even in such cases, the correct type of deliberation on how to design properly would be rooted precisely in regard for the proper relations among the aforementioned factors. Which ever stance a design finally takes, it needs to reflect on how typology in the widest sense interacts with considerations of *firmitas* and considerations of context, to issue in a reflection on 'social type' and a set of moral and societal ends that the compositional means help to attain. If the latter raises some sharp questions (to which we turn next), future research needs to develop a more rigorous delineation of context, type, and social function – for that way lies an ethics of urban designs. In that attention to building's intrinsic compositional properties is, the present work argued, *indispensable* to understanding any of the factors thus delineated, the present thesis has provided an important groundwork to inform such future studies and helps root it in a firmer understanding of architecture.

§11.4 LIMITS OF MEANS, LIMITS OF ENDS

A dominant theme in CHAPTERS 8-10 was the mutual calibration of architectural 'means' with moral 'ends'.⁷⁰¹ We met with Semper's affirmation to use 'any permissible means at his disposal' in CHAPTER 9, and German modernists like Mies were likewise characterized 'to contribute, with all means at their disposal, to drawing forth new ways of human sociability' (Tegethoff, *apud* §10.1). (As CHAPTER 10 explained, the notion itself harkens back to Vitruvius's own ethics of architecture sketched in §3.4.) An ethics of architecture, then, would have strong repercussion for an ethics of architects in one sense. Architects need to be mindful of *which* means they enlist to attain *which* ends. In order to accomplish some ends, we learnt in CHAPTER 10, the means hitherto at one's disposal might have to be revised. In other cases, one needs to scale back from one's ambitions, and rethink whether certain set goals are in actual fact attainable – thus, prudentially desirable. As elsewhere in ethics, 'ought' presupposes 'can', and thus a proper understanding of the 'can' is decisive in realizing and understanding one's real moral imperatives (that is, a subset thereof legitimately leveled at oneself).

The question arises particularly sharply for one specific example from the PREFACE we shall return to in the CODA. For we must ask: how seriously can we take the moral claims of architects to improve on the 'quality of life' of inmates and staff, when all they apparently occasion is a change to surface features, but nothing more profound? On the presupposition that a core part of what architects *do* is design buildings,

⁷⁰⁰ The original type 'basilica' was a building for commerce, for instance the basilica of Maxentius on the Forum in Rome and the basilica of Constantine (the only one that has survived intact) in the German city of Trier. – Thanks to Maarten Franssen for these references.

⁷⁰¹ I owe the suggestion to cast the overall issue in those terms to Michiel Riedijk.

that is, see to it that fairly large artefacts end up with specific properties, are these properties morally appraisable? (For if they are, then architectural work is morally appraisable certainly in one sense: with respect to its built output. If they are not, then a core part of architectural work operates, and should be permitted to operate, in a morally unrestrained way, and certain moral expectations leveled by society and the profession at architectural practice turn out to be unfounded.)

The framework articulated in CHAPTER 2 and refined in CHAPTERS 8-10 equips us with a more reliable response to this scenario. First, before we begin to appraise the moral quality of the clinic, we would require a much fuller account of its compositional features – intrinsic and relational, and then (also) aetiologically sensitive. For, if the question is whether the new condition is a considerable improvement on the previous situation, we need to understand the causal-historical context bearing on present compositional choices. (As Loos once put it, a change that is not an improvement is a deterioration.) Next, we would need to refine or replace the statements on the moral ends volunteered by the firm with something that is at once more definite and homes in on actual detail in the composition. For instance, which colour in particular is claimed to have which psychophysical effect? Can we develop a causal profile for the properties (of colour and otherwise) affected by design, and then align them with the moral ambitions claimed for the design? Once these factors are decided, we can proceed to an assessment of the design's actual accomplishments, and (very likely) may have to tone down the moral claims alleged here. I also argued in §1.6, however, that contemporary ethics of architecture does not (yet) afford us the conceptual tools to enable rigorous inquiry of this type of psychological impact. Our understanding of architecture's 'means', then, still requires massive amounts of research, drawn from various disciplines. I return to this set of issues in the CODA, §C.3.

An even trickier question, however, is the following. If architecture is severely limited in its means, is it alright to resign architects to moderate *ends*? Suppose architecture does not manage to intervene at much more than affecting changes in surface features, such as changing the colour of carpets and curtains in a forensic clinic. Is it good that architecture does not intervene at a more profound level than that, or is this precisely what is wrong with architecture?

We have seen since that architects can affect a great deal more than mere change in 'surface features'. By CHAPTER 9 we have seen how architects can play a key role in the reworking of urban environment, always on the understanding that they are not autonomous agents but operate in a field with many agents. The means of architects, then, are delimited, both in a *de facto* sense (how much they can affect at the level of composition) and a *de jure* sense (by how much the freedom and rights of other agents put limits on their compositions' intervention). What we need most, perhaps, is to rethink these limitations in light of contemporary practice and requirements, just as a reflection on contemporary limits could occasion *concrete* proposals on how to push these limits beyond their contemporary position. I expect, indeed hope, that many readers will be provoked to disagree with the present work's core conceits about such issues, and that the reasons behind such disagreements push us towards a clearer understanding, not just of where architecture is, but where it should be going.

It may well be that there is a great deal more that architecture can accomplish, and that we likely are only at an intermediate stage in our understanding of what materials and construction techniques can bring about, in impacting the livelihood of the built and natural environment. If so, the current thesis should be regarded as an interim report, a taking stock of where things mostly stand at the moment, and with it being left to future generations of architects to rethink the means and ends of their discipline. In any such scenario, however, it also seems that the core stance this thesis pushed for in its INTRODUCTION – that architecture would always have to 'come first' – is required, to properly assess the future potential of architectonic compositional intervention, in its relation to such wider concerns. As before, extending the present framework to address the impact of architectural production at a global scale for instance means that we have to rethink its compositional properties and their causal profiles involved, and rethink how they interact relationally (with one another and a wide swath of outside factors) rather than by summation.

§11.5 LIMITS OF METHOD, LIMITS OF SCOPE

On the architecture side, my thesis leaves a lot of things unaddressed. While its ambition is not that of a historical project, I heavily relied on the relevance of historical data to my undertaking. This raises a set of questions in its own right, namely of how we work with these data, and how we select them.

As to the first issue, §10.4 showed some moral appraisals of Mies van der Rohe's architecture to be on shaky grounds precisely for methodologically defective use and representation of data. A major lesson unearthed from that discussion was to ward off premature generalizations based on insufficient data. In that regard, other parts of the thesis hoped to attain a greater degree of attention to built detail, and only then venture towards moral appraisal of the buildings these details belong to. This raises the issue of just how much detail, in general, is required before moral appraisal can take place – the thesis seemed to evade this question, and rather operate in extremes (at the one end, Jencks with his entire disregard for built detail, and the other, analysis of how one brick engages another in the works of Mies and Semper). This issue certainly requires greater systematic attention.

Furthermore, in saddling built works and their architects with a particular outlook, §10.4 argued that claims on one philosopher (ethicist) 'influencing' the thought of a specific architect is quite hard to verify. And yet this thesis frequently teetered on the edge of claims of spurious correlations. CHAPTER 7 claimed that the German 'tectonic' tradition took its appreciation for the need of clearly demarcated compositional parts from Schopenhauer's principle of separate articulation (*Aussonderung*). And yet, alternative explanations are possible – for instance, by reference to the use of *membrae* (in Boetticher) as rooted in that of Quintilian, with the term's getting shifted (or ported over) from rhetoric to architecture. Like a speech, a built object can be considered a purposive unit where each part contributes towards serving some one end. In that regard, architects reading rhetoric manuals seems more likely than them reading Schopenhauer. On that very note, however, CHAPTER 3 argued that Vitruvius read Cicero, given a couple of verbal echoes here or there. But what hard evidence do we have? In such moments, my thesis seems to commit the type of spurious historical correlations that §10.4 outlined is highly dubious. If so, this would require that the current claims are juxtaposed to more careful attempts to trace the genealogy of particular ideas, to the extent it is possible to improve my account on such lines at all – perhaps all we can do is forego the temptation to pursue such attempts at all.

Second, there is the question of selection of data. My thesis features a drastic jump in its time line, moving from late Republican Rome to the late eighteenth century with barely a nod to the intervening centuries. At the very least, greater attention to architectural reflection in the Renaissance and Baroque (not to mention Romanesque and Gothic) eras seems to be required for us to have sufficient data to hand on the comparative merits of various proposals on how to constrain Π and \mathcal{M} and their interrelation. We may expect significant contributions by paying attention to the Aristotelian and Platonist background that informs the contributions of Alberti, Palladio, and Barbaro in particular. Recent work has done much to unearth the idiosyncrasies that accrue, from their handbooks, for the perception of architecture in particular. If so, tapping into that material, and working out its metaphysical and epistemic presuppositions, could do much to alleviate some of the questions the above left wide open.

Closer to our own time, I suspect that further research on the intricate writings and buildings by Otto Wagner and Adolf Loos, and the philosophical developments that took place in their own life time at Vienna and Graz, would unearth substantive insights on how to push Semper's immense ethical ambitions for architecture further. In more recent years, one could profitably scrutinize the built and written work of Hans Hollein and Jim Stirling for its potential to probe Semper's insights further, in particular, his commitment to 'cladding' buildings appropriately, his interest in museum architecture, and his concern for urban ensembles. Stirling's work at Stuttgart, and Hollein's efforts at Vienna would both make pristine study cases, the result of which could well be that their categorization as 'post-modern' has to be

revised,⁷⁰² and their debt to classical and modernist thought is brought out more strongly and consistently than suggested in recent years. Wagner, Loos, Hollein, and Stirling all seem to take up the full ambitions Semper seems to have bequeathed on the discipline, where the more canonical architects in the modernist era, to which this thesis gave pride of place, appear by comparison austere or even unconvincing – and that is significant in that much of contemporary building remains highly indebted to the precepts established in that era, by its spear head figures Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier, and how ill defined the moral dimension of architectonic composition remains, especially in Le Corbusier’s work.

It appears, with regard to many issues, that the modernist revolution in architectural compositionality has so far, hundred years on, failed to materialize in a genuine (or at least genuinely compelling) shift in our moral, metaphysical, and epistemological understanding of architecture. Least of all do we have any robust frameworks to understand just what, if anything, sets contemporary efforts in architectural composition apart from earlier eras. If anything, recent decades have alerted us to a widening gap between theory and practice, owing to a theory wishing to radically transform contemporary building practice before it has even begun to develop tools adequately describing and diagnosing such practice, in all its varieties around the globe today.

Having raised such wide ranging questions for future avenues of research, it behooves us to return to the outset of this journey – a set of troublesome statements about architecture we first encountered in the PREFACE. What of their fate now? This is the question the CODA shall wrestle with.

⁷⁰² Contrast Krämer (1998) with Riedijk (2009). Riedijk brings out particularly strongly the tempered debts in Stirling’s compositionality to Beaux-Arts design principles, some of which could be revisited in light of CHAPTER 6’s discussion. On the whole, the present thesis’ enterprise could be considerably refined by paying greater attention to the French and British (!) tradition in architectural reflection.

CODA

RESPONSIBLE MORALIZATION

At the close of this work, it behooves us to return to our opening examples and ask what has been accomplished by the theoretic work in the copious discussion of the intervening chapters. In the main, we have seen that an evaluation of buildings' moralization has to pertain to building's compositional features, where these are individuated according to the TRIAD VALUES made famous by Vitruvius. That is, to appraise a building morally, we need to morally appraise its compositional properties, and to properly individuate those properties, we need to look at how a building's aesthetic merits arise from how its constructional features account for its function. It is in the interaction of these three types of properties – aesthetic, constructional, and functional – and not in their isolated occurrence that we can discern the actual merits and demerits of buildings, and where any moralization of either has to begin and end. Relatedly, the CODA will argue that the net results of the present work provide the groundwork for future work on many foundational and applied issues in the ethics and, indeed, the philosophy of architecture.

I begin by reminding readers of the PREFACE'S sample statements.

- (1) 'This building is insane (or sick).'
- (2) 'This building mutilates the city.'
- (3) 'This building is the most civilized one of that era.'
- (4) 'This building obscures prerequisites of an open society.'
- (5) 'This building expresses the family life and its values.'
- (6) 'This building embodies values of rationality and calm character.'
- (7) 'Fascist buildings convey a sense of authoritarian attitude.'
- (8) 'This building is politically friendly.'
- (9) 'This building is a built realization of a concept – to find a balance between security and well being.'
- (10) 'This building raises the quality of life for its tenants.'
- (11) 'This building is evil.'

§C.1 ZIMMERMAN HOUSE

Some of the moralizations we encountered in the PREFACE have since been debunked, as inadequately rationalized under such standards. Thus, in CHAPTER 1 we saw that accounting for the moral quality of Frank Lloyd Wright's *Zimmerman House* fails, as long as we stick to attributions of symbolism. Such attributions are, in their currently developed form, not adequately accounted for, both inherently (they rely on shoddy philosophy of language), and contextually, in that they interact rather poorly with buildings' actual compositional features. Certainly much work remains to be done if the recent resurgence of symbolic readings of buildings is to attain relevance to the ethics of architecture.⁷⁰³

§C.2 LAFAYETTE PARK

In a similar manner, CHAPTER 10 looked at the moralization of Mies's *Lafayette Park*, and teased out separate (especially moral) varieties of Platonism. A proper delineation of *Lafayette Park*'s compositional features, both intrinsic and relational, revealed the lack of any meaningful intersection with the type of values (or vices) critics associate with 'Platonism'. A moralization of the design on such grounds, then, fails the CALIBRATION CHALLENGE – the challenge of calibrating compositional features with attempts at moralizing the buildings these are compositional features of. The building, however, did merit a moral

⁷⁰³ For a similar point, see Spector (2014, 124).

appraisal of others sorts, owing to its sensitive balancing of moral considerations pertaining to safety, privacy, and more. This shows that the adequacy of a building's moral appraisal relies of course on which variety of appraisal is attempted, and on its being well grounded in the features buildings actually have. To the extent *Lafayette Park* is moralized as 'Platonist', the sentiments behind such moralizations are likely better described as (that is, redescribed) as attaching to the architect's personality or political outlook, rather than the built artifact. The merits of such moral appraisals – that of architects – however, is a separate matter, one that the thesis largely avoided, and where extant work by others (referred to in CHAPTER 1) may provide us with a way forward, where necessary. It is a virtue of my CHAPTER 2 framework that it provides precisely demarcated conditions for when a building rather than its architect or wider context is appraised – and conditions when that is not the case, and issues of an altogether different nature are raised and need engaging.

§C.3 FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC

If we then attend to the forensic clinic by Nickl und Partner, nothing short of a full blown Vitruvian inquiry into its composition can conclusively validate or falsify the claims the firm attests for its design. Such an inquiry has to begin with the published documents the firm affords the public, and here we can see how some hurdles one faces are not moral or metaphysical, but rather epistemic. Consider the floor plan and section of the building (in Fig. C.1.) which, if CHAPTER 3 is on the right track, communicates the building's compositional properties salient for its moral appraisal.




Fig. C.1 (previous page) Nickl und Partner, *Forensische Psychiatrie*, Bezirkskrankenhaus Gabersee, DE (completed in 2006), floor plan. - Source: Nickl-Weiler and Nickl (2009, 118)

To help us fully understand the building's actual accomplishments, we would require the floor plan to indicate the functionality of each spatial element, indicate how the privacy and security of the staff and inmates are respectively afforded, and how – for instance – the door system manages to both protect the staff but not undermine the atmosphere of the building by being too 'prison like'. The floor plan, however, does nothing of the sort. It is offered in far too small and far too coarse-grained a format, and most importantly, it eliminates all detail on where the door system is located (let alone, how it works). Hence, the required information to conclusively validate *or invalidate* the appraisal is removed from sight – literally. The section and elevation (fig. C.2) do not alter this in the least. At most the architects' own statement that,

The size of the patients' rooms has been kept to a minimum, in order to optimize the spacious common room.⁷⁰⁴

indicates a stance of functional allocation and prioritization that is roughly discernible from the floor plan. But other details remain illegible.

The attempt to attain any additional information, at this point, would likely violate considerations of client confidentiality, specifically to inspect and assess the building's security concept. The general point pertains to any commission of high security buildings like banks and prisons, which cannot disclose certain details to the public inquirer. Having personally worked on a forensic clinic (for the *Isar-Amper-Klinikum* outside Munich) at this very firm only four years later (2010), I can attest that all those directly responsible in the production of such designs are under legal obligation of non-disclosure for such reasons (myself included). The only publically accessible information relates to the building's commission, not to its realization:

Das Isar-Amper-Klinikum gemeinnützige GmbH beabsichtigt die Errichtung zweier forensischer Krankenstationen der Sicherungsstufe B mit 44 vollstationären Betten und Ergotherapiebereichen. Hierfür soll das Haus 21 im Klinikum München-Ost (Baujahr 1905) gemäß einer bereits vorhandenen und genehmigten Bau- und Ausstattungsplanung generalsaniert werden (Leistungsphasen 5-9). Der Umbau umfasst 4.395 m² BGF bei 17 170 m³ BRI. Die Nutzfläche beträgt 2 088 m². Das freistehende, u-förmige Haus 21 (Grundfläche 1 497 m²) mit zwei Vollgeschossen, einem Keller- und einem Dachgeschoss, das zum Teil ausgebaut werden soll, ist Teil des denkmalgeschützten Ensembles im Klinikum München-Ost in Haar.⁷⁰⁵

Observe the highly abstract, because generic, nature of these data. The square footage indicates the area for *all* of the building's functionalities, and gives no indication to allocate them (let alone, what a sensitive allocation would consist in). The security demands indicate a very broad level, referenced as 'B', which again leaves it at the firm's discretion how to locate such security demands against the broader considerations (most of them omitted here) of the assignment. It is fair to say that any moral appraisal of a building at this site, then, has to arise from factors that explicitly and significantly go beyond what is prescribed in the commission, just as my framework prescribes. I call this out explicitly, because our next example (§C.4) is going to see this reversed, in a morally significant way.

⁷⁰⁴ Nickl-Weiler and Nickl (2009, 116): 'Die Flächen der Patientenzimmer wurden zugunsten einer großzügigen Aufenthaltszone auf das Notwendige beschränkt.'

⁷⁰⁵ This information was released for instance at, <http://www.competitiononline.com/de/ergebnisse/14771>.




Fig. C.2 Nickl und Partner, *Forensische Psychiatrie*, Bezirkskrankenhaus Gabersee, DE (compl. 2006), section along axis '1-1' (Fig. C.1) and elevation of eastern view. - Source: Nickl-Weiler and Nickl (2009, 119)

Other than lack of public information, or my own limitation to draw on and publicize information I remain under an NDA, I can also attest that even *during* the time of working on just such a project, none of the information at my disposal at all recorded how certain design considerations or attestations 'translate' into the building's actual composition. All *internal* records on this building are destroyed after ten years, and none of the documentation the firm accumulates within this time frame goes beyond recording *design outputs* and *contracting details*, neither of which gives an outside inquirer – even one who had legitimate access to it – *any* clue as to the firm's moral thinking about the project at the time. The lack for such documentation feeds right into a lack of accountability, and underscores how society does not expect the same sort of answerability that other professions have to meet. (I have in mind here the extensive electronic self-documentation systems that hospital nurses and doctors are required to operate.)

But let us ignore any *retained* information either, irrespective of its public inaccessibility and incompleteness. Any formal or informal conversations I had with colleagues during that project failed to reveal just how exactly, for instance, the building's interior colour scheme (hardly a matter of excessive confidentiality) precisely affords 'a heightened living quality'. At this point, project architects typically defer to broad type of generalization that CHAPTER 1 found wanting. There is a broad but empirically untested sense in which certain aesthetic qualities are said to have a certain *psychological impact* on people across the board (so, irrespective of subjective differences in (chromatic and other) sensitivity and reaction across a population), and given that impact, these qualities are then morally appraisable. The very two architects leading the firm themselves publish regularly on hospital architecture, a field that has at least shown a growing interest in 'evidence based design',⁷⁰⁶ and have just finished a joint monograph entitled *Healing Architecture*.⁷⁰⁷ Whether such research bears out the sought after data – that is, the correlations of aesthetic with psychological and moral qualities – or either fails on grounds of empirical inadequacy and/or conceptually mistaken assumptions (such as, psychophysical determinism, not to mention psycho-

⁷⁰⁶ See the publications of Roger S. Ulrich in particular. Ulrich has recently founded the *Center for Healthcare Building Research* at Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden, and TU Delft has likewise nominated a new chair for Healthcare architecture in 2014 (Cor Wagenaar).

⁷⁰⁷ Nickl-Weiler and Nickl (2013).

moral determinism), remains to be seen, and is most certainly an area that requires intense future scrutiny to sustain the moral expectations legitimately leveled at such projects.

But speaking for the present, a full moral appraisal of the forensic clinic – or, indeed, a full blown evaluation of extant moral appraisals of the building – is *epistemically* out of our reach. Precisely because the previous eleven chapters have shown us what kind of *data* we need, and how to *parse* such data, to arrive at statements like, ‘this building raises the life quality of its tenants’, or ‘this building balances values like...’, we can now point very concretely at the *epistemic shortcomings* in some segments of contemporary architectural practice. We can now say that the project’s presentation in the architects’ very own publication features *mere juxtaposition* in the sense given in the INTRODUCTION. There is a juxtaposition of moral with compositional claims, but the nature of the relation between them is not adequately explained, and in fact glossed over by the actual (verbal and visual) data provided. This in itself is morally irresponsible, since the architects help themselves to a moral justification their design – in its current presentation – does not merit. We can then say that of the following two statements, (N1) ‘This building *C* raises the quality of life for its tenants.’ and (N2) ‘The architects of *C* are morally justified to claim N1 and publish themselves as claiming N1.’, the truth value of N1 is underdetermined and that of N2 is provably false. The clinic’s architects are not justified, and their insistence in propagating N2 risks implicating them not just in epistemic but moral fault.

§C.4 SPUIFORUM

Attending to NeutelingsRiedijk’s *SpuiForum* project, we need to likewise query whether the building’s actual composition merits its being labeled as ‘insane’. There is much one could say about the building – about its allocation of spaces to specific functionalities, and how that allocation accords prominence to some spaces over others, in for instance featuring a small and negligible *foyer* that recalls the quick transit area of a shopping mall (with its upwards movement to a definite destination) much rather than the public meeting spaces in the opera houses of old, designed to give exposure to a public celebrating a shared cultural life. One could also attend to the building’s economy of means in its consistent width across three floors, that allow all three major bays to interlock in a frame of persistent width. The building’s axial orientation, moreover, facilitates not only access to extant underground parking facilities, but also connects to transit and transportation points without requiring a costly or clumsy alteration of the current urban layout. The indented façade, finally, helps to retain certain lines of sight to important architectural points of orientation, such as the Old Church (*Oude Kerk*).

None of these details, however, seem to justify the moral critique of the building, and inquiring into the misgivings that brought that critique on in the first place, one realizes that the critique never meant to attach to the specific compositional details at all. Rather, the protest arises from a misgiving over the projected *cost* of the area’s rebuilding in a time of (it is alleged) financial crisis. When Fig. P.1 in the PREFACE literally says that the current outline, with no rebuilding, is ‘cheap’ (*goedkoop*), that is the actual morality between the exclamation ‘*SpuiForum? Insane!*’.⁷⁰⁸ There is a perceived discrepancy or lack of proportionality between, on the one hand, the city’s budget and, on the other, the commission itself *however that commission is realized* in built form. That is, the *only* pertinent features relevant to the project’s moral critique are the building’s footprint, its (vertical) massing, its siting, and its cost. And these are fairly broad parameters circumscribed nearly entirely, not by an actual design for the commission like NeutelingsRiedijk’s, but by the commission. The moral fault, then, lies not with the building, but with its commission, and the statement that the *SpuiForum* building is itself ‘sick’ is not just short hand for the moralization of the design’s architects, or for a non-moral statement about their building. It is literally a moral statement directed at a building *outline*. Any building, irrespective of its more detailed compositional

⁷⁰⁸ Lootsma (2000, 15) detects a similar sentiment more widely in the production and debate of modern Dutch architecture, as in Berlage’s injunction to ‘strive to achieve the most with the least means’; he relates it to the culture’s Calvinist leanings (as isolated by Schama 1987).

features, on this view merits moral condemnation if it shares with the *SpuiForum* the following set of features: massing, footprint, siting, location. Speaking figuratively, one could even say that the *SpuiForum* was simply the right building at the wrong place, and that its design is not so much a poor fit for the urban environment, but that its design is a poor fit (in the eyes of some) for the commission *for the sole reason of complying to the commission*. This case, then, differs strongly from that encountered in §11.3, where we could still insist on a properly made fit between a building's intrinsic and relational features. When it comes to the *SpuiForum*, the building's intrinsic features matter no longer, only its relational ones do. And that, I would say, licenses us to say that the resulting moralization is no longer *of that particular building*. How precisely we characterize the target of the (only) valid moralization that remains behind – a 'building schema', for instance – is inessential. What gets moralized here is not a building, but the intended spatial 'gap' (or its creation) into which a building is to be inserted.

As with the forensic clinic, our framework revealed the precise reasons why an attempted moralization of a building has to be re-directed. Irrespective of whether the moral misgivings about public expenditure are warranted or not – and that matter merits investigation in its own right – it is an epistemic error to foist such misgivings on buildings in cases like this one. The very precise delineation of compositional features, and its subcategorization into the intrinsic and the relational, together with (thirdly) an insistence that relational features are only relevant when they interact with intrinsic ones, have together afforded us a reason to discern the actual justificatory status of the *SpuiForum*'s moralization. If the building has any moral faults, its current critique has not yet homed in on them. Even so, two weeks before this thesis went to print (early July 2014), the *SpuiForum* was finally canned. What, if anything, this says about the moral integrity of public discussion immediately preceding this decision is a delicate question.

§C.5 AL WAKRAH STADIUM

This brings us finally to Zaha Hadid's stadium in Qatar.⁷⁰⁹ As we saw, Hadid's own disavowal of responsibility over 800 casualties met both with moral approval and critique. A proper response to either, I would suggest, has to home in on her phrase, 'my duty as an architect', that opens her disavowal. There are systematic approaches of testing statements where professionals adopt or reject certain forms of responsibility. We have to ask, in particular, on whose behalf they voice such claims, and in what role. This is called role responsibility. One and the same person could easily be confronted with conflicting, or at least non-overlapping, sets of responsibilities. (Imagine a judge or policeman faced with a junior delinquent who is also his child.) This appears to certainly apply to Hadid who is certainly not just 'an architect', let alone (as one commentator had it), 'a designer'. Hadid is also the CEO of a company, a company that bears her name. Arguably, that company employs the on-site architects supervising construction. Likely, her company, in Zaha Hadid's name, signed over the commission in the first place. It is unlikely the company was entirely unaware of the labour condition in the target area. (If they were, that would be a cognitive and moral failing in its own right.) Hence, Hadid is certainly right that in her capacity *as a designer* the specifics of how labourers fare at a construction site for a Hadid design is beyond her responsibility. That is correct because the role responsibility of designers does not typically go so far, except to ensure – as one of the commentators pointed out – that the design meets basic requirements of health and safety (such as, compliance with fire codes and static stability). But as was just pointed out, Hadid is a great deal more than just a designer. She owns a company and employs people. As a CEO she is responsible for the choices her firm makes. It would be surprising if her firm accepted a commission of such a scale behind her back. In any case, it seems clear enough that she was aware of the commission – after all, she designed for it. Whence, then, this surprise to be held complicit with the moral failure of her firm at the site?

⁷⁰⁹ A fuller version of the following has been published as (Koller 2014b).

It is idle to speculate on other people's reasons, not only because they remain largely inaccessible, epistemically speaking. Our issue is not one person's particular psychology, or even their moral outlook. What seems at stake here is an interesting fragmentation of an architect's capacity and labour output into neatly categorized roles that are not supposed to interrelate at all – in the Biblical sense of, 'Do not let the left hand know what the right hand does.' Bizarrely, Hadid-the-designer has no knowledge of, and feels no responsibility for, the actions by Hadid-the-CEO, and vice versa. Or again, neither persona feels particularly moved by decisions taking place in and affecting local site supervision, and local labourers. This type of insulation from wider concerns was given striking articulation in Hannah Arendt's discussion of Eichmann.⁷¹⁰ Eichmann saw to it that the Nazi trains ran on time – among other things, to their destination at the concentration camps. When interrogated in Jerusalem, Eichmann claimed to have been ignorant of what happened once the Jewish passengers reached their destination – for that, Eichmann said, was not his responsibility. Eichmann voiced a clear stance on the limits of his own role responsibility, and the stance is internally consistent. Where it falls down, however, is in its measuring up to what society feels it can expect of people operating in positions that affect the livelihood of others. Arguably, Hadid is no Eichmann. Still, 800 people are dead now, and no one feels particularly responsible. Certainly Hadid-the-CEO has not deigned to speak up publically yet.

How, then, would one recover a broader and unfragmented sense of its responsibilities? For one, by being aware of what it means to design in the first place. If a student designs a building as part of a studio exercise, that seems to be a morally neutral space as far as it goes. If, however, the studio instructor announced that the best design of that semester's studio were to be realized in Qatar, suddenly the stakes have shifted. Then it is no longer alright to just design 'out of the blue' and with no regard to consequences. Just in this sense, architects may want to rethink the precise relation of design to construction, depending on context, but also more generally. This, after all, is what one of Hadid's commentators focused on in airing,

[T]his is a truly appalling attitude. Good safety starts with good design. If architects are not thinking about constructability and safety in implementation [then] they are simply poor architects.⁷¹¹

As we saw in CHAPTERS 6, 8, 9, and 10, there is a rich tradition in architecture of discussing the precise relation of construction to design, going from the extreme separation of the two in Le Corbusier's 1920s writings, to architects like Mies van der Rohe for whom all architectonic composition is ultimately grounded in and answerable to its own built realization (see also the argumentation in §4.3). This is a fairly familiar opposition within the discipline. What is less familiar, arguably, is that the opposition is not simply aesthetic but also moral. If we recall the RECIPROCITY THESIS of CHAPTER 3, in particular, we can see how Hadid's tacit attempt to tease out aesthetic from constructional considerations relies on a faulty view of what architectonic composition itself consists in. It is not so much faulty in the sense of being *obviously false* (in the manner a self-contradictory or self-refuting statement is), but as we saw in CHAPTER 6, arguments to sustain such an outlook are hardly ever conclusive, and sometimes even demonstrably false. Once we add the essentialist premise that (good) architecture, or a correct understanding of architecture, requires the subscription to the RECIPROCITY THESIS, the very premise on which Hadid excuses her moral complacency evaporates. And this underscores the tight relation of morality to architectonic composition that previous chapters scrutinized. In contrast to earlier examples – Wright or Mies, for instance – we are here not even interested in Hadid's *moral* outlook, and query how well that outlook might *calibrate* with her design's compositional properties. Rather, the argument is that Hadid's *understanding* of how such compositional properties are individuated – namely, as insulated from

⁷¹⁰ Arendt (1963).

⁷¹¹ See De Zeen (2014a).

constructional concerns – is epistemically mistaken.⁷¹² (I am hardly the first philosopher to voice this possibility. Stephen Davies, for instance, says:

Some so-called deconstructivist architects, such as Zaha M. Hadid, have produced prize-winning drawings and models. Many details of construction are absent from these. Her concerns lie with theory, shape, and form. She seems content that her projects stop at the drawing stage, believing that they are already established as architectural works of art in that representation. Is Hadid an architect as I have characterized that role? Someone who draws or models buildings with no intention that these be built and showing no concern with their constructability, materials, and uses might produce work of the highest aesthetic quality, but her artistic role is that of a painter, drawer, or sculpture, I maintain. Similarly, her ‘plans’ are not plans as such; rather they are pictures in the style of architects’ plans.⁷¹³

And, like myself, Davies relates this to the characterization of professional roles.) Hadid’s subsequent mistake, of thinking that her activity *as a designer* insulates her from concerns that arise *out of* her designs having certain features – concerns for the safety of those helping in the designs’ *construction* –, is however both an epistemic and a moral one. It is, to re-use the earlier example, on a par with Arendt’s reading of the Eichmann case, though the *scale* of the moral error is incomparably smaller. (Though I have to warn readers that even talking of ‘scales’ of moral error, because of the *magnitude* of how many human lives was lost is already itself morally haphazard.) As in the case of the forensic clinic, the moral error pertains not to the built object, but to what an architect says about her moral accomplishment with respect to it. We have a complicated interaction of epistemic, moral, and (meta)physical issues that certainly bears out much more systematic inquiry in the future.⁷¹⁴

§C.6 OUTLOOK

Where does that leave us? By a pure count of our five projects – *Zimmerman House*, *Lafayette Park*, *Forensic Psychiatric Clinic*, *SpuiForum*, *Al Wakrah Stadium* –, not one of them admits of CHAPTER 2’s FACE VALUE TREATMENT in straightforward terms. Is that treatment then inadmissible for such buildings? Has the intense labour of previous chapters to develop that framework all been in vain?

Far from it. The CHAPTER 2 framework is designed to *proscribe boundaries* for moralizing buildings. As such, it helps to shift, where necessary, moral appraisal of buildings to other recipients – or to call for better substantiations than those customarily encountered in the literature, news, or public debate. Such boundaries have informative value. We not only learnt *that* most moralizations examined in this CODA fail, but also *why*. Such moralizations fail to justify their *literal truth* because they fail to properly *calibrate* their targets’ moral and compositional properties as prescribed by the FACE VALUE TREATMENT.

And that conclusion is hardly devoid of informative value for future research. It precisely points at (1) the *location at which* attempted moralizations fail and at (2) *the type of data* one needs to mount improved

⁷¹² Certainly Hadid’s ahistorical usage of the term ‘tectonic (composition)’ invites little confidence on the matter. See her (1991, 47-48): ‘Die Projektaufgabe, die man uns stellte, war die Erkundung der Tektonik bei Malewitsch. Der Gedanke war der, daß diese Form, wenn man sie in die dritte Dimension übersetzte, ihr einen bestimmten Maßstab, Kontext und Standort zuwies und sie dann mit einem konkreten Nutzungsplan versähe, eine Architektur ergeben könnte.’ Hence, an entirely flat visual presentation devoid of utility, context, and plasticity, could itself be ‘tectonic’, or could become so once we added those *separate factors* to its visual features. On either reading (the text’s phrasing underdetermines which is the correct one) the remark violates the RECIPROCITY THESIS.

⁷¹³ Davies (2008, 130-131; I have silently corrected Davies’ misspelling of Hadid’s surname). Davies’ observation that Hadid’s concerns lie with ‘form’ return us to Schumacher’s claim (quoted at the end of §P.1) that architects like Hadid are only responsible for ‘form’, not ‘content’. I remain mystified as to the exact delineation of these terms in these passages – obviously they trace a (to these authors) significant distinction. To date, there are no philosophically satisfactory and architecturally persuasive discussions of formalism in architecture.

⁷¹⁴ For this type of interaction between epistemic and moral failure, see Oakley and Cocking (2005).

moralizations of our target buildings. In some cases, improved versions were already provided. In others, we presently lack the data to do so adequately. Thus, CHAPTERS 9 and 10 showed how to preserve the literal truth of more sensitive moralizations of *Lafayette Park* or Semper's forum designs in Dresden. This CODA points to the type of empirical research necessary to re-moralize the *Forensic Clinic*. And so on.

In other cases discussed in the foregoing chapters, considerations arising from the FACE VALUE TREATMENT itself pointed the way forward to which (further) moral issues are at stake. In at least two of the cases, §C.3 and §C.5 (cf. also §3.3.2 on Venturi), we could detect epistemic and moral fault in the architects behind the project. But that fault arises, if it does, not from the agents in isolation, but in their error when moralizing their own projects. To see such errors for what they are, the FACE VALUE TREATMENT is required precisely because it instructs us how to decompose the moral appraisal of architecture. The same applied to the *public* appraisal of two of our projects, where moral criticism is unfairly targeted at buildings when its actual recipient (merited or not) is the architect's *world view* or the building's *commission* rather than its actual design. Again, the demarcation lines for such differences in moral appraisal are utterly unclear if it were not for the FACE VALUE TREATMENT.

Further questions have now earned a more definite place on our agenda. If a building is deemed to be immoral on the basis of its composition, is it always immoral for architects to be complicit in its production? If not, when not? If a design stands no chance of its getting realized in the actual world – such as in most studio contexts of architectural education – what moral boundaries, if any, does it face? Which design cultures beyond those analysed in the present work, the tectonic tradition and the Beaux Arts, are out there? What moral foundations do these have, if any? And how far can the present work's results be utilized to appraise design practices outside architecture? Beyond the apparent continuity with urban design, how does the FACE VALUE TREATMENT fare when applied to practices and built results of urban planning or industrial design? And how do our moral appraisals shift when the technologies informing such practices enlist digital tools or other aids whose full potential is only slowly becoming apparent? Will we have to radically revise our understanding of how buildings are composed – how they ought to be composed? What chances are there, finally, for architects to address moral concerns of a more ambitious nature, pertaining to global justice and environmental sustainability? Now that architecture, narrowly construed, has received moral appraisal, what about the moral place of architecture in the wider world? Is there any hope that Vitruvius' ambition for a 'cosmic harmony', with architecture at its centre, can ever earn an ethically and scientifically respectable place in the world of tomorrow? Can twenty first architecture fulfill a promise made at its dawn two millennia ago?

These questions await our future resolution, and we are vastly better placed to tackle them, now that adequate foundations have been laid for taking our first steps towards answering them.

For as to the core issue this work has raised, we certainly know now where we are headed. Hasty readers hearing of the present work's championing the FACE VALUE TREATMENT may have jumped to the conclusion that the present work seeks to validate literal moralizations of architecture across the board. Nothing could be further from the truth. Moralizations of buildings frequently fail, not because they are systematically and inherently defective, but because they operate in ignorance of their own semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical prerequisites. But there is no reason they should or always will operate in this manner – and good reason to think such ignorance can be remedied, one step at a time.

The moralization of buildings has a future, then. But its future requires, of all those sharing in it, much greater sensitivity, to how buildings actually *work*, which properties they *have*, and which moral stories we can and cannot *tell* about architecture. And that is where all this labour leads. That is where our next steps take us – to a responsible moralization of architecture and its future.

APPENDICES

A1. TEXTUAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 (KANT)

For bibliographical details of texts and translations, see CHAPTER 5. I follow the Cambridge editions in rendering Kant's *S p e r r s c h r i f t* as bold font. Also, I provide (in parenthesis) pagination to the *Akademieausgabe* edition of Kant's texts in German, by volume and page number.

- J1** *Deutlichkeit in Begriffen* [...] beruht auf der Zergliederung des Begriffs in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen, das in ihm enthalten liegt. — So sind z. B. in dem Begriffe der *Tugend* als Merkmale enthalten 1) der Begriff der Freiheit, 2) der Begriff der Anhänglichkeit an Regeln (der Pflicht), 3) der Begriff von Überwältigung der Macht der Neigungen, wofern sie jenen Regeln widerstreiten. Lösen wir nun *so* den Begriff der Tugend in seine einzelnen Bestandteile auf: so machen wir ihn eben durch diese Analyse uns deutlich. (*Jäsche Logik* §5, 1800, 35)
- J1 *distinctness in concepts* [...] rests on the analysis of the concept in regard to the manifold that lies contained within it. Thus in the concept of *virtue*, for example, are contained as marks (i.) the concept of freedom, (2.) the concept of adherence to rules (to duty), (3.) the concept of overpowering the force of the inclinations, in case they oppose those rules. Now we break up the concept of virtue into its individual constituent parts, we make it distinct for ourselves through this analysis. (Translation by J. Michael Young as Kant, *Lectures on Logic* (Cambridge 1992, 545)
- J2** Alle klare Vorstellungen, auf die sich allein die logischen Regeln anwenden lassen, können nun unterschieden werden in Ansehung der *Deutlichkeit* und *Undeutlichkeit*. Sind wir uns der ganzen Vorstellung bewußt, nicht aber des Mannigfaltigen, das in ihr enthalten ist: so ist die Vorstellung undeutlich. — Zu Erläuterung der Sache zuerst ein Beispiel in der Anschauung. Wir erblicken in der Ferne ein Landhaus. Sind wir uns bewußt, daß der angeschaute Gegenstand ein Haus ist: so müssen wir notwendig doch auch eine Vorstellung von den verschiedenen Teilen dieses Hauses — den Fenstern, Türen u.s.w.-haben. Denn sähen wir die Teile nicht: so würden wir auch das Haus selbst nicht sehen. Aber wir sind uns dieser Vorstellung von dem Mannigfaltigen seiner Teile nicht bewußt und unsre Vorstellung von dem gedachten Gegenstande selbst ist daher eine undeutliche Vorstellung. Wollen wir ferner ein Beispiel von Undeutlichkeit in Begriffen: so möge der Begriff der Schönheit dazu dienen. Ein jeder hat von der Schönheit einen klaren Begriff. Allein es kommen in diesem Begriffe verschiedene Merkmale vor; unter andern, daß das Schöne etwas sein müsse, das 1) in die Sinne fällt, und das 2) allgemein gefällt. Können wir uns nun das Mannigfaltige dieser und anderer Merkmale des Schönen nicht aus einander setzen: so ist unser Begriff davon doch immer noch undeutlich. Die undeutliche Vorstellung nennen *Wolffs* Schüler eine *verworrene*. Allein dieser Ausdruck ist nicht passend, weil das Gegenteil von Verwirrung nicht Deutlichkeit, sondern Ordnung ist. (*Jäsche Logik* §5, 1800, 35)
- J2 All clear representations, to which alone logical rules can be applied, can now be distinguished in regard to *distinctness* and *indistinctness*. If we are conscious of the whole representation, but not of the manifold that is contained in it, then the representation is indistinct. First, to elucidate this, an example in intuition. We glimpse a country house in the distance. If we are conscious that the intuited object is a house, then we must necessarily have a representation of the various parts of this house, the windows, doors, etc. For if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either. But we are not conscious of this representation of the manifold of its parts, and our representation of the object indicated is thus itself an indistinct representation. If we want an example of indistinctness in concepts, furthermore, then the concept of beauty may serve. Everyone has a clear concept of beauty. But in this concept many different marks occur, among others that the beautiful must be something that (i.) strikes the senses and (2.) pleases universally. Now if we cannot explicate the manifold of these and other marks of the beautiful, then our concept of it is still indistinct *Wolff's* disciples call the indistinct representation a *confused* one. But

this expression is not fitting, because the opposite of confusion is not distinctness but order. (Translation by J. Michael Young as Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, Cambridge 1992, 546)

K1 Um zu unterscheiden, ob etwas schön sei oder nicht, beziehen wir die Vorstellung nicht durch den Verstand auf das Objekt zum Erkenntnis, sondern durch die Einbildungskraft (vielleicht mit dem Verstande verbunden) auf das Subjekt und das Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust derselben. Das Geschmacksurteil ist also kein Erkenntnisurteil, mithin nicht logisch, sondern ästhetisch, worunter man dasjenige versteht, dessen Bestimmungsgrund *n i c h t a n d e r s a l s s u b - j e k t i v* sein kann. Alle Beziehung der Vorstellungen, selbst die der Empfindungen, aber kann objektiv sein (und da beutet sie das Reale einer empirischen Vorstellung); nur nicht die auf [204:] das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, wodurch gar nichts im Objekte bezeichnet wird, sondern in der das Subjekt, wie es durch die Vorstellung affiziert wird, sich selbst fühlt. (*CPJ* §1 V:203-4)

K1 In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure.

The judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground **cannot** be **other than subjective**. Any relation of representations, however, even that of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what is real in an empirical representation); but not the relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation. (V:203-204)

K2 Begehungsvermögen ist das Vermögen durch seine Vorstellungen Ursache der Gegenstände dieser Vorstellungen zu sein. Das Vermögen eines Wesens, seinen Vorstellungen gemäß zu handeln, heißt das Leben. [...] Man nennt aber die Fähigkeit, Lust oder Unlust bei einer Vorstellung zu haben, darum Gefühl, weil beides das bloß Subjective im Verhältnisse unserer Vorstellung und gar keine Beziehung auf ein Object zum möglichen Erkenntnis desselben* (nicht einmal dem Erkenntnis unseres Zustandes) enthält; da sonst selbst Empfindungen außer der Qualität, die ihnen der Beschaffenheit des Subjects wegen anhängt (z. B. des Rothen, werden, die Lust oder Unlust aber (am Rothen und Süßen) schlechterdings nichts am Objecte, sondern lediglich Beziehung aufs Subject ausdrückt.

[*And, note *:*] (Man kann Sinnlichkeit durch das subjective unserer Vorstellungen überhaupt erklären; denn der Verstand bezieht allererst die Vorstellungen auf ein Object, d. i. er allein denkt sich etwas vermittelt derselben. Nun kann das Subjective unserer Vorstellung entweder von der Art sein, daß es auch auf ein Object zum Erkenntniß desselben (der Form oder Materie nach, da es im ersten Falle reine Anschauung, im zweiten Empfindung heißt) bezogen werden kann; in diesem Fall ist die Sinnlichkeit, als Empfänglichkeit der gedachten Vorstellung, der Sinn. Oder | das Subjective der Vorstellung kann gar kein Erkenntnißstück werden: weil es bloß die Beziehung derselben aufs Subject und nichts zur Erkenntniß des Objects Brauchbares enthält; und alsdann heißt diese Empfänglichkeit der Vorstellung Gefühl, welches die Wirkung der Vorstellung (diese mag sinnlich oder intellectuell sein) aufs Subject enthält und zur Sinnlichkeit gehört, obgleich die Vorstellung selbst zum Verstande oder der Vernunft gehören mag.) (*Metaphysik der Sitten*, VI:211-212 u. 211-212n.*)

K2 [...] The capacity for taking pleasure or displeasure in a representation is called feeling because both of these involve what is merely subjective in the relation of our representation and contain no relation at all to an object for possible knowledge of it (or even knowledge of our own condition). (VI:211-212, tr. Mary McGregor, Cambridge 1996)

- K3** Ein regelmäßiges, zweckmäßiges Gebäude mit seinem Erkenntnisvermögen (es sei in deutlicher oder verworrener Vorstellungsart) zu befassen, ist etwas ganz anderes, als sich dieser Vorstellung mit der Empfindung des Wohlgefallens bewußt zu sein. Hier wird die Vorstellung gänzlich auf das Subjekt und zwar auf das Lebensgefühl desselben, unter dem Namen des Gefühls der Lust und Unlust, bezogen; welches ein ganz besonderes Unterscheidungs- und Beurteilungsvermögen gründet, das zum [sic] Erkenntnis nichts beiträgt, sondern nur die gegebene Vorstellung im Subjekte gegen das ganze Vermögen der Vorstellungen hält, dessen sich das Gemüt im Gefühl seines Zustandes bewußt wird. (*CPJ* §1 V:204)
- K3 To grasp a regular, purposive structure [or ‘building’, see §5.2] with one’s faculty of cognition (whether the manner of representation be distinct or confused) is something entirely different from being conscious of this representation with the sensation of satisfaction. Here the representation is related entirely to the subject, indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging that contributes nothing to cognition but only holds the given representation in the subject up to the entire faculty of representation, of which the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state. Given representations in a judgment can be empirical (hence aesthetic); however, the judgment that is made by means of them is logical if in the judgment they are related to the object. Conversely, however, even if the given representations were to be rational but related in a judgment solely to the subject (its feeling), then they are to that extent always aesthetic. (§1, V:204)
- K4** Es gibt zweierlei Arten von Schönheit: freie Schönheit (*pulchritudo vaga*), oder die bloß anhängende Schönheit (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). Die erstere setzt keinen Begriff von dem voraus, was der Gegenstand sein soll; die zweite setzt einen solchen und die Vollkommenheit des Gegenstandes nach demselbem [nach dem Zweck] voraus. Die ersteren heißen (für sich bestehende) Schönheiten dieses oder jenes Dinges; die andere wird, als einem Begriffe anhängend (bedingte Schönheit), Objekten, die unter dem Begriffe eines besonderen Zwecks stehen, beigelegt. (*CPJ* §16 V:229)
- K4 There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) or merely adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*). The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. The first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the latter, as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty), are ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular end.
- K5** Die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit zu beurteilen, bedürfen wir jederzeit den Begriff eines Zwecks und (wenn jene Zweckmäßigkeit nicht eine äußere <Nützlichkeit>, sondern eine innere sein soll) den Begriff eines inneren Zwecks, der den Grund der inneren Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes enthalte. So wie nun Zweck überhaupt dasjenige ist, dessen Begriff als der Grund der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes selbst angesehen werden kann: so wird, um sich eine objektive Zweckmäßigkeit an einem Dinge vorzustellen, der Begriff von diesem, was es für ein Ding sein sollte, vorangehen; (*CPJ* §15 V:227, editorial insertion by Klemme ed. 2001 *ad loc.*)
- K5 Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the **utility** of the object, or internal, i.e., its **perfection**. [...] To judge objective purposiveness we always require the concept of an end, and <if that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility), but an internal one>, we require the concept of an internal end, which contains the ground of the internal possibility of the object. Now as an end in general is that the **concept** of which can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, thus in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of **what sort of thing it is supposed to be** must come first; (§15 V:227, tr. Guyer, 111; 112; the insertion is Kant’s own)

- K6** Das Wohlgefallen am *G u t e n* ist mit Interesse verbunden. Gut ist das, was vermittelt der Vernunft, durch den bloßen Begriff gefällt. Wir nennen einiges *w o z u g u t* (das Nützliche), was nur als Mittel gefällt; ein anderes aber *a n s i c h g u t*, was für sich selbst gefällt. In beiden ist immer der Begriff eines Zwecks [...] enthalten. [genauer:] In beiden ist immer der Begriff eines Zwecks, mithin das Verhältnis der Vernunft zum (wenigstens möglichen) Wollen, folglich ein Wohlgefallen am *D a s e i n* eines Objekts oder einer Handlung, d.i. irgend ein Interesse enthalten. Um etwas gut zu finden, muß ich jederzeit wissen, was der Gegenstand für ein Ding sein solle, d. i. einen Begriff von demselben haben. Um Schönheit woran zu finden, habe ich das nicht nötig. Blumen, freie Zeichnungen, ohne Absicht ineinander geschlungene Züge, | unter dem Namen des Laubwerks, bedeuten nichts, hängen von keinem bestimmten Begriffe ab und gefallen doch. (CPJ §4, V:207)
- K6 The satisfaction *in the good* is combined with interest. That is **good** which pleases by means of reason alone, through the mere concept. We call something **good for something** (the useful) that pleases only as a means; however, another thing is called **good in itself** that pleases for itself. Both always involve the concept of an end, hence the relation of reason to (at least possible) willing, and consequently a satisfaction in the **existence** of an object or of an action, i.e., some sort of interest. In order to find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, i.e., I must have a concept of it. I do not need that in order to find beauty in something. Flowers, free designs, lines aimlessly intertwined in each other under the name of foliage, signify nothing, do not depend on any determinate concept, and yet please.
- K7** Die *o b j e k t i v e* Zweckmäßigkeit kann nur vermittelt der Beziehung des Mannigfaltigem auf einen bestimmten Zweck, also nur durch einen Begriff erkannt werden. Hieraus allein schon erhellt, daß das Schöne, dessen Beurteilung eine bloß formale Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. eine Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, zum Grunde hat, von der Vorstellung des Guten ganz unabhängig sei, weil das letztere eine objektive Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. die Beziehung des Gegenstandes auf einen bestimmten Zweck, voraussetzt. (CPJ §15, V:226)
- K7 **Objective** purposiveness can be cognized only by means of the relation of the manifold to a determinate end, thus only through a concept. From this alone it is already clear that the beautiful, the judging of which has as its ground a merely formal purposiveness, i.e., a purposiveness without an end, is entirely independent of the representation of the good, since the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, i.e., the relation of the object to a determinate end.
- K8** Die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit ist entweder die äußere, d. i. die *N ü t z l i c h k e i t*, oder die innere, d. i. *V o l l k o m m e n h e i t* des Gegenstandes. Daß das Wohlgefallen an einem Gegenstande, weshalb wir ihn schön nennen, nicht auf der Vorstellung seiner Nützlichkeit beruhen könne, ist aus beiden vorigen Hauptstücken hinreichend zu ersehen: weil es alsdann nicht | ein unmittelbares Wohlgefallen an dem Gegenstande sein würde, welches letztere die wesentliche Bedingung des Urteils über Schönheit ist. Aber eine objektive innere Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. Vollkommenheit, kommt dem Prädikate der Schönheit schon näher und ist daher auch von namhaften Philosophen, doch mit dem Beisatze, *w e n n s i e v e r w o r r e n g e d a c h t w i r d*, für einerlei mit der Schönheit gehalten worden. (CPJ §15, V:226-227)
- K8 Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the **utility** of the object, or internal, i.e., its **perfection**. That the satisfaction in an object on account of which we call it beautiful could not rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently obvious from the two preceding main sections, since in that case it would not be an immediate satisfaction in the object, which latter is the essential condition of the judgment about beauty. But an objective inner purposiveness, i.e., perfection, already comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held to be identical with beauty even by philosophers of repute, though with the proviso **if it is thought confusedly**.

- K8a** Nun ist das Geschmacksurteil ein ästhetisches Urteil, d. i. ein solches, was auf subjektiven Gründen beruht, und dessen Bestimmungsgrund kein Begriff, mithin auch nicht der eines bestimmten Zwecks sein kann. Also wird durch die Schönheit, als eine formale subjektive Zweckmäßigkeit, keineswegs eine Vollkommenheit des Gegenstandes, als vorgeblich-formale, gleichwohl aber doch objektive Zweckmäßigkeit gedacht; und der Unterschied zwischen den Begriffen des Schönen und Guten, als ob beide nur der logischer Form nach unterschieden, der erste bloß ein verworrener, der zweite ein deutlicher Begriff der Vollkommenheit, sonst aber dem Inhalte und Ursprunge nach einerlei wären, ist nichtig; (*CPJ* §15, V:228)
- K8a Now the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., one that rests on subjective grounds, and its determining ground cannot be a concept, and thus not a concept of a determinate end. Thus by beauty, as a formal subjective purposiveness, there is not conceived any perfection of the object as a supposedly formal but yet also objective purposiveness, and the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and good, as if both differed only in logical form, the former being merely a confused but the latter a distinct concept of perfection while they were otherwise identical in content and origin, is null[.] (*CPJ* §15, V:228, tr. Guyer 112-113)
- K9** Die objektive Zweckmäßigkeit zu beurteilen, bedürfen wir jederzeit den Begriff eines Zweckes und (wenn eine Zweckmäßigkeit nicht eine äußere <Nützlichkeit>, sondern eine innere sein soll), den Begriff des inneren Zwecks, der den Grund der inneren Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes enthalte. So wie nun Zweck überhaupt dasjenige ist, dessen Begriff als der Grund der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes selbst angesehen werden kann: so wird, um sich eine objektive Zweckmäßigkeit an einem Dinge vorzustellen, der Begriff von diesem, was es für ein Ding sein sollte, vorangehen; (*CPJ* §15, V:227)
- K9 Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the **utility** of the object, or internal, i.e., its **perfection**. That the satisfaction in an objection account of which we call it beautiful could not rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently obvious from the two preceding main sections, since in that case it would not be an immediate satisfaction in the object, which latter is the essential condition of the judgment about beauty. But an objective inner purposiveness, i.e., perfection, already comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held to be identical with beauty even by philosophers of repute, though with the proviso **if it is thought confusedly**. (§15, V:226-7, tr. Guyer 111, emphasis in original)
- K10** Dagegen, wenn man verworrene Begriffe und das objektive Urteil, das sie zum Grunde hat, ästhetisch nennen wollte, man einen Verstand haben würde, der sinnlich urteilt, oder einen Sinn, der durch Begriffe seine Objekte vorstellte, welches beides sich widerspricht. Das Vermögen der Begriffe, sie mögen verworren oder deutlich sein, ist der Verstand; und obgleich zum Geschmacksurteil, als ästhetischem Urteile, auch (wie zu allen Urteilen) Verstand gehört, so gehört er zu demselben| noch nicht als Vermögen der Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes, sondern der Bestimmung derselben und seiner Vorstellung (ohne Begriff) nach dem Verhältnis derselben auf das Subjekt und dessen inneres Gefühl, und zwar sofern dieses Urteil nach einer allgemeinen Regel möglich ist. (*CPJ* §15, V:228-229)
- K10 [I]f one were to call confused concepts and the objective judgment that is grounded in them aesthetic, one would have an understanding that judged by sense or a sense that represented its object through concepts, both of which are self-contradictory. The faculty of concepts, be they confused or distinct, is the understanding; and although understanding also belongs to the judgment of taste, as an aesthetic judgment (as in all judgments), it does not belong to it as a faculty for the cognition of an object, but as the faculty for the determination of the judgment and its representation (without a concept) in accordance with the relation of the representation to the subject and its internal feeling, and indeed insofar as this judgment is possible in accordance with a universal rule. (§15, V:228-9, tr. Guyer 113)

- K10a** Wenn mich jemand fragt, ob ich den Palast, den ich vor mir sehe, schön finde, so mag ich zwar sagen: ich liebe dergleichen Dinge nicht, die bloß für das Angaffen gmeacht sind; [...] ich kann noch überdem auf die Eitelkeit der Großen auf gut Rousseauisch schmählen, welche den Schweiß des Volks auf so entbehrliche Dinge verwenden; [...] Man kann mir alles dieses einräumen und gutheißen: nur davon ist jetzt nicht die Rede. Man will nur wissen: ob die bloße Vorstellung des Gegenstandes in mir mit Wohlgefallen begleitet sei, so gleichgültig ich auch immer in Ansehung der Existenz dieser Vorstellung sein mag. (*CPJ* §2, V:205)
- K10a** If someone asks me whether I find the palace that I see before me beautiful, I may well say that I don't like that sort of thing, which is made merely to be gaped at [...]; in true *Rousseauesque* style I might even vilify the vanity of the great who waste the sweat of the people on such superfluous things. [...] All of this might be conceded to me and approved; but that is not what is at issue here. One only wants to know whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied with satisfaction in me, however indifferent I might be with regard to the existence of the object of this representation. (*CPJ* §2, V:205, tr. Guyer)
- K11** Wenn man, was ein Zweck sei, nach seinen transzendentalen Bestimmungen (ohne etwas Empirisches, dergleichen das Gefühl der Lust ist, [220:] voraussetzen) erklären will: so ist Zweck der Gegenstand eines Begriffs, sofern dieser als die Ursache von jenem (der reale Grund seiner Möglichkeit) angesehen wird; und die Kausalität eines **B e g r i f f s** in Ansehung seines **O b j e k t s** ist die Zweckmäßigkeit (*forma finalis*). Wo also nicht etwa bloß die Erkenntnis von einem Gegenstande, sondern der Gegenstand selbst (die Form oder Existenz desselben) als Wirkung, nur als durch einen Begriff von der letzteren möglich gedacht wird, da denkt man sich einen Zweck. (*CPJ* §10, V:219-220).
- K11** If one would define what an end is in accordance with its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure), then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a **concept** with regard to its **object** is purposiveness (*forma finalis*). Thus where not merely the cognition of an object but the object itself (its form or its existence) as an effect is thought of as possible only through a concept of the latter, there one thinks of an end.
- K12** Allein die Schönheit eines Menschen (und unter dieser Art die eines Mannes oder Weibes oder Kindes), die Schönheit eines Pferdes, eines Gebäudes (als Kirche, Palast, Arsenal oder Gartenhaus) setzt einen Begriff vom Zwecke voraus, welcher bestimmt, was das Ding sein soll, mithin einen Begriff seiner Vollkommenheit; und ist also adhärerende Schönheit. So wie nun die Verbindung des Angenehmen (der Empfindung) mit der Schönheit, die eigentlich nur die Form betrifft, die Reinigkeit des Geschmacksurteils verhinderte, so tut die Verbindung des Guten (wozu nämlich das Mannigfaltige dem Dinge selbst, nach seinem Zweck, gut ist) mit der Schönheit der Reinigkeit desselben Abbruch. (*CPJ* §16, V:230)
- K12** But the beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, of a building (such as a church, a palace, an arsenal, or a garden-house) presuppose a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and is thus merely adherent beauty. Now just as the combination of the agreeable (of sensation) with beauty, which properly concerns only form, hindered the purity of the judgment of taste, so the combination of the good (that is, the way in which the manifold is good for the thing itself, in accordance with its end) with beauty does damage to its purity. (§16, V:230)
- K13** Zur **P l a s t i k**, als der ersten Art schöner bildender Künste, gehört die Bildhauerkunst und Baukunst. Die erste ist diejenige, welche Begriffe von Dingen, so wie sie in der Natur existiren könnten, körperlich darstellt (doch als schöne Kunst mit Rücksicht auf ästhetische Zweckmäßigkeit); die zweite ist die Kunst, Begriffe von Dingen, die nur durch Kunst möglich

sind, und deren Form nicht die Natur, sondern einen willkürlichen Zweck zum Bestimmungsgrunde hat, zu dieser Absicht, doch auch zugleich ästhetisch-zweckmäßig, darzustellen. Bei der letzteren ist ein gewisser Gebrauch des künstlichen Gegenstandes die Hauptsache, worauf als Bedingung die ästhetischen Ideen eingeschränkt werden. Bei der ersteren ist der bloße Ausdruck ästhetischer Ideen die Hauptabsicht. So sind Bildsäulen von Menschen, Göttern, Tieren u. dgl. von der erstern Art, aber Tempel, oder Prachtgebäude zum Behuf öffentlicher Versammlungen, oder auch Wohnungen, Ehrenbogen, Säulen, Kenotaphien u. dgl., zum Ehrengedächtnis errichtet, zur Baukunst gehörig. Ja alle Hausgeräte (die Arbeit des Tischlers u. dgl. Dinge zum Gebrauche) können dazu gezählt werden; weil die Angemessenheit des Produkts zu einem gewissen Gebrauche das Wesentliche eines Bauwerks ausmacht; dagegen ein bloßes Bildwerk, das lediglich zum Anschauen gemacht ist und für sich selbst gefallen soll, als körperliche Darstellung bloße Nachahmung der Natur ist, doch mit Rücksicht auf ästhetische Ideen: wobei denn die Sinnenwahrheit nicht so weit gehen darf, daß es aufhöre, als Kunst und Produkt der Willkür zu erscheinen. (*CPJ* §51, V:322)

- K13 The **plastic** arts, as the first kind of beautiful pictorial arts, include **sculpture** and **architecture**. The **first** is that which presents corporeal concepts of things as they **could exist in nature** (although, as a beautiful art, with regard to aesthetic purposiveness); the **second** is the art of presenting, with this intention but yet at the same time in an aesthetically purposive way, concepts of things that are possible **only through art**, and whose form has as its determining ground not nature but a voluntary end. In the latter a certain **use** of the artistic object is the main thing, to which, as a condition, the aesthetic ideas are restricted. In the former the mere **expression** of aesthetic ideas is the chief aim. Thus statues of humans, gods, animals, etc., are of the first sort; but temples, magnificent buildings for public gatherings, as well as dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and the like, erected as memorials, belong to architecture. Indeed, all domestic furnishings (the work of the carpenter and the like things for use) can be counted as belonging to the latter, because the appropriateness of the product to a certain use is essential in a **work of architecture** (*Bauwerk*), while by contrast a mere **picture**, which is made strictly for viewing and is to please for itself, is, as a corporeal presentation, a mere imitation of nature, though with respect to aesthetic ideas: where, then, **sensible truth** should not go so far that it stops looking like art and a product of the power of choice. (§51, V:322)
- K14 Die b i l d e n d e n Künste oder die des Ausdrucks für Ideen in der S i n n e n a n s c h a u - u n g (nicht durch Vorstellungen der bloßen Ein|bildungskraft, die durch Worte aufgeregt werden), sind entweder die der S i n n e n w a h r h e i t oder des S i n n e n s c h e i n s. Die erste heißt die P l a s t i k, die zweite die M a l e r e i. (*CPJ* §51, V:321-322)
- K14 The **pictorial** arts or those of the expression of ideas in **sensible intuition** (not through representations of the mere imagination, which are evoked through words) are either those of **sensible truth** or of **sensible illusion**. The first are called the **plastic** arts, the second **painting**. (§51, V:321-322)
- K15 In der Malerei, Bildhauerkunst, ja allen bildenden Künsten, in der Baukunst, Gartenkunst, sofern sie schöne Künste sind, ist die Z e i c h n u n g das Wesentliche, in welcher nicht, was in der Empfindung vergnügt, sondern bloß, was durch seine Form gefällt, den Grund aller Anlage für den Geschmack ausmacht. (*CPJ* §14, V:225)
- K15 In painting and sculpture, indeed in all the pictorial arts, in architecture and horticulture insofar as they are fine arts, the **drawing** is what is essential, in which what constitutes the ground of all arrangements for taste is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases through its form.

A2. TEXTUAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 (SCHOPENHAUER)

- S1** Schöner ist aber Eines als das Andere dadurch, daß es jene rein objektive Betrachtung erleichtert, ihr entgegenkommt, ja gleichsam dazu zwingt, wo wir es dann sehr schön nennen. Dies ist der Fall theils dadurch, daß es [...] die Idee [seiner Gattung] vollkommen offenbart, so daß es dem Betrachter den Uebergang vom einzelnen Ding zur Idee und eben damit auch den Zustand der reinen Beschaulichkeit sehr erleichtert [.] (*WWR I. §41*)
- S2** Das eigentliche Problem des Schönen laesst sich sehr einfach so ausdrücken: wie ist Wohlgefallen und Freude an einem Gegenstande möglich ohne irgendeine Beziehung desselben auf unser Wollen? [...] Meine Lösung ist gewesen, daß wir im Schönen allemal die wesentlichen und ursprünglichen Gestalten der belebten und unbelebten Natur, also Platons Ideen derselben auffassen und dass diese Auffassung zu ihrer Bedingung ihr wesentliches Korrelat, das willensreine Subjekt des Erkennens d.h. eine reine Intelligenz ohne Absichten und Zwecke habe. (*PP II. §205*)
- S3** Denn alle diese [sc. organische wie künstliche Dinge] offenbaren die Ideen, durch welche der Wille sich auf den untersten Stufen objektivirt, geben gleichsam die tiefsten, verhallenden Baßtöne der Natur an. Schwere, Starrheit, Flüssigkeit, Licht u.s.w. sind die Ideen, welche sich in Felsen, Gebäuden, Gewässern aussprechen. Die schöne Gartenkunst und Baukunst können nichts weiter, als ihnen helfen, jene ihre Eigenschaften deutlich, vielseitig und vollständig zu entfalten, ihnen Gelegenheit geben, sich rein auszusprechen, wodurch sie eben zur ästhetischen Beschauung auffordern und dieselbe erleichtern. Dies leisten dagegen schlechte Gebäude und Gegenden, welche die Natur vernachlässigte oder die Kunst verdarb, wenig oder gar nicht: dennoch können auch aus ihnen jene allgemeinen Grundideen der Natur nicht ganz verschwinden. Den sie suchenden Betrachter sprechen sie auch hier an, und selbst schlechte Gebäude u. dgl. sind noch einer ästhetischen Betrachtung fähig: die Ideen der allgemeinsten Eigenschaften ihres Stoffes sind noch in ihnen erkennbar, nur daß die ihnen künstlich gegebene Form kein Erleichterungsmittel, ja vielmehr ein Hinderniß ist, das die ästhetische Betrachtung erschwert. (*WWR I. §41*)
- S4** Die Erkenntniß des Schönen setzt zwar immer rein erkennendes Subjekt und erkannte Idee als Objekt zugleich und unzertrennlich. Dennoch aber wird die Quelle des ästhetischen Genusses bald mehr in der Auffassung der erkannten Idee liegen, bald mehr in der Säligkeit und Geistesruhe des von allem Wollen und dadurch von aller Individualität und der aus ihr hervorgehenden Pein befreiten reinen Erkennens[.] (*WWR I. §42*)
- S5** [...] theils liegt jener Vorzug besonderer Schönheit eines Objekts darin, daß die Idee selbst, die uns aus ihm anspricht, eine hohe Stufe der Objektivität des Willens und daher durchaus bedeutend und vielsagend sei. Darum ist der Mensch vor allem Ändern schön und die Offenbarung seines Wesens das höchste Ziel der Kunst. Menschliche Gestalt und menschlicher Ausdruck sind das bedeutendste Objekt der bildenden Kunst, so wie menschliches Handeln das bedeutendste Objekt der Poesie. – Es hat aber dennoch jedes Ding seine eigenthümliche Schönheit: nicht nur jedes Organische und in der Einheit einer Individualität sich darstellende; sondern auch jedes Unorganische, Formlose, ja jedes Artefakt. (*WWR I. §41*)
- S6** [U]nd zwar wird dieses Vorherrschen des einen oder des andern Bestandtheils des ästhetischen Genusses davon abhängen, ob die intuitiv aufgefaßte Idee eine höhere oder niedere Stufe der Objektivität des Willens ist. So wird bei ästhetischer Betrachtung (in der Wirklichkeit, oder durch das Medium der Kunst) der schönen Natur im Anorganischen und Vegetabilischen und der Werke der schönen Baukunst, der Genuß des reinen willenlosen Erkennens überwiegend seyn, weil die hier aufgefaßten Ideen nur niedrige Stufen der Objektivität des Willens, daher nicht Erscheinungen von tiefer Bedeutsamkeit und vielsagendem Inhalt sind. Hingegen wird, wenn

Thiere und Menschen der Gegenstand der ästhetischen Betrachtung oder Darstellung sind, der Genuß mehr in der objektiven Auffassung dieser Ideen, welche die deutlichsten Offenbarungen des Willens sind, bestehn; weil solche die größte Mannigfaltigkeit der Gestalten, Reichthum und tiefe Bedeutsamkeit der Erscheinungen darlegen und uns am vollkommensten das Wesen des Willens offenbaren, sei es in seiner Heftigkeit, Schrecklichkeit, Befriedigung, oder in seiner Brechung (letzteres in den tragischen Darstellungen), endlich sogar in seiner Wendung oder Selbstaufhebung, welche besonders das Thema der Christlichen Malerei ist; wie überhaupt die Historienmalerei und das Drama die Idee des vom vollen Erkennen beleuchteten Willens zum Objekt haben. (*WWR* I.§42)

- S7** Those different grades of the will's objectification, expressed in innumerable [sublunary] individuals, exist as the unattained patterns of these, or as the eternal forms of things. Not themselves entering into time and space, the medium of individuals, they remain fixed, subject to no change [to no conflict or stasis, 173], always being, never having become. The particular things, however, arise and pass away'; they are always becoming and never are. (*WWR* I. tr.129, quoted *apud* Kenny 2007, 174)
- S8** Matter as such cannot be the presentation of an Idea. This is because [...] it is causality through and through: its being is nothing but acting. (*WWR* I.§43, tr. 2010, 238)
- S9** This applies to even the most general qualities of matter, qualities that it never lacks and whose Ideas are the weakest objecthood of the will. These are: gravity, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity, reaction to light, etc. When we consider architecture merely as a fine art, leaving aside its utilitarian function, where it serves the will rather than pure cognition, and is thus no longer art in our sense; then the only intention we can attribute to it is that of bringing some of the Ideas at the lowest levels of the objecthood of the will more clearly into intuition, namely: gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, these universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest and dullest visibilities of the will, the sounds of the ground bass of nature; and then, alongside these, light, which is in many respects their opposite. (*WWR* I.§43, tr. 2010, 239)
- S10** Die ganze Masse des Gebäudes würde, ihrer ursprünglichen Neigung überlassen, einen bloßen Klumpen darstellen, so fest als möglich dem Erdkörper verbunden, zu welchem die Schwere, als welche hier der Wille erscheint, unablässig drängt, während die Starrheit, ebenfalls Objektität des Willens, widersteht. Aber eben diese Neigung, dieses Streben, wird von der Baukunst an der unmittelbaren Befriedigung verhindert und ihm nur eine mittelbare, auf Umwegen, gestattet. Da kann nun z.B. das Gebälk nur mittelst der Säule die Erde drücken; das Gewölbe muß sich selbst tragen und nur durch Vermittelung der Pfeiler kann es sein Streben zur Erdmasse hin befriedigen u.s.f. Aber eben auf diesen erzwungenen Umwegen, eben durch diese Hemmungen entfalten sich auf das deutlichste und mannigfaltigste jene der rohen Steinmasse inwohnenden Kräfte: und weiter kann der rein ästhetische Zweck der Baukunst nicht gehn. (*WWR* I.§43)
- S11** Wenn wir nun die *Baukunst*, bloß als schöne Kunst, abgesehen von ihrer Bestimmung zu nützlichen Zwecken, in welchen sie dem Willen, nicht der reinen Erkenntniß dient und also nicht mehr Kunst in unserm Sinne ist, betrachten; so können wir ihr keine andere Absicht unterlegen, als die, einige von jenen Ideen, welche die niedrigsten Stufen der Objektität des Willens sind, zu deutlicher Anschaulichkeit zu bringen: nämlich Schwere, Kohäsion, Starrheit, Härte, diese allgemeinen Eigenschaften des Steines, diese ersten, einfachsten, dumpfsten Sichtbarkeiten des Willens, Grundbaßtöne der Natur; und dann neben ihnen das Licht, welches in vielen Stücken ein Gegensatz jener ist. Selbst auf dieser tiefen Stufe der Objektität des Willens sehn wir schon sein Wesen sich in Zwietracht offenbaren: denn eigentlich ist der Kampf zwischen Schwere und Starrheit der alleinige ästhetische Stoff der schönen Architektur: ihn auf mannigfaltige Weise

vollkommen deutlich hervortreten zu lassen, ist ihre Aufgabe. Sie löst solche, indem sie jenen unverteilbaren Kräften den kürzesten Weg zu ihrer Befriedigung benimmt und sie durch einen Umweg hinhält, wodurch der Kampf verlängert und das unerschöpfliche Streben beider Kräfte auf mannigfaltige Weise sichtbar wird. (*WWR* I.§43, partly overlapping with S10)

- S12** The effect of the suspension also deserves to be considered here. It is a dissonance delaying the final consonance that is with certainty awaited; in this way the longing for it is strengthened, and its appearance affords the greater satisfaction. This is clearly an analogue to the satisfaction of the will which is enhanced through delay. (*WWR* II, tr. p. 455-456)
- S13** Daher liegt allerdings die Schönheit eines Gebäudes in der augenfälligen Zweckmäßigkeit jedes Theiles, nicht zum äußern willkürlichen *Zweck* des Menschen (Insofern gehört das Werk der nützlichen Baukunst an); sondern unmittelbar zum Bestande des Ganzen, zu welchem die Stelle, Größe und Form jedes Theiles ein so nothwendiges Verhältniß haben muß, daß, wo möglich, wenn irgend ein Theil weggezogen würde, das Ganze einstürzen müßte. Denn nur indem jeder Theil soviel trägt, als er füglich kann, und jeder gestützt ist gerade da und gerade so sehr, als er muß, entfaltet sich jenes Widerspiel, jener Kampf zwischen Starrheit und Schwere, welche das Leben, die Willensäußerungen des Steines ausmachen, zur vollkommensten Sichtbarkeit [.] (*WWR* I.§43)
- S14** Nun aber das Verhältniß der Tonkunst zu dem ihr jedesmal aufgelegten bestimmten Äußerlichem, wie Text, Aktion, Marsch, Tanz, geistliche oder weltliche Feierlichkeit usw., ist analog dem Verhältniß der Architektur als bloß schöner, d.h. auf rein ästhetische Zwecke gerichteter Kunst zu den wirklichen Bauwerken, die sie zu errichten hat, mit deren nützlichen [tr. utilitarian], ihr fremden Zwecken, sie aber die ihr eigenen zu vereinigen suchen muss, indem sie dies unter den Bedingungen, die jene stellen, doch durchgesetzt und demnach einen Tempel, Palast, Zeughaus, Schauspielhaus usw. so hervorbringt, daß es wohl an sich schön als auch seinem Zwecke angemessen sei und sogar diesen durch seinen ästhetischen Charakter selber ankündige. [Die Zuordnung der Musik in die] Kirchen-, Opern-, Militaer-, Tanzmusik u. dgl. [...] aber ist ihrem Wesen so fremd wie der rein ästhetischen Baukunst die menschlichen Nützlichkeitszwecke, denen also beide sich zu bequemen und ihre selbst-eigenen den ihnen fremden Zwecken unterordnen haben. Der Baukunst ist dies fast immer unvermeidlich; der Musik nicht also: sie bewegt sich frei im Konzerte, in der Sonate, und vor allem in der Symphonie[.] (PP II.§219)
- S15** Da wir also die Schönheit der Baukunst hauptsächlich aus der unverhohlenen Darlegung der Zwecke und dem Erreichen derselben auf dem kürzesten und natürlichsten Wege hervorgehn sehn; so geräth hier meine Theorie in geraden Widerspruch mit der Kantischen, als welche das Wesen alles Schönen in eine anscheinende Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck setzt. (*WWR* II.§35) (NB: the official English translation [*WWR* II, tr. p. 416, *apud* Korab-Karpowicz 2012, 187] gives ‘apparent appropriateness without purpose’, which confuses Kant’s notion of *Zweckmäßigkeit* with that of *das Angemessene*.)
- S16** [...Die Architektur vermeidet] demnach alles, selbst nur scheinbar, Zwecklose [...] und ihre jedesmalige Absicht, sei diese nun eine rein architektonische, d.i. konstruktionelle, oder aber eine die Zwecke der Nützlichkeit betreffende, stets auf dem kürzesten und natürlichsten Wege erreicht und so dieselbe, durch das Werk selbst, offen darlegt. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S17** Weil nun also aus dem wohl verstandenen und konsequent durchgeführten Begriff der reichlich angemessenen Stütze zu einer gegebenen Last alle Gesetze der Säulenordnung, mithin auch die Form und Proportion der Säule, in allen ihren Theilen und Dimensionen, bis ins Einzelne herab, folgt, also insofern *a priori* bestimmt ist; so erhellt die Verkehrtheit des so oft wiederholten Gedankens, daß Baumstämme oder gar (was leider selbst Vitruvius, VI, I, vorträgt) die

menschliche Gestalt das Vorbild der Säule gewesen sei. Dann wäre die Form derselben für die Architektur eine rein zufällige, von außen aufgenommene: eine solche aber könnte uns nicht, sobald wir sie in ihrem gehörigen Ebenmaaß erblicken, so harmonisch und befriedigend ansprechen; noch könnte andererseits jedes, selbst geringe Mißverhältniß derselben vom feinen und geübten Sinne sogleich unangenehm und störend, wie ein Mißton in der Musik, empfunden werden. Dies ist vielmehr nur dadurch möglich, daß, nach gegebenem Zweck und Mittel, alles Uebrige im Wesentlichen *a priori* bestimmt ist, wie in de Musik, nach gegebener Melodie und Grundton, im Wesentlichen die ganze Harmonie. Und wie die Musik, so ist auch die Architektur überhaupt keine nachahmende Kunst; – obwohl Beide oft fälschlich dafür gehalten worden sind. Das ästhetische Wohlgefallen beruht, wie im Text ausführlich dargethan, überall auf der Auffassung einer (Platonischen) Idee. Für die Architektur, allein als *schöne* Kunst betrachtet, sind die Ideen der untersten Naturstufen, also Schwere, Starrheit, Kohäsion das eigentliche Thema [.] (*WWR* II.§35)

- S18** Wenn nun gleich, wie oben beiläufig gezeigt worden, die Baukunst keineswegs die *Formen* der Natur, wie Baumstämme, oder gar menschliche Gestalten, nachzuahmen hat; so soll sie doch im *Geiste* der Natur schaffen, namentlich indem sie das Gesetz *natura nihil agit frustra, nihilque supervacaneum, et quod commodissimum in omnibus suis operationibus sequitur*, auch zu dem ihrigen macht, demnach alles, selbst nur scheinbar, Zwecklose vermeidet und ihre jedesmalige Absicht, sei diese nun eine rein architektonische, d.i. konstruktionelle, oder aber eine die Zwecke der Nützlichkeit betreffende, stets auf dem kürzesten und natürlichsten Wege erreicht und so dieselbe, durch das Werk selbst, offen darlegt. Dadurch erlangt sie eine gewisse Grazie, der analog, welche bei lebenden Wesen in der Leichtigkeit und der Angemessenheit jeder Bewegung und Stellung zur Absicht derselben besteht. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S18a** Demnach sollen Gebäude und Geäte nicht der Natur nachgeahmt, sondern im *Geiste* derselben geschaffen sein. Dieser nun zeigt sich darin, daß jedes Ding und jeder Teil seinem Zwecke so unmittelbar entspricht, daß es ihn sogleich ankündigt, welches dadurch geschieht, daß es denselben auf dem kürzesten Wege und auf die einfachste Weise erreicht.
- S19** So wird bei ästhetischer Betrachtung (in der Wirklichkeit, oder durch das Medium der Kunst) der schönen Natur im Anorganischen und Vegetabilischen und der Werke der schönen Baukunst, der Genuß des reinen willenlosen Erkennens überwiegend seyn, weil die hier aufgefaßten Ideen nur niedrige Stufen der Objektivität des Willens, daher nicht Erscheinungen von tiefer Bedeutsamkeit und vielsagendem Inhalt sind. (*WWR* I.§42)
- S20** Unser Wohlgefallen an Gothischen Werken beruht ganz gewiß größten Theils auf Gedankenassociationen und historischen Erinnerungen, also auf einem der Kunst fremden Gefühl. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S21** im Gegensatz der gotischen Baukunst, welche gerade den vielen Zierarten und Beiwerken, indem wir ihnen einen uns unbekanntem Zweck unterschieben, ihr geheimnisvolles, mysterioeses Ansehn verdankt. (*PP* II.§214)
- S22** Wenn wir nun diesen Sinn und Grundgedanken der Gothischen Baukunst unterlegen und diese dadurch als gleichberechtigten Gegensatz der antiken aufstellen wollten; so wäre dagegen zu erinnern, daß der Kampf zwischen Starrheit und Schwere, welchen die antike Baukunst so offen und naiv darlegt, ein wirklicher und wahrer, in der Natur gegründeter ist; die gänzliche Ueberwindung der Schwere durch die Starrheit hingegen ein bloßer Schein bleibt, eine Fiktion, durch Täuschung beglaubigt. – Wie aus dem hier angegebenen Grundgedanken und den oben bemerkten Eigenthümlichkeiten der Gothischen Baukunst der mysteriöse und hyperphysische Charakter, welcher derselben zuerkannt wird, hervorgeht, wird Jeder sich leicht deutlich machen

können. Hauptsächlich entsteht er, wie schon erwähnt, dadurch, daß hier das Willkürliche an die Stelle des rein Rationellen, sich als durchgängige Angemessenheit des Mittels zum Zweck Kundgebenden, getreten ist. Das viele eigentlich Zwecklose und doch so sorgfältig Vollendete erregt die Voraussetzung unbekannter, unerforschlicher, geheimer Zwecke, d.i. das mysteriöse Ansehn. (*WWR* II.§35)

- S23** Demgemäß sehn wir, im guten antiken Baustil, jeglichen Theil, sei es nun Pfeiler, Säule, Bogen, Gebälk, oder Thüre, Fenster, Treppe, Balkon, seinen Zweck auf die geradeste und einfachste Weise erreichen, ihn dabei unverhohlen und naiv an den Tag legend; eben wie die organische Natur es in ihren Werken auch thut. Der geschmacklose Baustil hingegen sucht bei Allem unnütze Umwege und gefällt sich in Willkürlichkeiten, geräth dadurch auf zwecklos gebrochene, heraus und herein rückende Gebälke, gruppirte Säulen, zerstückelte Kornischen an Thürbögen und Giebeln, sinnlose Voluten, Schnörkel u. dergl.: er spielt, wie oben als Charakter der Puscherei angegeben, mit den Mitteln der Kunst, ohne die Zwecke derselben zu verstehn, wie Kinder mit dem Geräthe der Erwachsenen spielen. Dieser Art ist schon jede Unterbrechung einer geraden Linie, jede Aenderung im Schwunge einer Kurve, ohne augenfälligen Zweck. Jene naive Einfalt hingegen in der Darlegung und dem Erreichen des Zweckes, [entspricht] dem Geiste [...], in welchem die Natur schafft und bildet [.] (*WWR* II.§35)
- S24** Schöner ist aber Eines als das Andere dadurch, daß es jene rein objektive Betrachtung erleichtert [...]. Dies ist der Fall theils dadurch, *daß es als einzelnes Ding, durch das sehr deutliche, rein bestimmte, durchaus bedeutsame Verhältniß seiner Theile* die Idee seiner Gattung rein ausspricht [.] (*WWR* I.§41 emphasis added)
- S25** Denn nur indem jeder Theil soviel trägt, als er füglich kann, und jeder gestützt ist gerade da und gerade so sehr, als er muß, entfaltet sich jenes Widerspiel, jener Kampf zwischen Starrheit[.] (*WWR* I.§43)
- S26** d.h. der vollkommen richtige und angemessene Ausdruck jedes Willensaktes, durch die ihn objektivirende Bewegung und Stellung [...] Noch viel weniger aber, als die Schönheit, darf die Grazie durch das Charakteristische beeinträchtigt werden: welche Stellung und Bewegung auch der Ausdruck des Charakters erfordert; so muß sie doch auf die der Person angemessenste, zweckmäßigste, leichteste Weise vollzogen werden. (*WWR* I.§45)
- S27** 'Dadurch erlangt sie eine gewisse Grazie, der analog, welche bei lebenden Wesen in der Leichtigkeit und der Angemessenheit jeder Bewegung und Stellung zur Absicht derselben besteht.' (*WWR* II.§35).
- S28** In Gemäßheit der im Texte gegebenen Ableitung des rein Aesthetischen der Baukunst aus den untersten Stufen der Objektivation des Willens, oder der Natur, deren Ideen sie zu deutlicher Anschaulichkeit bringen will, ist das einzige und beständige Thema derselben *Stütze und Last*, und ihr Grundgesetz, daß keine Last ohne genügende Stütze, und keine Stütze ohne angemessene Last, mithin das Verhältniß dieser Beiden gerade das passende sei. Die reinste Ausführung dieses Themas ist Säule und Gebälk: daher ist die Säulenordnung gleichsam der Generalbaß der ganzen Architektur geworden. In Säule und Gebälk nämlich sind Stütze und Last *vollkommen gesondert*; wodurch die gegenseitige Wirkung Beider und ihr Verhältniß zu einander augenfällig wird. Denn freilich enthält selbst jede schlichte Mauer schon Stütze und Last: allein hier sind Beide noch in einander verschmolzen. Alles ist hier Stütze und Alles Last: daher keine ästhetische Wirkung. Diese tritt erst durch die *Sonderung* ein und fällt dem Grade derselben gemäß aus. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S29** Daher bietet es dem Auge eine ausgebreitete Masse dar, die dem ästhetischen Zwecke völlig fremd, bloß dem nützlichen dient, mithin jenen stört, dessen Thema immer nur Stütze und Last

ist. Die Form der Säule hat ihren Grund allein darin, daß sie die einfachste und zweckmäßigste Stütze liefert. (*WWR* II.§35)

- S30** Also Alles an der Säule, ihre durchweg bestimmte Form, das Verhältniß ihrer Höhe zur Dicke, Beider zu den Zwischenräumen der Säulen, und das der ganzen Reihe zum Gebälk und der darauf ruhenden Last, ist das genau berechnete Resultat aus dem Verhältniß der nothwendigen Stütze zur gegebenen Last. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S31** Das hier dargelegte alleinige Thema der Architektur, Stütze und Last, ist so sehr einfach, daß eben deshalb diese Kunst, soweit sie *schöne* Kunst ist (nicht aber sofern sie dem Nutzen dient), schon seit der besten Griechischen Zeit, im Wesentlichen vollendet und abgeschlossen, wenigstens keiner bedeutenden Bereicherung mehr fähig ist. Hingegen kann der moderne Architekt sich von den Regeln und Vorbildern der Alten nicht merklich entfernen, ohne eben schon auf dem Wege der Verschlechterung zu seyn. Ihm bleibt daher nichts übrig, als die von den Alten überlieferte Kunst anzuwenden und ihre Regeln, so weit es möglich ist, unter den Beschränkungen, welche das Bedürfniß, das Klima, das Zeitalter, und sein Land ihm unabweisbar auflegen, durchzusetzen. Denn in dieser Kunst, wie auch in der Skulptur, fällt das Streben nach dem Ideal mit der Nachahmung der Alten zusammen. Ich brauche wohl kaum zu erinnern, daß ich, bei allen diesen architektonischen Betrachtungen, allein den antiken Baustil und nicht den sogenannten Gothischen, welcher, Saracenischen Ursprungs, durch die Gothen in Spanien dem übrigen Europa zugeführt worden ist, im Auge gehabt habe. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S32** Alles was ich vom eigentlich ästhetischen Zweck, vom Sinn und Thema der Baukunst gesagt habe, verliert bei diesen [gothischen] Werken seine Gültigkeit. Denn das frei liegende Gebälk ist verschwunden und mit ihm die Säule: Stütze und Last, geordnet und vertheilt, um den Kampf zwischen Starrheit und Schwere zu veranschaulichen, sind hier nicht mehr das Thema. Auch ist jene durchgängige, reine Rationalität, vermöge welcher Alles strenge Rechenschaft zuläßt, ja, sie dem denkenden Beschauer schon von selbst entgegenbringt, und welche zum Charakter des antiken Baustils gehört, hier nicht mehr zu finden: wir werden bald inne, daß hier, statt ihrer, eine von fremdartigen Begriffen geleitete Willkür gewaltet hat; daher Vieles uns unerklärt bleibt. Denn nur der antike Baustil ist in rein *objektivem* Sinne gedacht, der gothische mehr in subjektivem. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S33** Das ästhetische Wohlgefallen beruht, wie im Text ausführlich dargethan, überall auf der Auffassung einer (Platonischen) Idee. Für die Architektur, allein als *schöne* Kunst betrachtet, sind die Ideen der untersten Naturstufen, also Schwere, Starrheit, Kohäsion das eigentliche Thema; nicht aber, wie man bisher annahm, bloß die regelmäßige Form, Proportion und Symmetrie, als welche ein rein Geometrisches, Eigenschaften des Raumes, nicht Ideen sind, und daher nicht das Thema einer schönen Kunst seyn können. Auch in der Architektur also sind sie nur sekundären Ursprungs und haben eine untergeordnete Bedeutung, welche ich sogleich hervorheben werde. Wären sie es allein, welche darzulegen die Architektur, als schöne Kunst, zur Aufgabe hätte; so müßte das Modell die gleiche Wirkung thun, wie das ausgeführte Werk. Dies aber ist ganz und gar nicht der Fall: vielmehr müssen die Werke der Architektur, um ästhetisch zu wirken, durchaus eine beträchtliche Größe haben; ja, sie können nie zu groß, aber leicht zu klein seyn. Sogar steht, *ceteris paribus*, die ästhetische Wirkung im geraden Verhältniß der Größe der Gebäude; weil nur große Massen die Wirksamkeit der Schwerkraft in hohem Grade augenfällig und eindringlich machen. (*WWR* II.§35)
- S34** Die Formen in der Architektur werden, wie oben an der Säule gezeigt worden, zunächst durch den unmittelbaren, konstruktionellen Zweck jedes Theiles bestimmt. Soweit nun aber derselbe irgend etwas unbestimmt läßt, tritt, da die Architektur ihr Daseyn zunächst in unserer räumlichen

Anschauung hat, und demnach an unser Vermögen *a priori* zu dieser sich wendet, das Gesetz der vollkommensten Anschaulichkeit, mithin auch der leichtesten Faßlichkeit, ein. (*WWR* II.§35)

S35 Diese aber entsteht allemal durch die größte Regelmäßigkeit der Formen und Rationalität ihrer Verhältnisse. Demgemäß wählt die schöne Architektur lauter regelmäßige Figuren, aus geraden Linien, oder gesetzmäßigen Kurven, imgleichen die aus solchen hervorgehenden Körper, wie Würfel, Parallelepipeden, Cylinder, Kugeln, Pyramiden und Kegel; als Oeffnungen aber bisweilen Cirkel, oder Ellipsen, in der Regel jedoch Quadrate und noch öfter Rektangel, letztere von durchaus rationalem und ganz leicht faßlichem Verhältniß ihrer Seiten (nicht etwan wie 6:7, sondern wie 1:2, 2:3), endlich auch Blenden oder Nischen, von regelmäßiger und faßlicher Proportion. Aus dem selben Grunde wird sie den Gebäuden selbst und ihren großen Abtheilungen gern ein rationales und leicht faßliches Verhältniß der Höhe zur Breite geben[.] (*WWR* II.§35)

S36 Das selbe Princip der Anschaulichkeit und leichten Faßlichkeit verlangt auch leichte Uebersiehbarkeit: diese führt die *Symmetrie* herbei, welche überdies nöthig ist, um das Werk als ein Ganzes abzustecken und dessen wesentliche Begränzung von der zufälligen zu unterscheiden, wie man denn z.B. bisweilen nur an ihrem Leitfaden erkennt, ob man drei neben einander stehende Gebäude oder nur *eines* vor sich hat. Nur mittelst der Symmetrie also kündigt sich das architektonische Werk sogleich als individuelle Einheit und als Entwicklung eines Hauptgedankens an. (*WWR* II.§35)

A3. TEXTUAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 8 (SEMPER)

Passages prefaced by **B** are to Boetticher's *Tektonik*, and to Semper's works are by **S** (*Der Stil*), **KS** (*Kleine Schriften*), and **V** (*Vier Elemente*). For bibliographical details of these works, see CHAPTER 8. Passages are quoted in their order of appearance in CHAPTER 8.

- B25** [D]ie Kunstform [...] tritt als sichtbarer Ausdruck derselben zur Werkform hinzu und vollendet letztere zugleich als Kunstwerk. Kein anderer als dieser innere ethische Beweggrund, jene tatsächlichen Verhältnisse auch bildlich vor Augen zu stellen, hat das Dasein aller Kunstformen hervorgerufen: sie bilden die eigentlichen Attribute eines jeden Gliedes, dessen Werkform von ihnen wie mit einer charakterisirenden Hülle bekleidet wird. In welcher Weise hierbei die Kunstform materiell erwirkt ist, ob aus dem Körper der Werkform zugleich geschnitten, ob diesem besonders angefügt, ändert an ihrem Wesen nichts; immer versinnlicht sie bildlich nur deren Dienstleistung ohne dieselbe materiell zu theilen, stets verhält sie sich zu ihr bloss wie eine Hülle zum Kerne oder zur Kernform. Sinnbezeichnend genug ist von den Alten die Kunstform deswegen *κοσμοζ*, *ornamentum*, *decoratio* genannt, während das Glied *membrum* ist.
- B3** Für den Kreis dieser letzteren Schöpfungen, für die rein bildnerischen Werke, in so fern sie mythologische Ideen, heilige Sagen oder wirkliche Vorgänge darstellen, ist es das Wahrzeichen ursprünglicher Gesundheit des Kunstverständnis der Hellenen, dass sie niemals Ideen und Vorstellungen gefasst haben welche [(a)] nicht zur vollen Klarheit des Bewusstseins gedeihen konnten, oder [(b)] wegen ihrer Ueberschwänglichkeit jenseits der Grenze des irdisch Darstellbaren lagen. Das sentimentale Unterliegen des Gefühles in übersinnlicher Schwärmerei, das passive Verweilen der Einbildung bei undarstellbaren Gedanken, wodurch alle Urtheilskraft des Denkens abgeschwächt und gelähmt wird, kennt der für Mathematik und Philosophie gebor[e]ne Hellene nicht, weder im religiösen noch im weltlichen Kreise seiner Kunstideen – vielmehr setzt er die scharfe Ergründung jedes Vorwurfes durch den eindringen Verstand [...] zum leitenden Grundsatzes alles künstlerischen Schaffens.
- B9** Die Vereinigung aller Glieder zum statischen Systeme, geschieht nach dem Gesetze ihres Beharrungsvermögens im Gleichgewichte. [...] So lange dieses normale Verhältnis jedes Einzelnen unversehrt bleibt, wird auch das ganze System dauernden Bestand haben.
- B9** Die Entwicklung beider Eigenschaften, ihre Benutzung für die Bildung eines Raumbaues, waren Zweck und Absicht [*telos*] der ganzen Gliederung des Werkstoffes zur Herstellung eines statischen Systemes – denn hierdurch nötigthe man das ihm eingeborne, in seinem formlosen Bestande jedoch latente Festigkeitsvermögen, zu dynamischer Äußerung in bewegungsloser Ruhe.
- B10** Jene Anordnung nach dem Gesetze des Gleichgewichtes, verbunden mit Verleihung des Beharrungsvermögens an Ort und Stelle, sind auch das wesentliche Mittel durch welche in den Monumenten die solide Verbindung aller Glieder auf und neben einander erwirkt ist: es diente die eigne Gewichtsschwere, vereint mit dem statischen Drucke der auf ihm ruhenden Lastung, jedes Glied an seinem Orte, auf seiner Stand- und Lagerfläche festzubinden.
- B10** Dies erforderte nothwendig einen absolut innigen Schluss aller Berührungsflächen, der jedes Aufkanten und Kippen bestimmt verhinderte: es musste die gegenseitige Deckung aller einzelnen Steinkörper welche sich berührten, möglichst in einer Vollkommenheit erzielt werden, als seien dieselben aus einem einzigen Monolithen gebildet.
- B11** Die Vollkommenheit des Schlusses selbst, ist durch die sehr einfache und leichte Manipulation des gegenseitigen Verschleifens der Berührungsflächen mittelst des Schleifbleches und nassen Sandes erzielt.

- B11** So findet sich die Fügung der Werkstücke am sogenannte Parthenon auf der Burg zu Athen, besonders an noch erhaltenen Wänden seines Opisthodomos, in einer Vollkommenheit erwirkt, dass kaum die Schneide des Messers vermag in den Fugenschluss der Werkstücke einzugreifen.
- S I, 204** Das Prinzip der Bekleidung hat auf den Stil der Baukunst und der anderen Künste zu allen Zeiten und bei allen Völkern grossen Einfluss geübt.
- S I, 204** Polychrome Anschauung der antiken Architektur und Plastik, wonach sie nicht mehr nackt, in der Farbe des Stoffs, der in Anwendung kam, sondern mit einem farbigen Ueberzuge bekleidet erscheint.
- S I, 213** Bald überbot man diese natürlichen Hilfsmittel der Kunst durch künstliche Vorbereitung des Stoffs, das Färben und die Wirkerei der bunten Teppiche zu Wandbekleidungen[.]
- S I, 206** Der schaffende Genius der Griechen hatte eine edlere Aufgabe, ein höheres Ziel als die Erfindung neuer Typen und Motive der Kunst, die von Alters her auf sie kamen und ihnen heilig blieben; ihre Mission bestand in Anderem, darin nämlich, diese Motive, wie sie dem Stofflichen nach bereits fest fixirt waren, d.h. ihren nächsten gleichsam tellurischen Ausdruck und Gedanken *in höherem Sinne* aufzufassen, in einer Symbolik der Form [...]. Unter diesen alt-überlieferten formalen Elementen der hellenischen Kunst ist keines von so tief greifender Wichtigkeit wie das *Prinzip der Bekleidung* und *Inkrustierung*, welches die gesammte vorhellenische Kunst beherrscht und in dem griechischen Stile keineswegs abgeschwächt oder verkümmert, sondern nur in hohem Grade vergeistigt und mehr im struktiv-symbolischen denn im struktiv-technischen Sinne, der Schönheit und der Form allein dienend, fortlebt.
- S I, 277-8** Wenn dagegen das bekleidende Prinzip eine engere monumentale Verbindung mit der Architektur eingeht, so bedienen sich für die Bezeichnung des ersteren und seiner Applikation sowohl Griechen als Römer ganz besonderer, gerade diesesn Zustand speziell charakterisirender Worte [... wie] *ἐναρμύζειν*, einfügen, [...] die Einfügung bronzener [...] Bildertafeln in die Mauer [...]. Die Lateiner brauchen dafür die Worte *imprimere, includere, | inserere*. Was darunter gemeint war, [...] tritt aber noch deutlicher hervor an den Wanddekorationen römischer antiker Bauwerke, [...] das Verfahren des Einlegens und Täfelns der Wände[.]
- S I, 211** Diese Tradition der Inkrustirung erstreckt sich in der That auf die Gesammtheit der hellenischen Kunst und beherrscht vor allem das eigentliche Wesen der Baukunst, indem es sich keineswegs allein auf die Weise der tendenziös-dekorativen Ausstattung der Flächen durch Skulptur und Malerei beschränkt, sondern die Kunstform im Allgemeinen wesentlich bedingt; beides aber, *Kunstform und Dekoration, sind in der griechischen Baukunst durch diesen Einfluss des Flächenbekleidungsprinzips so innig in Eins verbunden, dass ein gesondertes Anschauen beider bei ihr unmöglich ist*. Auch hierin bildet sie den Gegensatz zu der barbarischen Baukunst, in welcher dieselben Elemente, nämlich Struktur und Dekoration, nach dem Stufengange der höheren Entwicklung mehr oder weniger *unorganisch*, gleichsam *mechanisch* und in eigentlichster materieller Kundgebung zusammentreten.
- S I, 213** Das ursprünglichste, auf den Begriff *Raum* fussende, formelle Prinzip in der Baukunst, unabhängig von der Konstruktion. Das Maskiren der Realität in den Künsten.
- S I, 213** [...] immer bleibt gewiss, *dass die Anfänge des Baues mit den Anfängen der Textur zusammenhängen*.
- S I, 213** Die Wand ist dasjenige bauliche Element, das den *eingeschlossenen* Raum als solchen gleichsam absolute und ohne Hinweis auf Seitenbegriffe formaliter vergegenwärtigt und äusserlich dem Auge kenntlich macht.

Als früheste von Händen producirt Scheidewand, als den ursprünglichsten vertikalen räumlichen Abschluss, den der Mensch erfand, möchten wir den Pferch, den aus Pfählen und Zweigen verbundenen und verflochtenen *Zaum* nennen [...].

Von dem Flechten der Zweige ist der Uebergang zu dem Flechten des Bastes zu ähnlichen wohnlichen Zwecken leicht und natürlich.

Von da kam man auf die Erfindung des *Webens*, zuerst mit Grashalmen oder natürlichen Pflanzenfasern, hernach mit gesponnenen Fäden aus vegetabilischen oder thierischen Stoffen. Die Verschiedenheiten der natürlichen Farben der Halme veranlassten bald ihre Benützung nach abwechselnder Ordnung und so entstand das Muster. Bald überbot man diese natürlichen Hilfsmittel der Kunst durch künstliche Vorbereitung des Stoffes, das *Färben* und die *Wirkeri* der bunten Teppiche zu Wandbekleidungen, Fussdecken und Schirmdächern wurde erfunden.

S I, 214 [...] so bleibt gewiss, dass die Benützung grober Gewebe, vom Pferch ausgehend, als ein Mittel, das 'home', das *Innenleben*, von dem *Aussenleben* zu trennen und als formale Gestaltung der Raumesidee, sicher der noch so einfach konstruirten Wand aus Stein oder irgend einem anderen Stoffe voranging.

S I, 214 Die Gerüste, welche dienen, diese Raumesabschlüsse zu halten, zu befestigen und zu tragen, sind Erfordernisse, die mit *Raum* und *Raumesabtbeilung* unmittel[bar] nichts zu thun haben. Sie sind der ursprünglichen architektonischen Idee fremd und zunächst keine formenbestimmenden Elemente.

S I, 214 Dasselbe gilt von den konstruiren Mauern aus ungebrannten Ziegeln, Stein oder irgend sonstigen Baustoffen, die alle ihrer Natur und Bestimmung nach in durchaus keiner Beziehung zu den räumlichen Begriffen stehen, sondern der Befestigung und Vertheidigung wegen gemacht wurden, die Dauer des Abschlusses sichern oder als Stützen und Träger für obere Raumesabschlüsse, für Vorräthe und sonstige Belastungen dienen sollten, kurz deren Zweck der ursprünglichen Idee, nämlich der des Raumesabschlusses, fremd ist.

KS 394 Außer an den Terrassen, welche das Gebäude tragen, zeigten sie [die Griechen] den Stein nicht [...]. An allen anderen Stellen wurde die Steinkonstruktion durch einen dünnen Stuckbewurf bekleidet, welcher schließlich nach dem alten Prinzip übermalt und ornamentiert wurde.

S I, 214 In allen germanischen Sprachen erinnert das Wort *Wand* (mit *Gewand* von gleicher Wurzel und gleicher Grundbedeutung) direkt an den alten Ursprung und den Typus des *sichtbaren* Raumabschlusses. Eben so sind *Decke*, *Bekleidung*, *Schranke*, *Zaun* (gleich mit *Saum*) und viele andere technische Ausdrücke nicht etwa spät auf das Bauwesen angewandte Symbole der Sprache, sondern sichere Hindeutungen des textilen Ursprungs dieser Bautheile.

S I, 215 [E]s fragt sich nun, was aus unserem Bekleidungsprinzip wurde, nachdem das Mysterium der Transfiguration des an sich ganz materiellen struktiv-technischen Vorwurfs, den die Behausung bot, in die monumentale Form vollendet war und die eigentliche Baukunst daraus hervorging. [...] indem ich hier vorläufig darauf hinweise, wie der Wille, irgend einen feierlichen Akt, eine Religio, ein welthistorisches Ereignis, eine Haupt- und Staatsaktion, kommemorativ zu verewigen, noch immer die äussere Veranlassung zu monumentalen Unternehmungen gibt, [...] Der Festapparat, das improvisierte Gerüst (mit allem Gepränge und Beiwerke, welches den Anlass der Feier näher bezeichnet und die Verherrlichung des Festes erhöht, geschmückt und ausgestattet, mit Teppichen verhangen, mit Reisern und Blumen bekleidet, mit Festons und Kränzen, flatternden Bändern und Trophäen geziert), ist das Motiv des bleibenden Denkmals,

welches den feierlichen Akt und das Ereignis, das in ihm gefestigt ward, den kommenden Generationen fortverkünden soll.

S I, 216 So auch entstand der so charakteristische Theaterbaustil noch zu geschichtlichen Zeiten aus dem Brettern aber reich geschmückten und *bekleideten* ([note:] Die reich inkrustierten Proscenien der provisorischen Theater zu Rom sind aus Plinius und Vitruv bekannt.) Schaugerüst.

Es war mir bei der Ausführung dieser Beispiele vorzüglich darum zu thun, auf das Prinzip der *äusserlichen Ausschmückung* und Bekleidung des struktiven Gerüsts hinzuweisen, das bei improvisirten Festbauten nothwendig wird und die Natur der Sache stets und überall mit sich führt, um daran die Folgerung zu knüpfen, dass dasselbe Prinzip der Verhüllung der struktiven Theile, verbunden mit der monumentalen Behandlung der Zeltdecken und Teppiche, welche zwischen den struktiven Theilen des motivgebenden Gerüsts aufgespannt waren, auch ebenso natürlich erscheinen muss, wo es sich an frühen Denkmälern der Baukunst kund gibt.

S I, 216-217n3 Ich meine das *Bekleiden* und *Maskiren* sei so alt, wie die menschliche Civilisation, und die Freude an beidem sei mit der Freude an demjenigen Thun, was die Menschen zu Bildnern, Malern, Architekten, Dichtern, Musikern, Dramatikern, kurz zu Künstlern machte, identisch. Jedes Kunstschaffen einerseits, jeder Kunstgenuss andererseits, setzt eine gewisse Faschungs-laune [sc. *Verkleidungs-laune* - SK] voraus, um sich modern auszudrücken, | - der Karnevalskerzendunst ist die wahre Atmosphäre der Kunst. Vernichtung der Realität des Stofflichen ist nothwendig, wo die Form als bedeutungsvolles Symbol als selbständige Schöpfung des Menschen hervortreten soll. Vergessen machen sollten wir die Mittel, die zu dem erstrebten Kunsteindruck gebraucht werden müssen und nicht mit ihnen herausplatzen und elendiglich aus der Rolle fallen.

S I, 217-218n. Das *Maskiren* aber hilft nichts, wo *hinter* der Maske die Sache unrichtig ist, oder die Maske nichts taugt; damit der Stoff, der unentbehrliche, in dem gemeinten Sinne vollständig in dem Kunstgebilde vernichtet sei, ist noch vor allem dessen vollständige Bemeisterung vorher nothwendig. Nur vollkommen technische Vollendung, wohl verstandene richtige Behandlung des Stoffs nach seinen Eigenschaften, vor allem aber Berücksichtigung dieser letzteren bei der Formgebung selbst, können den Stoff vergessen machen, können das Kunstgebilde von ihm befreien, können sogar ein | einfaches Naturgemälde zum hohen Kunstwerke erheben. Dieses sind zum Theil Punkte, worin des Künstlers Ästhetik von den Symbolikern und auch von den Idealisten nichts wissen will [...]. Wie auch die griechische Baukunst das Gesagte rechtfertigte, wie in ihr das Prinzip vorwalte, das ich anzudeuten versuchte, wonach das Kunstwerk in der Anschauung der Mittel und den Stoff vergessen macht, womit und wodurch es erscheint und wirkt, und sich selbst als Form genügt, dieses nachzuweisen ist die schwierigste Aufgabe der Stillehre.

S I, 210 Diese Werke fallen nämlich in dieselbe Zeit, wo auch die Baukunst der Hellenen das uralte überlieferte Prinzip des Bekleidens nicht mehr materiell, sondern nur noch symbolisch und in vergeistigter Weise beibehält, während vorher sowie nachher, vorzüglich seit Alexander, dasselbe Prinzip in mehr barbarischer Realistik sich geltend macht und in Rom sogar mit einem neuen Bauprinzip, wonach die Steinkonstruktion als formgebendes Element auftritt, in Konflikt tritt.

S I, 218-219 Nicht minder wichtig, aber bei weitem schwieriger, ist es zu ermitteln, durch welche Übergänge die eigentliche Baukunst, und mit ihr die bildende Kunst allgemein betrachtet, in der Benützung der Stoffe zu bildlicher Darstellung hindurch ging und welche von diesen Mitteln die früheren, welche die späteren waren, die in Anwendung kamen. Es ist hier zunächst nur von den Stoffen selbst, nicht von der Art ihrer Verwerthung die Rede. Das Bedeutsame dieser Frage für die Geschichte des Stils ist leicht ersichtlich. Jeder Stoff bedingt seine besonere Art des bildnerischen Darstellens durch die Eigenschaften, die ihn von andern Stoffen unterscheiden und

eine ihm angehörige Technik der Behandlung erheischen. Ist nun ein Kunstmotiv durch irgend eine stoffliche Behandlung hindurchgeführt worden, so wird sein ursprünglicher Typus durch sie modificirt worden sein, gleichsam eine bestimmte Färbung erhalten haben; der Typus steht nicht mehr auf seiner primären Entwicklungsstufe, sondern eine mehr oder minder ausgesprochene Metamorphose ist mit ihm vorgegangen, Geht nun das Motiv aus dieser sekundären oder nach Umständen mehrfach graduirten Umbildung einen neuen Stoffwechsel ein, | dann wird das sich daraus Gestaltende ein gemischtes Resultat sein, das den Urtypus und alle Stufen seiner Umbildung, die der letzten Gestaltung vorangingen, in dieser ausspricht. Auch wird bei richtigem Verlaufe der Entwicklung die Ordnung der Zwischenglieder, die den primitiven Ausdruck der Kunstidee mit den mehrfach abgeleiteten verknüpfen, zu erkennen sein.

S II, 338 Die rückwirkende Festigkeit der angewandten Stoffe ist diejenige ihrer Eigenschaften, die bei der Mauer am meisten in Anspruch genommen wird. Neben dieser bildet die Kohäsion, d.h. die relative Festigkeit (der Widerstand gegen Kräfte, die senkrecht auf die Längsachse der Strukturtheile gerichtet sind), ein zweites Strukturmoment[.]

S II, 350 Bei den Alten wurden sie [die Fugen] oft durch Faren von den Spiegeln unterschieden, ja sogar vergoldet. Bekannt ist die, allerdings unklar, Mittheilung des Plinius über die goldeingefassten Quader einer Cellamauer zu Kyzikos. Man darf sie dekorativ als Band, als Saum, auch als Naht behandeln, z. B. einen Mäander oder ein Flechtwerk herumführen. [...] Auch sind [die Verankerungen der Quader] einer dekorativen Behandlung fähig, wie es manche schöne Beispiele aus dem Mittelalter darthun. Das Prinzip ist dabei leicht fasslich. Die Alten vermieden, wie ich zeigte, derartigen Schmuck der Mauer, der die absolute Haltbarkeit der letzten zweifelhaft erscheinen macht.

S II, 199 Die Kunst des Zusammenfügens starrer, stabförmig gestalteter Theile zu einem in sich unverrückbaren Systeme[.] [...] Dieser aber, nämlich der *fortwirkende* unmittelbare Einfluss der Zimmerei auf den Stil der Baukunst, ist nur dann in seiner wahren Bedeutung zu fassen, wenn wir, von den ältesten Typen, die aus der Zimmerei hervorgingen, ausgehend, die neuen Motive und die Umbildungen dieser Typen, wie sie in dem Laufe der Geschichte der Technik und Kunst eintraten, verfolgen.

S II, 200 Nun sind aber diese Wurzelformen der Tektonik viel älter als die Bukunst und bereits in vormonumentaler Zeit an dem beweglichen Hausrath zu vollster und sehr ausgesprochener Entwicklung und Ausbildung gelangt, ehe die heilige Hütte, das Gottesgehäuse, das monuemntale Gezimmer seine Kunstform erhielt. [...] Dieser wichtige Sachbestand [...] beweist ein für allemal den müssigen Streit über die vitruvianische Holzhütte, als angebliches Vorbild und rohestes Motiv des Tempels für dessen Gesamtform und seine architektonischen Glieder. Sie beseitigt auch andere Theorien, die erst in neuester Zeit auftauchten, wonach der vollendete dorische Tempel ohne Vorbild und Antecedens, aus den materialisten Erfordernissen des angewandten Stoffes, nämlich des Steines, wie Pallas Athene, vollständig gewappnet und gerüstet hervorging. ([Fn.1:] Am weitesten geht hierin der Architekt Viollet Le Duc, der die cylindrische Form der Säulen aus dem Vortheile herleitet, den diese Form den Steinbrechern gewährt, da die Säulentrommeln bequem von den Brüchen herunter gerollt werden!) Der Tempel bleibt immer ein Pegma, ein Gezimmer, in dem eben bezeichneten Sinne, sei er aus Holz oder aus Stein erbaut, aber ihre Kunstformen haben beide, der hölzerne wie der steinerne Tempel, weder aus sich heraus 'erbildet', noch von einander entlehnt, sondern mit Pegmen gemein, die das Hausgeräthe bereits viel früher mit ihnen eigenthümlichen Kunstformen bekleidet worden waren. Diese Typen erfahren in dem monumentalen Gerüste allerdings grosse Umwandlungen, aber dieses nur, insoweit der neue Zweck, der neue Stoff, vornehmlich aber der nun entstandene Gegensatz zwischen dem beweglichen Hausrath und dem unbeweglichen Baue sie herbeiführen und

nothwendig machen. Aber die Kunstformen, mit denen man den Hausrath umkleidete, ehe die monumentale Kunst sie annahm, sind ihrerseits ebenfalls nicht primitiv, sondern zusammengesetzt und in gewissem Sinne entlehnt.

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
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
*I have made many mistakes in the past and will doubtless make more in the future.
Anyone who points them out to me is my friend.* – Gregory Vlastos (†1991)



THIS BOOK IS ABOUT THE MORALITY OF ARCHITECTURE. IT IS MORE PRECISELY ABOUT MORALIZING BUILDINGS. PEOPLE TALK ABOUT ARCHITECTURE MORALLY ALL THE TIME – BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW AND IF ARCHITECTURE IS MORAL. NOR IS IT CLEAR WHAT PEOPLE MEAN MOST OF THE TIME WHEN THEY TALK ABOUT ‘THE ETHICS’ OR ‘THE MORALITY’ OF ARCHITECTURE. SOMETIMES MORAL TALK ABOUT ARCHITECTURE IS ABOUT A BUILDING, SOMETIMES ABOUT THE ARCHITECT – AND AT OTHER TIMES IT IS ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE YET. IF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS INCREDIBLY DIVERSE HERE, SO IS THE ROLE OF SUCH TALK. MORAL TALK ABOUT BUILDING COMMISSIONS DECIDES THEIR FATE, SOMETIMES SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE. MORAL TALK DECIDES THE PUBLIC FAVOUR OF ARCHITECTS, AS IT SCANDALIZES SOME AND GLORIFIES OTHERS. MORAL TALK WRITES HISTORY. AND MOST OF ALL, MORAL TALK STICKS. WE DO NOT QUITE KNOW HOW TO PARSE IT, OR HOW TO GET RID OF IT. AND WE CERTAINLY DO NOT KNOW WHEN IT IS VALID. IN FACT, WE HAVE NO IDEA IF ANY OF IT EVER IS.

WE THEREFORE NEED WAYS TO TEST SUCH TALK MORE SYSTEMATICALLY. WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT SUCH STATEMENTS ARE REALLY ABOUT, WHEN THEY ARE MEANINGFUL, WHAT IS BEHIND THEM, AND WHAT THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR TRUTH ARE. WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND HOW TO DISARM SUCH STATEMENTS, WHEN NECESSARY – AND HOW TO BACK THEM UP, WHEN REQUIRED. WHAT WE NEED, IN SHORT, IS AN ETHICS OF ARCHITECTURE, AND THIS BOOK PROVIDES ONE. IT TELLS US HOW TO SYSTEMATICALLY TEST MORAL STATEMENTS ABOUT ARCHITECTURE. AND IT EXPLAINS HOW ARCHITECTURE CAN BE MORAL, WHEN IT IS. FOR OTHERWISE WE WOULD NOT EVEN KNOW WHAT TO TEST FOR.

SPANNING THE WORKS OF VITRUVIUS, CICERO, KANT, SEMPER, MIES VAN DER ROHE, LE CORBUSIER, AND OTHERS, THIS WIDE RANGING STUDY ARGUES FOR THE CONTINUITY OF A MORAL OUTLOOK ACROSS TWENTY CENTURIES OF ARCHITECTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE WEST. DRAWING ON STATE OF THE ART RESEARCH IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, **THE BIRTH OF ETHICS FROM THE SPIRIT OF TECTONICS** ARGUES FOR A RADICAL REVISION OF WHERE PHILOSOPHY AND ARCHITECTURE MEET.



STEFAN KOLLER STUDIED PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AND WORKED AT ARCHITECTURE OFFICES IN MUNICH. HE CURRENTLY HOLDS A RESEARCH POSITION AT THE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF DELFT.