

Interdisciplinary Value Theory

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Interdisciplinary value theory

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Dedication

To Tanja, my ultimate value.

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1 Introduction – The many faces of value

Values are ubiquitous, important, and an unavoidable element of human life. To take some mundane examples: Whenever people come together to talk about societal and political issues, the conversation will, at some point, turn to values. People pick romantic partners (partly) based on whether their values match. Often enough, people make political election choices based on the values that a party or candidate represents. Indeed, whether people identify as liberals or conservatives is a matter of personal values. Furthermore, when people make major life decisions, like whether or not to start a family, where to live, or what job to take, they consider the implications of these choices for their values.

Values are deeply personal, but they also have a social dimension. Take as examples the Coronavirus pandemic and the topic of climate change. Both issues relate to important public and social values, like social security, public health, consideration for people in need, and solidarity with future generations. The pandemic and climate change highlight that political and social conflicts are often conflicts of value. Social issues often involve debates about which values are most important in a society. Stemming a pandemic and battling climate change requires that values and interests are weighed because it is often impossible to realize all values, and compromises are necessary.

The different responses of countries to the pandemic and climate change also bring out that values are culturally and socially embedded. That is to say, cultural norms, habits, and social and political institutions all stabilize particular value systems. That is why values can take a long time to change and why changes in social institutions, like laws and conventions, often accompany value change.

Considered together, all the examples above illustrate three critical aspects of value. First, value is personal. That means values are linked to personal identity and self-concept. The kind of person somebody is, what decisions somebody makes, and the attitudes one takes towards things are partly defined by values. Often, people explain and justify their beliefs and actions by referring to their values. For instance, ‘I don’t eat meat because it is incompatible with my values’.

Second, value is social. People are social animals that do not live in a social vacuum, which means other people influence their thinking and behavior. Society affects what values people endorse, and people are often socialized into value sets shared by others in their surroundings. Family and social institutions play a huge role in developing personal values as they reinforce existing societal norms and standards. Furthermore, values shape social interactions and how people interpret these social situations. Social interactions, in turn, stabilize the value system of society.

Third, value is cultural. That means that group members share values, and there is a cultural variability of values. What is considered good and important can differ between social groups. Value is also cultural in another sense. Members of a group or society express value commitments to each other in distinct cultural forms. For instance, values are exemplified in norms, rituals, and value-laden objects and symbols, like totems and monuments.

The fourth aspect of value has to do with conceptual and metaphysical questions. Philosophers like Reinhard Pauls' and William Frankena (Frankena, 1967; Pauls, 1990) have highlighted that people can have different things in mind when they use the word 'value'. Most importantly, we need to distinguish between value and valuation. People may use 'value' in the sense of object value, referring to an object's worth. For instance, when we say that a movie has artistic value, we assign value to an object (the movie). Frankena calls this notion '*value as concrete noun*'. This is to be distinguished from a more abstract notion of value, where value is the standard used to evaluate something. For instance, when people say 'I have my values', they use value as a standard, or what Pauls calls '*value-as-criterion*'. There is yet another sense of value because value can also mean 'to value something'. Frankena calls this notion '*value as a verb*'. For instance, we use value as a verb when we say that we appreciate or value a movie because of its artistic elements.

The distinction between value and valuation brings out important theoretical considerations. For instance, we can inquire how the different value concepts relate. Furthermore, we can also ask what makes something good or which properties make something valuable. Another possible question that arises from

the distinction between value and valuation is whether something can have value if nobody ever values it. One may wonder whether (and if so, in what sense) there is value over and above people's valuing attitudes. After all, the existence of subjective valuing attitudes and the fact that people value different things are less controversial than claiming that objective value exists. All of this indicates that the topic of value comes with abstract metaphysical and conceptual questions.

To recap, the topic of value has personal, social, and cultural dimensions, and it comes with conceptual and metaphysical implications. These four dimensions of value (loosely) correspond to four crucial academic disciplines that have focused their theoretical and empirical attention on value(s): psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. The chapters of this book will review how these four academic disciplines define, theorize about, and conduct research on value.

Psychology. While also considering social and cultural aspects of value(s), psychology often considers value through the lens of personality and from a *personal perspective*. As a science of the human mind and behavior, psychologists are interested in how value(s) shape people's personal beliefs and behavior. As we will see in more detail, psychology stresses the relation between value, personality, and self-concept. Psychology is also more interested in value as valuation.

Sociology. In sociology, value is predominantly theorized and investigated from a *social perspective*, which includes a focus on how people interact in social contexts and how social structures, like family or class, influence the actions of individuals. Because values shape social behavior, sociologists are interested in the role of value in society. One crucial question in sociology is how society shapes individuals and their values and how the actions of these individuals, which are motivated and influenced by values, shape society.

Anthropology. Anthropology considers value from a *cultural perspective*. That means that anthropologists are interested in collective differences in what people value. Additionally, they investigate the cultural forms through which people

express value(s) and try to account for how people create and preserve value(s) in a cultural setting.

Philosophy. Recall that the topic of value is related to *metaphysical* and *conceptual questions*. These questions fall within the purview of philosophy. Among other things, philosophers have addressed questions about whether values are real and objective and how different kinds of values relate to one another.

These four disciplines take a distinctive perspective on the world and focus on different dimensions of value. Consequently, the four disciplines ask different questions about value. The disciplines have also developed their own value theories and conceptualizations of value.

The different approaches to and conceptualizations of value reflect the different epistemic goals of the disciplines. However, the consequence of this plurality is a “balkanized nature of the research” (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 359). One must sift through idiosyncratic accounts with deep historical roots to learn about how other disciplines think about value. This makes it very difficult to get a good overview. In addition, value accounts of another discipline can be hard to understand because they are often steeped in jargon. These difficulties may discourage scholars from considering what other academic fields can offer, which can hinder mutual learning.

This book wants to ameliorate disciplinary balkanization and highlight how different disciplines think about value. The aim is to provide an introduction and overview of value theory and research in sociology, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. The hope is that this will support the conversation between disciplines and thus contribute to an enhanced understanding of value(s). Paying attention to how other fields investigate and conceptualize value promises to be mutually enriching because more interaction and cross-pollination can help to refine conceptual tools and improve value theories.

The debates about value within one discipline have often reached a very high level of abstraction. Even introductory texts within a discipline usually start from a certain level of conceptual understanding and often presuppose the mastery of jargon. To support interdisciplinary exchange, this book provides an

accessible guide to the value theories of the disciplines mentioned above – without assuming background knowledge in any of the four disciplines. To achieve this goal, the chapters provide an overview of how psychology (chapter 2), sociology (chapter 3), anthropology (chapter 4), and philosophy (chapter 5) approach value. Specifically, the chapters will introduce theories and conceptualizations of value that are crucial for developing value theory in the discipline. Because thinking does not occur in a vacuum, the chapters will also include some empirical research.

Because the issue of value is multifaceted, we need the effort of multiple disciplines to understand value. To make theoretical progress, scholars must get out of their disciplinary silos and should not neglect perspectives from other disciplines. Paying attention to how different disciplines approach the topic of value is the first step toward a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and improved understanding of value. To further this understanding, the last chapter will highlight in more detail the overlap between the different disciplines and what they can learn from one another. Bringing disciplines together is the first step towards crossing disciplinary boundaries, resolving conceptual differences, and increasing interdisciplinary communication.

An important caveat is that it is not the goal to give an exhaustive representation of all the details of the accounts of value. The text provides as much detail as is necessary for a general understanding. The hope is that this will make the text accessible to readers from all academic backgrounds and can serve as a valuable resource for scholars who want to learn how other disciplines think about value.

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2 Psychology and value

Psychology has a long history of theorizing about people's values, and this chapter will present essential and influential psychological theories of value. In the chapter, we will also look at how psychologists distinguish different kinds of values and how they distinguish value from related concepts, like attitudes. The chapter ends with an overview of how psychologists have approached value change.

It is crucial to remember that most psychologists nowadays distinguish value (singular) from values (plural). Value (singular) is a quality attributed to an object or inherent in an object. Most psychologists are interested in values (plural), which are the broad motivational goals, guiding principles, or abstract ideals that people consider important. It would be more apt to talk about the psychology of values instead of the psychology of value¹.

2.1 *Introduction to psychology*

The psychological investigation of value picked up pace in the middle of the 20th century. That was when Gordon Allport and Philip Vernon proposed their psychological theory of value, which became one of the most influential accounts of value. Ever since Allport's and Vernon's proposal, the investigation of value has been a staple of psychological research. This does not mean there was no fluctuation in the interest of value. Between the 1970s and 1990s, values did not play a crucial role in mainstream psychology, although there was some work on the periphery, e.g., by Milton Rokeach, which would later become influential.

Before we turn our attention to psychological accounts of values, it is worthwhile to consider some of the historical precursors of the psychological study of value. During the phase when psychology consolidated as an academic discipline in the 19th century, philosophy had a considerable influence. Most psychologists at the time engaged with philosophy, and many scholars worked at the intersection of (early) psychology and philosophy. Although their thoughts continue to shape both philosophical and psychological theorizing, their contribution often goes unacknowledged in current research on value.

¹ I am indebted to Shalom Schwartz here. One of his remarks on the draft convinced me to address this distinction.

Two of these influential but almost forgotten scholars are Herman Lotze and Wilhelm Windelband. Both made many contributions to psychology and philosophy, and in what follows, we will briefly consider their contributions to value theory.

Let us start with Herman Lotze, a 19th-century German physician, and philosopher. Lotze was an early pioneer of scientific psychology and inspired many philosophers, including John Dewey, whom we will encounter later. According to George Pierson (Pierson, 1988), Lotze was the first philosopher who used the term ‘value’ philosophically, but his concept of value is difficult to reconstruct because he synthesized ideas of many philosophers, like Kant and Hegel, and because his remarks on value are scattered throughout his work.

The general idea of Lotze is that value is a guiding principle that is both universal and objective. According to Lotze, values are objective because they do not depend on subjective attitudes in response to something. Although values are inherent in things, they can present themselves to the subject, and subjective states are crucial because objective values present themselves in our experiences of things and events through feelings of pleasure and pain. As Pierson puts it, according to Lotze, “[v]alues are made known to the mind through feelings” (Pierson, 1988, p. 117). Following Lotze, other philosophers also stressed the crucial role of feelings in the apprehension of value. One example is Max Scheler, whose ideas we will encounter later.

Another scholar who greatly influenced the psychological study of value is Wilhelm Windelband, who is considered the father of modern psychology. Windelband makes the crucial distinction between valuation and value. Value and valuation need not coincide, and the same thing, or state of affairs, can illicit different modes of valuation and value judgment. Windelband, like Lotze and many others, stresses the relationship between subject and object. Evaluations express the relationship between the evaluating subject and how the object is represented in feelings of approval or disapproval. He writes: “Value ... is never found in the object itself as a property. It consists in a relation to an appreciating mind [...] Take away will and feeling and there is no such thing as value” (Windelband, 1921, p. 215). With this statement, Windelband anticipates the

link between feeling, emotion, and value, which most current psychological accounts of value stress.

Windelband is not the only scholar to point out the connection value, emotions, and feelings. According to 19th- and 20th-century philosopher Max Scheler (Scheler, 2014), our faculty of 'Wertfühlen' (value-feeling) gives us access to objective value. He takes feeling (German: Fühlen) to be an affective perception. Value-feeling has a cognitive function in that value relations, like the relation of being-better-than, are given to us also immediately.

Scheler also proposed a universal order of values and claimed that value categories could be ranked by importance. According to Scheler, this hierarchy of values does not change, and there are four different kinds of values available to humans. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, we encounter sensual values (whether something is agreeable or disagreeable), followed by vital values (whether something promotes life or not). Higher up are mental values only accessible to entities with a mind. Mental values include the sense of beauty and ugliness, the appreciation of something as right and wrong, the ability to distinguish true or false, and the ability to love and hate. At the top level, we find what Scheler calls the values of the holy (and the unholy).

We can distinguish the higher and lower levels of values. For instance, the higher mental values are more enduring. For example, the sensual pleasure of food is fleeting, but the beautiful painting endures. Also, the lower values are more dividable than the higher values. For example, splitting a beautiful painting in half will erase its value, whereas dividing delicious food will not erase its sensual value. Furthermore, the higher values facilitate a higher quality of pleasure detached from mere pleasure.

Values, so Scheler, are organized hierarchically, and there are also specific feelings that correspond to each level of value. For the sensual value of agreeableness, the lowest level, there are feelings of pleasure and pain. Vital values are connected to feelings like liveliness, being glad, being disgusted, or anxiety. The mental values are linked to aesthetic feelings, like the experience of beauty or feelings of joy and sorrow. Lastly, the values of the holy are connected to feelings of bliss or hopelessness.

Before we turn to Vernon and Allport's first psychological account of value, let us consider Franz Brentano, arguably one of the most influential figures in psychology and philosophy. Brentano attempted to combine philosophy and psychology² systematically, and one of his greatest achievements is the popularization of the concept of 'intentionality'. Emotions play a crucial role in Brentano's account of value. Brentano did not believe objective value properties exist (Montague, 2017). Goodness and badness are not properties of external objects, and terms like 'good' and 'bad' do not refer to anything. Individuals must arrive at the concept of goodness/ badness through some internal perception. An individual needs a specific kind of experience to know value. To represent something as good or bad, according to Brentano, requires an emotional experience because our concept of 'good' originates from emotional experience (Montague, 2017, p. 84).

There is no denying that philosophers like Brentano and Scheler greatly influenced the development of psychology in general and the development of psychological accounts of value in particular. We can see this influence in the first genuine psychological theory of values, to which we will now turn.

2.2 Value in psychology

Philip E. Vernon and Gordon Allport (Vernon & Allport, 1931) developed the first psychological value theory. Vernon and Allport took inspiration from the work of German philosopher and psychologist Eduard Spranger, who was working in the tradition of Franz Brentano. Spranger proposed that there are six so-called value orientations and that these value orientations help us to distinguish six primary personality types: the theoretical, the economic, the aesthetic, the social, the political, and the religious personality type. Persons with different personality types are motivated by different goals. For instance, a theoretical person is primarily interested in and motivated by the discovery of truth and knowledge creation. Somebody who is mainly a political person is predominantly interested

² In a nutshell, Brentano claimed that every mental state takes an object beyond itself. That is, a mental state is 'about' something. For instance, a belief is about some state of the world and a desire means to desire something. The intentional object of a mental state can be another mental state as well. For instance, we can have beliefs about our beliefs.

in power. It needs to be emphasized that these personality types are ideal types and that people's personality is often a mix of different value orientations.

Drawing on Spranger's idea about the connection between values and personality, Allport and Vernon proposed that values are the key to a psychological investigation of personality. They suggested that we must focus on values if we want to grasp individual personality as a coherent system instead of as a sum of isolated aspects. The idea here is that how people evaluate things reflects their personality. According to Vernon and Allport, values are the fundamental convictions about what is and is not important in life, and people's evaluative attitudes reflect their values³. For Allport and Vernon, value is a combination of (1) an interest that motivates the initiation and maintenance of behavior, and (2) an evaluative attitude that influences the perception and evaluation of things⁴.

After Vernon and Allport introduced their psychological account of value, which links values to personality, other psychologists consolidated the link between personality and value. Two other very influential theories of value followed in the footsteps of Vernon and Allport because they consider value within the framework of personality theory and self-concept. The first is Milton Rokeach's theory of value, and the second is Shalom Schwartz's theory. Because his account is historically prior, we will focus on Rokeach first.

Rokeach bases his theory of value (Rokeach, 1973) on the idea that personality is a concentric system. In this system, beliefs about oneself and one's values are at the center. At the core are beliefs about oneself (self-conception), and values are the next layer of the system. As we move towards the periphery of the personality system, there are beliefs and attitudes about the world, people, and events. Less important beliefs are farther away from the center. Values, then, are of utmost importance to the person.

³ They use the terms 'value attitudes' and 'evaluative attitudes' interchangeably.

⁴ Based on their notion of value, which was inspired by Spranger's idea of value orientation, Vernon and Allport developed one of the first psychological questionnaires for personal value. Their value questionnaire measures the preference for the above-mentioned six types of values and yields the relative strength of the six values.

Because he thinks that personality is a system of beliefs, it is no surprise that Rokeach thinks of value in terms of beliefs. According to him, values are “enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence” (Rokeach, 1973, 5). Note that this definition is that it links values to justifications for judgments and behavior.

For Rokeach, there are two main types of values: terminal values (or end-state values) and instrumental values. Terminal values are desirable end-states, and instrumental values are preferable modes of behavior, or means to achieve terminal values. Examples of terminal values include self-respect and pleasure, and examples of instrumental values are politeness and courage.

For Rokeach, values are universal, and he proposed that all people have the same set of 36 values, which comprises 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values. Although there are only 36 universal values, people can differ in their hierarchy of values. That means people vary in the relative importance they give to values. For instance, two people can believe that honesty is important, but for one, honesty is more important and carries more weight in decision-making. Rokeach thought that the hierarchy of values makes people who they are. In other words, the hierarchy of values is a crucial part of people’s identity.

Milton Rokeach’s value theory influenced the thinking of many psychologists, including Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992), who adapted and refined Rokeach’s approach. Schwartz’s account of personal value is one of the most influential and widely used psychological theories of value today. The theory combines Rokeach’s idea of values as desirable goals with Allport’s and Vernon’s idea that values are interests and evaluative attitudes⁵.

Building on these previous psychological accounts of value, Schwartz proposes that values have seven features⁶. First, Schwartz retains Rokeach’s

⁵ Shalom Schwartz pointed out to me that his account focuses on desirability. Although preference is implicit in Schwartz’s account of the hierarchical organization of value, the account allows that two, or more, values are equally important to a person.

⁶ Some of these features are reflected in the definition of value that Schwartz sometimes includes in his publications. For instance, “I define values as desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity” (Schwartz, 1994, 21). In another publication he suggests this definition: “I define values as conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organizational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their action and evaluations.” (Schwartz, 1999, 24)

idea to think about values in terms of beliefs, and he suggests that values are beliefs linked to emotions.

Second, these beliefs are about desirable goals or end-states, and they motivate action. There is widespread agreement in psychology that values are crucial for the motivation of behavior. People want to realize and preserve the goals that align with their values, and actions that contribute to these goals are more attractive to people. For instance, people vote for parties they think will advance goals linked to their personal values (Caprara et al., 2006).

The third feature of values as beliefs about desirable goals is that values transcend specific actions and situations. That means a value is stable in that it will be important in all situations that have implications for that value⁷. A value can be more or less important in a situation, depending on whether the value is relevant. Values are not like a fixed point of importance but more like fundamental tendencies with a spectrum of variability⁸.

Fourth, values are standards for evaluating actions, people, and events. We evaluate our actions and the actions of others based on whether they promote or block the attainment of a desired goal or end-state. Also, when we think about the future, we evaluate events and actions according to their potential implications for our values.

Fifth, Schwartz proposes that people's values form a relatively stable hierarchical system ordered by relative importance. This proposal of a value hierarchy reflects the influence of Rokeach, who, as you will recall, also proposed a hierarchy of values⁹.

Sixth, the influence of values on everyday decisions and actions is rarely conscious and transparent to the acting person. Values usually operate in the background but can be made explicit through reflection.

The seventh feature of values in Schwartz's value theory is that values can compete with one another. The relative importance of multiple, sometimes

⁷ I would like to thank Shalom Schwartz for urging me to be more precise here.

⁸ I would like to thank Gregory Maio for bringing to my attention this interpretation about the stability and variability of value. For more on change in individual value priorities and the variability of value systems, please see Seligman and Katz (1996).

⁹ The crucial difference between Rokeach and Schwartz is that Rokeach assumed that every value can be ranked as either more or less important than every other value.

competing values guides the interpretation of a situation or action. When multiple values are essential to a person, they must make trade-offs between them. To take an everyday example, a person who values hedonistic activities and financial stability may have to make a trade-off because driving a car is enjoyable (hedonism), but it also has implications for financial stability. In a nutshell, Schwartz (1992) proposes that values are desirable trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles that can vary in importance, depending on their relevance to the situation.

Recall that Rokeach, Allport, and Vernon all proposed lists of values. Schwartz also has a list of basic individual value categories. The idea behind basic value categories is that while there is a multitude of value terms, these value terms fall into basic categories. That is to say that all value terms have a specific location in a system of value categories. Schwartz uses the concept of '*basic values*' for these value categories. The fundamental values (value categories) include security, hedonism, power, and benevolence. Basic values can be distinguished by their goals. For instance, security is a basic value that aims to ensure the safety and stability of society, relationships, and the self. The basic value of hedonism has as its goal excitement and novelty. The basic value of power has the goal of social status, prestige, and dominance over people, whereas the value of benevolence has as its goal the welfare of the group¹⁰.

On a higher level of abstraction, so Schwartz, we can cluster the basic values into four higher-order values: openness to change, self-transcendence, self-enhancement, and conservation. These four higher-order values reflect fundamental conflicts between values. For example, the higher-order value of self-transcendence concerns basic values that express concern for other people (e.g., benevolence). In contrast, the higher-order value category of self-enhancement includes basic values focused on personal needs, like achievement.

One of Schwartz's innovative suggestions is that the internal structure of the value system (i.e., how values relate to each other) is universal and the same for all people. Values are related to one another based on how motivationally

¹⁰ This list is subject to revision and recently Schwartz refined his model and now distinguishes between 19 basic values (Schwartz et al., 2012).

compatible or incompatible they are. Some values are motivationally compatible, like security and tradition, whereas others, like tradition and hedonism, are motivationally opposed. For instance, the values security and tradition are motivationally compatible because both are characterized by order, self-restriction, and reluctance to change. Focusing on the compatibility and incompatibility of values yields a segmented circular structure. Compatible values are located next to each other, and incompatible values are further away or on opposite sides of the circle. A person's value system has an internal structure determined by the conflicts and compatibilities between values. Although basic and higher-order values are universal, people can differ in the importance of values. For instance, some people find achievement important, while others find benevolence more important.

Empirical studies support Schwartz's value theory. For example, plenty of cross-cultural studies could corroborate the claim that the meaning of values and the circular structure of values is consistent across cultures (Schwartz, 2011). So, it seems that there is a set of universal values that all people share. Furthermore, researchers could repeatedly show that values are systematically related. So, when one value becomes important, the value(s) next to it in the circular structure also increases in importance.

In contrast, the value(s) on the opposite side of the circle decrease in importance (Bardi et al., 2009; Maio et al., 2009). For example, consider the motivationally compatible values of security and tradition, which sit next to each other in the circular value system. When the importance of security increases for a person, then the importance of tradition increases simultaneously. When the importance of tradition increases, the importance of motivationally incompatible values, like hedonism, which sits across tradition in the circular structure, decreases in importance.

It is no understatement to say that the value theory of Schwartz is the most widely used account of value in psychology. Still, there are other theories on the market. For instance, one of the most recent value theories is the so-called functional theory of value developed by Valdiney Gouveia and colleagues

(Gouveia et al., 2014). This theory synthesizes elements from earlier value theories, including the accounts of Schwartz and Rokeach.

According to the functional theory, values have two kinds of functions. First, values guide our actions; second, values are cognitive expressions of needs. Regarding action guidance, the functional theory differentiates values based on the orientation of the pursued goal. There are personal goals, social goals, and central goals. Personal goals focus on the individual, whereas social goals focus on the individual as part of a social group. The central goals strike a middle ground between social and personal goals. Central goals can simultaneously support the individual goals and social goals.

The functional theory proposes that values guide behavior and are expressions of needs. According to the functional theory, humans have two kinds of needs. First, people have so-called thriving needs, and second, people have survival needs. Survival needs are needs related to the survival of the individual or the survival of the group. For instance, needs focused on physiological and psychological survival, like food and health, are survival needs. Thriving needs are needs concerning intellectual and emotional stimulation. According to the functional theory, values express survival or thriving needs.

To remind you, the functional theory distinguishes values by their action-guiding function, related to three goals (personal, social, and central), and whether they express thriving or survival needs. This distinction yields a matrix of six fundamental values. So, like previous value theories, the functional theory proposes that humans have a set of fundamental values. These basic values are the following: (1) excitement values (the focus is on personal goals, and they express thriving needs like pleasure), (2) supra-personal values (with a focus on central goals, and they express thriving needs relating to abstract ideas like aesthetics, cognition, and self-actualization), (3) interactive values (focus is on social goals and they express thriving needs like belonging and affiliation), (4) promotion values (focus is on personal goals and they express survival needs), (5) existence values (here the focus is on central goals and survival needs like physiological needs and needs for security), and (6) normative values (where the focus is on social goals and they express survival needs like security and control).

Because the functional theory of value is relatively new, the scientific jury is still out on whether this account of value has advantages over other, more established accounts.

Based on the value theories reviewed, most psychologists consider values *abstract* entities. For instance, Allport, Rokeach, and Schwartz think values are abstract ideals that guide behavior. Some psychologists, however, stress that we should pay attention to the concrete dimension of value. Gregory Maio (Maio, 2010), for instance, proposes that a satisfying understanding of value, and a complete account of their role in people's lives, requires that we consider how values are interpreted and applied in concrete situations. To put it poetically, we must focus on how people infuse values with life.

Furthermore, people often express values in abstract terms, like loyalty or honesty. Just because two people endorse the same value does not mean that both have a similar interpretation of this value. Also, even if people have the same abstract idea of a value, they can differ in how they think it should be realized and achieved. This difference is why Maio thinks "values are abstract ideals that are best understood concretely" (Maio, 2016, p. viii). Maio suggests that values are mental representations and that we can consider three levels of abstraction. There are systems of abstract values, specific abstract values, and, lastly, some values are concretely instantiated (Maio, 2010, 9). As we will see in the next section, this abstract-concrete distinction echoes Kurt Lewin's idea that values are more abstract than aims and that the former influences the latter. Also, in the chapter on sociology and values, we will encounter Talcott Parsons, who had some ideas about how abstract values relate to concrete goals.

2.3 Values and related concepts in psychology

Psychologists focus on many mind-related phenomena related to values, but that we should not conflate with them. It may be worthwhile to say a little more about how values can be distinguished from other psychological constructs, like goals and attitudes. Let us look first at the distinction between values and goals.

We pursue various goals throughout the day and during our life, and the values we endorse inform some of these goals. What is the difference between

values and goals, and why is it important to distinguish these two? Kurt Lewin was one of the first to distinguish between values and goals (Lewin, 1951)¹¹. According to Lewin, we can never reach our values because they are ideals. Instead, in our actions, we try to realize concrete goals based on our definition or perception of a situation. These perceptions and interpretations, in turn, are influenced by our values.

Here is an example of how values relate to goals and interpretations of situations: Let us assume that a person values loyalty. Because loyalty is one of their values, this person will notice when a situation has implications for loyalty, depending on whether the person interprets the situation as loyalty-relevant. The person will also interpret some actions as a realization of the value of loyalty (whereas they consider other actions as realization of disloyalty). Based on the interpretation of a situation as loyalty-relevant and the characterization of possible actions, the person will aim to act to realize the value of loyalty. Lewin's theory is a multi-layered account that links the abstract constructs of values to the immediate aims of actions¹².

Many psychologists consider values to be a crucial part of personality and an essential part of the self-concept (Hitlin, 2003). We can distinguish values from other constructs, like attitudes, that are relevant to the identity of people. Although attitudes can express values, we should not conflate the two. For instance, Milton Rokeach (Rokeach, 1968), the psychologist who considered values to form the center of the self, stressed that both values and attitudes influence social behavior, but only values can influence attitudes. He defines attitude as an organized whole of multiple beliefs focused on a specific object (either a physical or social object or a concrete or abstract object) or a situation. Some beliefs that make up an attitude concern matters of fact (descriptive), whereas other beliefs are evaluative. Put differently; an attitude is a cluster of

¹¹ Lewin's view on values is encapsulated in this quote: „Values influence behavior but have not the character of a goal (i.e., of a force field). For example, the individual does not try to “reach” the value of fairness, but fairness is “guiding” his behavior [...] In other words, values are not force fields, but they “induce” force fields“ (Lewin, 1951, p. 41)

¹² Lewin's ideas about the relation between values and concrete goals influences empirical research. For instance, Bas Verplanken and Rob Holland (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) used a framework inspired by Lewin to investigate the relation between value and behavior.

beliefs that includes claims that certain things are true/ false and claims that some things are desirable/ undesirable.

Rokeach was not the first psychologist to compare values and attitudes, and there are many studies on the interrelations, commonalities, and differences between attitudes and values. For instance, attitudes are specific judgments focused on an object, whereas values are abstract and trans-situational, as Schwartz would put it. Furthermore, values are more relevant to people's self-concept than attitudes (Hanel, Foad, Maio, 2021).

Besides goals and attitudes, we can distinguish values from traits, which are also crucial aspects of personality. Traits are enduring dispositions or tendencies to exhibit consistent patterns of thought, feeling, and action. Traits delineate how people are like, whereas values denote things that people find essential or desirable (see Roccas et al., 2014). Nevertheless, there are some commonalities between traits and values. For instance, traits and values are stable (Maio, 2010). Nevertheless, there are significant differences. For example, people do not usually use traits to justify their actions (although they may use traits to explain their actions). Justifications require reasons, and people take values to be reasons.

2.4 Distinctions between values: Personal values and cultural values

Psychologists often refer to the following features to characterize personal values (e.g., see (Sagiv et al., 2017)): Personal values are cognitive representations of broad and trans-situational motivational goals. At this point, one may worry that thinking of values in terms of personality is too limiting because values have an interpersonal and cultural dimension.

Although psychologists have mainly concentrated on personal values, this does not mean that they have ignored cultural aspects. Some psychologists distinguish between personal and cultural values and between personal value systems and the value system of groups, sometimes called 'ideological value system' (Rohan, 2000, p. 265).

What are cultural values? Robin Williams (Williams, 1970) claims that cultural values are implicit, or explicit, abstract ideas about what is good, right,

and desirable shared and pursued by members of a group¹³. Social institutions often reflect the values of a society. For instance, a collective's norms, practices, rituals, and symbols are based on and express shared cultural values (Schwartz, 1999). For example, stressing the deeds of heroes in stories or rituals instills the importance of valor in group members (More on rituals, culture, and value in the chapter on anthropology).

The Dutch psychologist Geert Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001; Orig. 1980) conducted one of the earliest studies of cultural value, and his work is considered a classic in cultural psychology. Using an analogy inspired by computer science, Hofstede suggests that culture is “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (p. 9). For Hofstede, the concept of mind is rather broad and includes feeling and action. The collective programming, or culture, manifests itself in people’s preferences and in a group's symbols and rituals. A value, according to Hofstede, is a “broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (p. 5). Values, then, cannot be directly observed but must be inferred from people’s behavior and preferences. Note that Hofstede, like many other psychologists, thinks of value in the plural sense as the things that people or a social group find desirable or important¹⁴.

Psychologists are aware that the notion of culture is fraught with difficulties. For instance, there is disagreement among psychologists as to whether culture is external to the individual or whether culture is something that resides within individuals. Some cultural psychologists propose that we should think about culture as exclusively located in the mind of individuals (e.g., Wyer et al., 2009)¹⁵. In contrast, Shalom Schwartz has argued that cultural value orientation is a hypothetical and latent feature of a society or group, that is not located in individuals’ minds. Schwartz proposes that culture is a “press” (Schwartz, 2011,

¹³ What it means for value to be ‘shared’ is controversial. There is empirical research that suggests that within societies there is more value variance at the individual level than variance between societies at the cultural level (Fischer, Schwartz, 2010).

¹⁴ Hofstede believed that individuals and collectives can hold values. Similar to the value system of an individual, the values of a collective are hierarchical. Societies, groups, and cultures can be distinguished based on which values many, or most of their members emphasize.

¹⁵ As we will see in the chapter on anthropology, the anthropologist Louis Dumont seems to make a similar claim. He proposed that culture resides in mental structures.

470 f.) that affects attitudes and beliefs via practices, language, expectations, and social constraints. Cultural values, so Schwartz (Schwartz, 2014), must be inferred from social institutions and manifestations, like beliefs, symbols, norms, and practices, that are prevalent in society.

2.5 Value Change

Psychology is concerned with how people think and behave. How people think and act, however, can change over time. People also change how they judge things. The 16-th century French philosopher Montaigne expressed this eloquently: “Never did two men judge alike about the same thing, and it is impossible to find two opinions exactly alike, not only in different men, but in the same man at different times” (Montaigne, 1957, 816f.). If judgments and beliefs can change, it is sensible to ask whether values can change.

Although it is intuitive to think that people change their values, researchers find that people usually perceive their values to be stable and immutable (Roccas et al., 2014), and, as we have seen, many psychologists believe that values are a part of personality and people’s self-concept. Challenging your values is uncomfortable and has implications for your sense of self. Therefore, Gregory Maio and James Olson (Maio & Olson, 1998) suggest that values are like ‘truisms’ because they are rarely questioned or challenged. People are more inclined to change their beliefs about things that are not important to them and not linked to their personalities.

Although people perceive their values to be stable and rarely challenge their values, there is empirical evidence that personal value change occurs (Maio, 2010). For instance, with the help of experimental manipulations that rely on self-persuasion, psychologists could increase the importance of so-called benevolence values (Arieli et al., 2014). These values relate to concerns for the welfare of those with whom we identify and can be expressed in helping others. The increase in the importance of benevolence values persisted up to a month after the experimental intervention.

Some value change involves cognitive effort, but sometimes value change happens automatically. Milton Rokeach’s (Rokeach, 1973) method of value self-

confrontation is a voluntary and effortful attempt to change values. Rokeach believed that people tend to overestimate how competent and moral they are. When individuals are presented with feedback about a mismatch between their values, what they expect from themselves, and their behavior, they will be troubled. Some people will adapt their values to reduce this negative affective state and achieve consistency between their self-image and reality. There is some empirical evidence that using the method of value self-confrontation can change people's values (Grube et al., 1994).

Most value change likely happens involuntarily when people mature and have experiences, like when life's trajectory takes a turn. For instance, when people immigrate to another country, their value system adapts to the value system of their new home (Bardi et al., 2014).

It seems then that value change can happen via conscious processes, which are more reflective and effortful, and non-conscious automatic processes. To reconcile the conscious and non-conscious modes of value change, Anat Bardi and Robin Goodwin (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011) proposed an integrative framework. They present five factors that can facilitate value change or change in the importance of values: priming, adaptation, identification, consistency maintenance, and direct persuasion. Let us consider priming, which involves no effort by the subject, and persuasion, which requires effort. Priming, when an alternative way of thinking about a situation is activated unbeknownst to the person, can contribute to short-term value change (Gardner et al., 1999). It is important to note here that priming activates a concept(s) and will likely not lead to a long-lasting substantive value change. Activating a concept via priming leads a person to temporarily judge a value to be more important in that situation¹⁶. Persuasion, in contrast, involves an effort by the subject because it invites individuals to reconsider and change their values. For instance, education and social campaigns, like animal rights activism, are attempts to persuade people to consider changing their values¹⁷.

¹⁶ I am grateful to Gregory Maio for illuminating this issue for me.

¹⁷ Of course, different factors, like how socially entrenched the old values are, influence how successful these attempts will be.

Societal value change can happen within a couple of years. For example, investigating the value orientation of Turkish youth from 1989 to 1995, Meral Çileli (Çileli, 2000) discovered that the value orientation became more individualistic and competitive. We can explain this change as an adaptation to the changes in the socio-economic situation in Turkey. Values don't always change that quickly, however. For example, Central and Eastern Europe witnessed considerable and extensive political and social changes after the collapse of the communist regimes. If people adapt their values to changes in external circumstances, one expects to find a shift in values. However, Schwartz, Bardi, and Bianchi (Schwartz et al., 2000) could not find that these external social and political changes significantly affected people's values, even 5-6 years after the collapse.

The available psychological studies of short-term value change suggest that value change follows a predictable pattern: When a value increases in importance, the opposite values, with opposite motivational goals, become less important. This pattern of change is in line with Schwartz's proposal that values are systematically related. For instance, when people perceive a threat, the self-protection values, like security and tradition, become more important, and values like openness to change decrease in importance. Researchers observed this type of change in Finnish students in 2011, after the terrorist attacks of September 11 (Verkasalo et al., 2006). This value change, however, was only brief. Besides threats to bodily security, economic insecurity is another threat related to self-protection and well-being. In a cross-national and comparative study of young Europeans' change in value priorities after the global financial crisis, Florencia Sortheix and colleagues (Sortheix et al., 2019) found a shift from growth and self-expansion values, like hedonism, to self-protection values, like security and tradition. Again, the change in the importance of values reflects the pattern predicted by Schwartz's model.

Not all changes in values are short-lived. Psychologists could observe longer-lasting value changes after significant life transitions and changes because of education. For instance, in a longitudinal study, Anat Bardi and colleagues (Bardi et al., 2014) looked at three major life transitions: the vocational training

of police recruits, the education of psychology and business students, and the migration of people from Poland to Great Britain. They found that people's values adapt to fit the new life situation¹⁸. Most pronounced was the value change after immigration to another country. Bardi and collaborators speculate that moving to another country affects many different aspects of life.

There is also evidence that values change continuously throughout life (Gouveia et al., 2015). Values reflect people's psycho-social dimension (e.g., a teenager has different psychological and social needs than a 50-year-old), and changes in this psycho-social dimension facilitate changes in values. For instance, when people get older and sensory abilities and energy decline, values related to new stimuli and sensation-seeking decline in importance (Gouveia et al., 2015). To reiterate, almost all the studies on value change throughout life show that the change is systematic. The increase in the importance of one value is accompanied by the rise in related, which means motivationally similar, values, whereas opposing values decrease in importance.

We have seen that education and changes in life's trajectory, or social circumstances, like immigration (Bardi et al., 2014), can influence people's values. Some of these changes in an individual's life are related to societal shifts and economic development. For instance, it seems that both socioeconomic factors and living conditions influence the value structure of individuals (Fischer et al., 2011).

If people's values are closely tied to their economic and social situation, one would expect that a change in values accompanies economic changes. Indeed, researchers could show that economic development and accompanying social changes, like urbanization, lead to a change in value because people adapt their value system to new circumstances. For instance, by using Google Books Ngram Viewer, a tool to chart the occurrence of words in a large corpus of texts, Patricia Greenfield (Greenfield, 2013) found that between 1800 to 2000, word use related to individualistic and materialistic values increased in frequency. This increase in frequency reflects the growth in urban populations and the decline of rural

¹⁸ Which does not mean that people change their value consciously. Although, as we have seen with self-persuasion, people can make an effort to change their values.

populations. Community-focused values relating to obligation, duty, and welfare of others, are more conducive to life in rural communities. In contrast, materialist individualist values that focus on individuality and personal property are better suited for urban environments with less tightly knit social relations.

Besides the influence of economic development on values, psychologists have considered other potential factors that can facilitate value change. For instance, Patricia Greenfield (Greenfield, 2009, 2016) presents an account that focuses on the implications of social change for values. Greenfield's theory considers multiple levels: On the top level are sociological variables, like sociodemographic factors, and the middle level is cultural variables, like collectivistic or individualistic values or hierarchical and egalitarian gender relations. The two bottom levels comprise psychological variables, like socialization practices and learning environments, which can lead to behavioral shifts.

According to Greenfield, there is a dominant direction of social change in the world. This change includes the shift from rural to urban, from less technology to more, and from less to more wealth. Greenfield links these dominant trends to changes in social values. Novel socialization practices and learning environments (the bottom levels, see above), which can lead to new patterns of behavior and psychological changes, reflect these changing values.

The idea of a link between socio-economic development and value change is a key feature of modernization theory, which claims that changes in the value system accompany the economic development of societies. For instance, industrial societies transformed into postmodern societies over time, and the rise of humanitarian and emancipatory values accompanied this shift (Inglehart, 1997). The relation between socio-economic development and values need not be a one-way street because values may also facilitate economic development. Some authors cautiously state that there is support for the idea that some cultural values promote economic development (Allen et al., 2007). The next chapter on sociology and values will introduce modernization theory in more detail.

2.6 Summary

This chapter introduced important historical precursors, like Herman Lotze, Wilhelm Windelband, Max Scheler, and Franz Brentano, who shaped psychological theories of value. Then, the chapter described influential psychological theories of value, specifically the theories of Philip E. Vernon and Gordon Allport, Milton Rokeach, and Shalom Schwartz. The chapter also considered the recent functional theory of value (Valdiney Gouveia). Most psychologists take value to be abstract motivational goals that transcend situations and that systematically relate to one another. Psychologists distinguish values from other concepts, like attitudes and traits. The last part of the chapter focused on psychological research concerning value change. People's values are not fixed, and studies show that people adapt their values to shifting social and economic circumstances.

Psychologists are aware that humans are social beings. They acknowledge that values are crucial for social interaction and cooperation. Psychologists are also mindful that culture influences individual values. Thinking about the relationship between society and the individual is within the purview of sociology. As we will see in the next chapter, thinking about this relationship has always meant thinking about value.

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3 Sociology and value¹⁹

3.1 *Introduction to sociology*

Since its inception in the 19th century, sociology has taken a keen interest in the relationship between values and society. Sociologists have always considered values to be crucial for social groups and society. For instance, Émile Durkheim, the founding father of sociology, was aware that values are connected to norms and behaviors, and differences in values can explain the differences between groups. Max Weber, another father of sociology, called values the “hapless problem child of our discipline” (Oakes, 1988, p. 40) but devoted much of his writing to examining values and their role in social action. Weber introduced two influential ideas to sociology. First, there are different value spheres and, second, there is a difference between value rationality and instrumental rationality.

As we delve deeper into value theories of sociology, it will become clear that psychologists and sociologists have overlapping interests. Especially social psychology and sociology are closely related. Social psychologists and sociologists want to know how the individual relates to the group and society. However, social psychology and sociology ask similar questions but have different focuses. Whereas psychologists focus on the internal psychological mechanisms and how the social influence behavior and decisions, sociologists focus on social relationships, groups, and social processes. Despite these differences, it is common for sociologists to draw on insights from other disciplines, including social psychology, to make sense of the social world.

This chapter will review influential sociological theories of value and how sociologists distinguish values from related concepts. One section will be devoted to sociological approaches to value change.

3.2 *Value in sociology*

Value has always played an essential part in sociological theorizing. One needs to proceed with caution here because there is a distinction between value (singular) and values (as abstract plural noun). Value in the singular is about an

¹⁹ I would like to express my gratitude to Steven Hitlin and Nathalie Heinich, who provided valuable feedback.

ultimate end, whereas values (plural) are principles. Some authors do not make it entirely clear whether they talk about value or values, and we will see this shortly when we focus on Max Weber's ideas about value. The focus has shifted over the years, and many sociologists concentrate on values (plural) as legitimizing and guiding principles (Martin & Lembo, 2020). There has also been a 'pragmatist turn' from values to valuation in sociology. Building on the ideas of pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, pragmatist approaches shift attention from value to valuation and concentrate on the processes by which people attribute value to something (Heinich, 2020). Accordingly, we must distinguish between sociological accounts that focus on values as guiding principles and accounts that focus on valuation.

With these distinctions in mind, let us turn to German sociologist Max Weber, probably best known beyond sociology for his treatment of the relationship between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism (Weber, 2002). Weber provided one of the most influential but hard-to-understand accounts of the role of value in society. His main contributions to sociological value theory are the notion of value spheres and the distinction between value rationality and instrumental rationality.

Alas, Weber's elaborations about value are hard to follow, and as Michael Cuneo has put it, "Weber's treatment of this subject is unsystematic and without concentrated focus." (Cuneo, 1990, p. 84). Nevertheless, it is possible to outline the crucial elements of Weber's account and the role he thinks values play in modern society. Weber diagnoses that rationalization and intellectualization, in the shape of science and technology, have dissolved universal standards and objective values in modern society. What is left, according to Weber, is a plurality of irreconcilable values (Weber, 1981, pp. 148–149).

What does Weber mean when he talks about value? Recall the distinction between value and valuation introduced above. Weber seems to think about values in terms of valuation. Things are subjectively valued, and subjects believe their valuation has validity, but for Weber, there is no objective value. He writes that "[w]e ascribe 'value' to an item if and only if it can be the content of a

commitment: that is, a consciously articulated positive or negative ‘judgment,’ something that appears to us to ‘demand validity’” (Weber, 1975, p. 182).

Because there is no objective value, Weber thinks that values (the ultimate ends of actions) are non-rational. This means that the choice of which values to endorse is a matter of subjective preference and that a conflict between values cannot be settled rationally. For instance, for Weber, there is no rational reason why someone should endorse the value of truth over the value of beauty.

Alasdair MacIntyre has put it like this: “Questions of ends are questions of values, and on values reason is silent; conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 26).

However, rationality still plays an important role, and Weber distinguishes between instrumental rationality and value rationality. Rationality here refers to an actor’s subjective orientation towards an act. Instrumental rationality, in a nutshell, is the kind of rationality where the actor considers objects and other people as the means to achieve or realize their ends. Instrumental rationality is not limited to means and ends, however. Instrumentally rational actions may focus on obstacles that need to be removed to achieve a particular end.

By contrast, value rationality means that the actor is oriented towards unobservable and subjectively endorsed ultimate values. The subject considers value rational actions as expressions of values or as an enactment of a value (Weber, 1981, pp. 151–154). That means value-rational actions are not taken because of their consequences but because they are “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior independently of its prospects of success” (Weber, 2013, p. 25).

According to Weber, the modern Western world is split into different areas, or domains, of value rationality²⁰. He uses the term ‘*value spheres*’ to refer to these domains. Weber (Weber, 1981, Chapter 13) distinguishes seven value spheres: religious, familial, political, economic, scientific, aesthetic, and erotic love. Weber

²⁰ For Weber, the value spheres of the modern West are contingent on historical development, particularly the rise of Christianity. What he says, then, is that other historical and cultural developments, and other religions, could have produced different ultimate values and hence value spheres.

distinguishes and defines the different value spheres by their ultimate values²¹. Each value sphere is characterized by one ultimate value to which people orient their actions. For instance, the ultimate value of the economy is to maximize financial gain. In politics, the ultimate value is domination by coercion based on force. The ultimate value of the domain of science is the production of truths based on factual evidence. The ultimate value of religion is care.

The value spheres, so Weber, are independent of one another and incommensurable. That means that the value spheres have their internal logic and “each one of these fields may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, and what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another” (Weber 1920/1992, 27.). Each value sphere claims to be the ultimate ground from which the values of the other value spheres derive, which means that other value spheres are subordinated. Because the principles of each value sphere are incommensurable, the “value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other” (Weber, 1981, p. 147).

Weber’s ideas about value and value spheres influenced generations of sociologists. Raymond Boudon, for instance, used Weber’s ideas to understand how values affect social action and how value is related to the meaning of actions. In the book *The origin of values* (Boudon, 2001), Boudon presents his account of axiological rationality, which is strongly inspired by Max Weber. In contrast to Weber, Boudon is explicit about what he means by value. For Boudon, values are explicit normative beliefs. For instance, someone may endorse the normative belief that ‘democracy is good’. His model of value expands the conventional rational choice model, which focuses on instrumental reasoning. The concept of axiological rationality, Boudon’s translation of Weber’s German ‘Wertrationalität’, not only points to the fact that people conform to internalized values but also indicates that axiological beliefs are grounded in strong reasons. Axiological beliefs are meaningful to actors, and they are meaningful because, for the actor, they are grounded in convincing and strong

²¹ At one point, Weber says that each sphere is the domain of a god, which only underscores that the values he has in mind are ultimate. It also indicates his assumption that ultimate values are arbitrary and that the ultimate values of value spheres cannot be justified from within; they are a leap of faith.

reasons (Boudon, 2001, p. 103). An action, so Boudon, can have meaning to an actor for instrumental reasons but also because the action is based on values.

After Weber, scholars in the tradition of structural functionalism²² advanced the sociological theory of value. Particularly the ideas of 20th-century American sociologist Talcott Parsons on the role of values in society greatly influenced sociology²³. Parsons translated some of Weber's writings into English, and Weber's ideas had a considerable influence on his thinking on values. Parsons introduced Weber to American sociology, and he also put the notion of value on the map (Martin & Lembo, 2020). Parsons wanted to differentiate sociology from economics and proposed that value considerations distinguish sociological models of action from economic accounts. The normative order, to Parsons, is separate from mere individualistic means-ends calculations that economists focus on.

Parsons believed that values play a crucial role in the stability of society (Parsons, 1991). He argued that members of society internalize a limited set of core values provided by society. People orient and organize their actions and thoughts around these core values. Parsons rejects objectivizing notions of value. According to him, values are not objects but conceptions of the desirable that guide human behavior and choice. Values are abstract and general, which means they are not specific to particular situations. Parsons's ideas about value resonate with psychological notions of value as abstract trans-situational goals.

Besides introducing value to sociology, Parsons was also one of the first authors of sociological theory to distinguish values and norms (Spates, 1983, p. 32). Whereas values are trans-situational and abstract goals, norms guide concrete situations. They tell you what you should and should not do. The value is about a desirable end, whereas norms tell you how to achieve this end. According to the functionalist idea of value, values are abstract. Still, they influence the norms of society, which in turn affect people's behavior. Core

²² Structural functionalism is the position that society is a system, much like an organism. The parts of this system, like institutions, roles, and norms, have a function and all parts depend on one another for their existence and all parts contribute to the persistence of the whole system.

²³ Scholars have pointed out multiple problems with Parsons's view, and functionalism has fallen out of favor (for more on the difficulties of Parsons's account, see Miles, 2015 and Spates, 1983). For instance, society is not as stable as the structural-functionalist account assumes. Furthermore, the theory makes highly abstract claims that are hard to check empirically, and empirical research casts doubt on the structural-functionalist assumption that people are always rationally motivated.

values, which members of a group share, have a double function. On the one hand, they provide internal motivation for the people who have internalized them; on the other hand, they ground social norms that keep up the social order.

Recall that Max Weber argued for the crucial place of ultimate values in the sociological understanding of social action. Parsons wanted to contribute to this understanding. In a 1935 essay entitled “The place of ultimate values in sociological theory”, Parsons proposes an account of how individual human action is embedded in society. He maintains that if we want to explain human action, our explanation must include ultimate ends. Please note that Parsons uses the terms ‘ultimate ends’ and ‘ultimate values’ interchangeably.

Ultimate ends are ends in themselves, which means they are not means to another end. To Parsons, the system of ultimate ends can include empirical and transcendental ends. We can investigate empirically whether an empirical end has been attained, which means we can determine whether we have reached it. In addition to these empirical ends, humans are motivated to pursue transcendental ends, which are “outside the empirical sphere” (Parsons, 1935, p. 290). We cannot determine by empirical observation if we have achieved these ends. Eternal salvation, for instance, is a transcendental end in this sense. It is important to note that although transcendental ends are outside the empirical sphere, their achievement implies empirical ends as means. Would they not implicate empirical ends, the transcendental ends would lose their connection to our actions; they would not even be ends because we could do nothing to realize them²⁴.

Parsons notes that people do not randomly choose their ultimate ends and the means to achieve them. People are social animals, and society provides a “common system of ultimate ends” (Parsons, 1935, p. 299) from which individuals choose. Parsons was well aware that there is a diversity of value systems and that sociology should acknowledge this plurality. He proposes that focusing on systems of ultimate values helps us to understand the social life of

²⁴ Because transcendental ends have this connection to empirical ends, empirical and scientific knowledge are important. Although scientific knowledge alone cannot determine the ends that we should strive for, once the ends are set, science can help us choose the best means to attain these ends. Ends are outside of the scientific analysis and science can only help to evaluate whether the means are appropriate and to what degree the end has been achieved.

different societies. He gives the example of ancient Greek civilization, which focused on the value of the polis, and societies in the Middle Ages, which focused on values related to the church (ibid., 296). We can understand these societies by focusing on the ultimate values that shaped them.

According to Parsons, ultimate ends (ultimate values) relate to actions in two ways. First, an ultimate end can serve as the actor's immediate end. This is an instance of Max Weber's value rationality (or axiological rationality), where action is oriented towards subjectively endorsed ultimate values. Parsons gives the example of a general's actions in a religious war when the general is a true believer, as opposed to a hired gun. Second, ultimate ends and actions can be indirectly related. He acknowledges that the pursuit of immediate ends can be "removed by a very large number of intermediate links from any system of ultimate ends" (ibid., p. 298). The example he provides is that of a coal miner. The mined coal can contribute to railway transportation, which may be the ultimate end. However, the miner's action is removed from the ultimate value of railway transportation. The question is how the pursuit of immediate ends integrates with ultimate values in a system of action.

Parsons's answer is that pursuing immediate non-ultimate ends is linked to ultimate values via institutions. Institutions are the normative rules ensuring that individual actions conform to the ultimate value system. Institutions define what immediate ends should or should not be pursued and restrict the means that can be used to achieve them. Actors, so Parsons, adhere to institutions for two reasons. First, the institution may have inherent moral authority because it is derived from the common system of ultimate values. Second, actors may conform to institutions because it serves their interest, for instance, to acquire social esteem or to avoid sanctions.

In his writings, Parsons wanted to carve out values' role in action and to provide an account of the relationship between society, ends, and means. He also acknowledged the variety and plurality of value systems that influence human action. All of this made his ideas attractive beyond sociology. For instance, his proposal that values are abstract ideas has influenced anthropological approaches to values, for example, the influential account of the social

anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn (Kluckhohn, 1951). According to Kluckhohn, a “value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (Kluckhohn, 1951, 395). We will consider Kluckhohn’s research on values later in the chapter on anthropology and value.

Although eminent and influential scholars like Max Weber and Talcott Parsons focused their attention on the issue of value, the popularity of the concept of value in sociology fluctuated. Robert Wuthnow reviewed the sociological study of values between the 1950s and early 2000s. He divides sociological attention to value into three periods (Wuthnow, 2008). In the first period, from the 1950s to the 1970s, value took a central role in sociology, with many empirical studies investigating values and value differences across countries and social groups.

Only some scholars shared enthusiasm for the topic of value. For instance, Franz Adler (Adler, 1956) critically assesses the concept of value at the time. He reduces the value concepts used in sociological writings to four basic types: (1) values considered as absolutes (e.g., eternal ideas); (2) values as inherent in the object, whether it is material or immaterial; (3) values as located within man (either in individuals or the group); and (4) values as identical with actions of man²⁵.

According to Adler, sociology should be ‘natural science sociology’ that needs a behaviorist approach and must always refer to observable behavior. Accordingly, “...action is the only empirically knowable aspect of value” and “... for the purpose of sociological scientific discourse, values and actions may safely be treated as identical” (Adler, 1959, 276; 279). Hence, Adler argues that value in the sense of (1) is not a suitable focus for sociology because it is not accessible through the methods of natural sciences but only via intuition and speculation. Similarly, notions of (2) and (3) are not suitable for the methods of natural sciences either because we cannot discover value by observing them directly.

²⁵ Adler contends that there can be mixed types. For instance, absolutes may be inherent in objects.

Between the late 1970s and 1980s, many scholars followed Adler and took a skeptical stance toward value. Some scholars even questioned the usefulness of the concept of value. Ann Swidler (Swidler, 1986), for instance, claimed that values are of little explanatory worth, and she criticized the dominant view at the time that values, or ultimate goals, play a central causal role in shaping human action.

The debate about the usefulness of the notion of value for sociology is still ongoing, and some sociologists would like to retire the concept. Recently, John Levi Martin and Alessandra Lembo (Martin & Lembo, 2020) proposed that sociologists should reject the notion of value to advance the sociological theory of action. The concept of ‘value as abstract principle,’ so Martin and Lembo, does not help to predict what people will do. Furthermore, researchers often use value as a placeholder for everything that causes behavior, which leads to conceptual inconsistencies²⁶. Martin and Lembo recommend replacing the concept of value with the notion of interest. However, not all scholars agree that sociology can and should do without the notion of value. For instance, Andrew Miles (2015) claims that values are a crucial part of motivating culture that can predict actions. Because of the supposed explanatory power, Miles suggests that sociologists include values in their theories of culture and action.

After the first and second phases of the sociological study of value and the slump in sociological interest in value, the investigation of value picked up again in the late 1980s. Sociologists studied the distribution of values, the link between value and economic development, and focused on value conflicts. This period also witnessed massive surveys on value. For instance, in the 1980s, Ronald Inglehart initiated the massive World Values Survey. The World Values Survey is a global research project that measures values and beliefs in almost 100 countries²⁷. Below, we will consider modernization theory in more detail in the section on value change.

²⁶ Their critique of the concept of value does not apply to all value theory in sociology. As Stephen Vaisey (2021) correctly points out, Martin’s and Lembo’s criticism of the concept of values is aimed at a Parsonian conception of value and it seems to miss the mark when it comes to contemporary value research.

²⁷ The World Values Survey is not the only large-scale collection of human values. Since 2002, the European Social Survey maps the attitudes, beliefs, and values in European countries every two years. This data allows social scientists to track the development and change of values over time and relate value change to economic and political change. For an overview of some recent findings, please see The Human Values Scale. Findings from the European Social Survey (2021). Available here: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/ESS_Findings_HVS.pdf.

3.3 *Values and related concepts*

Conceptual confusion lurks whenever people think and write about value. For instance, writing in the 1970s, Pat Hutcheon (Hutcheon, 1972) noticed a lot of confusion in sociology because scholars used the term ‘*value*’ to refer to many different things. For instance, scholars used value to refer to norms, cultural ideals, assessments of action, beliefs, objects, value orientations, behavior possibilities, or generalized attitudes. Fortunately, sociologists also tried some terminological housekeeping. An early attempt comes from Jay Meddin (Meddin, 1975), who extracts the main themes from the literature on value. Meddin uses these themes to create a framework to organize the terminology. He notes a hierarchical continuum from the concrete to the abstract. For instance, value orientations, as introduced by Clyde Kluckhohn and colleagues (Kluckhohn, 1951), are more abstract than concrete values and the former are the organizing principles for the latter. Similarly, values are more abstract than attitudes, and attitudes are more abstract than opinions.

Some sociologists, like Boudon, also draw a difference between value and preference. Compared to preferences, so Boudon, values are axiological beliefs that have attached to them a feeling of universality, or what he calls a “trans-subjective dimension” (Boudon, 2001, p. 124). That means we expect others to endorse the same axiological beliefs. In contrast, we do not feel that others should endorse our preferences, and we accept that they have vastly different, and even opposite, preferences. For Boudon, the difference between axiological belief and preference is grounded in the fact that we perceive our beliefs as grounded in reasons and because we expect others to be convinced by these reasons.

Despite attempts to clarify the value concept and to distinguish it from related concepts, some authors, like Nathalie Heinich, note that many scholars still conflate values with norms, traits, and beliefs (Heinich, 2020). However, there are attempts to remedy this situation²⁸. Drawing on works from sociology and social psychology, Steven Hitlin and Jane Allyn Piliavin (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004) propose that compared to attitudes, values are focused on ideals, and

²⁸ Not all sociologists agree that these attempts have been successful. See Martin and Lembo (2020).

values are more abstract. Furthermore, values are more durable than attitudes; we do not expect our values to change because values are a significant part of who we are. Although traits are stable aspects of our personality, they are more like enduring dispositions, whereas values are enduring abstract goals. In contrast to norms, values are trans-situational, extending across situations. Because values are a part of personality, they are perceived as intrinsically motivating, whereas people often perceive norms as an external force that puts pressure on our behavior.

3.4 Value change

Sociologists were always interested in change. For instance, influential authors like Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx have focused their attention on social changes, like the transition from pre-modern to modern capitalist society. Because of this interest in change and value's role in sociology, one would expect to find sociological theories of value change. However, it is astonishing that there is scarcely anything written on the theory of value change and the temporal dimension of values (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004).

There are notable exceptions to this lack of theoretical attention to value change. For instance, Pat Hutcheon (Hutcheon, 1972) proposed one of the earliest sociological models of value change. In the account, Hutcheon focuses on the relationship between the individual's value system and the group's so-called ideological system. An individual's value system, which for Hutcheon is a particular organization, or constellation, of values, is a defining aspect of the self. The individual value system includes normative and descriptive beliefs, which means beliefs about what is good and right, and beliefs about what is real. Similarly, the ideological system of the group comprises a knowledge system and a normative system. The first includes factual knowledge, and the second contains norms and ideals.

The individual's value system and the group's ideological system shape individuals' actions and thoughts.²⁹ For instance, the culture's ideals partly

²⁹ For a schematic rendering of the model of how value system and ideological system relate to one another see Hutcheon, 1972, p. 183

determine how the individual evaluates things and what the individual thinks is good or bad.

Crucially, the individual value system and the ideological system of the group are not static, and they can influence one another. So how do values change according to Hutcheon's model? She assumes that humans, like other organisms, are affected by environmental changes. The environment here includes both the natural environment and the social environment. The individual value system must adapt to these environmental changes (p. 182). Hutcheon was inspired by Thomas Kuhn's ideas about paradigm shifts in science (Kuhn, 1996). When a paradigm continuously fails to solve problems, it is replaced by one that does a better job.

Similarly, Hutcheon suggests that because the environment changes, people encounter problems that the old ways of thinking cannot solve. Consequently, the knowledge system adapts to the changes, and people create new paradigms of thought. Thus, the changes in the knowledge system will lead to transformations in the value systems. Alas, Hutcheon does not provide details about how changes in the knowledge system transform the value system.

Other scholars have tried to provide a more fine-grained account of the relation of macro-level changes to micro-level individual value change. For instance, the political scientist Dennis Chong (Chong, 2000) provides a model of individual choice that takes the influence of culture and environment seriously. Chong combines sociological thinking about social and cultural elements, like norms and values, as motivating factors, with rational choice thinking that conceives social action as determined by interests and incentives. This combination is a model that can help understand the dynamics of stability and change in values.

Chong makes the case that people's choices are based on individual dispositions and the situation's material and social incentives. Dispositions, for Chong, include personal traits and knowledge but also values and group identification³⁰. Social processes shape these dispositions, and Chong argues

³⁰ It should be mentioned here that this putting together of different things into the category of 'dispositions' is one of the crucial shortcomings of Chong's proposal. He seems to treat norms and values as the same thing but it seems more correct to treat norms, which are backed by social sanctions, as incentives.

that dispositions can change, given that there are rational incentives. Incentives are the costs and benefits the individual estimates based on the desire for material rewards and the desire to achieve social goals, like social acceptance (Chong, 2000, p. 213). Chong argues that changes in values should be explained by a mix of new social or material incentives, altered social norms, and dispositions. However, it may take some time for norms and values to fit the changing conditions better because dispositions can frustrate adopting new values.

Sociologists are interested in the relationship between the social and the individual, and some suggest that changes in the value systems of individuals are linked to cultural, social, and economic changes. How should we understand the connection between macro- and micro-changes?

Modernization theory accounts for how individual value change and socio-economic change are related. It is no overstatement that modernization theory is one of the most influential theories in the social sciences today. The main idea is that so-called system-level changes, such as economic and technological development, can lead to individual-level changes, including values. In turn, changes on the individual level can have system-level consequences, like changes in the political agenda (Inglehart, 2015).

In his seminal treatment, Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart, 1997), one of the founders of modernization theory and creator of the World Values Survey, distinguishes between materialist values and postmaterialist values. Modernization theory posits that economic development, accompanied by rising living standards, leads to changes in values from materialist values, which are focused on survival, to post-materialist values, which are concerned with personal freedom and quality of life, for instance, protection of the environment, self-expression, and gender equality. In a nutshell, one could say that modernization theory posits that economic development facilitates a cultural change toward autonomy, gender equality, and democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Empirical investigations corroborate the shift in value that modernization theory proposes. For instance, Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker (Inglehart &

Baker, 2000) present evidence for the connection between economic changes and the change from materialistic to post-materialistic values. Recently, Inglehart (Inglehart, 2018) has traced the global shift from materialist to post-materialist values, which seems to support his view that people's values are shaped by how secure their survival is. Other studies also support the modernization theory. For example, by studying the values reflected in Japanese newspaper editorials from 1945 to 2000, Masaki Taniguchi (Taniguchi, 2006) shows that value change occurred in phases of economic development. Furthermore, Scott Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee (Flanagan & Lee, 2000) present evidence that changes in the techno-material circumstances and economic development in Korea and Japan have led to a shift from authoritarian values to libertarian values. Changes in social and political attitudes that drive democratization and political reform reflect this value shift.

3.5 Summary

Early on, thinking about value played an essential role in sociology. This chapter opened with Max Weber's ideas about value rationality and value spheres. Although interest in value never wholly disappeared from sociology, the attention to value was revitalized by functionalism. Talcott Parsons believed that values are abstract goals and emphasized the role of ultimate goals and values in explaining social action. Like psychologists, sociologists acknowledge values as crucial aspects of the self. They have tried to make sense of how individual value systems and the value systems of the group are related (e.g., Hutcheon).

Sociologists also acknowledge that values can change. Although detailed theoretical models of value change have yet to emerge, sociologists have also focused on the link between macro-level change and micro-level value change. The influential modernization theory (Inglehart) proposes that socio-economic change contributes to value change.

Like psychologists, sociologists are sensitive to the cultural dimension of value. However, it is anthropologists who want to understand humans as cultural beings. Accordingly, anthropological theorists have developed

interesting accounts of the role of value in culture and how value is created and reproduced. We will turn to anthropology in the next chapter.

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4 Anthropology and value

4.1 *Introduction to anthropology*

In the last chapter, we saw that sociologists are interested in how the individual relates to the social world. Some, following Parsons, also stress the role of values in understanding social actions. Besides being linked to the social, value is also an integral aspect of culture. Psychologists, like Hofstede in his influential work on the cultural dimensions of value, and sociologists, like Parsons, who claimed that cultures could be understood and differentiated by their ultimate goals, acknowledge the cultural aspect of value.

The primary goals of anthropology are to understand humans as cultural beings and to illuminate culture's influence on individuals. If we want to understand the cultural aspects of value, we need to turn to anthropology. Anthropological theories of value highlight the cultural processes responsible for value creation, re-creation, and transmission.

In contrast to psychology, where the Schwartz model of value is dominant, anthropology does not have a leading theory of value. Moreover, Ton Otto and Rane Willerslev (Otto & Willerslev, 2013) organized an international roundtable discussion where participants seemed to agree that there is no contemporary anthropological theory of value. Some participants also questioned whether a unified anthropological theory of value would even be helpful and desirable³¹.

It is possible to tease out some major historical trends of anthropological thinking about value (Otto & Willerslev, 2013, p. 3). For example, in the 1950s, one major theoretical problem for anthropology was how to connect culture to the actions of individuals. A particular problem was to explain an individual's motivation to reproduce a specific social and cultural system. At this time, structural-functionalist ideas gained popularity and influenced anthropological accounts of value. Structuralism, as a form of cultural anthropology, took hold in the 1960s. Furthermore, in the 1950s, anthropologists were interested in

³¹ According to Otto and Willerslev, a scholar's stance on whether a unifying anthropological theory of value is desirable depends on whether they think anthropology should be driven by theory or ethnography.

comparing different value systems, so-called world-views, or ideologies, and they developed the theoretical tools to make these comparisons.

By the early 1980s, structuralism fell out of favor, and anthropologists wanted to cast aside structuralism's conception of value as something static. Instead, anthropologists developed an interest in how values are linked to human agency and how values are created and transmitted in a group through human cultural activity, like rituals or exchanges such as gift-giving. To account for value creation and transmission and to link value to human agency, anthropologists developed so-called action-based accounts of value. In what follows, we will review structuralist ideas about value and action-based approaches in more detail.

4.2 Value in anthropology

A good entry point into the anthropological theory of value is the work of the American anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn. In the 1950s, Kluckhohn and his collaborators set up a comparative study of value in the Rimrock region of the US. This so-called Harvard Values Project was groundbreaking and one of the earliest anthropological attempts to systematically investigate value. However, despite its scope, the project, and the publications resulting from it, did not significantly influence anthropology at the time (Powers, 2000).

Kluckhohn and his colleagues proposed that values cannot be separated from cultures and groups. They suggest that a "value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (Kluckhohn, 1951, 395). Note that this notion of value includes a normative component. Values are ideas about what people should desire because they are about the desirable, not what is desired. Please note that values as conceptions of the desirable are not limited to the moral domain. For instance, conceptions of the desirable can be about what is aesthetically or artistically desirable.

Another noteworthy aspect of the value account of Kluckhohn and his colleagues is that it stresses that values can be implicit or explicit. The values they endorse may not be transparent to them, and people may find it hard to

articulate them. Hence, scientists seeking to investigate society's values must often infer value commitments from behavior patterns.

One particularly influential idea from Kluckhohn's value project is the proposal of value orientations. Kluckhohn introduced the idea of value orientation in the 1950s (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 409), later refined and elaborated by his wife, Florence Kluckhohn, and Fred Strodtbeck in their book *Variations in Value Orientations* (Florence Kluckhohn & Fred Strodtbeck, 1961). This book is an early attempt to flesh out a theory of values usable to investigate values across cultures. The underlying assumption is that all societies and cultures have similar concerns because they need to address the same problems.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck proposed that these concerns can be clustered around five topics: (1) human nature: humans are either good, evil, or a mix thereof, (2) the relationship between humans and nature, (3) time: the focus is either on the past, the present, or the future, (4) human activity: this is the question about the primary motivation of action, which may be to express oneself, to grow or to achieve something, (5) social relationships and social organization: this is about how individuals should relate to one another³².

Some readers may note that Kluckhohn's and Strodtbeck's idea of a link between values and existential concerns resonates with some psychological theories of value. For instance, Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz, 2015) proposes that values result, among other things, from the needs of humans to coordinate social interaction and facilitate the welfare of the group. The functional theory of value (Gouveia et al., 2014) raises similar points about human needs. We will revisit the overlap between psychology and anthropology in the last chapter.

As indicated above, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck propose that cultures may exhibit one of three possible responses to each of the categories of concerns. For instance, one universal problem is how to conceive the relationship between man and nature. Three responses are possible: Humans are subordinate to nature, humans should live in harmony with nature, or humans should dominate nature.

³² Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck introduced space as an additional sixth category of concern but did not explore it further. The focus of the concern of space can either be on here, there, or far away. Michael Hills (Hills, 2002) notes that the theory of value orientation is incomplete, and we could add more categories of concerns. For instance, one could add a cluster of concerns about gender and how roles and power should be distributed among men and women. Another category that could be added concerns the relationship between the state and the individual.

As another example, consider the question about the best form of social organization. Again, there are three possible answers: a hierarchical social organization, people are recognized as equals with a focus on consensus, or an individualistic organization.

The values of a society, so the idea goes, are reflected in the socially preferred responses to the abovementioned existential problems. Kluckhohn's and Strodtbeck's crucial idea is that the preferred responses betray a group's value orientation. What precisely is a value orientation? Tom Gallagher has provided a concise answer in summarizing the value orientation approach. Value orientation is "[h]ow a group is predisposed to understand, give meaning to, and solve these common problems is an outward manifestation of its innermost values, its window on the world: its value orientation" (Gallagher, 2001, p. 2). Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck give the example of a society with a time orientation that is focused on the past instead of the present or the future. Because it focuses on the past, this society endorses traditions and holds in high esteem their elders.

In contrast, a culture with a future orientation will likely put more emphasis on planning. The complete value orientation of a society, according to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, is the totality of the rank orderings of the three alternative solutions for all the existential problems. More concrete cultural elements, like attitudes, norms, and rituals, flow from this value orientation. For instance, norms about treating your elders are a concrete cultural form that flows from value orientation.

Value orientation is supposed to be a useful anthropological tool to compare cultures. Because cultures have different value orientations, they differ in their preferred responses to these problems. This difference in the ranking of responses gives us the means to distinguish between cultures³³.

It is important to stress that a value orientation includes more than just values. Value orientations are a structured and general blend of normative

³³ Although Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck believed that cultures can be distinguished by their dominant preferences, they acknowledged that there always is a variety of preferences and a diversity of viewpoints within every culture. Also, they seemed to be aware cultures are not static but that they are in flux. Nevertheless, the idea of value orientation has been criticized for its assumed universalism of values and its reductive idea of orientations. Roy D'Andrade (D'Andrade, 2008) provides a detailed review and critique.

elements (i.e., values in the sense of the desirable) and descriptive assumptions about nature, human's place in nature, human existence, the human-human relationship, and time. Other influential anthropologists concur that we cannot separate values and non-normative descriptive elements. For instance, Louis Dumont argued that values are inseparable from ideas. Talking about a system of values is already an abstraction from a total system that combines descriptive and evaluative elements, which Dumont calls a system of 'ideas-and-values'. According to Dumont, speaking about 'value-ideas' would be more precise (Dumont, 2013, p. 297) instead of value. We will consider Dumont's structuralist ideas about culture and value below.

We can classify anthropological accounts of value into three categories: structuralist accounts, action-oriented accounts, and accounts that attempt to bridge these structuralist and action-oriented accounts (Sommerschuh & Robbins, 2016). In a nutshell, structuralist accounts propose that values are embedded in mental structures. Action-oriented accounts suggest that value must be continually produced by human activity, like rituals or exchanging goods.

There is a split in anthropological theories of value. On the one side are structuralists, like Dumont, who focus on values (in the plural) and how these values are hierarchically arranged. On the other side, there are action-oriented accounts, which are inspired by Karl Marx's idea that there is only one kind of value that can take various forms. With this split of perspectives in mind, let us first consider structuralist accounts of value.

Structuralist theories of values draw inspiration from structuralism. In anthropology, structuralism is associated with Claude Lévi-Strauss's work in the 1940 and 1950s (Lévi-Strauss, 1963, 1969). Drawing on the idea from linguistics that language can be broken down into smaller components, Lévi-Strauss proposed that culture is the product of the unchanging mental structures of the human mind. Based on this assumption, he suggested that anthropologists focus their attention on how these mental structures contribute to creating the categories and concepts of a society. Structuralists believe that people's underlying mental structures and thought processes are the same across

cultures. Nevertheless, cultures differ because, over time, different cultures created different, and often baroque, systems of classifications to express these deep structures. In other words, although they differ on the surface, deep down, cultures are rooted in the same universal mental structures.

According to Levi-Strauss, a crucial mental structure is universal to all cultures, namely the so-called binary opposition (Levi-Strauss, 1955). Binary oppositions are theoretical constructs that oppose one another and can only be defined concerning one another. Examples of binary oppositions are hot and cold, female and male, and culture and nature. This focus on relationships is another crucial tenet of structuralism, besides the proposal that mental structures are universal and fixed. For structuralists, culture is cognitive, and as such, it comprises mental elements and meaningful relations between them. We cannot explain elements of cultures in isolation. Structuralists suggest that anthropologists if they want to understand a culture, should investigate the relationships between the mental elements and the relationships of these elements to the broader system of meaning.

The French anthropologist Louis Dumont applied structuralist ideas to anthropological thinking about value (Dumont, 1980). He drew inspiration from the classical structuralist position that culture can be understood as binary oppositions of equally important categories, such as hot/cold or male/female. Dumont argued that these opposites are not equal but that they are hierarchically structured. One part of the pair is superior and usually contains the lower, inferior part. For instance, in most cultures, 'man' usually incorporates 'woman'.

We cannot consider opposite categories in isolation, so Dumont. He holds on to the structuralist idea that we must also pay attention to the relationship between parts and wholes. He illustrates this with the example of the left and the right hand. We can only understand why the right side is considered superior when we look at the relationship the right and left have with the whole body. A different relationship, a different constellation of parts and whole, yields other places in the hierarchy (Dumont, 2013, p. 298).

Dumont proposed that cultures are meaning systems, or as he calls it, 'ideologies'. These meaning systems comprise categories and ideas people use to make sense of the world. Dominant values, which are the ideas or categories on top of the hierarchy, hierarchically order these categories and ideas.

Note that the idea that values are hierarchically structured resonates with ideas from other anthropologists. For instance, recall that Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck acknowledged the hierarchical organization of values in ordering preferable responses to existential concerns. According to Dumont, the position of elements is determined by their relationship to the paramount value. The highest value, the category at the top of the hierarchy, is considered superior. For instance, purity is the paramount category (value) in the Indian caste system. Thus, purity is the 'highest' idea that encompasses 'lower' ideas, like power. This hierarchy affects the social order because the priest is superior to worldly leaders, such as the king.

Dumont proposes a twist because he suggests that hierarchies are reversible and that multiple orders can exist simultaneously in one culture. Dumont proposes parallel value domains whose ordering depends on the social domain and "different 'levels' hierarchized together with the corresponding entities" (Dumont, 2013, p. 302).

The Indian caste system illustrates the idea of reversed hierarchies related to social domains. Within the religious realm, the king is lower in the hierarchy than the priest because purity is the principal value in the religious domain. However, in the political domain, the ordering is reversed because the king is superior to the priest here. After all, the principal value in the political domain is power. So, the priest must defer to the king in the political domain.

Critics of structuralist theories argue that these theories neglect people's creative agency in transforming culture and change of social systems. In contrast to structuralist accounts of value, action-oriented approaches to value shift the focus away from mental structures, systems, wholes, and elements. Action-oriented accounts emphasize human agency and focus on the role of actions for value creation.

David Graeber proposed the most recent anthropological action-oriented account of values. However, before we take a closer look at his account, we will focus on two anthropologists whose work on value has paved the way for Graeber's theory: Nancy Munn and Terence Turner.

In the 1990s, the US American anthropologist Nancy Munn (Munn, 1992) developed an influential action-oriented account of values, where she emphasizes the process by which value is created and sustained through human activity. In her study of the people of Gawa, a small island near Papua New Guinea, she finds that fame is the prime value of the Gawans and that fame can be created and destroyed through action. Exchange of goods, for instance, can increase the value of fame, whereas consumption and witchcraft can destroy it. To extend their fame, Gawans must connect themselves to prestigious shells. People can acquire these shells through a chain of exchange, which Munn calls value transformation. Items with low value, like fruits, can be exchanged for items of higher value, like canoes. Ultimately, people can exchange items with a high enough value for precious shells of a low value, which people can then trade for shells of even higher value.

In her fieldwork, Munn also discovered that for the Gawans, certain qualities signify value. For instance, the heaviness of the body indicates negative value because it means that the person has eaten the food instead of exchanging it for something more valuable.

Terence Turner (Turner, 2008) proposed another theory of value that, like Munn's, concentrates on the role of human practice in value creation. Turner draws on the Marxist idea that value is the outcome of labor. The concept of labor here signifies the creative activity by which humans transform the environment, themselves, and other people. Thus, labor includes more than just the material production of items and comprises reproductive labor, such as household work, childcare, or education. The more labor goes into producing something, the higher its value.

Besides the idea that value is the product of labor, Turner brings another Marxian thought to the anthropological thinking about value, namely that value is often represented in some material form. Money is a familiar example here,

but the representation can take other material forms, as the shells of the Gawans illustrate. Furthermore, the material representation of value is not limited to objects. For instance, in some rituals, the function performed by someone can indicate their high social function.

The accounts of Turner and Munn, and Marx's labor theory of value, have inspired David Graeber's (Graeber, 2001) action-oriented approach to value. It is fair to say that his account is one of the most comprehensive anthropological investigations of value to date.

There are three crucial elements in Graeber's account of value. First, Graeber stresses the role of agency in value creation. Human action, particularly labor, is the source of value. Graeber echoes Turner's ideas that labor is more than just the production of commodities. Second, Graeber emphasizes that for actions to be meaningful, they need to be part of a broader social or cultural system of meaning. Graeber suggests that we should think of value "as the way in which actions become meaningful to the actor by being incorporated in some larger, social totality—even if in many cases the totality in question exists primarily in the actor's imagination." (Graeber, 2001, p. xii). What this reference to imagined social totality means is that value is always social in the sense that "value can only be realized in other people's eyes" (Graeber, 2013, p. 226). Society is the simulated audience "of everyone whose opinion of you matters in some way" (Graeber, 2001, p. 76).

Third, Graeber stresses that when we think about value, we should not neglect how people represent value to themselves and others. Value, to Graeber, "...is the way people represent the importance of their own actions to themselves" (Graeber, 2001, p. 45). These forms of representation, however, should not be confused with the source of value. Value is represented through a medium. For instance, money can represent value, but value can also be represented through heirlooms or, as Munn has shown, through shells that are traded with other people.

Graeber's account is the most recent proposal of an anthropological theory of value. A central unifying anthropological theory of value is still forthcoming, but some authors have extended and refined some of the existing accounts. For

instance, the Canadian anthropologist Michael Lambek (Lambek, 2013) has recently proposed an account that is a refinement of theories that take seriously human agency in value creation. Drawing on Aristotle and Hannah Arendt, Lambek distinguishes between action and work, or doing and making. Doing and or action are focused on human relationships, whereas work, or making, focuses on creating things. Like Munn, Turner, and Graeber, Lambek is inspired by Marx's ideas about how objects become valuable. The Marxist view is that acts can congeal into objects because of the labor that went into their production. Sometimes, these objects become detached from this labor process, for instance, when they circulate through markets and are exchanged with other commodities.

Based on the distinction between work (or making) and doing, Lambek asks whether, in the domain of doing, which concerns human relationships, there are processes of value creation and circulation that are analogous to processes in the realm of work. He answers in the affirmative and proposes that "ethical value is to action (doing something) as material value is to production (making something)" (Lambek, 2013, p. 141). Like labor that congeals in objects, value-creating performative acts, like rituals, can congeal too. Value creation always requires a cultural value system that a group acknowledges. The value system grounds the recognition of value-creating actions, like rituals. The value of the performative act congeals not in a material object but in the effect the performative act has on the minds of the audience. The value-creating performative actions of the ritual perpetuate the value system.

However, value can also take an objective form. For instance, the value of ancestors can be attached to or stored in objects, like relics, which can be used in ritualistic actions, which, in turn, affirm the value of the relic. Crucially, the objectified value depends on activities of valuation, which sustain values. As Lambek puts it, "In effect, to have, store, and emit value, the relics must be properly valued. Value, even that congealed as the sanctity of the ancestors, is understood here expressly as a consequence of human acts and attention. Value circulates through human activity and rapidly evaporates in the absence of such activity" (Lambek, 2013, p. 150).

So far, in this chapter, we have focused on the central ideas and strands of anthropological value theory. In the next section, we will consider how anthropologists conceptualize value change.

4.3 Value change

There has yet to be a full-fledged anthropological account of value change. However, we can discern glimpses of what an account of value change could look like in anthropologists' treatment of phenomena like cultural change. Joel Robbins (Robbins, 2007), for instance, proposes that we think about culture in terms of value. Accordingly, we can characterize cultural change in terms of changes in values. Such a change, Robbins argues, can occur when new values are introduced in society or when the hierarchical relations between traditional values are transformed. When confronted with new values, people often try to maintain the significance of old values and are motivated to defend the position of dominant values in the hierarchy. Despite these conservative efforts, sometimes new stable value structures arise in the process of change³⁴.

An anthropological theory of value change could draw on the work of Marshall Sahlins, one of the most influential anthropologists of the past five decades³⁵. Sahlins put his proposals in terms of culture instead of value. For instance, in his influential book *Culture and Practical Reason* (Sahlins, 2000 [1976], Sahlins argues that culture is a pattern of meaning. Much like Dumont, Sahlins subscribes to the structuralist paradigm. Culture depends on an underlying structure of cultural categories, and it is through the lens of structuralism that Sahlins wants to illuminate cultural change. In Sahlins' model of culture change, there is a process of reproductive transformation of cultural categories. People use existing cultural categories to interpret new social developments. In response to a novel situation, the cultural categories are only partly reproduced because they change their meaning. This meaning change leads to a structural change in culture because it also changes the relationship between cultural categories (Sahlins, 1985).

³⁴ The value-based notion of culture is a useful perspective to make sense of cultural changes. It has been applied to cases like the changes of value in a group in Papua New Guinea during conversion to Christianity (Robbins, 2017).

³⁵ I would like to express my gratitude to Ton Otto, who brought to my attention Sahlins' contribution to anthropology.

Structuralism could inspire the development of an anthropological theory of value change. Scholars have often criticized structuralist accounts of value, like Dumont's, for thinking that cultural systems are static and for the alleged inability to explain how cultural systems change. In the case of Dumont, however, this criticism seems to be unwarranted because he can be interpreted as a thinker of cultural change (see (Robbins & Siikala, 2014)). It also seems like structuralist accounts have the resources to account for value change. Dumont provides the theoretical tools to account for some forms of value change. For instance, Dumont acknowledges that ideas and categories, and their hierarchical relationship, are not static. Put differently; the value rankings can change. Ideas can gain importance and status; when this happens, the new 'high' idea will encompass the 'lower' idea (Dumont, 2013, p. 301).

It is no surprise that some authors, like Knut Rio and Olaf Smedal (Rio & Smedal, 2008), draw inspiration from Dumont's ideas and propose that value systems are not fixed once and for all but that they need to be reproduced. Similarly, by focusing on the tension between opposing values, Knut Rio (Rio, 2014) emphasizes that in all societies, the process of valuation and the hierarchization of values is in constant flux. Tensions and conflicts between values are a crucial feature of society and are not limited to periods of cultural change. The value formations that organize society are never entirely stable but are constantly in motion.

4.4 Summary

This chapter provided an overview of essential value theories in anthropology, including early anthropological accounts, like Kluckhohn's and Strodbeck's theory of value orientations, which was an attempt to provide a tool for cross-cultural comparison. In this theory, values are connected to universal concerns that every society or culture must address. The chapter also outlined the structuralist approach to value, specifically Dumont's influential account, where values are part of a hierarchical meaning system. Furthermore, the chapter introduced so-called action-oriented approaches to value (Munn, Turner, Graeber). Action-oriented accounts focus on agency and how humans actively

create and reproduce values within a cultural system of meaning. The chapter also briefly touched on value change. Although anthropology has the conceptual resources necessary to develop a theory of value change, such a theory is still forthcoming.

Thinking about value and developing a theory of value involves metaphysical assumptions and conceptual distinctions. This means that accounts of value come with some philosophical baggage. Philosophy will be the subject of the next chapter.

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5 Philosophy and value

5.1 *Introduction to philosophy*

Philosophers ask fundamental questions about values and valuing. Some of the philosophical debates about these fundamental questions have repercussions for the value theories of other disciplines. Every discipline makes unexamined philosophical assumptions, and philosophy can help shed critical light on these assumptions. Furthermore, philosophy can help other fields to achieve conceptual clarity in thinking about value.

The philosophical literature on value is pervasive. One reason for the vast amount of literature is that values play a role in many domains of human practice, including the moral, aesthetic, economic, and social domains. Due to the multitude of value domains, the philosophical investigation of value comprises ethics, metaethics, and aesthetics. Furthermore, because philosophers are often interested in metaphysical questions, like whether value is objective and whether there is only one value or many, the philosophical investigation of value also includes metaphysics³⁶.

Because of this complexity, a complete overview of what philosophy has to say about value would significantly inflate this chapter. The focus will be on fundamental issues, conceptual distinctions, and philosophical positions relevant to the debates and conceptual problems concerning value in psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Basic philosophical questions regarding value organize the chapter.

5.2 *Descriptive claims, evaluative claims*

One way to philosophically approach value is to examine people's different claims about the world. Take the following two sentences: (1) "This picture has a wooden frame"; (2) "The wooden frame of the picture looks good". The first sentence makes a descriptive claim and merely states what the case is without making a value judgment. The second sentence makes an evaluative claim

³⁶ A terminological remark: The terms 'value' and 'values' are less commonly used than terms like 'the good' and 'the right', which are often used interchangeably. However, the notion of value needs to be kept separate from notions of right and wrong, which concern what we owe to one another (Scanlon, 1998, 78f.). For instance, considerations about the value of artworks or nature are independent of the consideration of right and wrong.

because it involves a normative concept. Examples of normative concepts are ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘right’. Philosophers commonly distinguish two kinds of normative concepts. There are evaluative concepts, like ‘good’, and so-called deontic concepts, like ‘ought’. Evaluative concepts are used in claims about quality, merit, or worth, like saying that the wooden frame looks good. This example also shows that not all evaluative claims are moral because they can also be evaluative in a non-moral way. For instance, making an aesthetic claim about the beauty of something is a non-moral normative claim.

In contrast to evaluative concepts, deontic concepts are used in action-guiding claims. That is, these claims are about what one is supposed to do (or not to do). Correspondingly, deontic claims express that something *ought* to be the case. Like evaluative claims, deontic claims can be non-moral. For instance, the sentence “If you want to tighten this screw, you should use this screwdriver”, is a deontic claim, but it has no moral import. Moral deontic claims, then, are a subgroup of normative claims. For instance, the sentence “You should not kill” expresses a moral deontic claim, and the ‘should’ in the sentence should be interpreted as a moral ‘should’³⁷.

Normative and evaluative claims are important, and people always make them without thinking about them too much. Philosophers want to gain clarity in thinking, which is why they like to complicate things by bringing out underlying assumptions in our thinking. For instance, Judith Jarvis Thomson (Thomson, 2008) has made critical observations regarding normativity and how the word ‘good’ is used. She argues that ‘good’ is always an attributive adjective that modifies a noun, which means nothing is just *good, period*. Put differently; something is always a good or bad *something*, like a good knife or a bad painting. Furthermore, whether something is good or bad depends on the comparison class. A computer from the year 2000 may be a good computer when compared to computers from the 1990s but not when compared to computers from 2019³⁸.

³⁷ Although the examples here seem clear-cut, what makes a claim a moral claim is not easy to say. Later, we will see that philosophers struggle with the distinction between moral and non-moral.

³⁸ The same thing holds for the word ‘better’. Something is better than another thing concerning a particular aspect. Nothing is better in the sense of ‘better, period’.

Thomson also notes that to say something is good means to praise it but to praise it does not necessarily mean to desire it. For instance, one can say that something is a good drug without having the desire to take the drug. Recall that there are moral and non-moral evaluative claims, which may include the word 'good'. Thomson contends that the word 'good' means the same in moral and non-moral contexts. The difference in sentences like "This act is morally good" and "This is a good knife" is not a difference in the meaning of the word 'good' but a difference in what the compounds 'morally good' and 'good knife' mean. The upshot of Thomson's argument is that it is worthwhile to inquire into the standards that make an act morally good or an artifact of a particular kind a good artifact of that kind.

Anthropology, sociology, and psychology deal with value judgments and what people think is good or should be done. The philosophical investigation of value judgments and the importance of keeping normative, descriptive, and deontic concepts apart could help researchers in these disciplines sharpen their conceptual tools.

5.3 Kinds of values – Taxonomy of value

Philosophers like to make many distinctions, and the topic of value is no exception. It is common in philosophy to distinguish between different kinds of value, like extrinsic and intrinsic, and here we will review some of the most important distinctions philosophers have introduced.

Let us start with the difference between *final value* and *non-final value*. Something has a final value if it is valuable for its own sake. However, as Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen point out (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2015), terms like 'final' and 'for its own sake' can be tricky because they are ambiguous. They suggest that 'final' and 'for its own sake' should be taken to mean that something has value independent of whether it contributes to, or is necessary for, something else that has value. Human life can be said to have final value in this sense.

In contrast, when something has non-final value, it is valuable because it contributes to or is necessary for something else that has value. For instance, a

tool like a hammer may not have final value but merely instrumental value because it is valuable for repairing something else that has value. Something has instrumental value when it is valuable for the sake of something else and not for its own sake. Having instrumental value does not exclude the possibility of having final value. Something can have value for its own sake and have instrumental value in some situations.

Philosophers also commonly differentiate between *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* value. When something has extrinsic value, it has this value because of its external properties, for instance, its relationship to other things. The instrumental value of a tool, like a hammer, is extrinsic because the value derives from the value of the item we want to repair.

Extrinsic value is often contrasted with intrinsic value, which is often described as a value that something has ‘in itself’ or ‘for its own sake’. For instance, many virtue ethicists consider human flourishing intrinsically valuable, and most people would probably say that friendship and love have intrinsic value. G.E. Moore (Moore, 1993) provided an influential characterization of intrinsic value. He proposed that something is intrinsically valuable when the value is grounded in features that are intrinsic to the object, which are necessary properties that something has independent of any of its relations to other things of the world. Besides making distinctions, philosophers also like to disagree, and some are skeptical about whether intrinsic value hinges on necessary properties. These philosophers think that intrinsic value can depend on features that are not necessary. Shelly Kagan (Kagan, 1998), for instance, argues that at least in some cases, like the pen that Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation, the intrinsic value depends on relational properties or even the instrumental value of the object.

The distinctions of value can be confusing; even for philosophers, it is sometimes hard to keep the different notions of value apart. Rae Langton (Langton, 2007, p. 161) proposed a handy way of thinking about all the distinctions. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is about the way things can have value. Either a thing has value in itself, or its value derives from another thing. In addition to the ways that items can have value, there are also ways that we

value things. We can value something as an end, which means for its own sake (final value). Or we can value something instrumentally, as a means, for the sake of something else.

By drawing distinctions between values and providing a systematic account of the kinds of values, philosophers can provide some clarity and precision that could be useful for debates on value in other disciplines.

5.4 Value monism, value pluralism, commensurability

Is there only one intrinsic value, or are there multiple intrinsic values?

Philosophers have provided two answers to that question: value monism and value pluralism. Value monism is the standpoint that there is only one fundamental intrinsic value and that other things are valuable only because they contribute to this ‘super value’. A famous value monist is Jeremy Bentham, one of the founding fathers of Utilitarianism. He believed that pleasure is the only fundamental intrinsic value and that other things are valuable as they provide pleasure or contribute to it.

In contrast to value monists, the value pluralist holds that there is more than one fundamental intrinsic value. One proponent of value pluralism is Judith Jarvis Thomson, who we already encountered in the section above on evaluative statements. Recall that Thomson makes the point that if something is good, it is good in some way, which means that there are multiple ways of being good. There is not one property of goodness to which all other forms of goodness can be reduced³⁹.

What makes value pluralism appealing is that it fits our experience. Particularly our experience with choices that are difficult for us because they have implications for multiple values we endorse. These choices do not seem merely to be a matter of assessing how much each option realizes the one fundamental value and then picking the option that most realizes this value⁴⁰.

Value monism has its appeal too. Consider the issue of how values can be measured. Two values are incommensurable when measuring them with a

³⁹ For more on value pluralism and value monism, see (Mason, 2013).

⁴⁰ For more details and arguments in favor of pluralism and possible responses by monists, see (Mason, 2013).

cardinal unit is impossible. For instance, values of justice and beauty cannot be measured with a cardinal unit, like money. The issue of commensurability is no problem for value monists because they believe there is only one fundamental intrinsic value. We can compare options in terms of how much they contribute to it. Pluralists, on the other hand, must devise a solution for how different fundamental intrinsic values can be compared. The pluralist's answer to the problem of commensurability cannot refer to some super-value that trumps the other values because this would be to endorse monism.

Because thinking about solutions to intricate conceptual problems is philosophers' bread and butter, pluralists have developed a couple of responses to the challenge of commensurability. For instance, James Griffin (Griffin, 1988, p. 90ff.) has argued for the commensurability of a plurality of values based on the idea of a super value scale (although, of course, this does not mean admitting the existence of a super value). Furthermore, both Michael Stocker ((Stocker, 1992), p. 72) and Ruth Chang (Chang, 2004) have proposed ideas about how value pluralists can account for commensurability. Plural values can be compared by either using a higher-level synthesizing category (Stocker) or concerning a covering value that subsumes the values that we want to commensurate (Chang). Some readers may have noticed that this proposal endorses monism. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the pluralist solutions to the problem of commensurability are sometimes mysterious and hard to grasp. If pressed, they all seem to collapse into value monism (e.g., see (Moen, 2016)).

One may be forgiven for thinking that the philosophical debate about whether there is a plurality of values or just one value is too abstract to be important for the value theories of other disciplines. However, disciplines can learn from one another, and the anthropologist Joel Robbins (Robbins, 2013) has argued that the pluralist-monist debate could benefit from a closer exchange between philosophy and anthropology. We will come back to the dialogue between disciplines in the last chapter.

5.5 *Objective, subjective, real? - The philosophical debate about value*

What is the nature of value, and is value independent of what people think or feel? This section will briefly outline the philosophical discussion about whether evaluative properties and evaluative facts are mind-independent.

A good entry point into the philosophical discussion about the nature of value is to focus on the division between objectivists and subjectivists. Proponents of both camps agree on what makes objects valuable; namely, something is valuable because of non-evaluative features. For instance, some authors propose that to say that something is valuable is to say that it has non-evaluative properties that give us reasons to favor it (Scanlon, 1998). Using philosophical jargon, philosophers sometimes say that the non-evaluative features ground or constitute value⁴¹. One influential account in this regard is the so-called fitting attitude account of value. The fitting attitude account proposes that for something to be valuable means it has properties that make it a *fitting* object of a pro-attitude or pro-behavior⁴². That something is valuable means we ought to take a specific stance or response to it (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004). Pro-attitudes include the attitude of favoring, and pro-behaviors include pursuing, promoting, and maintaining something. Conversely, that something has disvalue means that it has properties that make it a fitting object of contra-attitudes, like hate.

Despite the agreement mentioned above between subjectivism and objectivism that value is grounded in non-evaluative properties, the two camps make different claims about the nature of value. Subjectivists believe that the value of something is conferred on it by the subject's attitude toward it. Without the attitude towards the object, so the subjectivist, the object has no value. Attitude here needs to be understood broadly and includes a variety of mental states, like desires, preferences, and passions. Some of these attitudes are favoring, and

⁴¹ Sometimes, philosophers also say that value *supervenes* on non-value properties. Supervenience means that something comes above or is grounded by something else on which it supervenes. Value comes above or is grounded by other non-value properties, meaning there could be no difference in value without a difference in non-value properties.

⁴² Brentano can be credited as one of the first philosophers to develop a fitting-attitude account of value (more on fitting-attitudes below). According to Brentano's fitting-attitude account, what is good is worthy of love and what is bad is worthy of hate. He uses love and hate in a broad sense and they are catch-all terms for a range of pro- and con-attitudes (Kriegel, 2017). What is good is that towards which it would be fitting to have a pro-attitude, and what is bad is that towards which it would be fitting to have a con-attitude.

others are disfavoring. For example, loving something, or someone, is a favoring attitude, and being disgusted would be a disfavoring attitude. In contrast to subjectivists, objectivists believe that there are value facts independent of someone's attitudes. That is, an object has value regardless of someone's attitude toward it.

Because of their different standpoints about the nature of values, objectivists and subjectivists make different claims about the kind of facts expressed in evaluative statements. Subjectivists hold that statements expressing evaluative judgments declare specific facts about the world but that these facts are facts about the subjective states of the individual (and not facts about something 'external' to the subject). Objectivists, on the other hand, think that evaluative statements report facts about the object itself.

As the distinction between subjectivists and objectivists illustrates, philosophers are puzzled by whether there are mind-independent values. Realists believe there are, whereas anti-realists think there is no such thing as mind-independent values.

For so-called 'robust' value realists, values are independent of people's minds. For them, values are ontologically separate from individuals' attitudes and preferences (Oddie, 2009). Furthermore, a value realist thinks that claims about value can be true or false. For example, the claim 'The painting Mona Lisa is a beautiful painting' can be true or false. A moral realist believes that moral reality is 'stance independent', which means there are moral truths that do not depend on anyone's perspective (Shafer-Landau, 2003). Accordingly, moral judgments, like 'Torturing people is morally wrong', are not just an expression of preferences or tastes. When people make a moral claim like this, they mean to report moral facts⁴³.

In contrast to realists, a value anti-realist claims that there are *no* objective mind-independent values. An anti-realist will either deny that value properties

⁴³ Many realists subscribe to naturalism, which identifies value properties with natural properties. For example, being valuable is being pleasant or being the object of preference. Being pleasant or being the object of a preference are non-problematic and presumably natural properties.

exist or the anti-realist concedes that they exist but claims that they are mind-dependent.

After this outline of the crucial philosophical debates about the nature of value, let us turn to what philosophers have to say about value change.

5.6 Value change and other changes

The last chapters have considered how psychology, sociology, and anthropology address value change. Given that value change seems to be an essential aspect of life and that value is a crucial focus of philosophy, one would expect that philosophers have something to say about value change. Unfortunately, so far, philosophers have yet to seriously consider value change. The only exception is John Dewey, who proposed an account of value that takes values to be dynamic. We will later consider in more detail Dewey's ideas about value change.

If you take value in the sense of *valuing*, the issue of value change does not seem attractive to philosophers. That attitudes of valuing are in flux seems trivial and uncontroversial. For instance, someone may appreciate chocolate ice cream now but no longer loves it when they are on a diet.

Furthermore, philosophers may not be interested in value change if you take value change to mean that value items are added to the world or subtracted from it. For instance, if beautiful pictures have aesthetic value, then making more beautiful pictures multiplies the valuable items in the world. Destroying valuable items reduces the number of valuable items in the world. Value change, then, boils down to keeping a score of the value-items of the world, which goes up or down, depending on our actions.

Although philosophers have yet to provide a complete account of value change, we can already discern the outlines of possible positions. For instance, recall that value realism is the idea that value properties are grounded in mind-independent properties. A realist account of value change would propose that a change in the mind-independent properties that constitute the value would affect the object's value. Now, consider the issue of objectivism and intrinsic properties. Objective value is a value due to intrinsic properties, and something has objective value regardless of whether anyone values it. For instance, G.E. Moore

(Moore, 1993) claimed that being intrinsically valuable implies being objectively valuable⁴⁴. If one subscribes to this view of objectivity, an account of value change needs to be fleshed out in terms of a change of the properties on which intrinsic value hinges.

Compared to objectivists, subjectivists have a straightforward way of accounting for value change. For a subjectivist, value is grounded in attitudes. For example, consider Valerie Tiberius' (Tiberius, 2020) account of value. According to Tiberius, we should think of value in terms of robust and complex psychological states. Tiberius proposes that to value something is "... to have a relatively stable pattern of emotions and desires concerning it and to take these attitudes to give you reasons for actions..." (p. 35). Something is a value for you if it is the object, or target, of these complex psychological states. This account is subjective because it ties values to valuing, that is, the attitudes of individuals. If value is cashed out in terms of stable complex patterns of psychological states, an account of value change will concentrate on the transformation of these patterns of psychological states.

Although philosophers have yet to propose an account of value change, they have focused on other kinds of changes in the vicinity of value, like moral change and norm change. For example, in a recent book Cecilie Eriksen (Eriksen, 2020) investigates the dynamics and structure of moral change, including changes in moral norms, changes in moral concepts, and changes in moral capacities⁴⁵. In her analysis of moral change, Eriksen does not address value. Although she acknowledges that moral change can be a change in what is valued (p. 16), it remains unclear what the relation is between values and other morally relevant factors like institutions and norms. Consequently, it remains unclear what the relationship is between value change and different kinds of moral change, like changes in moral norms.

Let us turn to norm change. Philosophers have always shown a keen interest in norms. For instance, Jon Elster has explored the nature of social and moral norms and the relationship between emotions, rationality, and social norms

⁴⁴ Some philosophers have raised objections against the claim that intrinsic implies objective. See (Langton, 2007)

⁴⁵ Moral progress, as a kind of moral change, has recently received a lot of attention from philosophers. For more on moral progress see (Egonsson, 2018).

(Elster, 1989, 1994). Others have extended Elster's work. Christina Bicchieri, for example, has developed one of the most detailed accounts of the nature of social norms, including how they come about and change (Bicchieri, 2005; 2007). In a nutshell, a social norm is a behavioral rule that a sufficiently large number of individuals prefer to follow. This preference is based on the belief that others also follow the rule, and the belief that they expect the individual to do the same and will possibly sanction norm violations⁴⁶. In contrast to Bicchieri, who focuses on *social* norms, Geoffrey Brennan and his collaborators (Brennan et al., 2013) have recently provided a general account of the concept of norms. Like Bicchieri, Brennan and co-authors address how norms come into existence, why they continue to exist, and how they change.

Although both Bicchieri and Brennan and collaborators provide a detailed account of norms and norm change, the relationship between values and norms remains to be determined. This is a pity because other disciplines would benefit from a philosophical account of the relationship between values and norms. To construct such an account, it seems worthwhile for philosophers to consider insights from sociology, psychology, and anthropology. For instance, one could build on existing proposals of the relation between values and norms, like Talcott Parsons' suggestion that norms regulate actions to conform to values (Parsons, 1935). In the last chapter, we will focus in more detail on what the disciplines can learn from one another but

So far, philosophers have yet to pay much attention to value change. The notable exception is pragmatism, specifically the account of pragmatist philosopher and pedagogue John Dewey. Thus, in the next section, we will briefly consider pragmatist ideas about the malleability of values.

5.6.1 *Pragmatism and values*

Before we delve deeper into Dewey's proposal, it is noteworthy that he is not the first philosopher to propose that values are dynamic. For instance, in the 19th century, the early pioneer of scientific psychology, Herman Lotze, proposed that

⁴⁶ For a full detailed account see (Bicchieri, 2005, p. 11ff.)

value is “something which is essentially dynamic and developing” (Pierson, 1988, p. 121). However, what sets Dewey apart is that he explains how values change.

Pragmatists stress that humans actively relate to their environment and that the environment affects them. This relational character of human existence is a crucial premise of Dewey’s account of value, as we will see shortly. In his theory of value, Dewey distinguishes between value, valuing, and valuation. For Dewey, *value* is a quality of an entity. Objects, activities, and feelings can all have value. Values, Dewey argues, are relational in two ways. First, they are linked to the environment, and, second, they are connected to other values and beliefs. Because values are embedded in a network of values and beliefs, there are multiple ways to affect and reinforce them.

Dewey distinguishes values from *valuing*. For Dewey, valuing is an individual activity, like, prizing and appraising (Dewey, 1939, p. 5). Further examples of valuing are caring and honoring. Generally speaking, valuing refers to all acts of ratings and value judgments. In its most basic form, says Dewey, valuing is the tendency to be attracted or repelled by something. It is important to note that Dewey does not claim that valuing something means that it is valuable. He clearly distinguishes between the desired and the desirable, the admired and the admirable (Dewey, 2008, p. 212.).

For Dewey, value is not primarily something that is there but something that we do, so we should think about value in terms of value activity. Valuing is one of many value activities, according to Dewey. People also engage in so-called *valuation*, which is the process of questioning and investigating what we want. It is important to clarify that for Dewey, valuation goes beyond the critical investigation of ends and includes evaluating the means to achieve these ends.

What is important from a pragmatist perspective is that values are not fixed but are subject to revision. Value activities are intimately bound to our practices and habits, but our experience of the world expands and changes. New information about the world and the breakdown of our practices, and habits, prompts us to revisit and, if necessary, revise our value judgments. This can happen when the situation is indeterminate or because our habitual ways of doing things cannot respond to new problems. When such problematic situations

occur, we must engage in so-called *value inquiry* to develop new value practices that can handle these challenging situations. Value inquiry is a reflective process in which value judgments are tested to evaluate whether acting according to these value judgments successfully solves the problem. Value judgments are like scientific claims; for pragmatists, the process of value inquiry never ends.

Because they think human activity is an ongoing process and value judgments are subject to revision, pragmatists reject the dualism of means and ends⁴⁷. In the constant flow of our engagement with the world, ends are often turned into means for other ends. Because of the possible revision of means and ends, there are neither final ends nor ends in themselves. There are only what Dewey calls ends-in-view (Dewey, 1939).

These ends-in-view are objectives or anticipated results that link value judgments to desires and interests and that guide our actions. One way to think about ends-in-view is that they are like plans for building a house. The plans guide the activity, but they are not the house itself. The end of an action is the plan to bring about some change in the world. Importantly, ends-in-view are always provisional, which means they can become means to another end-in-view.

What is more, ends-in-view and means are tightly linked. We cannot understand one in isolation from the other. Ends only fully come into view when we grasp what is necessary to realize a goal or achieve an end.

5.7 Summary

This chapter focused on crucial conceptual distinctions and philosophical positions about value. For instance, the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic value. The chapter also reviewed important metaphysical positions concerning the nature of value, like objectivism and subjectivism. It also touched upon the issue of pluralism and monism, which is whether there are many values or just one. Finally, the chapter addressed the issue of value change and related topics, like moral change and norm change.

⁴⁷ Most pragmatists also reject the dualisms of fact and value, and extrinsic and intrinsic. However, it is important to keep in mind, as Hilary Putnam (Putnam, 2002, 9) has stressed, that rejecting the dualism does not mean rejecting the distinction of fact and value. Drawing this distinction can be helpful for some purposes, like making an argument.

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6 A bridge between disciplines

In the previous chapters, we have focused on value theories of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. We briefly considered some historical overlaps and similarities between the theories along the way. This chapter will consider in more detail how the theories relate to one another and what the disciplines can learn from each other to make headway in theory development.

As we have seen, every discipline has its focus, which leads to different accounts of value. However, the disciplines may seem divided, but they converge on several issues. This chapter includes tentative proposals concerning overlap and common themes, like the relationship between value, personality, and society or the link between values and social structures. Each section of this chapter compares two disciplines and will bring out their overlap, similarities, and differences. The hope is that this constructive comparison will build a bridge between disciplines, which helps to advance the theory building within the disciplines and brings theoretical blind spots into focus.

6.1 *Psychology and sociology*

Psychologists are primarily interested in individuals and their mental processes, whereas sociologists focus on macro-level phenomena and society. Given this difference in focus, psychology and sociology approach value differently.

Although we need to recognize these differences, we should also stress the similarities. Because both sociology and psychology are interested in human social behavior, they want to understand how cultural or societal values become personal, that is, how they are internalized and how they motivate the actions of the members of the collective. There is a substantive overlap between the two disciplines, and they would benefit from a dialogue with one another. For instance, social psychology and sociology have an overlapping interest in how the individual relates to the social and how the social and the individual shape one another⁴⁸. In what follows, we will consider the commonalities of sociology and psychology concerning their theoretical approaches to value.

⁴⁸ Sometimes the disciplines seem to merge into one, and particularly social psychology combines elements from psychology and sociology.

Let us begin with some apparent conceptual overlap. Authors in both disciplines distinguish between different kinds of values. For instance, social psychologist Milton Rokeach (Rokeach, 1973) distinguishes terminal and instrumental values. Similarly, preceding Rokeach's work, the sociologist Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1935) distinguishes ultimate values, transcendental ends, and immediate ends. However, it seems that determining values along these lines has since fallen out of favor in psychology, and the distinction between terminal and instrumental value is not psychologically fundamental nor useful for psychological research (Maio, 2016, p. 18),

Let us now turn to a current conceptual overlap. The value theories in sociology and psychology converge on the proposal that we should consider values as abstract goals that are not specific to situations. For instance, recall that several authors, like Parsons, Rokeach, and Schwartz, embrace the idea that values are abstract trans-situational goals. Also, psychologists and sociologists acknowledge that values need to be considered concerning motivations and that values guide actions. As Hitlin and Piliavin put it, values are "commonly conceived of as ideal ends within an action situation" (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 364). Psychologist Norman Feather (Feather, 1995) has argued that values are motivational and not merely abstract concepts of the desirable. Andrew Miles (Miles, 2015) claims that sociologists should re-introduce values into their agency models and culture. For Miles, values are specific cultural constructs that shape actions across various contexts because values are tied to the social self and because values play a role in fast cognitive processes (as opposed to slow, more deliberate processes).

Furthermore, psychologists and sociologists share an interest in how value, personality, and the (social) self are linked. Recall that since Vernon and Allport (Vernon & Allport, 1931) connected values to personality types, psychological theorizing about value has stressed the importance of the connection between value and self-concept. In sociology, Pat Hutcheon (Hutcheon, 1972) has emphasized that we should consider value and self in relation to one another.

There is another parallel between (social) psychology and sociology in that both emphasize that social and cultural values are shaped in response to

challenges that a society or group needs to tackle (This is also where psychology shares common ground with anthropology but more on that in the next section). Scholars in both disciplines have suggested that value change should be understood in terms of adaptation to social and economic changes. For instance, in psychology, Schwartz and Bardi (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) argue that the development and change of value are based on adaptive processes that adjust values to social and political circumstances. Recall that in sociology, modernity theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) proposes something similar: that people adapt their values to economic circumstances, particularly when security and survival are threatened.

Psychologists and sociologists are interested in how the social (e.g., social structures and institutions) influences the individual. (As a side note, psychologists and sociologists would also benefit from what anthropologists have to say on the connection between the individual and the social. More on this in the next section). At least since Rokeach (Rokeach, 1968) proposed that values are related to what is individually or socially preferable, psychologists have paid attention to the social dimension of value. For example, consider the recently proposed functional theory of value (Gouveia et al., 2014), which differentiates values in terms of personal and social goals. Psychologists could profit from theoretical resources of sociology and social theory to advance their accounts of how society, in the shape of social structure and social institutions, shapes individual behavior. For instance, a rich body of literature on social structure (Fleetwood, 2008) focuses on how social structure, institutions, and agents relate to one another.

Sociology can also benefit from psychology. Sociologists are interested in how social order is maintained. Part of the explanation includes the role of personal values and how individuals reproduce the values prevalent in their social group. For a fine-grained picture of how individuals internalize and maintain their group's values, it is crucial to consider the psychological mechanisms that mediate between the social and the individual. For sociologists, it seems vital to consider the “empirical links found between social structure and individual values” (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 383). Psychological research can provide these

empirical links and sociologists can learn from psychology about which social situations, and factors, facilitate or hinder value activation and when exactly values play a crucial motivational role. Empirical insights from psychology are relevant for sociologists who want to develop empirically grounded explanations of how social structures and social value systems are reproduced.

6.2 Psychology and anthropology

Psychologists and anthropologists take complementary perspectives on value, and insights from one discipline can help to advance value theories in the other. For instance, psychologists are interested in how values are internalized, and a complete account of value internalization should pay attention to culture. A focus on culture helps to understand how individuals acquire values as members of social groups. Conversely, an anthropological approach to culture and how people behave as group members requires psychological insights into how values constrain social behavior and how values are linked to personality and personal identity.

A crucial overlap between psychology and anthropology is that both seek to illuminate the influence of culture on the individual. For instance, psychologist Meg Rohan (Rohan, 2000) suggests thinking of cultural values as an ideological value system that influences the value formation of the individual. This idea is close to Dumont's proposal to think of values as ideologies. (When we look at the overlap between sociology and anthropology, we will find a similar convergence.)

A significant overlap in the psychological and anthropological approaches to value is that both disciplines strongly emphasize value as response to (universal) social challenges. Recall that Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck (Florence Kluckhohn & Fred Strodtbeck, 1961) argue that value orientations are responses to universal problems that all cultures need to solve. In psychology, Schwartz's theory of value (Schwartz, 2015) and the functional theory of value (Gouveia et al., 2014) include similar claims, namely that values arise as a solution to social coordination problems and that values facilitate the pursuit of social goals.

Psychologists and anthropologists have expressed similar ideas about how values are organized, and there seems to be broad agreement that values are

arranged in a hierarchy. In anthropology, Rokeach and Dumont (Dumont, 1980; Rokeach, 1973) proposed that values, or ideas and categories representing values, are hierarchically ordered. In psychology, the Schwartz theory of value (Schwartz, 1992) emphasizes the idea that values are organized in a (personal) hierarchy, and the cultural psychologist Geert Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001) proposed that cultural values form a system and that values are hierarchically ordered.

Psychology and anthropology embrace corresponding views about how values contribute to individuals' interpretation of social situations. In psychology, Kurt Lewin (Lewin, 1951) was one of the first to claim that values, as abstract ideals, influence how an individual understands a situation and what meaning the situation has for the individual. In anthropology, structuralists, like Dumont, have suggested that cultures are meaning systems comprising categories that people use to make sense of the world. Similar points have been made by anthropologists, like Graeber (Graeber, 2005), who link value to social and cultural systems of meaning.

Awareness of the disciplinary overlaps and similarities is essential if we want to work toward an interdisciplinary understanding of value. However, besides similarities, there are also crucial differences, which, if unaddressed, may ensure that disciplines talk past each other. For example, consider the idea that values are organized in a hierarchy. Psychologists may think about values in relation to personality, where the value hierarchy is a personal hierarchy. For Rokeach, value hierarchy means the weights individuals give to preferable modes of conduct and end states. Next, when Dumont speaks of hierarchy, he means an ordering in terms of 'encompassment' of contrary categories. The differences in the notion of hierarchy illustrate the importance of clarity and that teasing out the differences and similarities is a practical step toward interdisciplinary theorizing.

Most psychologists would acknowledge that people incorporate different social roles and are confronted with different social domains with varying value implications. One idea from anthropology that psychologists could include in their value theories is that there are spheres of value and that within society,

there are domains that are structured by different value hierarchies. Recall Dumont's structuralist theory of value and his claim that social domains have different value hierarchies. Considering this social stratification of the value system could open new avenues for psychological theorizing about the link between personal and social value systems.

Psychologists of value could also benefit from considering anthropological ideas about how values are culturally enacted and created, like practices and activities that synchronize individual and cultural value systems, like rituals. It would be interesting for psychologists to take a closer look at action-oriented approaches in anthropology because they focus on the activities by which values are created, enacted, and circulated in society. Furthermore, to develop their accounts about how individual values are shaped by culture and how the individual internalizes social values, psychologists could draw on anthropological treatments of exemplars, which are "people or institutionalized cultural forms that realize specific values to the fullest extent possible in a given cultural setting" (Robbins, 2018, p. 175).

Most psychologists tend to think about values as abstract entities. However, psychologist Gregory Maio (Maio, 2016) has pointed out that although values are abstract ideas, an exclusive focus on the abstract would miss important aspects that we need to understand value fully. A complete understanding of values, so claims Maio, cannot ignore how values find concrete expressions, how they are instantiated and interpreted in concrete situations. Anthropology could help psychology to shed light on these concrete value instantiations and manifestations. For instance, anthropologies' focus on concrete value practices, including rituals and exemplars, could help to broaden the psychological perspective and open psychological theories for the idea that values are not merely 'in the heads' of people but also out in the world.

Anthropology can also benefit from a closer consideration of psychology. Anthropologists could focus more on what psychologists say about the link between self-concept and value because this link could bridge culture and the individual. Ever since Allport and Vernon took inspiration from Adler's suggestion that values are part of personality (Adler, 1956; Vernon & Allport,

1931), psychology has stressed the link between value, personality, and self-concept. Psychological insights could help anthropologists to develop an account of how cultural values become part of people's personality and self-concept; that is, anthropology could benefit from what psychology has to say about the mechanisms of how people internalize values. Recall that structuralists in anthropology stress the close link between cultural values and structures, which means structures of the human mind or thought processes. Action-oriented approaches, in contrast, focus on human activity as the source of value. A bridge between these two approaches seems necessary because anthropologists may want to close the gap between cultural values, that is, a collective understanding of what is good, which relates to mental structures, and personal values that motivate people to act according to these values. Psychology can provide the psychological mechanisms of value internalization that can help to bridge the divide between culture and the individual.

Anthropologists are interested in cultural transformation and value change. For instance, Robbins (2007, 2017) considers cultural change through the lens of values. Psychology could provide anthropologists with some insights into the dynamics of cultural change. In psychology, Bardi and Goodwin (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011), for instance, proposed that value change can happen via an automatic and effortful, more conscious route. Anthropologists could incorporate in their accounts of cultural change these insights about psychological mechanisms of value change, resulting in more fine-grained accounts of the link between culture and value change.

Finally, anthropologists could draw on distinctions from psychology to enhance their conceptual toolbox. For instance, in anthropological accounts of value, it sometimes needs to be clarified whether there is a difference between values if there is a difference, what this difference consists of. We have seen that in psychology, a popular idea is to distinguish values by their motivational goals (Schwartz, 1992). The functional theory of value distinguishes between values based on needs and goals (Gouveia et al., 2014). Anthropologists could take inspiration from these proposals and refine their concept of value.

6.3 *Psychology and philosophy*

As far as theorizing about value is concerned, philosophy and psychology do not intersect much. Part of the explanation for this lack of interaction is that the two disciplines are interested in different issues regarding value. Philosophy, for instance, is mainly concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature of value and goodness. Psychologists, in contrast, are more interested in what could be called *valuing*. They focus on what people find valuable, the attitudes that express values, and the factors that influence what people find valuable.

Despite this difference in outlook, there is an overlap between psychology and philosophy. For instance, consider the topic of emotion and value. Influential psychologists, like Rokeach and Schwartz, have stressed that values are tightly linked to emotions. Many other psychologists also acknowledge that emotions and values are associated (Nelissen et al., 2007) and that emotions are crucial to our moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). To advance theory about the value-emotion link, psychology could benefit from the re-discovery of neglected thinkers like Max Scheler. To remind you, in the early 20th century, the philosopher Scheler proposed that we grasp objective value via value-feelings and that different kinds of values are linked to different feelings. Other philosophers, like Hermann Lotze and Wilhelm Windelband, also wrote about the connection between feeling and value. Many philosophers are busy thinking about the link between emotion and value (Christine Tappolet, 2015). A closer exchange between philosophers and psychologists on the connection between emotion and value could help both to advance their theories.

For another point of overlap, consider that most psychologists stress the relation between values and motivation. For instance, many psychologists follow Schwartz's suggestion that values are broad motivational goals (Schwartz, 1992). In philosophy, it is an ongoing debate about how motivation and value are related. For instance, so-called motivational internalists claim that there is an intrinsic and necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment (Björnsson, 2015). So, when people value justice and judge that an action is just, they are necessarily motivated to act accordingly. Given their overlapping

interest in motivation, and value (including evaluative judgments), it seems worthwhile that psychologists and philosophers work together to develop an account of how these things hang together.

We just saw some overlap in the interests of philosophy and psychology concerning value. We will now look in more detail at some of the blind spots of each discipline and how the other could help to address these.

Philosophy can support psychology in some conceptual housekeeping because the distinctions that philosophers draw could be helpful for psychology. For instance, it is crucial to distinguish between norms and values. Of course, psychologists are aware of this distinction and have focused on the interplay of norms and values (Maio, 2016, p. 235 ff.). However, a more fine-grained account of what distinguishes norms from values and how they relate to one another could be beneficial. For instance, drawing on the work of philosophers like Bicchieri and Brennan and colleagues (Bicchieri, 2005; Brennan et al., 2013), psychologists could refine their conceptual toolbox and include in their accounts a distinction between moral norms and social norms.

Psychologists should introduce more fine-grained categories and distinguish between moral and non-moral values. Because it often seems that they speak about values indiscriminately. Psychologists often talk about values in general terms. With some exceptions, like the list of universal moral values that Richard Kinnier and colleagues constructed (Kinnier et al., 2000), psychology barely references moral values. Moral values seem to have a special place regarding people's motivation. So, given that psychologists want to know what motivates people to act and how values influence decision-making, it could be interesting for them to explore the distinction between moral and non-moral values. More generally, philosophy could provide psychology with ideas about distinguishing between moral and non-moral. For instance, one way to distinguish moral and non-moral is to suggest that a distinctive feature of morality is that it is „impartial, but equally concerned with all those potentially affected“ (Railton, 1986, p. 189).

It must be stressed that psychologists are very much interested in morality and morally relevant phenomena, which brings us to the question of how

philosophy can benefit from psychology. Psychology may help philosophy to develop an empirically guided account of morality and what distinguishes moral from non-moral. Take moral psychology, a huge sub-discipline that focuses, amongst other things, on the difference between moral and non-moral construals of a situation (Van Bavel et al., 2012). More generally, philosophy can benefit from empirical psychology because philosophical accounts, especially when they make assumptions about human psychology, should have empirical adequacy⁴⁹. For instance, Scheler (Scheler, 2014) claimed that some values provide a greater level of satisfaction and that specific feelings correspond to levels of value. Also, recall that philosophers make claims about the link between feelings, emotions, and value. These claims may or may not track what humans feel. Psychology can empirically inform philosophers' intuitions (Hopster & Klenk, 2020) and enrich their armchair perspective.

To remind you, psychological accounts of value draw a close link between the self and values. Looking into these psychological accounts would be interesting for philosophers that focus on personal values and the role of values in people's lives. An example is the recent value-fulfillment account of well-being by Valerie Tiberius. According to Tiberius, for every person, "[...] values form systems of mutual reinforcement and integration that help or hinder their fulfillment" (Tiberius, 2020, p. 40). Psychology could be a valuable resource for philosophers who stress the relationship between values because many psychologists stress that values are systematically related. They also provide empirical results that validate this claim.

Lastly, philosophers can learn from psychology and other disciplines to make headway on the topic of value change. Psychology, sociology, and anthropology have tried to make sense of value change. For instance, as modernization theory and psychological studies of voluntary and involuntary value change attest, the idea that people's values adapt to changing circumstances has traction in sociology and psychology. In contrast to scholars in other disciplines, philosophers, with the notable exception of pragmatist philosopher Dewey, have not seriously pursued the idea that values are malleable or adaptive.

⁴⁹ Psychological investigations may not be relevant for philosophers that seek a priori accounts.

6.4 *Sociology and anthropology*

Sociology and anthropology share many similar perspectives on value⁵⁰. For instance, thinkers in both disciplines linked values to challenges and problems that a group or society needs to solve. In sociology, Pat Hutcheon (Hutcheon, 1972) thought of values in terms of paradigms to solve social problems. In anthropology, Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck (Florence Kluckhohn & Fred Strodtbeck, 1961) proposed that value orientations reflect a group's solution to universal social and cultural problems.

Another crucial overlap between sociology and anthropology is that in both disciplines, the notion of value is supposed to do the heavy lifting in explaining social order and motivation. Parsons (Parsons, 1991) is exemplary here because he claimed that shared core values stabilize a society. This perspective chimes well with the ideas of some anthropologists (e.g., (Robbins, 2018)), who propose that culture, understood as shared values, facilitates social order.

Sociologists and anthropologists also share an interest in how the group influences the individual, which is crucial in explaining how culture and value facilitate social order. For instance, the sociologist Pat Hutcheon (Hutcheon, 1972) claimed that group members share a value system, which Hutcheon called the ideological system, which is coupled with the personal value system of the individuals. The anthropologist Dumont (Dumont, 2013) has proposed that individuals are exposed to ideologies, which are systems of 'ideas-and-values', and that these ideologies influence how individuals make sense of the world. Kluckhohn (Kluckhohn, 1951) also makes some tentative remarks about how the value system needs to be taken up by the individual. To theorize about the interaction of group and individual, sociology and anthropology could enlist the

⁵⁰ Anthropologists and sociologists share similar perspectives and ideas and face a similar methodological problem: How can we access value? In sociology, Adler (Adler, 1956) has claimed that values are only accessible through people's actions and social institutions. Similarly, the anthropologist Kluckhohn (Kluckhohn, 1951) has cautioned that values are often implicit and that people may not be able to lucidly talk about their values, which makes it hard for anthropologists to access them. As a consequence, the values of a society cannot be directly observed but have to be inferred from the observable behavior of people. The problem lurking here is the causal relation between value and behavior. This problem is aptly expressed by James Spates, who says about values that "we have no logical way of getting back to them from the data; we cannot say that x causes y when the only indicator we have of x is y" (Spates, 1983, p. 35).

help of psychology. Recall that the psychology of value stresses that values and personal identity go hand in hand. It would be promising for sociology and anthropology to consider the psychological processes of how individuals internalize collective value systems.

Another similarity between sociology and anthropology is that both disciplines stress value pluralism. Anthropologists are the first to acknowledge that differences in social groups or societies can be cashed out in terms of values⁵¹. Similarly, sociological authors like Weber and Parsons have stressed the plurality of value spheres and value systems. You may recall that Weber proposed that modern society comprises different spheres or domains that can be identified by their ultimate values. For instance, the value spheres of politics and economy are characterized by different ultimate values, namely power, and financial gain. The idea that there are different value spheres is echoed in anthropology by Dumont's proposal that there are domains, like the religious or political domain, that are internally structured by different value hierarchies. Combining elements of Weber's account with Dumont's thoughts on value hierarchy could be worthwhile to advance theory building. For instance, Weber stressed that the value spheres have their internal logic. Here, Dumont's ideas about hierarchization could be used to develop ideas about how the different value spheres are organized and structured.

Sociology and anthropology also have overlapping interests concerning value emergence and how values are maintained in groups. Sociologist Emile Durkheim, for instance, claimed that collective experiences, particularly the emotional processes involved, contribute to people's commitment to values. A process that Durkheim called collective effervescence (Durkheim, 2008). Rituals are a collective experience in this sense. Durkheim emphasizes the role of human activity for value, and this echoes ideas of authors within the anthropological action-theory of value, like Turner, Munn, and Graeber. They stress the role of human activity in the maintenance of value.

⁵¹ It should be noted here that this focus on values means taking seriously the idea that what groups and societies define as good can differ. For instance, one group may value honor more than another group.

Anthropologists could utilize insights from sociology to advance their accounts of value change. Modernization theory, for instance, claims that people adapt their values to changes in socio-economic circumstances (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Specifically, economic development contributes to an increase in the importance of individualistic values and a decrease in the importance of values related to power and hierarchy. Anthropologists do not ignore external factors of cultural change (Robbins, 2017). Still, it may be worthwhile for anthropologists to consider how value change is related to socio-economic change in more detail. Specifically, when anthropologists consider values related to hierarchy and equality (Rio, 2014), drawing on modernization theory and other sociological accounts of how socio-economic change alters power and hierarchy values could be helpful.

To create a comprehensive picture of human action in relation to the group and culture, anthropologists must pay attention to the factors influencing human decisions. Individual decisions are shaped by the relationship between individual and group and by cultural factors, but individuals also have particular interests and desires. Anthropological thinking about the macro and micro-level relationship could benefit from social sciences' ideas. For instance, recall Chong's (Chong, 2000) model of individual choice that includes individual factors and cultural and social influences. Personal choice is grounded in interests, social and material incentives, individual dispositions, and values. Bringing incentives and other notions of rational choice into the theoretical mix could enhance the power of anthropological explanations of individual's action in culture.

Although values have an important place in the theoretical repertoire of sociology, one is hard-pressed to find satisfying proposals of value creation and value commitment. For instance, Parsons proposes that society provides the individual with a set of ultimate values, but he does not detail how values are created. The exception is sociologist Hans Joas, who, in his book *Genesis of value* (Joas, 2000) reconstructs and integrates the complementary ideas of crucial social thinkers like Nietzsche, William James, John Dewey, and Emile Durkheim. Going beyond these thinkers, Joas provides his account of value commitment. Values, so Joas, arise from experiences of self-transcendence and

self-formation. Self-transcendence refers to situations where individuals have non-routine experiences that force them to expand their tried-and-true repertoire of actions. Self-formation kicks in when individuals reflectively ‘renew’ themselves based on these non-routine experiences. Sociological proposals, like Joas, to account for the emergence of and commitment to value could be enriched by including anthropological insights into value creation and value commitment. What comes to mind here are action-oriented accounts, like Graeber’s (Graeber, 2001), that include anthropological ideas about how value is continually produced by human social activity, like rituals.

6.5 Sociology and philosophy

Sociology and philosophy have a rich history of thinking about value, but the overlap between the two disciplines vis-à-vis value is not apparent. This does not mean that sociologists are not interested in philosophical issues or that philosophers ignore sociology. On the contrary, as an example, consider questions of social ontology, which are methodologically relevant to social sciences (Epstein, 2015).

Although overlap is not apparent, it is possible to identify junctures where close interaction between sociology and philosophy would benefit the advancement of value theory in both disciplines. For instance, sociological authors, like Hutcheon and Kluckhohn, and pragmatist philosophers, like Dewey, have adopted a perspective that considers values as solutions to (societal) problems. Conceptual work done by philosophers could be interesting for sociologists, whereas sociological accounts about the relation of values and societal problems could inform philosophical theories.

As previously mentioned, there has yet to be a satisfactory account of value change in philosophy. To develop such an account, exploring the sociological idea that values are adaptive and responsive to environmental changes could be worthwhile. Pragmatist philosopher Dewey proposed that values are dynamic and adaptive but account like that could be further refined with the help of sociological ideas. For instance, recall modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997),

which proposes that people's values adapt to system-level changes, like economic progress. Notably, individual values seem to respond to how secure survival is.

Furthermore, the link between economic security and value could be interesting for philosophers like Valerie Tiberius (Tiberius, 2020), that work on the connection between well-being and value. Similarly, philosophers interested in transformative experiences (Paul, 2015), which are personal experiences that influence how things are valued, could draw inspiration from sociological and psychological accounts of transformative changes. Lastly, it could be worthwhile for philosophers interested in moral change to take seriously the idea that values are adaptive and flexible. For instance, Anthony Kwame Appiah's account of moral change regarding honor (Appiah, 2011) and Robert Baker's theory of moral change (Baker, 2019) could be combined with sociological ideas about the adaptive nature of values.

What can philosophy contribute to sociology? An obvious candidate is helping with conceptual housekeeping (The same goes for other disciplines). For instance, Nathalie Heinich (Heinich, 2020) has noted that there is enduring confusion about value and norms in sociology. To ameliorate this, sociologists could draw on accounts of norms from philosophers, like the proposals developed by Bicchieri or Brennan and collaborators (Bicchieri, 2005; Brennan et al., 2013). Looking into philosophical literature on norms could have two positive effects. First, it can help clear up the confusion, and second, it can provide a deeper understanding of how norms relate to values.

A less obvious candidate for what philosophy can offer sociological theorizing about value is that philosophy can help sociologists if they want to think about values in non-moral domains. A considerable part of philosophical value theory concerns morality and moral values. However, philosophers have also considerably focused on non-moral domains, like art and aesthetic values (Sauchelli, 2016). The suggestion here is that sociologists who want to concentrate on non-moral values may want to venture into philosophy for inspiration.

6.6 *Anthropology and philosophy*

Anthropologists and philosophers have some common interests concerning the issue of value. Both are interested in value monism and pluralism, and some scholars think the disciplines can learn from one another. In the hope of contributing to anthropology and philosophy, the anthropologist Joel Robbins (Robbins, 2013) connects the philosophical debate regarding value monism and value pluralism to ethnographic research.

Besides value pluralism and monism, philosophers and anthropologists are interested in value (in)commensurability. Anthropologists sometimes stress the distinction between economic value and ethical value. For example, the anthropologist Michael Lambek (Lambek, 2008) argues that ethical and economic values are incommensurable in a capitalist society. Lambek proposes that values are commensurable to one another when we consider them from the perspective of a particular meta-value. Meta-values, however, are incommensurable. This idea of a meta-value could be productively linked to the philosophical discussion about monism and pluralism, particularly Stocker's and Chang's (Chang, 2004; Stocker, 1992) ideas about higher-level synthesizing categories and covering values.

Another issue where the interests of anthropology and philosophy overlap are the distinction between fact and value. Some anthropologists reject the separation of fact and value. For example, Dumont dismissed the idea that values and description can be separated. Instead, Dumont's systems of value combine descriptive and evaluative elements, which he called ideas-and-value' (Dumont, 2013, p. 297). Dewey's pragmatist account of value also rejects fact and value dualism. Connecting anthropological ideas and pragmatist philosophy could be worthwhile for both anthropologists and philosophers of value.

What inspiration can philosophy draw from anthropology? There are many areas where paying attention to anthropology can pay off for philosophers. For instance, moral philosophy can benefit from input from cultural anthropology on topics like moral change and the definition of morality (Klenk, 2019). Anthropology can enrich philosophical accounts of morality because

anthropology focuses on the socially and culturally mediated experience of morality (Robbins, 2007).

Anthropological work could also help philosophers illuminate the relationship between values. Robbins (Robbins, 2013), for instance, suggested that anthropologists could empirically explore value relations, which could then inform philosophical thinking.

Although there is no philosophical account of value change, philosophers are interested in many phenomena of change, like moral change and norm change. It may be helpful for philosophers to look at change through an anthropological lens to acquire a fresh perspective on conceptualizations of change and to increase the empirical adequacy of their accounts. Take the idea that there are different value spheres or domains of value, an idea prevalent in anthropology and sociology. Max Weber suggested that society comprises different domains of value distinguished by different ultimate values. Robbins (Robbins, 2007) combines Weber's ideas with Dumont's (Dumont, 1980) model of social spheres that have different value rankings. Philosophers interested in value change could take these ideas as a starting point for exciting questions. For instance, it could be worthwhile to ask whether different value spheres are subject to different kinds of value change. One idea here is also to develop further the accounts of philosophers Martin Walzer and Elizabeth Anderson (Walzer, 2010 (orig. 1985); Anderson, 1995). With a nod to Weber's idea, both argued that society consists of varying societal spheres with different standards, social meanings, and values.

Let us now turn to what philosophy can contribute to anthropology. Philosophy can supply some conceptual clarity. As an example, take the distinction between fact and value. Like Dumont's concept of 'idea-and-value', the notion of value orientation proposed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (Florence Kluckhohn & Fred Strodtbeck, 1961) combines normative and descriptive elements. To refine the conceptual tools for thinking about the relationship between descriptive and normative, anthropologists could turn to philosophy. One idea is to utilize the philosophical distinction between thick and thin concepts. A thin concept is a concept with only evaluative content, whereas a

thick concept combines evaluative and descriptive content (Roberts, 2013). Examples of thin concepts are good and bad; examples of thick concepts are brave and cowardly. The thin-thick distinction could be brought to bear on the anthropological discussions about the distinctions between fact-value and normative-descriptive.

Philosophy could also serve anthropology regarding the distinction between value and virtue. Value terms, like beautiful or unjust, are usually used to judge state-of-affairs and objects. Virtue terms, like brave or loyal, are typically used in judgments about people, particularly their character traits and actions. Values and virtues are sometimes conflated. For instance, the social psychologist Milton Rokeach (Rokeach, 1973) distinguishes between terminal values, which are preferred end-states, and instrumental values. Being ambitious or courageous are examples of instrumental values. However, they also describe virtues. The distinction and the relationship between value and virtue are relevant in anthropology, and at least some anthropologists know that values and virtues should not be conflated (e.g., Lambek, 2008). To develop a clear distinction between value and virtue, anthropology could benefit from philosophical input, and anthropologists could tap into the vast philosophical literature on virtues (Chappell, 2006).

Philosophy can help anthropology to uncover and illuminate theoretical blind spots. Consider that norms play a crucial role in anthropological considerations of value because they stabilize social practices of value creation, like rituals. The role of norms, however, is only sometimes explicitly recognized in anthropological accounts of value. For instance, Graeber's (Graeber, 2001) action-oriented approach to value, which focuses on activity and interaction between humans, includes no treatment of norms. Anthropologists who want to focus on norms can draw inspiration from philosophy. For example, in their treatment of norms, Brennan and colleagues (Brennan et al., 2013) proposed an account of the function of norms in social groups, and they also argued for a distinction between social norms and moral norms. Anthropologists could use

these philosophical accounts to develop their ideas about the role of norms in value practices⁵².

6.7 Conclusion: Toward an interdisciplinary theory of value

The book's chapters focused on value theories in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. All these disciplines have their unique perspective on value, but this chapter has shown that they have a lot in common. Not only is there much overlap, but the disciplines can also benefit and learn from one another. For instance, a closer interaction can help to address conceptual difficulties and loosen fixed perspectives on value. An interdisciplinary collaboration between disciplines, so the hope, will improve value theory in all disciplines.

Why do we need an interdisciplinary approach to value? Interdisciplinary research is necessary when a topic or an issue is complex and has multiple aspects to consider. Issues are multi-faceted when they appear different depending on the perspective you take. Viewers from one perspective see facets and relationships that another viewer does not see. It is especially phenomena relating to the social world of human interaction that transcends disciplinary boundaries, and the topic of value falls squarely in this category. To make sense of value, we must consider it from a psychological perspective, but value also has a social and cultural dimension, which requires sociological and anthropological theorizing.

Interdisciplinarity requires the integration of disciplines that focus on a common, often complex, issue (Holbrook 2013, p. 1897). A comprehensive and interdisciplinary understanding of value, then, requires the integration of different theoretical perspectives and different conceptions of value. The various theoretical perspectives on value need to be integrated to make headway toward an interdisciplinary theory of value.

⁵² Anthologists may also want to look at the philosophical discussion of moral trendsetters, especially discussions about the role of trendsetters in norm change. The topic of norm- or moral trendsetters seem connected to the anthropological interest in exemplars. Here, both disciplines may benefit from paying attention to what the other discipline has to say.

How disciplines can be integrated is a contested issue (Holbrook 2013), but a crucial step toward integration is to advance the communication and interaction between the disciplines. Scholars must often be made aware of other disciplines' discussions and theories. Because of this lack of awareness, they may miss out on novel concepts, theories, and fresh perspectives. To advance theory building and realize the full potential of all disciplines, the disciplines need to cooperate constructively. Efforts, like joint research projects, workshops, or special issues in journals, are required to bring together the different fields and make them talk to one another.

Continued communication and contact between scholars of different disciplines will also bridge terminological differences, which helps avoid people talking past one another. As the scholar of interdisciplinarity, Julie Thompson Klein, puts it, working towards interdisciplinarity “requires analyzing terminology to improve understanding of phenomena and to construct an integrated framework with a common vocabulary” (Klein, 2005, pp. 43 f.). Developing an interdisciplinary perspective on value requires familiarity with each discipline's relevant concepts and theories, but it also requires identifying differences and similarities in terminology. Two disciplines may use the same term, but this does not mean they are discussing the same thing. Take, as an example, terms like ‘hierarchies’ or ‘structures’ of value, which can have entirely different meanings for anthropologists and psychologists. Awareness of these terminological differences is the first step toward a common vocabulary, which will help establish an integrated framework.

To achieve a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach to value, we also need to pay attention to the hidden assumptions of each discipline. One way to illuminate these hidden assumptions is to critically assess concepts and ideas through the lens of another discipline (Newell, 2001). For instance, some anthropological accounts of value make metaphysical assumptions, and philosophy can help to clarify them. Structuralist accounts, for example, “treat values as objective phenomena embedded in cultural structures” (Sommerschuh & Robbins, 2016, p. 1). It is unclear, however, what kind of objectivity

structuralists have in mind, and an intimate conversation between anthropologists and philosophers could ameliorate this lack of clarity⁵³.

Likewise, an interdisciplinary collaboration with anthropologists could help psychologists to critically assess their ‘internalist’ assumption, which ties values to individuals but neglects external cultural aspects. When psychologists’ accounts of value are examined through an anthropology lens, it becomes clear that psychology does not pay enough attention to the role of culture. For example, consider values as abstract goals, which is an idea that many psychologists subscribe to. When this idea is assessed from the perspective of anthropology, it becomes clear that these abstract goals do not emerge out of thin air but are shaped and maintained by culture. Values have external aspects, and they are related to practices, rituals, and even artifacts.

There is much to be done, but it is the hope that this book is a valuable step toward an interdisciplinary understanding of value.

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⁵³ Although philosophers like Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert and Max Scheler are on the radar of anthropologists (e.g., Sommerschuh & Robbins, 2016), more recent philosophical thinking about the objective existence of value is absent from anthropological discussions.

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