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Beyond Local Nash Equilibria for Adversarial Networks

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Abstract. Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a ‘local Nash equilibrium’ (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash equilibrium (NE), which implies that there are no guarantees on the quality of the found generator or classifier. This paper proposes to model GANs explicitly as finite games in mixed strategies, thereby ensuring that every LNE is an NE. We use the Parallel Nash Memory as a solution method, which is proven to monotonically converge to a resource-bounded Nash equilibrium. We empirically demonstrate that our method is less prone to typical GAN problems such as mode collapse and produces solutions that are less exploitable than those produced by GANs and MGANs.

1 Introduction

Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [14] are a framework in which two neural networks compete with each other: the *generator* (G) tries to trick the *classifier* (C) into classifying its generated fake data as true. GANs hold great promise for the development of accurate generative models for complex distributions without relying on distance metrics [23]. However, GANs are difficult to train [1, 2, 40]. A typical problem is *mode collapse*, which can take the form of *mode omission*, where G does not produce any points from certain modes, or *mode degeneration*, in which G only partially covers some of the modes. In fact, except for special cases (cf. Sect. 7), current training methods [17, 40] can only guarantee to converge to a *local* Nash equilibrium (LNE) [35]. However, an LNE can be arbitrarily far from an NE, and the corresponding generator might be exploitable by an opponent due to suffering from problems such as mode collapse. Moreover, adding computational resources alone may not offer a way to escape these local equilibria: the problem does not lie in the lack of

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computational resources, but is inherently the result of only allowing small steps in strategy space using gradient-based training.

We introduce an approach that does not get trapped in LNEs by formulating adversarial networks as *finite* zero-sum games. The solutions that we try to find are saddle points in *mixed strategies*. This approach is motivated by the observation that, in the space of mixed strategies, any LNE is an NE. We employ Parallel Nash Memory (PNM) [29], to search for approximate mixed equilibria with small support.

PNM has been shown to monotonically converge to an NE, provided that in its iterations it has non-zero probability to find better responses [29]. However, due to the extremely large number of pure strategies that result for sensible choices of neural network classes, we cannot expect to find exact best responses. Therefore, we introduce resource-bounded best-responses (RBBRs), and show that our PNM approach monotonically converges to the corresponding resource-bounded Nash equilibrium (RB-NE).

Key features of our approach are that: (1) It is based on finite zero-sum games, and as such it enables the use of existing game-theoretic methods. In this paper we focus on one such method, Parallel Nash Memory (PNM) [29]. (2) It will not get trapped in LNEs: we prove that it monotonically converges to an RB-NE, which means that more computation can improve solution quality. (3) It works for any network architecture. In particular, future improvements in classifiers/generator networks can be exploited directly.

We investigate empirically the effectiveness of PNM and show that it can indeed deal well with typical GAN problems. We show that the found solutions closely match the theoretical predictions made by [14] about the conditions at a Nash equilibrium, and are much less susceptible to being exploited by an adversary than those produced by GANs and MGANs [18].

2 Background

We defer a more detailed treatment of related work until Sect. 7. Here, we introduce some basic game theory.

Definition 1 (**‘game’**). *A two-player strategic game, which we will simply call ‘game’, is a tuple $\langle \mathcal{D}, \{\mathcal{S}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{D}}, \{u_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{D}} \rangle$, where $\mathcal{D} = \{1, 2\}$ is the set of players, \mathcal{S}_i is the set of pure strategies (actions) for player i , and $u_i : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is i ’s payoff function defined on the set of pure strategy profiles $\mathcal{S} := \mathcal{S}_1 \times \mathcal{S}_2$. When the action sets are finite, the game is finite.*

We also write s_i and s_{-i} for the strategy of agent i and its opponent respectively. A fundamental concept is the *Nash equilibrium (NE)*, which is a strategy profile $s = \langle s_i, s_{-i} \rangle$ such that no player can unilaterally deviate and improve his payoff: $u_i(s) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$ for all players i and $s'_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$.

A finite game may not possess a pure NE. A *mixed strategy* μ_i of player i is a probability distribution over i ’s pure strategies \mathcal{S}_i . The payoff of a player under a profile of mixed strategies $\mu = \langle \mu_1, \mu_2 \rangle$ is defined as the expectation:

$u_i(\mu) := \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} [\prod_{j \in \mathcal{D}} \mu_j(s_j)] \cdot u_i(s)$. Then an NE in mixed strategies is defined as follows. A $\mu = \langle \mu_i, \mu_{-i} \rangle$ is an NE if and only if $u_i(\mu) \geq u_i(\langle s'_i, \mu_{-i} \rangle)$ for all players i and potential unilateral deviations $s'_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$. Every finite game has at least one NE in mixed strategies [25]. In this paper we deal with two-player zero-sum games, where $u_1(s_1, s_2) = -u_2(s_1, s_2)$ for all $s_1 \in \mathcal{S}_1, s_2 \in \mathcal{S}_2$. The equilibria of zero-sum games, also called *saddle points*,¹ have several important properties, as stated in Von Neuman’s Minmax theorem [27]:

Theorem 1. *In a finite zero-sum game, v^* is the value of the game that satisfies: $\min_{\mu_2} \max_{\mu_1} u_1(\mu) = \max_{\mu_1} \min_{\mu_2} u_1(\mu) = v^*$.*

All equilibria have payoff v^* and equilibrium strategies are interchangeable: if $\langle \mu_1, \mu_2 \rangle$ and $\langle \mu'_1, \mu'_2 \rangle$ are equilibria, then so are $\langle \mu'_1, \mu_2 \rangle$ and $\langle \mu_1, \mu'_2 \rangle$ [32]. This means that in zero-sum games we do not need to worry about equilibrium selection. Moreover, the convex combination of two equilibria is an equilibrium, meaning that the game either has one or infinitely many equilibria. We also employ the standard, additive notion of *approximate equilibrium*: A pair of strategies (μ_i, μ_{-i}) is an ϵ -NE if $\forall i \quad u_i(\mu_i, \mu_{-i}) \geq \max_{\mu'_i} u_i(\mu'_i, \mu_{-i}) - \epsilon$.

In the literature, GANs have not typically been considered as finite games. The natural interpretation of the standard setup of GANs is of an infinite game where payoffs are defined over all possible weight parameters for the respective neural networks. With this view we do not obtain existence of saddle points *in the space of parameters*, nor the desirable properties that follow from Theorem 1.² This is why the notion of *local Nash equilibrium (LNE)* has arisen in the literature [35, 40]. Roughly, an LNE is a strategy profile where neither player can improve in a small neighborhood of the profile. In finite games every LNE is an NE, as, whenever there is a global deviation (i.e., a better response), one can always deviate locally in the space of mixed strategies towards a pure best response (by playing that better response with ϵ higher probability).

3 GANGs

In order to capitalize on the insight that we can escape local equilibria by switching to mixed strategy space for a finite game, we formalize adversarial networks in a finite games setting.³

We consider a standard adversarial network setup: $\mathcal{M} = \langle p_d, \langle G, p_z \rangle, C, \phi \rangle$ where

¹ Note that in game theory the term ‘saddle point’ is used to denote a ‘global’ saddle point which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium: there is no profitable deviation near or far away from the current point. In contrast, in machine learning, the term ‘saddle point’ typically denotes a ‘local’ saddle point: no player can improve its payoff by making a small step from the current joint strategy.

² Some results on the existence of saddle points in infinite action games are known, but they require properties like convexity and concavity of utility functions [5], which we cannot apply as they would need to hold w.r.t. the neural network parameters.

³ By relying on Glicksberg’s theorem, we think it would be possible to extend our formulation to the continuous setting.

- $p_d(x)$ is the distribution over (‘true’ or ‘real’) data points $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
- G is a neural network class with d outputs, parametrized by a parameter vector $\theta_G \in \Theta_G$, such that $G(z; \theta_G) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denotes the (‘fake’ or ‘generated’) output of G on a random vector z drawn from some distribution $z \sim p_z$.
- C is a neural network class with a single output, parametrized by a parameter vector $\theta_C \in \Theta_C$, such that the output $C(x; \theta_C) \in [0, 1]$ indicates the ‘realness’ of x according to C .
- $\phi : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a *measuring function* [4]—e.g., log for GANs, the identity mapping for WGANs—used to specify game payoffs, explained next.

We call \mathcal{M} a *Generative Adversarial Network Game (GANG)*, since it induces a zero-sum game $\langle \mathcal{D} = \{G, C\}, \{\mathcal{S}_G, \mathcal{S}_C\}, \{u_G, u_C\} \rangle$ with:

- $\mathcal{S}_G = \{G(\cdot; \theta_G) \mid \theta_G \in \Theta_G\}$ the set of strategies s_G ;
- $\mathcal{S}_C = \{C(\cdot; \theta_C) \mid \theta_C \in \Theta_C\}$ the set of strategies s_C ;
- $u_C(s_G, s_C) = \mathbf{E}_{x \sim p_d}[\phi(s_C(x))] - \mathbf{E}_{z \sim p_z}[\phi(s_C(s_G(z)))]$. I.e., the score of C is the expected ‘measured realness’ of the real data minus that of the fake data;
- $u_G(s_G, s_C) = -u_C(s_G, s_C)$.

As such, when using $\phi = \log$, the above formulation of GANGs employ a payoff function for G that use [14]’s trick to enforce strong gradients early in the training process (but it applies this transformation to u_C too, in order to retain the zero-sum property). It is also possible to use the original GAN objective. Correctness of these transformations is shown in [31].

In practice, GANs are represented using floating point numbers, of which, for a given setup, there is only a finite (albeit large) number. From now on, we will focus on finite GANGs, which have finite parameter sets and a finite set of neural network architectures.

We emphasize this finiteness, because this is exactly what enables us to obtain the desirable properties mentioned in Sect. 2: existence of (one or infinitely many) mixed NEs with the same value, as well as the guarantee that any LNE is an NE. Moreover, these properties hold for the GANG in its original formulation—not for a theoretical abstraction in terms of (infinite capacity) densities—which means that we can truly expect solution methods (that operate in the parametric domain [38]) to exploit these properties. However, since we do not impose any additional constraints or discretization⁴, the number of strategies (all possible unique instantiations of the network class with floating point numbers) is *huge*. Therefore, we think that finding (near-) equilibria with small supports is one of the most important challenges for making principled advances in the field of adversarial networks. As a first step towards addressing this challenge, we propose to make use of the *Parallel Nash Memory (PNM)* [29], which can be seen as a generalization (to non-exact best responses) of the *double oracle method* [6, 24].

⁴ Therefore, our finite GANGs have the same representational capacity as normal GANs that are implemented using floating point arithmetic.

4 Solving GANGs

Treating GANGs as finite games in mixed strategies permits building on existing tools and algorithms for these classes of games [10, 11, 33]. In this section, we describe how to use Parallel Nash Memory (PNM) [29], which is particularly tailored to find approximate NEs with small support, and monotonically⁵ converges to such an equilibrium.

Parallel Nash Memory for GANGs. The basic idea of PNM is that we iteratively find new strategies which are good candidates for improvement of an approximate mixed strategy NE $\langle \mu_G, \mu_C \rangle$. Previous works (such as the original PNM paper [29], and before that the double-oracle method [24]) have considered the use of exact best response (BR) functions to deliver such new candidates. In GANGs, however, computing such an exact BR is intractable, and we typically use gradient descent, or another way to compute an approximate best response. In phrasing our algorithm, we abstract away from the actual implementation of *how* it is computed, but we acknowledge the fact that the quality we can expect is bounded by computational resources. As such we will use the term ‘resource-bounded best response’ (RBBR) to denote an approximate best response function which computes the best possible answer it can given some amount of computational resources.

Definition 2. A strategy $s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i^{RB}$ of player i is a resource-bounded best-response (RBBR) against a (possibly mixed) strategy μ_j , if

$$\forall s'_i \in \mathcal{S}_i^{RB}, \quad u_i(s_i, \mu_j) \geq u_i(s'_i, \mu_j).$$

That is, s_i only needs to be amongst the best strategies that player i can compute in response to μ_j .

For ease of explanation, we focus on the setting with deterministic best responses, but the approach can easily be extended to non-deterministic RBBR functions⁶ and our empirical evaluation makes use of such non-deterministic RBBR functions (due to random initializations).

Algorithm 1 details our approach. PNM incrementally grows a strategic game SG over a number of iterations using the AUGMENTGAME function. It uses SOLVEGAME to compute (via linear programming, see, e.g., [37]) a mixed strategy NE $\langle \mu_G, \mu_C \rangle$ of this smaller game at the end of each iteration. At the beginning of each iteration the algorithm uses the RBBR functions to deliver new

⁵ For an explanation of the precise meaning of monotonic here, we refer to [29]. Roughly, we will be ‘secure’ against more strategies of the other agent with each iteration. This does not imply that the worst case payoff for an agent also improves monotonically. The latter property, while desirable, is not possible with an approach that incrementally constructs sub-games of the full game, as considered here: there might always be a part of the game we have not seen yet, but which we might discover in the future that will lead to a very poor worst case payoff for one of the agents.

⁶ By changing the termination criterion of line 8 in Algorithm 1 into a criterion for including the newly found strategies. See the formulation in [29] for more details.

Algorithm 1. PARALLEL NASH MEMORY WITH DETERMINISTIC RBBRS

```

1:  $\langle s_G, s_C \rangle \leftarrow \text{INITIALSTRATEGIES}()$ 
2:  $\langle \mu_G, \mu_C \rangle \leftarrow \langle \{s_G\}, \{s_C\} \rangle$  ▷ set initial mixtures
3: while True do
4:    $s_G \leftarrow \text{RBBR}(\mu_C)$  ▷ get new bounded best resp.
5:    $s_C \leftarrow \text{RBBR}(\mu_G)$ 
6:   // Expected payoffs of these ‘tests’ against mixture:
7:    $u_{BRs} \leftarrow u_G(s_G, \mu_C) + u_C(\mu_G, s_C)$ 
8:   if  $u_{BRs} \leq 0$  then
9:     break
10:  end if
11:   $SG \leftarrow \text{AUGMENTGAME}(SG, s_G, s_C)$ 
12:   $\langle \mu_G, \mu_C \rangle \leftarrow \text{SOLVEGAME}(SG)$ 
13: end while
14: return  $\langle \mu_G, \mu_C \rangle$  ▷ found an RB-NE

```

promising strategies (s_G, s_C) . Then we test if they ‘beat’ the current $\langle \mu_G, \mu_C \rangle$. If they do, $u_{BRs} > 0$, and the game is augmented with these and solved again to find a new NE of the sub-game SG . If they do not, $u_{BRs} \leq 0$, and the algorithm stops.

AUGMENTGAME evaluates (by simulation) each newly found strategy for each player against all of the existing strategies of the other player, thus constructing a new row and column for the maintained payoff matrix. In order to implement the best response functions, we have used standard stochastic gradient descent, which means that any existing neural network architectures can be used. However, we need to compute RBBRs against *mixtures* of networks of the other player. For C this is trivial: we can simply generate a batch of fake data from the mixture μ_C . Implementing an RBBR for G against μ_C is slightly more involved, as we need to back-propagate the gradient from all the different $s_C \in \mu_C$ to G . Intuitively, one can think of a combined network consisting of the G network with its outputs connected to every $s_C \in \mu_C$. The predictions \hat{y}_{s_C} of these components $s_C \in \mu_C$ are combined in a single linear output node $\hat{y} = \sum_{s_C \in \mu_C} \mu_C(s_C) \cdot \hat{y}_{s_C}$. This allows us to evaluate and backpropagate through the entire network. A practical implementation loops through each component $s_C \in \mu_C$ and does the evaluation of the weighted prediction $\mu_C(s_C) \cdot \hat{y}_{s_C}$ and subsequent backpropagation per component.

Analysis. Given that we do not compute exact BRs, we cannot get convergence to an NE. Instead, using RBBRs, we define an intuitive specialization of NE:

Definition 3. $\mu = \langle \mu_i, \mu_j \rangle$ is a resource-bounded NE (RB-NE) if and only if $\forall i \ u_i(\mu_i, \mu_j) \geq u_i(\text{RBBR}_i(\mu_j), \mu_j)$.

That is, an RB-NE can be thought of as follows: we present μ to each player i and it gets the chance to switch to another strategy, for which it can apply its bounded resources (i.e., use RBBR_i) exactly once. After this application, the

player’s resources are exhausted and if the found $RBBR_i(\mu_j)$ does not lead to a higher payoff it will not have an incentive to deviate.⁷

Intuitively, it is clear that PNM converges to an RB-NE, which we now state formally.

Theorem 2. *If PNM terminates, it has found an RB-NE.*

Proof. We show that $u_{BRs} \leq 0$ implies we have an RB-NE:

$$\begin{aligned} u_{BRs} &= u_G(RBBR_G(\mu_C), \mu_C) + u_C(\mu_G, RBBR_C(\mu_G)) \\ &\leq 0 = u_G(\mu_G, \mu_C) + u_C(\mu_G, \mu_C) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Note that, per Definition 2, $u_G(RBBR_G(\mu_C), \mu_C) \geq u_G(s'_G, \mu_C)$ for all computable $s'_G \in \mathcal{S}_G^{RB}$ (and similar for C). Therefore, the only way that $u_G(RBBR_G(\mu_C), \mu_C) \geq u_G(\mu_G, \mu_C)$ could fail to hold, is if μ_G would include some strategies that are not computable (not in \mathcal{S}_G^{RB}) that provide higher payoff. However, as the support of μ_G is composed of strategies computed in previous iterations, this cannot be the case. We conclude $u_G(RBBR_G(\mu_C), \mu_C) \geq u_G(\mu_G, \mu_C)$ and similarly $u_C(\mu_G, RBBR_C(\mu_G)) \geq u_C(\mu_G, \mu_C)$. Together with (1) this directly implies $u_G(\mu_G, \mu_C) = u_G(RBBR_G(\mu_C), \mu_C)$ and $u_C(\mu_G, \mu_C) = u_C(\mu_G, RBBR_C(\mu_G))$, indicating we found an RB-NE.

Corollary 1. *Moreover, making use of the finiteness of the game, it can be easily shown that Algorithm 1 terminates and monotonically converges to an equilibrium.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that there are only finitely many RBBRs and the fact that we never forget RBBRs that we computed before, thus the proof for PNM [29] extends to Algorithm 1.

Finally, an RB-NE can be linked to the familiar notion of ϵ -NE by making assumptions on the power of the best response computation.

Theorem 3. *If both players are powerful enough to compute ϵ -best responses, then an RB-NE is an ϵ -NE.*

Proof. Starting from the RB-NE (μ_i, μ_j) , assume an arbitrary i . By definition of RB-NE $u_i(\mu_i, \mu_j) \geq u_i(RBBR_i(\mu_j), \mu_j) \geq \max_{\mu'_i} u_i(\mu'_i, \mu_j) - \epsilon$.

The PNM algorithm for GANGs is parameter free, but we mention two adaptations that are helpful: Interleaved training of best responses and regularization of classifier best responses. Details can be found in [31].

⁷ During training the RBBR functions will be used many times. However, the goal of the RB-NE is to provide a characterization of the *end point* of training.

5 Experiments

Here we report on experiments that aim to test if searching in mixed strategies with PNM-GANG can help in reducing problems with training GANs, and if the found solutions (near-RB-NEs) provide better generative models and are potentially closer to true Nash equilibria than those found by GANs (near-LNEs). Since our goal is to produce better generative models, we refrain from evaluating these methods on complex data like images: image quality and log likelihood are not aligned as for instance shown by [39]. Moreover there is debate about whether GANs are overfitting and assessing this from samples is difficult; some methods have been proposed e.g., [3, 22, 28, 36], but most provide merely a measure of variability, not over-fitting. As such, we choose to focus on irrefutable results on mixture of Gaussian (MoG) tasks, for which the distributions can readily be visualized.

Experimental Setup. We compare our PNM approach (‘PNM-GANG’) to a vanilla GAN implementation and state-of-the-art MGAN [18]. Table 1 summarizes the settings for GAN and PNM training. RBBR models were taken to be as small as possible while still achieving good results. As suggested by [8], we use leaky ReLU as inner activation for our GAN implementation to avoid sparse gradients. Generators have linear output layers. Classifiers use sigmoids for the final layer. Both classifiers and generators are multi-layer perceptrons with 3 hidden layers. We do not use techniques such as Dropout or Batch Normalization, as they did not yield significant improvements in the quality of our experimental results. The MGAN configuration is identical to that of Table 3 in Appendix C1 of [18].

Table 1. Settings used to train GANs and RBBRs.

	GAN	RBBR
Learning rate	$3 \cdot 10^{-4}$	$5 \cdot 10^{-3}$
Batch size	128	128
Dimension of z	40	5
Hidden nodes	50	5
Iterations	20000	750
Generator parameters	4902	92
Classifier parameters	2751	61
Inner activation	Leaky ReLU	Leaky ReLU
Measuring function	log	10^{-5} -bounded log

We test on 3 MoG tasks: ‘round’, ‘grid’ and ‘random’ (cf. Fig. 1). For each we create test cases with 9 and 16 components. In our plots, black points are real data, green points are generated data. Blue indicates areas that are classified as ‘realistic’ while red indicates a ‘fake’ classification by C .




Fig. 1. Results for mixtures of Gaussians with 9 and 16 modes. Odd rows: PNM-GANG, Even rows: GAN. The histograms represent the probabilities in the mixed strategy of each player. True data is shown in black, while fake data is green. The classification boundary (where the classifier outputs 0.5) is indicated with a red line. Best seen in color. (Color figure online)

Found Solutions Compared to Normal GANs. The results produced by regular GANs and PNM-GANGs are shown in Fig. 1 and clearly convey three main points: (1) The PNM-GANG mixed classifier has a much flatter surface than the classifier found by the GAN. Around the true data, it outputs around 0.5 indicating indifference, which is *in line with the theoretical predictions* about the equilibrium [14]. (2) This flatter surface is not coming at the cost of inaccurate samples. In contrast: nearly all samples shown are hitting one of the modes and thus *the PNM-GANG solutions are highly accurate*, much more so than the GAN solutions. (3) Finally, the PNM-GANGs, unlike GANs, *do not suffer from mode omission*. We also note that PNM-GANG typically uses fewer total parameters than the regular GAN, e.g., 1463 vs. 7653 for the random 9 task in Fig. 1. This shows that, qualitatively, the use of multiple generators seems to lead to good results. However, not all modes are *fully* covered. This can be controlled by varying the learning rate [31].

Found Solutions Compared to MGANs. Here we compare the solutions found above for PNM-GANGs to a state-of-the-art GAN variant: MGAN [18] proposes a setup with a mixture of k generators, a classifier, and a discriminator. In an MGAN, the generator mixture aims to create samples which match the training data distribution, while the discriminator distinguishes real and generated samples, and the classifier tries to determine which generator a sample comes from. We use MGAN as a state-of-the-art baseline that was explicitly designed to overcome the problem of mode collapse.

Figure 2 shows the results of MGAN on the mixture of Gaussian tasks. We see that MGAN results do seem qualitatively quite good. Comparing them to the PNG-GANG results from Fig. 1, we see that MGAN may even have less mode degeneration. However, we also see that in the MGAN results there is one missed mode (and thus also one mode covered by 2 generators) on the randomly located components task (right column). In contrast, the PNM-GANGs results did not fail to capture any mode.

We point out that MGAN results were obtained with an architecture and hyperparameters which exactly match those proposed by [18] for a similar task. This means that the MGAN models shown use many more parameters (approx. 310,000) than the GAN and GANG models (approx. 2,000). MGAN requires the number of generators to be chosen upfront as a hyperparameter of the method. We chose this to be equal to the number of mixture components, so that MGAN could cover all modes with one generator per mode. We note that PNM does not require such a hyperparameter to be set, nor does PNM require the related “diversity” hyperparameter of the MGAN method (called β in the MGAN paper).

Overall, these results show that the quality of the solutions found by PNM-GANGs is competitive to that of the state-of-the-art MGAN, while using much fewer parameters.

Exploitability of Solutions. Finally, to complement the above qualitative analysis, we also provide a quantitative analysis of the solutions found by GANs, MGANs




Fig. 2. Results for MGAN on several mixture of Gaussian tasks with 9 modes. Markers correspond to samples created by each generator.

and PNM-GANGs. We investigate to what extent they are exploitable by newly introduced adversaries with some fixed computational power (as modeled by the complexity of the networks we use to attack the found solution). Intuitively, since PNM-GANGs are trained by (against) more powerful attack than GANs, we expect them to be more robust against new attacks of any kind. Specifically, for a given solution $\tilde{\mu} = (\tilde{\mu}_G, \tilde{\mu}_C)$ we use the following measure of exploitability:

$$\text{expl}^{RB}(\tilde{\mu}_G, \tilde{\mu}_C) \triangleq \text{RBmax}_{\mu_G} u_G(\mu_G, \tilde{\mu}_C) + \text{RBmax}_{\mu_C} u_C(\tilde{\mu}_G, \mu_C),$$

where ‘RBmax’ denotes an approximate maximization performed by an adversary of some fixed complexity.

That is, the ‘RBmax’ functions are analogous to the RBBR functions employed in PNM, but the computational resources of ‘RBmax’ could be different from those used during PNM. Intuitively, it gives a higher score if $\tilde{\mu}$ is easier to exploit. However, it is not a true measure of distance to an equilibrium: it can return values that are lower than zero which indicate that $\tilde{\mu}$ could not be exploited by the approximate best responses. Our exploitability is closely related to the use of GAN training metrics [20], but additionally includes the exploitability of the classifier. This is important: when only testing the exploitability of the generator, this does give a way to compare generators, *but it does not give a way to assess how far from equilibrium we might be*. Since finite GANGs are zero-sum games, distance to equilibrium is the desired performance measure. In particular, the exploitability of the classifier actually may provide information about the quality of the generator: if the generator holds up well against a perfect classifier, it should be close to the data distribution.⁸

Figure 3 shows our exploitability results for all three tasks with nine modes. We observe roughly the same trend across the three tasks. First, we investigate the exploitability of solutions delivered by GANs, MGANs and GANGs of

⁸ This measure of exploitability was used to quantify convergence in PNM [29], and also has been used in the optimization literature [26]. It was in the context of GANs in [30], and further motivated for this purpose in [31]. Additionally, an empirical evaluation of exploitability as a measure for GANs was performed in the meantime [16], suggesting that this is a useful measure to quantify sample quality and mode collapse.




Fig. 3. Exploitability results all 9 mode tasks. Top to bottom: round, grid, random.

different complexities (in terms of *total* number of parameters used). For this, we compute ‘attacks’ to these solutions using attackers of fixed complexity (a total of 453 parameters for the attacking G and C together). These results are shown in Fig. 3 (left and middle column). The left column shows the exploitability of PNM-GANG after different numbers of iterations, as well as the number of parameters used in the solutions found in those iterations (a sum over all the networks in the support of the mixture). Error bars indicate standard deviation over 15 trials. It is apparent that PNM-GANG solutions with more parameters typically are less exploitable. Also shown is that the variance of exploitability depends heavily on the solution that we happen to attack.

The middle column shows how exploitable GAN, MGAN and PNM-GANG models of different complexities are: the x-axis indicates the total number of parameters, while the y-axis shows the exploitability. The PNM results are the same points also shown in the left column, but repositioned at the appropriate place on the x-axis. All data points are exploitability of models that were trained until convergence. Note that here the x-axis shows the complexity in terms of total parameters. The figure shows an approximately monotonic decrease in exploitability for GANGs, while GANs and MGANs with higher complexity are still very exploitable in many cases. In contrast to GANGs, more complex architectures for GANs or MGANs are thus not necessarily a way to guarantee a better solution.

We also investigate what happens for the converged GAN/PNM-GANG solution of Fig. 1, which have comparable complexities, when attacked with varying complexity attackers. We also attack the previously reported MGAN solution

(Fig. 2), which has a significantly larger number of parameters (approx. 310,000) than the GAN and GANG models (approx. 2,000). These results are shown in Fig. 3 (right). Clearly shown is that the PNM-GANG is robust with near-zero exploitability even when attacked with high-complexity attackers. The MGAN models also have low exploitability, but recall that these models are *much* more complex. Even with such a complex model, in the ‘random’ task, the MGAN solution has a non-zero level of exploitability, roughly constant for several attacker complexities. This is most likely related to the missed mode and the fact that two of the MGAN generators collapsed to the same lower-right mode in Fig. 1. In stark contrast to both PNM-GANGs and MGAN, we see that the converged GAN solution is exploitable already for low-complexity attackers, again suggesting that the GAN was stuck in an Local Nash Equilibrium far away from a Nash Equilibrium.

6 Discussion

Overall, the preceding results are very positive: they demonstrate that PNM-trained GANGs can provide more robust solutions than GANs/MGANs with the same number of parameters, suggesting that they are closer to a Nash equilibrium and provide better generative models.

However, we have had (at least so far) less positive results scaling these methods to the image tasks (e.g., MNIST, CelebA or CIFAR-10) that researchers have used to evaluate GANs. A typical problem is that we experience extreme mode collapse of the generator RBBR: i.e., the RBBR typically outputs a single image, regardless of the noise vector z . This mirrors the problem of generator mode collapse also observed in regular GAN training and we are investigating how to overcome this problem by building on techniques, such as minibatch discrimination [36], that were introduced to overcome the related problem in regular GAN training.

An interesting observation that we made on MNIST is that we get the same issues when initializing PNM with the solutions from a number of different runs of normal GAN training. That is, using these GAN solutions as the set of initial strategies, we still find RBBRs (which look like noise attacks) that significantly gain over the mixed strategies maintained, for many iterations. This echos the results that we reported above for the MOG domains: the GAN provided solutions for MNIST are not robust to newly trained attacks. As such, one might question in how far GAN training really works for MNIST in terms of capturing the true data distribution: as far as we can tell these solutions are far from equilibrium, and therefore there is no reason to conclude that the data distribution would be well-captured.

7 Related Work

There is a vast body of work related to this paper. We will restrict to discussing only the most relevant papers here. For a broader discussion, including recent

progress on solving in zero-sum games, more general GAN improvements, and bounded rationality, please see [31].

Recently, more researchers have investigated the idea of (more or less) explicitly representing a set or mixture of strategies for the players. For instance, [21] retains sets of networks that are trained by randomly pairing up with a network for the other player thus forming a GAN. This, like PNM, can be interpreted as a coevolutionary approach, but unlike PNM, it does not have any convergence guarantees. MAD-GAN [13] uses k generators, but one discriminator. MGAN [18] proposes mixtures of k generators, a classifier and a discriminator with weight sharing; and presents a theoretical analysis similar to [14] assuming infinite capacity densities. None of these approaches have convergence guarantees.

Generally, explicit mixtures can bring advantages in two ways: (1) *Representation*: intuitively, a mixture of k neural networks could better represent a complex distribution than a single neural network of the same size, and would be roughly on par with a single network that is k times as big. Arora et al. [4] show how to create such a bigger network that is particularly suitable for dealing with multiple modes using a ‘multi-way selector’. In our experiments we observed mixtures of simpler networks leading to better performance than a single larger network of the same total complexity (in terms of number of parameters). (2) *Training*: Arora et al. use an architecture that is tailored to representing a mixture of components and train a single such network. We, in contrast, explicitly represent the mixture; given the observation that good solutions will take the form of a mixture. This is a form of domain knowledge that facilitates learning and convergence guarantees.

A closely related paper is the work by [15], which also builds upon game-theoretic tools to give certain convergence guarantees. The main differences are as follows: (1) We provide a more general form of convergence (to an RB-NE) that is applicable to *all* architectures, that only depends on the power to compute best responses, and show that PNM-GANG converges in this sense. We also show that if agents can compute an ϵ -best response, then the procedure converges to an ϵ -NE. (2) [15] show that for a quite specific GAN architecture their first algorithm converges to an ϵ -NE. On the one hand, this result is an instantiation of our more general theory: they assume they can compute exact (for G) and ϵ -approximate (for C) best responses; for such powerful players our Theorem 3 provides that guarantee. On the other hand, their formulation works without discretizing the spaces of strategies. (3) The practical implementation of the algorithm in [15] does not provide guarantees.

Ge et al. [12] propose a method similar to ours that uses *fictitious play* [7, 11] rather than PNM. Fictitious play does not explicitly model mixed strategies for the agents, but interprets the opponent’s historical behavior as such a mixed strategy. The average strategy played by the ‘Fictitious GAN’ approach converges to a Nash equilibrium *assuming that “the discriminator and the generator are updated according to the best-response strategy at each iteration”*, which follow from the result by [9] which states that fictitious play converges in con-

tinuous zero-sum games. Intuitively, fictitious play, like PNM, in each iteration only ever touches a finite subset of strategies, and one can show that the value of such subgames converges. While this result gives some theoretical underpinning to Fictitious GAN, of course in practice the assumption is hard to satisfy and the notion of RB-NE that we propose may apply to analyze their approach too. Also, in their empirical results they limit the history of actions (played neural networks in previous iterations) to 5 to improve scalability at the cost of convergence guarantees. The Fictitious GAN is not explicitly shown to be more robust than normal GANs, as we show in this paper, but it is demonstrated to produce high quality images, thus showing the potential of game theoretical approaches to GANs to scale.

Hsieh et al. [19] also search in the space of mixed strategies, but without making finiteness assumption (enabled by Glicksberg’s theorem). In particular they extend entropic Mirror Descent and Mirror-Prox to infinite dimension to solve GANs, and propose an approximation that can be implemented making use of sampling algorithms. However, for the algorithm to improve over time it needs to make updates that are proportional to the expected payoffs of strategies against the opponents current strategy. De facto this implies that the sampling strategy must be able to find best responses, which in turn implies solving a non-convex optimization problem. As such, it seems unlikely that their practical approach would converge to Nash equilibrium. An interesting question is whether their method can be shown to converge to an RB-NE.

8 Conclusions

We introduce finite GANGs—Generative Adversarial Network Games—a novel framework for representing adversarial networks by formulating them as finite zero-sum games. By tackling them with techniques working in mixed strategies we can avoid getting stuck in local Nash equilibria (LNE). As finite GANGs have extremely large strategy spaces we cannot expect to exactly (or ϵ -approximately) solve them. Therefore, we introduced the resource-bounded Nash equilibrium (RB-NE). This notion is richer than LNE in that it captures not only failures of escaping local optima of gradient descent, but applies to any approximate best-response computations, including methods with random restarts. Additionally, GANGs can draw on a rich set of methods for solving zero-sum games [10, 11, 29, 34]. In this paper, we build on PNM and prove that the resulting method monotonically converges to an RB-NE. We empirically demonstrate that the resulting method does not suffer from typical GAN problems such as mode collapse and forgetting. We also show that the GANG-PNM solutions are closer to theoretical predictions, and are less exploitable than normal GANs: by using PNM we can train models that are more robust than GANs of the same total complexity, indicating they are closer to a Nash equilibrium and yield better generative performance.

We presented a framework that can have many instantiations and modifications. For example, one direction is to employ different learning algorithms.

Another direction could focus on modifications of PNM, such as to allow discarding “stale” pure strategies, which would allow the process to run for longer without being inhibited by the size of the resulting zero-sum “subgame” that must be maintained and repeatedly solved.

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