TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamical Analysis of Power System Cascading Failures Caused by Cyber Attacks
AU - Rajkumar, Vetrivel S.
AU - Stefanov, Alexandru
AU - Rueda, José L.
AU - Palensky, Peter
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Cascading failures in power systems are extremely rare occurrences caused by a combination of multiple, low probability events. The looming threat of cyberattacks on power grids, however, may result in unprecedented large-scale cascading failures, leading to a blackout. Therefore, new analysis methods are needed to study such cyber induced phenomena. In this article, we propose a data-driven method for dynamical analysis of power system cascading failures caused by cyberattacks. We provide experimental proof on how attacks may accelerate the cascading failure mechanism, in comparison to historically observed blackouts. Using a dynamic power grid model, consisting of multiple, coordinated protection schemes, we define and analyze the point of no return in a cascading failure sequence by applying the Hilbert-Huang transform for time-frequency analysis. Numerical results indicate, cyberattacks may accelerate cascading failures at least by a factor of 3x. This is due to the excitation and non-damping of multiple frequency modes greater than 1 Hz in a short time span. The proposed method is tested using time domain simulations conducted through a modified IEEE 39-bus test system, which can simulate cascading outages using coordinated protection schemes.
AB - Cascading failures in power systems are extremely rare occurrences caused by a combination of multiple, low probability events. The looming threat of cyberattacks on power grids, however, may result in unprecedented large-scale cascading failures, leading to a blackout. Therefore, new analysis methods are needed to study such cyber induced phenomena. In this article, we propose a data-driven method for dynamical analysis of power system cascading failures caused by cyberattacks. We provide experimental proof on how attacks may accelerate the cascading failure mechanism, in comparison to historically observed blackouts. Using a dynamic power grid model, consisting of multiple, coordinated protection schemes, we define and analyze the point of no return in a cascading failure sequence by applying the Hilbert-Huang transform for time-frequency analysis. Numerical results indicate, cyberattacks may accelerate cascading failures at least by a factor of 3x. This is due to the excitation and non-damping of multiple frequency modes greater than 1 Hz in a short time span. The proposed method is tested using time domain simulations conducted through a modified IEEE 39-bus test system, which can simulate cascading outages using coordinated protection schemes.
KW - Blackout
KW - cascading failures
KW - cyberattacks
KW - cyber security
KW - power system dynamics
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85189306444&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TII.2024.3372024
DO - 10.1109/TII.2024.3372024
M3 - Article
SN - 1551-3203
VL - 20
SP - 8807
EP - 8817
JO - IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
JF - IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
IS - 6
ER -