Fraud Detection and Deterrence in Electronic Voting Machines: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Anuj S. Vora, Ankur A. Kulkarni

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We study a setting where a detector wishes to detect and deter adversarial manipulation in an electronic voting machine. An adversary tries to win the election by tampering the votes while obfuscating its manipulation. We pose this problem as a game between the detector and the adversary and characterize the equilibrium payoffs for the players and the asymptotic nature of these payoffs. We find that if the detector is too cautious, then in equilibrium the adversary wins with a probability higher than its prior probability of winning. We derive an expression for the deterrence threshold, i.e., the minimum level of false-alarm that the detector should endure so that the adversary is not any better off by the manipulation. With this, asymptotically, the detector can ensure that the probability of missed-detection becomes zero by appropriately adjusting the rate of decay of probability of false-alarm. But if this rate of decay is too 'fast', then the adversary can get an arbitrarily high probability of winning in spite of having a vanishing prior probability of winning. We then extend the results to a setting where the detector has incomplete information about the adversary.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2023)
PublisherIEEE
Pages3832-3837
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)979-8-3503-0124-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Event62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2023 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 13 Dec 202315 Dec 2023

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370

Conference

Conference62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2023
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period13/12/2315/12/23

Bibliographical note

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care
Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

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