Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate

M. Dröes, B.O. Biermans, Philip Koppels

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volumeConference contributionScientific

3 Citations (Scopus)
39 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Using a unique transactions dataset, this paper examines the determinants of lease incentives in the Amsterdam office market. The study focusses on the type of landlord involved (institutional/privately owned) and whether the tenant or landlord used an advisor to help them with the transaction. The results show that an institutional landlord, ceteris paribus, offers 11 percentage points more incentives than a private owner. In addition, a landlord who uses the services of an advisor pays 11 percentage points less incentives. An advisor at the side of the tenant increases incentives by 13 percentage points. The results in this paper highlight the crucial role of market information, information asymmetry, and bargaining in the market for commercial real estate.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAmerican Real Estate and Urban Association International Conference
Pages1-24
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event2016 AREUEA International Conference - Europe, Alicante, Spain
Duration: 6 Jul 20168 Jul 2016
https://web.ua.es/en/areuea/home-old.html

Conference

Conference2016 AREUEA International Conference
CountrySpain
CityAlicante
Period6/07/168/07/16
Internet address

Keywords

  • commercial real estate
  • office market
  • lease incentives
  • advisor
  • information asymmetry

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