Mean Field Game for Strategic Bidding of Energy Consumers in Congested Distribution Networks

Amirreza Silani; Simon H. Tindemans

doi:10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10384016

Mean Field Game for Strategic Bidding of Energy Consumers in Congested Distribution Networks

Intelligent Electrical Power Grids

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedings/Edited volume › Conference contribution › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

The proliferation of batteries, photovoltaic cells and Electric Vehicles (EVs) in electric power networks can result in network congestion. A redispatch market that allows the Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to relieve congested networks by asking the energy consumers to adjust their scheduled consumption is an alternative to upgrading network capacity. However, energy consumers can strategically increase their bids on the day-ahead market in anticipation of payouts from the redispatch market. This behaviour, which is called increase-decrease gaming, can aggravate congestion and allow the energy consumers to extract windfall profits from the DSO. In this paper, we model the increase-decrease game for large populations of energy consumers in power networks using a mean field game approach. The agents (energy consumers) maximize their individual welfare on the day-ahead market with anticipation of the redispatch market, coupled via the electricity price. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game and use an algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium for the infinite population case.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2023
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	3606-3611
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	979-8-3503-0124-3
ISBN (Print)	979-8-3503-0125-0
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10384016
Publication status	Published - 2023
Event	2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 13 Dec 2023 → 15 Dec 2023 Conference number: 62nd

Conference

Conference	2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Country/Territory	Singapore
City	Singapore
Period	13/12/23 → 15/12/23

Bibliographical note

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care
Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

Keywords

Power systems
Game theory
Power generation

Access to Document

10.1109/CDC49753.2023.10384016

Cite this

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title = "Mean Field Game for Strategic Bidding of Energy Consumers in Congested Distribution Networks",

abstract = "The proliferation of batteries, photovoltaic cells and Electric Vehicles (EVs) in electric power networks can result in network congestion. A redispatch market that allows the Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to relieve congested networks by asking the energy consumers to adjust their scheduled consumption is an alternative to upgrading network capacity. However, energy consumers can strategically increase their bids on the day-ahead market in anticipation of payouts from the redispatch market. This behaviour, which is called increase-decrease gaming, can aggravate congestion and allow the energy consumers to extract windfall profits from the DSO. In this paper, we model the increase-decrease game for large populations of energy consumers in power networks using a mean field game approach. The agents (energy consumers) maximize their individual welfare on the day-ahead market with anticipation of the redispatch market, coupled via the electricity price. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game and use an algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium for the infinite population case. ",

keywords = "Power systems, Game theory, Power generation",

author = "Amirreza Silani and Tindemans, {Simon H.}",

note = "Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.; 2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) ; Conference date: 13-12-2023 Through 15-12-2023",

year = "2023",

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AU - Silani, Amirreza

AU - Tindemans, Simon H.

N1 - Conference code: 62nd

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - The proliferation of batteries, photovoltaic cells and Electric Vehicles (EVs) in electric power networks can result in network congestion. A redispatch market that allows the Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to relieve congested networks by asking the energy consumers to adjust their scheduled consumption is an alternative to upgrading network capacity. However, energy consumers can strategically increase their bids on the day-ahead market in anticipation of payouts from the redispatch market. This behaviour, which is called increase-decrease gaming, can aggravate congestion and allow the energy consumers to extract windfall profits from the DSO. In this paper, we model the increase-decrease game for large populations of energy consumers in power networks using a mean field game approach. The agents (energy consumers) maximize their individual welfare on the day-ahead market with anticipation of the redispatch market, coupled via the electricity price. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game and use an algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium for the infinite population case.

AB - The proliferation of batteries, photovoltaic cells and Electric Vehicles (EVs) in electric power networks can result in network congestion. A redispatch market that allows the Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to relieve congested networks by asking the energy consumers to adjust their scheduled consumption is an alternative to upgrading network capacity. However, energy consumers can strategically increase their bids on the day-ahead market in anticipation of payouts from the redispatch market. This behaviour, which is called increase-decrease gaming, can aggravate congestion and allow the energy consumers to extract windfall profits from the DSO. In this paper, we model the increase-decrease game for large populations of energy consumers in power networks using a mean field game approach. The agents (energy consumers) maximize their individual welfare on the day-ahead market with anticipation of the redispatch market, coupled via the electricity price. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game and use an algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium for the infinite population case.

KW - Power systems

KW - Game theory

KW - Power generation

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M3 - Conference contribution

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BT - Proceedings of the 2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2023

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Y2 - 13 December 2023 through 15 December 2023

ER -

Mean Field Game for Strategic Bidding of Energy Consumers in Congested Distribution Networks

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Keywords

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