Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

Robbert Fokkink; Hans de Munnik

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606

Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

Robbert Fokkink^*, Hans de Munnik

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

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Abstract

We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.

Original language	English
Article number	111606
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	236
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606
Publication status	Published - 2024

Keywords

Cooperative games
Impact of boycotts
Shapley value

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10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606

1-s2.0-S0165176524000892-mainFinal published version, 434 KBLicence: CC BY

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title = "Multiplayer boycotts in convex games",

abstract = "We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.",

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AU - de Munnik, Hans

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AB - We extend the notion of boycotts between players in cooperative games to boycotts between coalitions. We prove that convex games offer a proper setting for studying these games. Boycotts have a heterogeneous effect. Individual players that are targeted by many-on-one boycotts suffer most, while non-participating players may actually benefit from a boycott.

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Impact of boycotts

KW - Shapley value

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U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111606

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85187266174

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 236

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

M1 - 111606

ER -

Multiplayer boycotts in convex games

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Keywords

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